人力资本投资风险与企业激励制度创新

在知识经济时代,人力资本投资能够显著增强企业的竞争力;但当投资完成,由于违约造成的劳动力流失会严重影响企业的投资收益和市场力量。文章认为,违约风险的产生与企业激励机制不完善有关。通过对企业原有激励制度进行创新和改革,加强对精神激励的重视,能够降低违约风险。     

人力资本投资风险与企业激励制度创新

在知识经济时代,人力资本投资能够显著增强企业的竞争力;但当投资完成,由于违约造成的劳动力流失会严重影响企业的投资收益和市场力量。文章认为,违约风险的产生与企业激励机制不完善有关。通过对企业原有激励制度进行创新和改革,加强对精神激励的重视,能够降低违约风险。     

人力资本投资风险与企业激励制度创新

在知识经济时代,人力资本投资能够显著增强企业的竞争力;但当投资完成,由于违约造成的劳动力流失会严重影响企业的投资收益和市场力量。文章认为,违约风险的产生与企业激励机制不完善有关。通过对企业原有激励制度进行创新和改革,加强对精神激励的重视,能够降低违约风险。     

Investment and Liquidation Incentives under Solvency Tests and Legal Capital

The European Union (EU) has been debating for several years whether to change from the legal capital regime as regulated under the Second Company Law Directive to a solvency test regime as applied in the USA, for example. Based on an analysis of direct compliance costs and capital maintenance systems in non-EU countries, the EU decided not to change the regulatory regime in the short term. This paper focuses on the indirect costs of these two regimes. The paper develops a model in which payouts are restricted by one of the two regimes and the equity holders have the choice between extending and liquidating the existing investments. I find that both regimes will create first-best incentives if their respective design parameters are properly balanced. Under a legal capital regime, however, first-best will be a random event, because accounting standards typically do not allow for the necessary interdepencies between the accounting for liabilities and investments. The advantage of a solvency test with respect to the implementation of first-best incentives diminishes if equity holders can misreport future prospects. Under the legal capital regime, misreporting incentives can be excluded by sufficiently conservative depreciation. A solvency test designed to achieve efficient decisions will always create incentives to overstate future cash flows.     

论企业人力资本投资与人力资本流动

本文将企业人力资本流动分为主动性和被动性流动两类。作者通过对一个理想的人力资本市场上企业通用性人力资本投资与专用性人力资本投资关系的研究表明，企业增加其自身的通用性人力资本投资规模客观上能解决由专用性人力资本投资所产生的“套牢”问题，并使人力资本主动性流动的概率大大增加，这对企业人力资本投资策略的选择具有重要的现实意义。     

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities. We illustrate the impact of this interaction on firm boundaries in a dynamic agency model. There may be disadvantages in merging two firms even when such a merger allows the internalization of externalities between the two firms. Merging, by making unprofitable certain decisions, increases the cost of inducing managerial effort. This incentive cost is a natural consequence of the manager's business-strategy-specific human capital.     

论人力资本投资风险

人力资本投资是近几年,也是当前研究的重点,本文以人力资本投资的含义和特点为起点,从政府、企业、个人三个角度分析了人力资本投资的风险和对策,希望对国家、企业、个人的人力资本投资有所帮助。     

契约理论视角下专用性投资激励研究述评

契约理论的发展,提出了物质资产专用性和投资激励的问题.专用性人力资本投资同专用性物质资产投资一样,也受到了机会主义的困扰,对该问题的研究形成了专用性人力资本投资的激励理论.契约理论主要包括完全契约理论、交易成本理论和新产权学派三大主要分支.文章分别论述了这三大分支各自的理论观点以及基于这三大分支理论基础上的专用性人力资本投资激励研究的现状并作出了简要述评.     

教育、人力资本投资与经济增长——广东省和四川省的比较研究

人力资本在社会经济发展中具有基础性、战略性的作用。而教育是人力资本投资,提高人力资本质量的重要途径。本文利用生产函数分析比较广东省和四川省经济增长过程中人力资本投资对经济增长的产出弹性以及贡献率,实证了人力资本是经济增长的重要决定因素,并对教育和经济发展的关系做出较为全面的解释,对四川省的经济发展提出政策建议。     

人力资本投资行为异化研究

企业人力资本投资行为是企业可持续发展的战略性资源投资行为,是企业取得核心竞争力的关键因素。本文通过搜集和分析十大创新型企业的人力资本投资数据,描述我国企业人力资本投资行为的异化现状,并找出异化原因,提出解决方法,为理论界提供新的研究数据,也为实务界提供新的决策依据。     

人力资本结构高级化与企业投资效率

基于2007-2018年中国A股上市公司的研究样本,文章系统考察了人力资本结构高级化对企业投资效率的影响。研究发现,人力资本结构高级化与企业投资效率显著正相关,且当员工监督能力强、企业-员工关系好、受劳动力市场制约程度小时,人力资本结构高级化对企业投资效率的提升作用更明显。进一步研究发现,人力资本结构高级化主要通过降低代理成本和提高员工执行效率两条路径对企业投资效率产生影响。研究结论有利于揭示企业人力资本与财务行为之间关系的内在逻辑,为企业合理优化资源配置、提高人才利用率提供了经验证据。     

人力资本投资与和谐城市建设

本文从理论和实证两方面分析了我国城市化进程中人力资本投资对促进城市和谐发展所起的作用.城市的和谐发展包括城市中人与人之间的和谐以及人与自然之间的和谐.通过分析发现人力资本投资是影响城市和谐发展的主要因素之一.人力资本投资与城市和谐之间存在着相互作用、相互促进的辩证关系.文章最后采用主成分分析法构建了人力资本投资指数,将44个城市的和谐指数与人力资本投资指数进行回归分析,发现人力资本投资对城市的和谐发展有显著的正效应.     

Yardstick Competition and Investment Incentives

This paper analyzes how firms' investment incentives are affected by yardstick competition in a situation in which the regulator is unable to commit himself to the regulatory contract before firms invest. Despite its rent-extracting property, yardstick competition does not necessarily reduce efficiency-improving investment. Considering firm-specific investment, yardstick competition is shown to increase investment incentives over individual regulation affirms. In this case, therefore, yardstick competition both reduces the regulator's informational problem ex post and strengthens the firms' investment incentives ex ante. If instead investment is industry-specific, incentives to invest are lowered by yardstick competition.     

The Political Economy of Investment in Human Capital

Investments in human capital accumulation, government consumption and total government expenditures present a striking negative correlation with capital shares. This correlation is robust to alternative specifications, lists of controls, and exclusion of outliers. Causality tests strongly support the hypothesis that the direction of causation runs from capital shares to the government spending variables. We present a political economy model of interest groups that can account for these correlations. In contrast, a median voter model predicts positive correlations between capital shares and the government spending variables.     

人力资本投资结构及其经济增长效应——基于扩展MRW模型的内生增长理论与实证研究

本文针对已有的关于人力资本投资的理论研究往往只关注人力资本投资数量而忽视人力投资结构研究的现状,把教育和健康看作是两种资本,分析了人力资本投资的具体构成形式。假设人力资本由教育资本和健康资本按照Cobb-Douglas生产技术形式组合生成。通过扩展Mankiw、Romer和Weil（1992）模型（简称MRW模型）,构建了一个内生经济增长模型。理论分析结果表明,人力资本投资结构制约着经济增长,人力资本投资数量和结构都对经济产生重要影响。最后,本文以理论分析为基础构建计量经济模型,利用1978-2004年中国29个省市的面板数据实证分析了教育资本和健康资本对中国经济增长的影响。     

高新技术企业人力资本投资收益分析

高新技术企业人力资本投资直接影响着企业的核心竞争力,对于企业在激烈的市场竞争中保持持续的竞争优势尤为重要。作为一种投资行为,企业必须对人力资本的投资和收益情况进行分析。人力资本投资主要分为:资金投资和感情投资,人力资本投资收益主要分为可计量的经济型收益和不可计量非经济型收益。     

人力资本投资的资产专用性问题及其防范机制研究

专用性人力资本投资所具有的不完全契约性及资产专用性等特征必然导致了投资双方的激励缺乏问题。文章通过构建专用性人力资本投资的“囚徒困境”模型说明了该现状,并在此模型基础上从不完全信息下的静态博弈到动态博弈再到无限次合作博弈构建了专用性人力资本投资的决策模型。通过对决策模型的分析,文章找出了防范机制的三个关键点,即：稳定的雇佣关系、充分的授权激励以及充分的流动机制。     

Investment Incentives and Electricity Spot Market Competition

In this paper we analyze investment decisions of strategic firms that anticipate competition on many consecutive spot markets with fluctuating (and possibly uncertain) demand. We study how the degree of spot market competition affects investment incentives and welfare and provide an application of the model to electricity market data. We show that more competitive spot market prices strictly decrease investment incentives of strategic firms. The effect can be severe enough to even offset the beneficial impact of more competitive spot markets on social welfare. Our results obtain with and without free entry. The analysis demonstrates that investment incentives necessarily have to be taken into account for a serious assessment of electricity spot market design.     

企业人力资本投资风险审计构想

企业人力资本投资风险审计的概念及其关键要素，如审计主体、审计方法、审计对象、审计目的等要素的界定；环境风险、预测风险、决策风险、招聘培训风险、配置使用风险、代理风险、流失风险等审计内容的构想；审计评价与报告。     

大学生就业难对人力资本投资行为的影响

当下,大学生的教育投资是否有价值可言,职业教育是否胜过大学教育,家庭教育投资又当何去何从?本文在大学生就业难的社会现状下,以家长投资主体为主要研究对象,将资助孩子上大学看成是主要的人力资本投资行为,通过问卷设计,以实证分析来清楚的展示家长投资意愿的影响因素,研究就业难是否影响了家庭的人力资本投资决策。以此对大环境下的人力资本投资提供建议。