A Tiger Without Teeth? Regulation of Administrative Monopoly Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law

We identify in this paper the sources and types of administrative monopoly and the possible harms that administrative monopoly causes to the Chinese economy in its current institutional environment. We review the arguments for and against the inclusion of provisions on administrative monopoly in the ambit of the Anti-Monopoly Law and explain the weaknesses of such provisions. After analyzing the clauses against administrative monopoly in some countries?? antitrust laws and two recent litigation cases on administrative monopoly in China, we detail the challenges in practicing anti-administrative monopoly law and provide a number of suggestions as to how the law and its enforcement can be improved.     

AT&T and the consent decree

For years AT&T has been accused of being too big, too powerful and too pervasive. Since the late 1960s, FCC decisions aimed at introducing limited competition in some areas of the telecomunications market have eroded AT&T's monopoly position. Then, in 1974, the Department of Justice filed its antitrust suit seeking to dismantle the Bell System. In January 1982, AT&T signed a Consent Decree requiring them to divest the local portions of its 22 Bell operating companies. In this comment, Charles Brown (Chairman of the Board of AT&T) describes the build-up to AT&T's decision to agree to divestiture, and outlines how AT&T os adapting to the new telecommunications environment.     

电信主导运营商价格压榨的竞争效应

在纵向相关市场结构下,电信在位主导运营商的价格压榨行为是一种恢复纵向垄断市场势力和获取纵向一体最大化垄断利润的策略性行为,它会严重伤害下游市场的竞争,并降低社会总福利。在反垄断执法中,判定反竞争的价格压榨行为需要分析市场结构条件和进行竞争伤害检验,本文提出了基础的归因检验规则和具体的四种不同类型价格压榨检验方法。基于上述分析,对中国电信和中国联通网络接入价格歧视行为反垄断审查的结构条件和归因检验进行了分析,并认为不合理接入管制政策是价格压榨长期存在的重要原因。     

Market Power and Technology

It is well known that market power depends on the price elasticity of demand and the intensity of competition. It is also well known that technology can influence market power through its effect on market structure. However, there is limited research on the direct link between market power and technology. In this paper, we investigate this relationship. We find that the monopoly price can be constrained to be identical to marginal cost under certain technological conditions. We also show how market power depends directly upon technology, holding constant demand conditions, market structure, and the degree of competition.     

自然垄断产业市场结构重组的目标、模式与政策实践

为促进自然垄断产业的有效竞争 ,提高经济效率 ,许多国家都对自然垄断产业实行市场结构重组政策。本文将探讨自然垄断产业市场结构重组的基本目标 ,5种主要市场结构重组模式及其特点 ,并分析一些经济发达国家和中国在自然垄断产业实行市场结构重组的政策实践。     

Agencies and directions of Japanese policy

A major objective of Japanese telecommunications policy over the past thirty years has been to modify the traditional government monopoly and create a new communications environment. Although the country's internal conflicts and arguments are rooted in its historical and cultural background, a policy consensus is now emerging. In connection with this development, the author describes relevant government agencies and then outlines the major topics of debate relating to the development of Japan into an information-oriented society.     

从竞争范式到垄断范式

本文以新经济为时代背景，综合经济全球化、经济网络化和经济知识化这三大基本趋势，从企业自身和社会福利角度对垄断效应进行了深入分析。探讨了现代垄断不同于传统垄断的重要特征，指出从竞争范式向垄断范式过渡的合理性和必然性。在此基础上，对我国企业发展和产业政策提出了若干建议。     

中国垄断性生产业管制机构的改革--以中国电信产业管制机构为例

管制机构对垄断性产业的经济效率具有重要影响.本文将分析中国垄断性产业现行管制机构存在的主要问题,具有独立性的管制机构的优越性,讨论美国和英国等经济发达国家管制机构的特点,最后探讨中国垄断性产业管制机构的设立与规范问题.     

管理腐败新特征与国有企业改革新阶段

本文在分析国有企业管理腐败一般表现的基础上，认为国有企业管理腐败呈现出从以侵吞国有资产为主的国有企业领导人个人腐败逐渐减弱、以行政垄断腐败为主的国有企业群体腐败日益严重的新特征。本文进一步提出，相对以前单纯以改善国有企业效率为改革目标的国有企业改革而言．现在必须强调在打破行政性垄断的前提下改善国有企业效率，我国进入了一个以解决垄断性产业改革问题为核心的国有企业改革新阶段。     

行政垄断制度选择的一般分析框架——以我国电信业行政垄断制度的动态变迁为例

行政垄断是政府机构利用行政权力对竞争进行限制和排斥，会造成资源配置扭曲、社会福利损失、收入分配不均以及地方保护和区域市场分割等问题。但现实中行政垄断是客观并普遍存在的．在特定的经济环境中．行政垄断作为资源配置的一种手段发挥了市场调节无法实现的作用。本文借鉴新比较经济学的社会制度选择分析框架，建立了行政垄断制度选择的一般分析框架．并以此来重新思考行政垄断制度选择问题．最后应用该一般分析框架分析我国电信产业行政垄断制度的动态变迁过程。为我国行政垄断制度的改革提供一个一般分析框架和相应的理论指导乃本文目的之所在。     

我国行政性垄断的危害——市场势力效应和收入分配效应的实证研究

垄断者所具有的市场势力一般而言将导致高价,从而造成整个社会的福利损失;不仅如此,在我国,由于行政性垄断行业较高的工资福利所导致的收入分配效应也是极大的,即它可能拉大社会各行业职工的收入差距。本文通过对1997—2005年我国行政性垄断行业的福利损失的测算,以及这一研究区间行政性垄断行业与其他行业职工收入差异的分析,实证检验了行政性垄断对我国经济社会的危害,进而强调了打破行政性垄断的必要性和紧迫性。     

信息经济时代产业组织模块化与垄断结构

信息经济时代产业组织的主导形态是呈横向一体化形态，具有合作竞争性质的模块化垄断结构。模块化垄断结构有其独特的表现形态和具有效率的制度安排．为保护这种高效的可竞争性模块化垄断结构，我们要重视其市场制度与规制制度安排。     

论经济全球化时代跨国公司垄断结构

在经济全球化时代，一国的竞争优势和影响力主要体现在其跨国公司对全球资源的支配力上。跨国公司的竞争优势来源于其垄断结构及由此带来的垄断结构利润。在全球化与信息经济条件下，跨国公司的垄断结构是有效率的，并不会妨碍竞争，这可以用新的可竞争市场理论来说明。     

Toward measuring monopoly power

Some implications of Hyde and Perloff's paper on whether monopoly power can be measured are considered. It is concluded that measuring monopoly power requires a long-run view, with a focus on the implications of product differentiation, and a reliance on accounting data.     

规制定价机制的激励强度权衡与模型设计--以我国电信产业的规制定价总体模型设计为例

自然垄断产业中，由于规制机构与被规制企业之间存在着信息不对称。价格规制政策的实施效果受到制约，而制度背景和经济发展程度是设计一个适合国情的规制定价机制必须考虑的前提因素。本文分析了我国目前的制度特征如何影响我国自然垄断产业规制定价机制激励强度的权衡。在此基础上，尝试提出适合我国目前制度特征的电信产业规制定价总体模型——基于收益率规制并加入动态激励因素的规制定价模型．最后对未来的规制定价机制做出展望．     

制度环境、激励结构与垄断行业收入规范

文章将转轨经济条件下制度及经济环境随机变动的因素引入分析中,并将收入合同作为管制者与经营者之间策略互动的一个内生结果。特定制度环境导致的垄断厂商经营者面临不确定性的扩大以及国有产权下管制者与经营者贴现因子的差异使我国垄断行业厂商经营者有更大的动力攫取制度设计中的信息租金。认为在垄断性行业改革中更多的强调绩效考核及引入专家式监管对我国垄断性行业收入规范改革有着重要的作用。     

Prices,Profits, and Preference Dependence

We develop a new approach to discrete choice demand for differentiated products, using copulas to separate the marginal distribution of consumer values for product varieties from their dependence relationship, and apply it to the issue of how preference dependence affects market outcomes in symmetric multiproduct industries. We show that greater dependence lowers prices and profits under certain conditions, suggesting that preference dependence is a distinct indicator of product differentiation. We also find new sufficient conditions for the symmetric multiproduct monopoly and the symmetric single‐product oligopoly prices to be above or below the single‐product monopoly price.     

中国电信服务业的市场化演进

本文对中国电信分拆后中国电信业市场新格局的变化，研究和分析了今后3－5年中国电信业市场化进程的走势，并对电信公司资产的多元化、民营资本的进入、打破行政性垄断，建立市场化垄断等问题进行了较深入的研究，提出了相应的对策。     

Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding and Firms’ Incentives to Collude

Collusion seems to be a pervasive problem when regional monopoly rights are auctioned to private firms. This leads us to study whether firms may collude if the regulator uses yardstick competition to simulate competitive forces, and how collusion is affected when both schemes are used. Using an infinitely repeated game framework, we find that collusion is sustainable when firms are sufficiently patient under yardstick competition. An additional franchise bidding mechanism can even help firms sustain collusion when they are impatient. When temporary monopoly rights are assigned for sufficiently long periods of time, collusion may not be sustainable even when firms are patient.     

The political economy of monopoly and competition: A critique of monopoly and stagnation theory

This paper examines critically the Kaleckian theory of monopoly capitalism proposed by Cowling (1982). The supply side of the model is shown to be incapable of providing an aggregate degree of monopoly and the neglect of inter-sectoral competition is highlighted. On the demand side, there is little indication of the source of stagnationary tendencies; it is the emphasis on collusion over conflict which underpins stagnation. The model is characterised by its emphasis on distribution and exchange at the expense of production relations, and is an inadequate representation of ‘monopoly capitalism’.