互联网接入价格机制研究

互联网“俱乐部”产品、外部性的两面性等特征导致了网络拥塞出现的可能性。在互联网基础设施巨额固定投资的压力下,利用价格手段来实现有限网络资源的有效配置,成为目前比较可行的方法。文章通过提出基于差别产品的两部定价机制为解决网络拥塞问题构建一种简单和有效的价格体系。在垄断竞争市场下,这种定价体系不但可以实现网络外部效用的内部化,同时也能够增进社会福利。     

Competitive Neutrality in Access Pricing

This article examines the notion of competitive neutrality when setting access prices for vertically integrated bottleneck networks. In contrast to the claims of regulated firms (for example, Telstra), it is not possible to argue that access charges that involve unit prices in excess of short‐run marginal cost reflect competitive neutrality. That is, we demonstrate that in general models of downstream oligopoly, upstream prices that differ from marginal cost are not competitively neutral in the sense of placing integrated and non‐integrated firms on an equal basis.     

供应商规模、产品差异与通道费定价策略

传统理论对通道费的解释是大型零售商相对于供应商所具有的市场势力,本文借助双边市场的分析框架,将大型零售商视为一个为供应商和消费者提供交易服务的平台厂商,通过向双方分别收取通道费和零售加价来获得利润。用户数量和交叉网络外部性是影响大型零售商利润和通道费定价策略的重要因素,产品差异对交叉网络外部性的强弱有重要影响,通道费的高低则与供应商的规模与市场份额密切关系。     

电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制

电信企业能否达到纵向市场圈定目的,与实施市场圈定的企业和被圈定企业在下游市场的成本差异有关。本文通过构建一个两阶段博弈模型,分析了电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制问题。研究发现,当主导企业的下游附属企业具有成本优势时,则其通过实施价格策略性行为能够达到纵向市场圈定目的;当其处于成本劣势时,则不能通过价格行为实现纵向市场圈定。因此,规制机构在制定接入规制政策时,应根据下游市场两个企业的成本差异选择合理的接入规制方法。当新进入企业成本较低时,可采取有效成分接入定价法和由市场决定接入价格的两种接入规制方法;当两者成本相同时,可采取激励性接入规制方法;当新进入企业成本较高时,可对两者实行不对称接入规制。     

Access prices,unbundling and product variety in European Internet markets

A fundamental policy in European broadband regulation is unbundled access to the local loop of the incumbent telephone company. We present comparative static results that show as the access price decreases, the retail price decreases, the variety of plans offered by Internet service providers increases and the quantity of each variety increases when a threshold condition is met. Using data from 18 European countries from 2006 to 2012, we find empirical support for these results when Internet product variety is measured by variation in download speeds.     

网络产业Ramsey接入定价方法研究

网络产业放松规制、引入竞争的改革使得上游"瓶颈"环节和下游竞争性环节出现了"业务分离",催生了接入问题,并成为网络产业规制改革能否成功和有效竞争的关键.通过对用于指导网络产业单向接入定价的Ramsey接入定价方法的研究,得出结论:短期内,将接入服务和最终产品无差别对待的做法可能遭受到较大的实阻碍,从而整体最高价格上限规制的实施显得不太可能.因此,比较现实的做法是,在接入服务市场上,允许在位企业实施两部制(或多部制)接入定价方法.     

The Broadband Access Market: Competition,Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage

In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome.     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

Product Quality With Heterogeneous Consumers and Linear Pricing

This paper considers a linear‐pricing monopolist that conducts vertical product differentiation. Previous analyses consider customers who either have unit demand or firms who conduct nonlinear pricing. In this paper, customers’ opportunity cost of time generates a demand for quality. Customers differ in either their demand, income or taste for quality. Differences in income and taste for quality are sources of vertical differentiation. The presence of quality distortion and the variety that may exhibit it are dependent on the functional form of the customer types’ demand.     

Pricing and Access under National Competition Policy: The Case of the Natural Gas Pipeline Sector

This paper reviews the development of open access and deregulation of trunk pipeline natural gas transportation in Australia and the United States. It investigates Australian policy developments in the setting of reference tariffs for firm service, but argues that the institutional arrangements for granting third party access, and the pricing of that access on a spot or interruptible basis, are at least as important as tariffs for firm service. The paper concludes that, in the absence of an established pipeline network, pipelines may have little incentive to price their excess capacity efficiently. In this case, attempts to promote an efficient allocative outcome through privatisation and open access in Australia are unlikely to be as successful as they have been in North America.     

XBRL网络财务报告、信息质量与企业价值研究

通过选取2009-2011年的6个半年度财务报告间的746家上市公司共4476个样本的相关数据,对XBRL网络财务报告、信息质量与企业价值的关系进行了理论分析与实证检验。研究结果表明:通过使用XBRL网络财务报告模式来披露企业财务信息能够降低投资者的预测风险,从而提升企业价值。这主要表现在运用XBRL网络财务呈报财务信息能够导致企业的预期现金流量增加,其对降低企业资本成本的效果不是很明显。     

不确定性、普通商品定价和资产定价

考察普通的商品的定价理论的历史,我们发现从劳动价值论、效用理论以及新古典的一般均衡分析中的时间维度都是面向历史的,也就是说在普通商品的定价理论中,我们的思维范式是面向历史的定价模式。但是基于无套利思想的资产定价中的时间维度则是面向未来的,这种面向未来的定价范式使得我们虚拟资产的定价更多地反应了人们对虚拟资产未来盈利能力的预期,也使得资产价格表现出比普通商品价格更多的波动性。     

开放存取期刊质量评价方法与相关问题思考

近年来开放存取出版模式因其信息传播的即时性与学术资源的开放性得到了业界广泛关注,其质量评价也成为本领域研究热点.在此背景下,对开放存取期刊质量的同行审议评价法、引文分析评价法和网络计量评价法的利弊作了阐述,提出加强和改进评价工作的对策.     

开放存取期刊质量评价方法与相关问题思考

近年来开放存取出版模式因其信息传播的即时性与学术资源的开放性得到了业界广泛关注,其质量评价也成为本领域研究热点。在此背景下,对开放存取期刊质量的同行审议评价法、引文分析评价法和网络计量评价法的利弊作了阐述,提出加强和改进评价工作的对策。     

Pricing,distribution and the supply of storage

The Belgian nitrogen fertilizer cartel announces each year a price schedule which is enforced during the coming twelve months. These prices are resale prices to final users and reflect changes in costs of storage. A game-theoretic model is set up to rationalize this behavior for the case of instantaneous final demands and a large number of distributors. Habit formation in final demand is then shown to lead to even more flexible prices, while transferability over time is seen to favor more rigid prices. It is finally suggested that vertical integration into a competitive distribution sector can be profitable because it restores the possibility of intertemporal price discrimination.     

学术杂志收费会导致质量下降吗

讨论了学术杂志为实现学术交流功能如何定价和控制文章质量。我们发现学术杂志对作者收费并不会影响文章质量。中国现有学术评价机制是影响学术杂志定价和质量控制的关键,过度关注研究数量的学术评价机制导致追求利润最大化的学术杂志丧失质量控制功能,造成乱收费、文章质量低下和读者流失。     

Internet信息质量的评价

提出了迅猛发展的Internet信息存在着质量上的问题，并对如何评价Internet信息质量进行了一些探讨。     

互联网金融特征、投资者情绪与互联网理财产品回报

互联网金融投资者情绪(IFIS)和互联网理财产品回报的互动关系是亟待解决的问题,本文基于互联网金融投资者情绪对互联网理财产品市场回报独特的影响机制,创新性地分别采用四个类股市指标表征IFIS的直接作用、六个反映互联网金融特征的指标表征其间接作用,协同构建互联网金融投资者情绪指数。应用从2014年1月到2017年12月的Wind数据库和网贷之家数据库的月度数据进行实证分析,结果表明:IFIS与互联网理财产品回报之间呈负向关系,并且IFIS造成的系统性风险独立于宏观经济与其他互联网理财产品市场系统性风险,会额外通过互联网理财产品价格波动影响预期收益,得到风险补偿,这与基于股市投资者情绪的研究结果一致。IFIS对互联网理财产品回报呈现单向因果关系。还有一个有趣的发现是,与国内外股市投资者情绪相关研究的结论相反,IFIS与由类比IPO数量而采用的新增平台数量呈负向关系,这可以通过互联网理财产品市场阶段性监管政策得到解释。本文结论稳健,为研究互联网金融、互联网理财产品市场以及互联网金融投资者行为提供一个新工具。     

双寡头市场中电视媒体平台的质量水平及定价策略研究

本文以电视媒体平台为例,以竞争平台企业如何确定平台质量水平为出发点,建立了双寡头双边市场竞争模型,旨在给出双边市场价格结构的参考。本文主要运用完全信息静态博弈收益矩阵,试图找到纳什均衡。分析可得,媒体平台企业的主要收入来自于广告,其努力寻求更广泛的观众是为了拥有更多的广告收入。媒体平台企业为了吸引更多的广告商,最终会选择提高平台质量水平。     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000