Price Discrimination in Two‐Sided Markets

We examine the profitability and welfare implications of targeted price discrimination (PD) in two‐sided markets. First, we show that equilibrium discriminatory prices exhibit novel features relative to discriminatory prices in one‐sided models and uniform prices in two‐sided models. Second, we compare the profitability of perfect PD, relative to uniform prices in a two‐sided market. The conventional wisdom from one‐sided horizontally differentiated markets is that PD hurts the firms and benefits consumers, prisoners' dilemma. We show that PD, in a two‐sided market, may actually soften the competition. Our results suggest that the conventional advice that PD is good for competition based on one‐sided markets may not carry over to two‐sided markets.     

Behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination

We develop a model of behavior‐ and characteristic‐based discriminatory pricing where consumers are heterogeneous both in tastes and in price sensitivity. Each firm is able to distinguish between the consumers that have bought from it and those that have bought from the rival. Furthermore, each firm learns the price sensitivity of their own consumers. We show that using this additional information may yield higher profits than uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with respect to price sensitivity. We also discuss consumer surplus implications of such behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination, and we show that the impact of price discrimination depends on both the consumer type and the level of consumers’ heterogeneity.     

The Relative Price of Non‐traded Goods under Imperfect Competition*

We consider the role of imperfect competition in explaining the relative price of non‐traded to traded goods within the Balassa–Samuelson framework. Under imperfect competition in these two sectors, relative prices depend on both productivity and mark‐up differentials. We test this hypothesis using a panel of sectors for 12 OECD countries. The empirical evidence suggests that relative price movements are well explained by productivity and mark‐up differentials.     

Coupon Advertising Under Imperfect Price Information*

This paper studies sales promotions through coupons in an oligopoly under imperfect price information. Sellers can distribute either ordinary coupons, or coupon (price) advertising, or both types of coupons, at distant locations to attract consumers from their rivals' markets. A unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists where rebates and couponing intensity are always positive. In the ordinary-coupon equilibrium, prices, promotional efforts, and sellers' profits are higher than in the coupon-advertising equilibrium. However, if sellers are allowed to distribute both types of coupons, only coupon advertising is sent out in equilibrium.     

Price Discrimination in Input–Output

Modern economies are characterized by a great variety of pricing rules. Therefore, the commodities' prices and the primay factors' prices are discriminated in reality. However, in practical input–output tables, as well as in theoy, the prices are uniform and relative. In this work, an input–output model is described with absolute and different prices for final uses commodities and production's primay factors (wages, profits, etc.). In this case, the economic relationships are based on the commodities' demand curves for all the categories of final uses, and the factors' supply curves for all production's branches. In this way, we can establish the linkage and the feedback between factors' prices and quantities, and final uses commodities' prices and quantities. This is obtained by a novel interpretation of input–output, which approximates reality better.     

Europe—Past Imperfect

Pegged exchange rates imply instability in domestic economices - a reconstifuted ERM is likely to re-emerage but with special provisino to deal with 'crises'     

Spatial Price Discrimination in the Spokes Model

The spokes model allows to address nonlocalized spatial competition between firms. In a spatial context, firms can price discriminate using location‐contingent pricing. Nonlocalized competition implies that neighboring effects are not relevant to firms. This paper analyzes spatial price discrimination and location choices in the spokes model. Highly asymmetric location patterns are one outcome if the number of firms is sufficiently high: in that case, one firm supplies a generally appealing product whereas others focus on a specific niche. Moreover, multiple equilibria arise for intermediate values of the number of firms. In this case, the location patterns do not always globally minimize the sum of transport costs: asymmetric configurations distribute more efficiently the cost between firms.     

Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers

This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD). From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is twofold. First, it shows that when firms are allowed to price discriminate, the (unique) equilibrium merger gives rise to significant increases in profits for the merging firms (the ones with information to price discriminate), but has no ex‐post effect on the outsider firm's profitability, thereby eliminating the so‐called (static) “free‐riding problem.” Second, this equilibrium merger is shown to increase industry profits at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare unaffected. This then suggests that competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries where firms are expected to engage in BBPD.     

Quality of Information and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination

Recent developments in information technology (IT) have resulted in the collection of a vast amount of customer-specific data. As IT advances, the quality of such information improves. We analyze a unifying spatial price discrimination model that encompasses the two most studied paradigms of two-group and perfect discrimination as special cases. Firms use the available information to classify the consumers into different groups. The number of identifiable consumer segments increases with the information quality. Among our findings (1) when the information quality is low, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate arise in equilibrium; (2) after a unique threshold of information precision such a commitment is a dominated strategy, and the game becomes a prisoners' dilemma; and (3) equilibrium profits exhibit a U-shaped relationship with the information quality.     

When Price Discrimination Fails – A Principal Agent Problem with Social Influence

I develop a theoretical model of price discrimination under social influence. I find that social influence gives sellers the incentive to artificially create and maintain excess demand on the market. The rationing occurs mainly at the low end of the market and sometimes results in full rationing of the low end. Furthermore, the incidence of price discrimination under social influence is much lower than in the absence of it. Social influence lowers the profitability of price discrimination and incentivizes sellers to reduce product variety and to only target the high end of the market, a fact that is consistent with many empirical observations. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing Practices of Resellers in the Airline Industry: Posted Price vs. Name‐Your‐Own‐Price Models

I find that when a reseller with market power serves an airline company and only linear contracts are feasible, the airline prefers that the reseller utilizes the Name‐Your‐Own‐Price (NYOP) (a la Priceline) instead of the Posted Price (PP) (a la Hotwire) model. Essentially, the airline can better extract the surplus of the reseller if power over pricing is in the hands of numerous consumers, each bidding according to her preferences, instead of being concentrated in the hands of the reseller. Introducing two part tariff contracts or competition among resellers eliminates the distinction between the two pricing models. Either form of pricing generates the same outcome as vertical integration of the airline with the downstream market of resellers.     

差异性社会和双头垄断中的价格歧视

正则幂函数在数学上容易处理,而且包括了常数和线性函数作为特例,因而适用于研究经济行为人的差异性的有无及大小对各种经济现象的影响.继Ulph和Vulkan采用非正则幂函数的一文之后,本文通过用正则幂函数来描述消费者的差异性来改进传统的Hotelling双头垄断模型,并用新模型对双头垄断中的价格歧视问题进行了分析.     

生产者市场价格歧视问题的博弈研究

本文运用现代产业组织理论，在生产者市场信息不完全对称的条件下，对供方价格歧视策略优化与选择问题进行研究，证明了实行价格歧视的充分必要条件及最优解与次优解。可作为我国企业在加入WTO后，从事跨国经营、全面能与国际市场竞争，制定合理的市场竞争价格策略的基本理论依据。     

论跨国公司的“价格歧视、策略

国人早已关注到这一现象：一些外国的产品,在我国市场上的销售价格反而低于该产品在生产国本国的销售价格。如日本的富士胶卷和美国的柯达胶卷在我国的售价远远低于其在日本和美国的售价。对这一“胶卷现象”,有人解释是外国生产厂家占领中国市场的惯用手段－早期低价倾销占市场,后期高价赚利润;也有人解释是由于我国民族工业的支柱－乐凯胶卷的价格牵制作用。这些解释当然不无道理。     

Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Efficiency

The extant theory on price discrimination in input markets takes the structure of the downstream industry as exogenously given. This paper endogenizes the structure of the downstream industry and examines the effects of permitting third‐degree price discrimination on market structure and welfare. We identify situations where permitting price discrimination leads to either higher or lower wholesale prices for all downstream firms. These findings are driven by upstream profits being discontinuous due to costly entry. Moreover, permitting price discrimination fosters entry which often improves welfare. Nevertheless, entry can also reduce welfare because it may lead to a severe inefficiency in production.     

Modelling Regime‐Specific Stock Price Volatility*

Single‐state generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models identify only one mechanism governing the response of volatility to market shocks, and the conditional higher moments are constant, unless modelled explicitly. So they neither capture state‐dependent behaviour of volatility nor explain why the equity index skew persists into long‐dated options. Markov switching (MS) GARCH models specify several volatility states with endogenous conditional skewness and kurtosis; of these the simplest to estimate is normal mixture (NM) GARCH, which has constant state probabilities. We introduce a state‐dependent leverage effect to NM‐GARCH and thereby explain the observed characteristics of equity index returns and implied volatility skews, without resorting to time‐varying volatility risk premia. An empirical study on European equity indices identifies two‐state asymmetric NM‐GARCH as the best fit of the 15 models considered. During stable markets volatility behaviour is broadly similar across all indices, but the crash probability and the behaviour of returns and volatility during a crash depends on the index. The volatility mean‐reversion and leverage effects during crash markets are quite different from those in the stable regime.     

Second‐Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs

This paper studies equilibria of second‐price auctions in independent private value environments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for submitting a bid, and nonmonotonic equilibria in which a lower participation cost results in a higher cutoff. We show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the monotonic equilibrium is unique for either concave distribution functions or strictly convex distribution functions with nonincreasing reverse hazard rates. There exist nonmonotonic equilibria when the distribution functions are strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limiting properties of equilibria when the difference in bidders’ participation costs approaches zero.     

Refusals to Deal, Price Discrimination, and Independent Service Organizations

A number of recent Canadian and U.S. antitrust cases have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper provides a theory of these strategies and considers the welfare implications of judicial orders to supply. The refusals here are seen as necessary to protect manufacturers' program of price discrimination: Expensive repairs represent a way to select high-intensity, high-value users and charge them more. In addition to the usual ambiguity associated with the welfare effects of prohibitions of price discrimination, forcing competition in repairs can have the further damaging effect of reducing social welfare by inducing manufacturers to lower product quality.     

What Price Drug Use? The Contribution of Economics to an Evidence‐Based Drugs Policy

Abstract.  This paper presents a review of the recent economics literature in the area of illicit drug use. Particular attention is paid to the economics of addiction and the rational addiction model, the welfare economics framework for analysing the social costs of drug use, and the attempts that have been made by economists to evaluate recent or proposed policy interventions. A dominant theme in this review is the problem of poor data availability. This is particularly true when it comes to implementing the Rational Addiction model, but it is also apparent in the literature on estimating the costs of illicit drug use to society as a whole. One of the main conclusions of this review is that until recently public policy has not been particularly influenced by research carried out by economists. It is not clear whether this is because economists have had to grapple with inadequate data, and hence their conclusions are couched in uncertainty, or whether it is because drugs researchers have assumed a very limited role for economists in their analysis.     

网络环境下信息商品的价格歧视初探

本文首先阐述信息商品的特点,接着解释价格歧视的概念和分类;在此基础上又进一步分析信息商品的价格歧视现象。最后探讨网络环境对信息商品的价格歧视策略的种种影响。