Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems

Conley and Wilkie (1993) introduced an axiomatization at the Nash extension bargaining solution defined on a domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex problems. In this paper we present a non-cooperative game which implements the Nash extension solution in subgame perfect equilibria in the limit as the discount rate applied between rounds of play vanishes.     

A Note on the Structural Notion of Information in Extensive Form Games

It is argued that the method of representing games by extensive forms and by the associated partitional information structure calls for a wider and more dynamic definition of information set, increasing the overall expressivity of extensive forms of games. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Supporting others and the evolution of influence

In this paper we study environments in which agents can transfer influence to others by supporting them. When planning whom to support, they should take into account the future effect of this, since the receiving agent might use this influence to support others in the future. We show that in the presence of a finite horizon there is an essentially unique optimal support behavior which can be characterized in terms of associated marginal value functions. The analysis of these marginal value functions allows us to derive qualitative properties of optimal support strategies under different specific environments and to explicitly compute the optimal support behavior in some numerical examples. We also investigate the case of an infinite horizon. Examples show that multiple equilibria may appear in this setting, some of which sustaining a degree of cooperation that would not be possible under a finite horizon.     

Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game

We consider a two-player asymmetric differential game of pollution control. One player is non-vulnerable to pollution, or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non-cooperative game. We characterize the feedback-Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution. We establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non-vulnerable player to control her emissions. We further use the Nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time-consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff.     

Integration of collective bargaining and formal worker participation processes: Boon or barrier to worker rights?

Many employers are extending workplace rights by allowing for more employee voice in decision making. Numerous unionized organizations have established formal worker participation processes to help achieve this end and to improve organizational performance. Based largely on theory, such processes are normally designed to operate independently from the bargaining process. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between participation and bargaining processes, and the effect of this relationship on workplace satisfaction. A total of 712 Midwest union officials were surveyed, and the results indicate that the processes tend to become integrated in the workplace. Further, union officials' workplace satisfaction was greater where formal worker participation is institutionalized within the bargaining process.     

A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games

Two players play a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information. Before the game starts one player receives a private signal that depends on the realized state of nature. The rules that govern the choice of the signal are determined by the information structure of the game. Different information structures induce different values. The value-of-information function of a game associates every information structure with the value it induces. We characterize those functions that are value-of-information functions for some zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information.     

Coordinating under incomplete information

We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence. We thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Hans Carlsson, Ani Guerdjikova and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Part of this work was done while Asheim was visiting Cornell University, which hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.     

例谈探究式教育游戏设计

探究式教育游戏是以游戏为载体,以网络为平台,将知识以游戏任务的形式融入主题游戏并通过交互策略来引导学生探究思维的学习软件。本文以"乐中学"游戏为例阐述了探究式教育游戏的设计流程、基本结构以及应注意的问题。     

Small change,big impact? Organisational membership rules and the exit of employers' associations from multiemployer bargaining in Germany

German employers' associations first introduced a so‐called “bargaining‐free” membership (BFM) category in 1990, giving companies the option to join and access services while avoiding the obligations arising to regular members from industry‐level collective agreements with unions. To explain how this phenomenon contributes to change in the German political economy, we investigate why some associations offer their members BFM status whereas others have refused to introduce this option. Controlling for influences such as size and industry, our multivariate analysis of survey data shows that four sets of influences are positively associated with BFM: the role of courts' judicial decisions as “door openers,” structural characteristics of diverging business environments, the evaluation of multiemployer bargaining by the leadership of the association, and the strategic choices of associations.     

论游戏与儿童创造力的培养——让儿童回归“田野游戏”

城市化进程、功利化教育理念、科技的发展,让传统的游戏方式逐渐简化成室内智能游戏的特殊模式,违背了儿童的成长和创新性培养的要求。基于这一现象,为了提高儿童创造力,笔者提出了要让儿童回归真实、自然、实践的"田野游戏"。在游戏中,促进儿童生存技能和智力的双重训练,从而培养儿童的创造力和创新精神。