An assessment of the equality of access and no-regulation approaches to next generation networks

The European Commission believes that for the regulation of next generation fixed telecommunications networks the continuity approach is preferable to the equality of access approach and the no-regulation approach. According to the European Commission, (i) functional separation eliminates discrimination and promotes competition, but should only be used as a measure of last resort because it involves various complex trade-offs, whereas (ii) the no-regulation approach fosters investment, at the cost of sacrificing competition. The article agrees that functional separation involves complex trade-offs but disputes the assertion that functional separation necessarily eliminates discrimination and promotes competition. In addition, the article also establishes conditions under which the no-regulation approach does not reduce competition.     

Telecommunications companies: One meeting with any competitor is enough to violate the EU's competition laws and result in fines

This commentary's purpose is to review how Telfort, T-Mobile, Vodafone, and others discovered that one “meeting” of any type with any telecommunications competitor could result in fines up to 10 percent of total “turnover” under EU competition law Regulation no. 1/2003, Article 23(2)(a), and to provide planning tips on how to eliminate the potential for those adverse consequences. While competition laws do not apply solely to the telecommunications industry, they do seem to affect it disproportionately. Telecommunications companies have global reach, and some of the most stringent competition law exists in Europe. Thus, all should review the most recent telecommunications ruling from the European Court of Justice, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van der Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit C-8/08 (2009). ¹ The ruling deals with whether the one meeting was “concerted activity” in violation of Article 81(1) EC.     

Net neutrality and market power: The case of South Africa

Net neutrality rules have been implemented in many developed countries, often in response to concerns over network operator market power and potential blocking or throttling of content. However, developing countries typically have significantly lower levels of internet penetration and usage. Market power in respect of internet access looks quite different given that mobile is the predominant means of connection and there are often three or more mobile operators. In South Africa, there is a quasi-monopoly in the paid satellite broadcasting market and broadband providers zero-rating content from third parties (such as Netflix) may bring about more competition. We test the main theories of harm arising in the net neutrality debate, including network operator market power and exclusion among content providers using data on the number of announced prefixes and peers and IP addresses and considering examples of bundling and zero-rating conduct by operators. We find that net neutrality rules are less likely to be required in South Africa and other developing countries and that strict enforcement of such rules could in fact hinder competition in markets for content, telecommunications networks and other related markets.     

The case against competing infrastructures

The EU Council of Ministers is considering proposals to liberalize telecommunications infrastructure. This article shows that there is no evidence that infrastructure competition in the UK has contributed to improvement in BT's performance. The author argues that the public wants and deserves choice of services and prices at all levels of telecommunications now. It should not have to wait 10 or 20 years while competitors to the old monopolies laboriously construct networks and wrestle with funding problems.     

The impact of convergence on regulatory policy in Europe

In December 1997, the European Commission published a Green Paper on the regulatory implications of the convergence of telecommunications, media and information technology sectors. The article starts with a look at the consultation process, and goes on to discuss some of the substantive issues raised. Without repeating material already evident in the Green Paper itself, it attempts to clarify the difference between Community and national approaches to regulation. Some ideas on the basis for national regulation are then explored, as are notions of the balance between the application of competition rules and sector-specific regulation in a converged environment.     

Cable TV in Austria. Between telecommunications and broadcasting

In this paper the development of the Austrian cable television (CATV) sector is discussed, focusing on its delicate interconnections with telecommunications and broadcasting, the blurring borderlines and resulting regulatory problems. The policy network is identified and recent changes in the CATV policy and strategy are highlighted, In particular, developments towards a stronger convergence within the electronic communications sector. The case study illustrates peculiarities and shortcomings of Austrian media and communications policies on the way toward a future-oriented information infrastructure.     

The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications

The recent growth of the Internet is creating markets for broadband telecommunications networks. In the past, virtually all such 'infrastructure' networks have been subject to government regulation. Two reasons advanced for this market intervention are (i) such networks constitute a natural monopoly, and (ii) to achieve 'universal service', in which all citizens have access to services. In this paper, we develop a model and estimate it using engineering data which tests if these two hypotheses are likely to obtain for broadband networks. We find that oligopolistic competition is likely to emerge for demand levels approaching that of today's cable television.     

Riding the US wave: spectrum auctions in the digital age

Given its significant technological advantages compared to analog broadcasting, digital television (DTV) will be the television system of the future. However, it requires a full replacement of analog television sets by digital receivers, as DTV can only be watched with special equipment. In order to make this transition happen smoothly without losing the analog television audience, both signals have to be simulcasted until a substantial coverage with DTV broadcasting has been achieved. Australia and the US meanwhile have established a regulatory framework to lead this transition towards the end of analog broadcasting, the so-called analog switch-off. Part of the US regime is the FCC's obligation to reassign analog frequencies after the switch-off has taken place by means of auction. Spectrum auctions, however, originate not from the US but from New Zealand, where they have been used since the end of 1989 and ever since been subject to legal and political criticism. The article outlines the principles of both the DTV and spectrum auctions regulation and shows the links between both areas of telecommunications regulation. It concludes by suggesting that the analog switch-off is a unique opportunity to reconsider current spectrum policies, as it frees large amounts of the radio spectrum that are today occupied by analog broadcasting and will soon be subject to one of the biggest frequency reassignment processes in the history of telecommunications regulation.     

Regulation and the promotion of investment in next generation networks—A European dilemma

The paper discusses the dilemmas facing European regulators (the European Commission and the national regulatory authorities) over the promotion of investment in Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs). Whereas the US has adopted a deregulatory approach and parts of Asia takes an approach linked to industrial policy considerations, the EU has largely left the process to operators working subject to a framework of regulation of access. While this may be enough to elicit investment where there is competition among networks, the incentives to invest are weaker where there is only one fixed network, as is the case in most of the territory of the EU. In reaching this view, the paper examines the prospects for competition from both wireless and municipal networks. It recommends that steps be taken fully to mobilise incentives to invest in NGANs where there is competition. Elsewhere, it may be necessary to consider a broader range of policies to create conditions for investment.     

The Evolution of “Competition”: Lessons for 21st Century Telecommunications Policy

For over a century, assessments of competition or the lack thereof have been central to how public policy treats the telecommunications industry. This centrality continues today. Yet, numerous foundational questions about this concept persist. In this paper, we chronicle how the definition of “competition” has evolved in economics and has been applied in the communications arena. The academic literature on competition hits an important inflection point in the mid-20th century with the development of “workable competition”: a term that is equated to “effective competition.” We find that while the concept of “effective competition” is central to policy formation at the FCC, the Commission’s own applications of “effective competition” are inconsistent. Given the centrality of this concept, and its inconsistent applications to date, we draw upon the seminal contributions to the development of the notion of “effective competition” to offer a modern definition suitable for application in 21st century communications markets.     

A new direction for the net neutrality debate

In recent years, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has become a microcosm of the political battles in Congress. The Democratic-controlled Wheeler Commission entitled its Net Neutrality Order “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet.” Not to be outdone, the Republican-controlled Pai Commission that overturned that Order entitled its own “Restoring `Internet Freedom.” And like Congressional pronouncements, Commissioners look to grab headlines with dramatic statements of impending doom if their policies are not enacted. We show that the untold societal damage that both sides claim have relatively little to no factual support. Outmoded distinctions between information and telecommunications services exacerbate the situation because a good deal of regulatory history is built on them. As a potential way forward toward reliance on theoretically-sound, evidence-based decision-making, the authors recommend moving away from the silo mentality of focusing on whether particular services are information services or telecommunications services (e.g., Broadband Internet Access Service (BIAS)) toward a focus on packet transmission across broadband networks. Such an approach would facilitate fresh perspectives with the objective of more collaborative, less confrontational regulatory decision-making.     

Triple play: How do we secure future benefits?

Recent technological developments make it possible to provide all telecommunications services (TV, telephony and internet) via the TV cable and fixed telephony network. Moreover, a new infrastructure based on optical fibre (to the home) is emerging in some places, which may in the future replace both existing networks. Making use of the available economic literature, the paper analyzes some of the consequences of the emergence of one electronic communications market. It focuses on two policy issues: the consequences of convergence of technologies and competition between networks for regulation in the short and medium runs, and the role of public investment in the rollout of optical fibre. It concludes that the present state of regulation may have some undesirable effects in the face of convergence and that public investment in a new general purpose infrastructure may have important advantages.     

Rollout and regulation of Fibre-To-The-Premises networks. Insights from the Spanish case

In 2017, the coverage of Fibre-to-the-Premises (FTTP) infrastructure reached 71% of households in Spain, surpassing most of the other Member States of the European Union (EU) and only outweighed by Portugal, Latvia and Lithuania. This article analyses the factors that have contributed to the deployment of these fibre networks by both the incumbent and the alternative operators that previously relied on the Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) of copper cables. An investment-friendly regulatory framework, which did not mandate access to the optical loops, and a telecommunications market comprised of dissimilar actors in the fixed and mobile segments, have been key to the deployment of FTTP networks in Spain. Additionally, based on historical coverage data, we test retrospectively, the sensitivity of geographic market segmentation to the time of the analysis and criteria for potential NGA competition. As per the analysis, the unregulated area where facility-based competition may be expected range between 23% and 61% of the premises upon the case. We discuss the implications of having mandated a Virtual Unbundled Local Access (VULA) to New Generation Access (NGA) infrastructure in 2013, examining the most likely operators' strategies. We conclude that, in the Spanish market, an earlier regulation would have reinforced inter-platform NGA competition at the expense of more limited coverage. The analysis can provide policy-makers with useful insights about the trade-off between coverage and infrastructure competition.     

Regulating audiotex: Lessons for the future development and oversight of electronic information and telecommunication services

Much can be learned from the audiotex experience regarding the future regulation of automated, recorded, live conversation and fax-based information and entertainment telecommunication services. Audiotex has raised a number of ‘carriage v content’ issues with significance for value-added multimedia services more generally. In addition, audiotex has led policy makers and practitioners alike to wrestle with the challenges posed to traditional, industry-focused regulatory regimes by the convergence of the telecommunications, broadcasting, computing and publishing industries which lies at the heart of the development of multimedia services. This paper draws heavily on events in two of the most developed domestic audiotex markets (the UK and the USA) in discussing four lessons which it is suggested both industry players and regulatory bodies take from the audiotex experience in considering the future development and oversight of electronic information and telecommunication services.     

The mixed blessing of a deregulatory endpoint for the public switched telephone network

Receiving authority to dismantle the wireline public switched telephone network (PSTN) will deliver a mixture of financial benefits and costs to incumbent carriers and also jeopardize longstanding legislative and regulatory goals seeking ubiquitous, affordable and fully interconnected networks. Even if incumbent carriers continue to provide basic telephone services via wireless facilities, they will benefit from substantial relaxation of common carriage duties, no longer having to serve as the carrier of last resort and having the opportunity to decide whether and where to provide service. On the other hand, incumbent carriers may have underestimated the substantial financial and marketplace advantages they also will likely lose in the deregulatory process. Legislators and policy makers also may have underestimated the impact of no longer having the ability to impose common carrier mandates that require carriers to interconnect so that end users have complete access to network services regardless of location.This paper will identify the potential problems resulting from prospective decisions by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), such as the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to grant authority for telecommunications service providers to discontinue PSTN services. The paper also will consider whether in the absence of common carrier duties, private carriers providing telephone services, including Voice over the Internet Protocol (VoIP), voluntarily will agree to interconnect their networks. The paper will examine three recent carrier interconnection issues with an eye toward assessing whether a largely unregulated marketplace will create incentives for carriers to interconnect networks so that consumers will have ubiquitous access to PSTN replacement and other broadband services.The paper concludes that private carrier interconnection models and information service regulatory oversight may not solve all disputes, or promote universal service public policy goals. Recent Internet interconnection and television program carriage disputes involving major players such as Comcast, Level 3, Fox, Cablevision and Google point to the possibility of increasingly contentious negotiations that could result in balkanized telecommunications networks with at least temporary blockages to desired content and services by some consumers.     

A pan-European telecommunications regulator?

Creating a single telecommunications market in the European Union is well under way, particularly with the approach of full competition after 1 January 1998. However, the regulatory framework needs to reflect the demands of the single market and the needs of industry. The European Commission has been reviewing whether a single pan-European telecommunications regulator would offer a valuable focus in streamlining the existing regulatory structure. In so doing, they commissioned Denton Hall and NERA to evaluate the needs of industry and the legal and practical approaches to the creation of a single regulator.     

Cable television and competition : Theory, evidence and policy

There is currently widespread discussion in the USA of the merits of amending legislation to allow competition in the cable television market, notably from the telecommunications companies. This article explores what economic theory can contribute to this debate, and adduces empirical evidence on the effects of competition in the cable market where it presently exists. The authors conclude that blocking entry into cable, and indeed into telecommunications markets, is likely to be poor policy, and that increased competition would foster the development of an efficient modern broadband network.     

Competition Policy under Laissez-Faireism: Market Power and its Treatment in Hong Kong

The paper describes the current competition policy framework in Hong Kong: how it came into existence, what business practices are prohibited, and how the enforcement system works. Recent cases in the telecommunications industry are used to illustrate the sectoral approach, a unique feature of Hong Kong's competition policy. We argue that a sectoral approach faces two fundamental drawbacks. First, due to having different ``rules of the game' for different sectors, the allocation of resources may be distorted in the long run. Second, since the relevant regulatory agencies perform dual roles both as competition policy enforcer and as traditional regulator of natural monopolies, the impartiality of their competition decisions may not be credibly conveyed to the public. We also address other specific problems associated with the sectoral approach, such as the exclusion of structural issues, narrow coverage of sectors, and the lack of public enforcement. We conclude that an overall competition law can better promote competition and economic efficiency in Hong Kong.     

The Pacific Islands. Policy options for telecommunications investment

The Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development (Maitland Commission) reported that telecommunication networks, including public telephone systems, are an infrastructure which aids economic development throughout the world. The Commissions objective is to bring the majority of the world's population within easy access of a telephone and, in time, other communications services. Development in the Pacific Islands region is slowed by a lack of efficient communications. The islands are spread over 29 million square kilometers of ocean and extremely vulnerable to natural disasters. Pacific Island Nations (PINs) have problems of foreign exchange, skill shortages, and poor credit terms. Telecommunications infrastructure audits showed the overall regional teledensity of 3 telephones per 100 population. The individual countries vary form 8.3 in Fiji to 1.5 in Papua New Guinea and 25.2 in New Zealand. The population of the developing island countries is in mostly rural areas where there is a chronic shortage of telephones. The constraints on radio systems can be overcome with satellite technology. The new technologies are coming on the market faster than these countries can afford to handle them. By using satellite technology and sharing facilities PINs can greatly reduce the cost of telecommunications systems. Fiber optic cables will be used to carry large volumes of traffic over major routes while satellites can be used for a array of services for the smallest PIN nation to the largest route rim country. Work is being done to standardize the equipment specifications and to develop policies for the coordination of regional telecommunications training. To further facilitate communications development in this area, changes need to be made in international funding priorities for development, and recommendations by the Maitland Commission must be taken seriously.     

FCC policy research

Since 1967 the Federal Communications Commission has conducted a programme of research and policy studies to provide guidance on long-term technical and policy problems in all areas of telecommunications. This programme is now under the direction of the Office of Plans and Policy, which undertakes studies and research projects using the skills and expertise of its multidisciplinary staff. It organizes and implements conferences and symposia on behalf of the Commission, whereby Commission staff can interact with outside experts on topics of significant policy concern. Finally, it manages the FCC's programme of contractual research studies.