An Application of the Hedonic Price Model to the Perth Residential Land Market*

This paper presents the results of an application of the Rosen-Freeman hedonic price model to the Perth (Western Australia) residential land market. A sample of over two thousand market transactions is used to estimate the value of residential land attributes. Major emphasis is given to those particular land attributes that are subject to public regulation and to the policy implications that follow.     

A Simple Model of Corporate Bailouts in a Globalized Economy*

In this paper, we explore how globalization influences the decision of governments to rescue inefficient domestic firms when bailouts affect firms’ markup. We develop a model of international trade in which immobile domestic-owned enterprises (DOEs) compete with foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) in an oligopolistic market. The decision to bail out DOEs leads to lower corporate tax revenues if FOEs are immobile, whereas tax revenues might increase if FOEs are mobile. Interestingly, the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to rescuing inefficient domestic firms because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of a bailout policy in terms of public good provision.     

A Study of Property Valuations in Relation to Market Prices and the Characteristics of Properties*

Using data on some 1400 properties in Sydney, Australia, the paper examines the extent to which valuations reflect market prices and the characteristics of properties. Valuations of houses are found to be poorly related to market prices. Furthermore, although valuations of houses can be explained in terms of property characteristics, they are found to be less sensitive than market prices to variations in these characteristics. Land valuations are also analyzed and it is shown that these can be explained in terms of ‘land’ characteristics including environmental factors. The paper concludes that quantitative models relating valuations to the characteristics of properties could reduce the often arbitrary nature of the valuation process.     

Residential Mobility and the Housing Market in a Two-sector Neoclassical Growth Model

The impact of residential mobility and competitive housing markets on long run growth is examined using a two-sector general equilibrium overlapping-generations model in continuous time. There is an infinity of agents with finite lives who adjust their housing consumption by moving, which is costly. We explore the model's steady-state properties, first with a free housing market, then under rent control when the market clears through restrictions on the frequency of moves. Rent controls do not just reduce welfare; they may increase the steady-state capital-labor ratio.     

A Simple Model to Teach Business Cycle Macroeconomics for Emerging Market and Developing Economies

The canonical neoclassical model is insufficient to understand business cycle fluctuations in emerging market and developing economies. The author reformulates the model proposed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007 Ahumada, I., and F. Butler. 2009. La enseñanza de la economía en México. Working Paper 672. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Google Scholar]) in a simple setting that can be used to teach business cycle macroeconomics for emerging market and developing economies at the undergraduate level. The simplified model is employed for qualitatively explaining facts such as the highly countercyclicality of the trade balance and the higher volatility of output and consumption compared with those observed in advanced countries.     

我国产权市场发展模式的辩证思考

文章详细分析了我国产权市场的业态,认为应当将我国产权市场作为整个社会经济系统中的一个子系统,以系统科学的思维通盘规划,应当尽快在"交易创新"的理念指导下,打造一个全国统一的电子化产权市场有机体,走在统一市场、统一法律、统一信息披露制度和技术标准前提下的机制灵活、均衡布局、创新发展的市场自适性发展道路。     

Optimal Protection of Property Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth*

We incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of growth and second‐best optimal policy. In this setup, the state plays two of its key roles: it protects property rights and provides public services. The government chooses policy (the income tax rate, as well as the allocation of collected tax revenues between law enforcement and public services) to maximize the growth rate of the economy. The focus of our analysis is on how weak property rights generate multiple decentralized competitive equilibria, the different properties of these equilibria, and the implications of second‐best optimal policies.     

Long‐run Lunacy,Short‐run Sanity: a Simple Model of Trade with Labor Market Turnover*

It is often argued that international trade is all about long‐run relationships. In this paper, we argue that this view is flawed when factor markets are characterized by turnover. Toward that end, we provide a simple dynamic model of trade with labor market turnover and show that the relationship between the economy's short‐run and long‐run behavior is more complex than in traditional trade models. For example, in the short run, the economy may produce outside of its long‐run frontier. We show that focusing on long‐run relationships can lead one to draw faulty policy conclusions, while focusing on its short‐run behavior restores sanity. The implication is that in the presence of factor market turnover, international trade issues can only be understood by studying the entire dynamic path of the economy. Long‐run relationships should be ignored.     

略论复杂的市场经济与"简单的"新古典范式

若参照复杂系统科学范式来分析市场经济的本质属性可发现，它无论作为开放的自组织系统，还是作为属人的演化系统，均具有复杂性。如开放性、非设计性、属人性、非均衡性、不确定性、难以预测性等等，它们莅往超出理性控制之外。新古典范式拒绝承认市场经济的这些重要属性和基本方面，只致力于揭示其均衡性的简单方面。而忽视复杂系统科学范式在现代物理学、化学、生物学和演化经济学、混沌经济学中的深入渗透，其“物理学艳羡”已陷入尴尬境地。     

A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions

This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite's preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions. The notable exception to this general picture emerges when long‐term investments are important, thus creating a commitment (holdup) problem, whereby equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful.     

A Simple Two-Sector Model of Outsourcing

Outsourcing has become an increasingly contentious subject ever since N. Gregory Mankiw remarked in 2004 that outsourcing is just another way of doing international trade, and must be beneficial to the nation, including the workers. We construct a simple two-sector specific-factor model and explore the validity of Mankiw's remarks. We find his ideas are valid when the country does not produce any outsourced factor's work at home in that both the laborers and the nation benefit. But when some outsourced factor cum intermediate good is also produced at home, the nation still benefits but the workers may suffer.     

A Model of the Australian Housing Market

We build an empirical model of the Australian housing market that quantifies interrelationships between construction, vacancies, rents and prices. We find that low interest rates (partly reflecting lower world long-term rates) explain much of the rapid growth in housing prices and construction over the past few years. Another demand factor, high immigration, also helps explain the tight housing market and rapid growth in rents in the late 2000s. A large part of the effect of interest rates on dwelling investment, and hence GDP, works through housing prices.     

Is There a Macroeconomic World of One Simple Model?: Reply*

Two questions arise from the note by Hughes: is there a choice for policy in the short term between more production and less inflation and can special factors, such as institutional arrangements for the fixing of wages, have an influence on outcomes for inflation? We will take these questions in turn.     

A Simple Model of Contract Enforcement Institutions

We demonstrate that in highly productive economies contract enforcement institutions are endogenously established, and partnership contracts correct inefficient land allocation. In less productive economies, however, such institutions are not established, and partnership contracts are not formed. In economies with intermediate productivity levels, multiple Nash equilibria exist; that is, contract enforcement institutions are established in the high Nash equilibrium whereas they are not formed in the low Nash equilibrium. In this case, institutional quality can be diverse across economies. We also prove that improvement in institutional quality reduces within‐country inequality. All these outcomes are consistent with cross‐country observations.     

A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition

This study investigates competition between health insurance companies under different financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German healthcare reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that contribution rate competition yields lower company profits and higher consumer welfare than premia competition when switching between insurance companies is costly.     

国有工业企业简单控制型的劳动关系分析

本文以四家国有工业企业为研究样本,分析了转制后国有工业企业存在的简单控制型劳动关系。这种劳动关系表现为企业目标已经转变为绩效目标,国有企业劳动关系主体等级化,经营管理者与国家保持着紧密的联系,得到其政治与经济的双重庇护,并具有绝对支配权;技术人员有明确的市场优势,却是个体化和碎片化的;技术工人虽享有传统国有企业的保护,但却呈现老龄化趋势,后继乏人;而大量低价非正规劳动力的使用使等级化的用工模式达到极端。简单控制型的劳动关系与非正规劳动力市场有着重要的依存关系,它有效地瓦解了工会的作用,并使固定工以及劳务工们在市场中碎片化。