Team Incentives under Relative Performance Evaluation

This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives in the repeated setting with many agents under the restriction that only relative performance evaluation is feasible for contracting. We show that the optimal contract in the repeated setting may take a different form than that in the static setting. In the repeated setting, it may be optimal for the principal to arbitrarily divide the agents into teams and compensate them based on team ranking, as it allows the principal to motivate the agents through peer sanctions. The situation draws a clear contrast to the static setting where such a strategy is never optimal. The result indicates that the concept of team plays an important role in the repeated setting even when performances can only be evaluated in relative terms.     

Inter‐Team Coordination Patterns and Outcomes in Multi‐Team Projects

We examine what kinds of patterns of mechanisms can be applied in the coordination of several inter‐related project teams. We identify three distinct coordination schemes; namely: centralized coordination, decentralized coordination, and balanced coordination. In addition, we compare individuals' perceptions on communication, coordination effectiveness, project efficiency, learning, task analyzability, and task uncertainty between the three identified coordination schemes. The results of our study extend to both theoretical and practical understanding of coordination in multi‐team projects and its relation to communication, coordination effectiveness, project performance, and learning.     

团队激励对员工绩效的影响

对于团队整体来说,要有好的业绩,就要对团队整体进行有效的激励,激励对员工绩效有重要的影响,团队激励则影响公司整体业绩。团队激励的方法是制定团队目标、评定团队等级,培养团队文化,增强团队凝聚力。     

Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms

Whistle‐blowing is an important mechanism of corporate governance. We show that whistle‐blowing has negative effects on productive efficiency by undermining the incentives within a corporate hierarchy. In our model, a top manager intends to overreport earnings; a division manager may have evidence about the intended overreporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have such evidence when the performance of his own division is low. Top management may offer a bribe to prevent the manager from blowing the whistle. This provides the division manager with an additional payoff when his division’s output is low. Therefore, potential whistle‐blowing undermines the division manager’s incentives to exert effort, which results in a less efficient outcome.     

Narrow‐Framing and Risk Preferences in Family and Non‐Family Firms

Building upon prospect theory’s concept of narrow‐framing, we explore family firms’ risk preferences across multiple decisions in corporate entrepreneurship. We argue that family firms’ decisions are less likely to be narrowly framed (more likely to be made as a group rather than in isolation) compared to non‐family firms. Examining the interaction between two risky decisions (internationalization and R&D investment) in two samples of publicly traded firms in the USA and China confirms our hypotheses. Family firms appear more likely than non‐family firms to diversify risk when making multiple decisions concerning corporate entrepreneurship. However, given inferior performance, risk taking across multiple decisions in family firms is positively related.     

Equilibrium Principal‐Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives

We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities and market competition to study the choice of the incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivity. Oligopolistic screening requires extra effort/investment from the most productive managers: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no distortion in the middle rather than at the top. The equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive relation between competition and high‐powered incentives. An inverted U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most productive managers.     

Bayesian Estimation of Willingness‐to‐pay Where Respondents Mis‐report Their Preferences*

We introduce a modified conditional logit model that takes account of uncertainty associated with mis‐reporting in revealed preference experiments estimating willingness‐to‐pay (WTP). Like Hausman et al. [Journal of Econometrics (1988) Vol. 87, pp. 239–269], our model captures the extent and direction of uncertainty by respondents. Using a Bayesian methodology, we apply our model to a choice modelling (CM) data set examining UK consumer preferences for non‐pesticide food. We compare the results of our model with the Hausman model. WTP estimates are produced for different groups of consumers and we find that modified estimates of WTP, that take account of mis‐reporting, are substantially revised downwards. We find a significant proportion of respondents mis‐reporting in favour of the non‐pesticide option. Finally, with this data set, Bayes factors suggest that our model is preferred to the Hausman model.     

Incentives of low‐quality sellers to disclose negative information

The paper studies incentives of low‐quality sellers to disclose negative information about their products. We develop a model in which one's quality can be communicated via cheap‐talk messages only. This setting limits the ability of high‐quality sellers to separate, as any communication strategy they pursue can be costlessly imitated by low‐quality sellers. We study two factors that can incentivize low‐quality sellers to communicate their quality: buyers' loss aversion and competition. Quality disclosure reduces buyers' risk, thereby increasing their willingness to pay for the product. It also introduces product differentiation, softening the competition.     

State‐Dependent Threshold Smooth Transition Autoregressive Models*

In this article, we consider extensions of smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) models to situations where the threshold is a function of variables that affect the separation of regimes of the time series under consideration. Our specification is motivated by the observation that unusually high/low values for an economic variable may sometimes be best thought of in relative terms. State‐dependent contemporaneous‐threshold STAR and logistic STAR models are introduced and discussed. These models are also used to investigate the dynamics of US short‐term interest rates, where the threshold is allowed to be a function of past output growth and inflation.     

Work‐to‐Family Spillover Effects of Workplace Ostracism: The Role of Work‐Home Segmentation Preferences

This study considers workplace ostracism as a source of stress and examines its spillover effects on the family. By integrating the work‐family interface model with boundary theory, we investigate the impact of workplace ostracism as perceived by employees on their family satisfaction by examining the mediating role of work‐to‐family conflict and the moderating role of work‐home segmentation preferences. The results from a three‐wave field survey of 233 employees in China indicate that workplace ostracism is negatively related to family satisfaction; this relationship is also mediated by work‐to‐family conflict. In addition, work‐home segmentation preferences attenuate the mediating effect of work‐to‐family conflict on the relationship between workplace ostracism and family satisfaction. The theoretical and managerial implications of these findings are discussed.     

The Effects of Personality Composition and Decision‐making Processes on Change Preferences of Self‐managing Teams

Team decision‐making on organizational and strategic changes is pervasive. Yet, little is known about determinants of teams' change preferences. We analyze how composition with respect to personality traits associated with (pro‐)active behavior (locus of control and type‐A/B behavior) influences self‐managing teams' preferences for the likelihood and magnitude of changes, and whether participative decision‐making and team monitoring as core features of group decision‐making counteract or reinforce change tendencies. Results from a business simulation with 42 teams largely support predictions. Stronger type‐A orientation increases the likelihood of (drastic) changes. Teams dominated by internal locus of control members are highly responsive to performance feedback in their change preferences. Participative decision‐making encourages, whereas team monitoring restricts tendencies towards extreme magnitudes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Counteracting Free‐Riding With Team Morale—An Experimental Study

This study focuses on a behavioral perspective to examine the detrimental effects of free‐riding on team performance, and investigates team morale as a key factor that counteracts the tendency of free‐riding among team members. Results of the empirical test imply that enhancing team morale can effectively reduce the scale of free‐riding behavior in project teams; in addition, controlling team size also provides help to constrain the undesired behavior. The two means can be carefully applied to project management during early stages of project development before the commitment of significant resources. Implications for both research and team practices are discussed.     

Evaluating Form and Functionality of Pay‐for‐Performance Plans: The Relative Incentive and Sorting Effects of Merit Pay,Bonuses, and Long‐Term Incentives

Using two‐year longitudinal data from a large sample of US employees from a service‐related organization, the present study investigates the relative effects of three forms of pay‐for‐performance (PFP) plans on employees’ job performance (incentive effects) and voluntary turnover (sorting effects). The study differentiates between three forms of pay: merit pay, individual‐based bonuses, and long‐term incentives. By definition, these PFP plans have different structural elements that distinguish them from each other (i.e., pay plan form) and different characteristics (functionality), such as the degree to which pay and performance are linked and the size of the rewards, which can vary both within and across plan types. Our results provide evidence that merit raises have larger incentive and sorting effects than bonuses and long‐term incentives in multi‐PFP plan environments where the three PFP plans are operating simultaneously. Only merit pay has both incentive and sorting effects among the three PFP plans. The implications for the PFP‐related theory, as well as for the design and implementation of PFP plans, are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

But Is It Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock‐Based Managerial Incentives

This paper points out that stock incentives do not lead to myopia unless they result in more emphasis on the short-term than would occur under an optimal contract. It shows that myopia findings relative to the standard used throughout the literature (first-best efficiency) are often reversed when evaluated relative to the relevant standard of optimal contracting. Results reported by the previous literature to be myopia often in fact have excessive emphasis on the long-term. The paper solves in closed-form for the region in parameter space which gives rise to these reversals and shows that it can be arbitrarily large .     

Team Learning from Mistakes: The Contribution of Cooperative Goals and Problem‐Solving*

ABSTRACT Although mistakes may have considerable potential for learning, previous research has emphasized that organizational members are often defensive when their mistakes are pointed out and will even continue with their present course of action despite growing costs. Recent research has shown that team‐level variables, such as psychological safety and shared mental model, can help overcome barriers to learning from mistakes. Structural equation analyses on teams working in a sample of organizations in Shanghai, China, suggested that teams were able to learn from their mistakes to the extent that they took a problem solving orientation. This orientation in turn was based on developing cooperative but not competitive goals within the team. Although competitive and independent goals induce blaming, blaming itself was not significantly related to learning. Blaming, especially when conducted openly, may hold individual team members accountable as well as provoke defensiveness. Findings empirically link the theory of cooperation and competition with the organizational learning literature. Results suggest that cooperative goals and problem solving promote learning from mistakes.     

Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real‐Effort Experiment

This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real‐effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he or she can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under‐performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his or her performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information Management and Incentives

We ask how the incentives of an agent are affected by an information management system that lets the agent receive information about the performance of a colleague before (“transparent firm”) rather than after he provides effort (“nontransparent firm”). Transparency is detrimental for incentives if the performance of the colleague provides information on the relative impact of the agent’s effort on his success probability. The findings imply that firms in which comparisons between employees play a minor role for compensation are transparent. Firms in which they play a major role sometimes choose to be nontransparent despite the flexibility gains transparency provides.     

Diagnostic Tests of Cross‐section Independence for Limited Dependent Variable Panel Data Models*

This article considers the problem of testing for cross‐section independence in limited dependent variable panel data models. It derives a Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test and shows that in terms of generalized residuals of Gourieroux et al. (1987) it reduces to the LM test of Breusch and Pagan (1980) . Because of the tendency of the LM test to over‐reject in panels with large N (cross‐section dimension), we also consider the application of the cross‐section dependence test (CD) proposed by Pesaran (2004) . In Monte Carlo experiments it emerges that for most combinations of N and T the CD test is correctly sized, whereas the validity of the LM test requires T (time series dimension) to be quite large relative to N. We illustrate the cross‐sectional independence tests with an application to a probit panel data model of roll‐call votes in the US Congress and find that the votes display a significant degree of cross‐section dependence.