产出缺口估计、泰勒规则检验及应用--基于中国1996Q4-2015Q1的实时和最终数据

本文首先基于1996Q4-2015Q1的数据估计了我国的实时和最终产出缺口,分析表明,这一时期我国的产出缺口经历了较大且持续的修正,我国的实时产出缺口和最终产出缺口之间存在显著差异。其次,利用估计的两类产出缺口对前瞻性泰勒规则进行检验,结果显示,我国货币政策对实时产出缺口的变化做出了显著反应,对最终产出缺口的反应则不显著。最后,进一步的实证检验表明,实时和最终产出缺口在“货币政策风险承担渠道”模型中也有不尽一致的表现,但无论是利用实时泰勒规则还是最终泰勒规则测度我国的货币政策立场都能够证实“货币政策风险承担渠道”的存在,即宽松的货币政策立场将使银行倾向于承担更多的风险。     

汇率波动、财政赤字与最优货币政策

通过构建IS曲线和总供给曲线,引入中央银行损失函数推导出了考虑汇率和财政赤字的最优货币政策规则。在此基础上,利用我国数据实证分析了汇率波动、财政赤字等对最优货币政策的影响。研究表明我国最优货币政策规则应优先考虑实际有效汇率的波动,其次是产出缺口和物价水平（通货膨胀率）。最优货币政策规则中产出缺口、通胀率以及名义有效汇率的权重均受到中央银行损失函数中产出缺口比重和贴现因子的影响．政府财政赤字与名义有效汇率的变动则不会受到产出缺口比重和贴现因子的影响,并且政府财政赤字水平对于均衡利率的影响不大。     

新凯恩斯主义的最优货币政策理论

从本质上看,以控制通货膨胀为目标是新凯恩斯主义的最优货币政策理论的核心.根据这一目标,中央银行必须把通货膨胀稳定在一个较低的水平上,同时缩小产出缺口;必须对通货膨胀的预测做出反应.新凯恩斯主义的最优货币政策观点揭示了中央银行的权力与职责以及实际货币政策的构成.     

利率政策环境与央行货币政策选择

央行的货币政策实施受货币政策环境制约,特别是实施价格型货币政策时,在不同的利率环境下央行可能选择不同的利率调控模式。为此,通过构建门限回归模型对货币政策调控模式与利率区制的相依性进行实证检验,结果发现：在不同的利率区制内中央银行的政策偏好和利率调控模式存在显著差异。在高利率区制,中央银行存在针对产出缺口调整名义利率的政策偏好;在低利率区制,中央银行则不存在这种政策偏好,低利率环境下货币政策效应弱化甚至失效是导致此区制中央银行不针对产出缺口调整利率的主要原因。     

实时数据与货币政策分析和评价——基于产出缺口的一个说明

本文基于1994Q1-2008Q4的数据并分别利用三次趋势和HP滤波两种模型方法估计了我国的实时、准实时和最终产出缺口,分析表明,这一时期我国的产出缺口遭受了较大而且高度持续的修正,说明我国的实时产出缺口和基于事后修正数据估计的产出缺口有很大不同。由于产出缺口是货币政策决策的重要依据,而货币政策决策总发生在实时,不能等待后来产出缺口等数据信息的修正,因此,区分实时数据和事后修正数据对政策分析和评价而言可能就十分重要。     

中美货币政策外溢效应的时变特征研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文通过建立时变参数向量自回归模型,从货币政策产出效应和价格效应两个方面,分析了中美两国利率冲击对产出缺口和通货膨胀率的时变影响动态,以此考察中美两国货币政策外溢效应的时变规律。分析结果表明,中国货币政策短期内对本国产出缺口和价格水平产生了良好的逆风向调控效果,而美国货币政策却并没有产生逆风向的调控效果;中美货币政策的外溢效应存在本质区别且表现出显著的时变特征:中国货币政策对美国产出缺口和通货膨胀率所表现出的"火车头"效应存在逐渐增强的趋势,而近年美国货币政策对中国经济整体上表现为迅速增强的"以邻为壑"效应。这些研究结果为推进中国利率市场化改革、提高货币政策宏观调控的有效性提供了有益的经验参考和政策启示。     

劳动市场摩擦与机会主义货币政策

本文在存在劳动市场摩擦的DSGE模型框架下考察机会主义货币政策的合理性。研究发现,当经济中存在显著的工资粘性、雇佣成本和搜寻匹配摩擦时,实行灵活通胀目标的机会主义货币政策在社会福利效果上优于以稳定通胀和产出缺口为目标的标准泰勒规则,并接近无约束最优政策的福利效果。因此在这些条件下,机会主义货币政策是中央银行合理的政策选择。     

论货币政策有效性理论及其在我国的实践

政策的制定和实施是中央银行进行宏观管理的基本职能之一,中央银行根据经济的运行特点实施相应的货币政策。这里隐含的意义是货币政策对经济控制是有效的。但理论界对货币政策的作用也有不同的观点,即货币中性和非中性之争。本文试从几个侧面对货币政策的有效性进行讨论。一、货币政策有效抑或无效货币政策的有效性问题,在西方货币理论文献中特指货币政策能否影响产出等经济变量,即货币是否中性,并由此形成货币政策有效和无效二种理论。货币政策是否有效,主要取决于三个条件:一是货币能否系统地影响产出;二是货币与产出是否存在稳定的联系;…     

中国货币政策调控模式演变及政策效应——基于MS-DSGE模型的研究

本文构建包含马尔可夫区制转移特征的动态随机一般均衡模型,研究中国货币政策调控模式演变进程,并对不同区制下货币政策规则的调控效应进行研究。结果发现:在经济低波动的平稳时期,央行倾向于采用同时关注通胀和产出缺口的稳定泰勒规则;在经济高波动的危机时期,央行对通胀缺口的关注不足,而更关注实际产出缺口。此外,相较非稳定泰勒规则,稳定泰勒规则的调控效应更加持久、有效,有利于实现经济增长和通胀稳定的双重目标。     

中国经济部门价格指数波动差异性研究

在整体价格指数运行的背后,部门价格指数波动显示较大差异。本文将中国经济部门分为贸易品、非贸易品和食品部门三大类别,分别考察了三部门的菲利普斯曲线属性,发现各部门价格指数对产出缺口的弹性,以及部门成本冲击的持续性和方差显著不同,在货币政策作用下调整的幅度和时间也有较大差异。这使得货币政策在关注整体价格指数运行的同时,需对各部门价格指数的相对变动做进一步研究;同时,中央银行应根据不同部门价格指数波动的参数特征设置不同的反应权重。     

Inflation,Employment, and Monetary Policy: Objectives and Outcomes in the UK and U.S. Compared

This paper explores how sensitive is monetary policy to the precise preferences of the central bank over inflation and economic activity. It does so in order to address a puzzle—which is that the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England appear to have quite different objectives and yet have adopted strikingly similar policies in recent years. I use a calibrated model to assess how policy might be sensitive to attaching different weights to inflation, output, and the output gap in central bank objectives. I find that a wide range of weights can give rise to rather similar monetary policies.     

A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

Under a conventional policy rule, a central bank adjusts its policy rate linearly according to the gap between inflation and its target, and the gap between output and its potential. Under “the opportunistic approach to disinflation” a central bank controls inflation aggressively when inflation is far from its target, but concentrates more on output stabilization when inflation is close to its target, allowing supply shocks and unforeseen fluctuations in aggregate demand to move inflation within a certain band. We use stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model to contrast the behavior of output and inflation under opportunistic and linear rules.     

Nominal GDP Targeting and the Taylor Rule on an Even Playing Field

Some economists advocate nominal GDP targeting as an alternative to the Taylor Rule. These arguments are largely based on the idea that nominal GDP targeting would require less knowledge on the part of policymakers than a traditional Taylor Rule. In particular, a nominal GDP targeting rule would not require real-time knowledge of the output gap. We examine the importance of this claim by amending a standard New Keynesian model to assume that the central bank has imperfect information about the output gap and therefore must forecast the output gap based on previous information. Forecast errors by the central bank can then potentially induce unanticipated changes in the short-term nominal interest rate, distinct from a standard monetary policy shock. We show that forecast errors of the output gap by the Federal Reserve can account for up to 13% of the fluctuations in the output gap. In addition, our simulations imply that a nominal GDP targeting rule would produce lower volatility in both inflation and the output gap in comparison with the Taylor Rule under imperfect information.     

模型不确定性条件下的货币政策决策分析

为什么中央银行在制定货币政策时往往是比较谨慎或保守的?从具体的货币政策规则的经验估计如泰勒规则看,这些货币政策比具体经济模型所要求的最优货币政策更为保守。本文从模型不确定性及决策者对不确定性态度变化的角度,运用美联储数据进行实证来解释这一现象。经过分析发现,若与降低利率的变动相比,央行更为关心产出缺口的稳定性,则央行对模型不确定呈厌恶或呈中性将会大大降低泰勒规则中的反应系数,随之产生较为保守的货币政策,若央行对不确定性呈偏好,则产生较为积极的货币政策。     

Notes on the Underground: Monetary Policy in Resource‐Rich Economies

The central bank of a commodity‐exporting small open economy faces the traditional trade‐off between domestic inflation and output gap. The commodity sector introduces a terms‐of‐trade inefficiency that gives rise to an endogenous cost‐push shock, changes the target level for output, reduces the slope of the Phillips curve, and increases the importance of stabilizing the output gap. Optimal monetary policy calls for a reduction of the interest rate following a drop in the oil price. In contrast, a central bank with a mandate to stabilize consumer price inflation raises interest rates to limit the inflationary impact of an exchange rate depreciation.     

Optimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions

This paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms' desired markups. To minimize the welfare‐reducing output gap and price dispersion between firms, the central bank controls firms' incentives and expectations by using a monetary instrument and disclosing information on the realized shocks. This paper shows that an optimal policy comprises the disclosure of a linear combination of the two shocks and the adjustment of monetary instruments contingent on the disclosed information.     

On the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators

We describe a behavior of a central bank when its measures of current inflation and output are subject to measurement errors, in a framework of optimizing models with nominal price stickiness. In our model, a central bank sets the interest rate equal to its current estimate of the so-called Wicksellian natural rate of interest. This is shown to imply that the interest rate responds to the central bank's estimates of both current inflation and output gap, as advocated by Taylor (1993). It is also shown that the noise contained in the indicators justifies a degree of policy cautiousness. A reduced-form representation of optimal policy should exhibit interest-rate smoothing, which is often found in the empirical literature on monetary policy reaction functions.     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.