逃税规模的衡量

逃税造成了政府财政收入的减少,因而政府理所当然地关心社会中的逃税程度,而且逃税程度的大小也代表了一国税务机关税收征管成效的高低.因此从这个意义上讲,对逃税规模的衡量就显得必要了.不过,由于纳税人的逃税行为是隐蔽的,故很难对逃税规模进行直接有效的衡量,尽管如此,还是存在一些方法从侧面去测算一国的逃税规模的.     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.     

论偷税故意

在税收执法实践中,认定偷税是否应考虑行为人的主观故意性一直是争议最为激烈,且至今没有解决的问题之一。这一问题得不到解决,不但会对纳税人造成不公平,同时也会极大地损害税务机关自身的形象,侵蚀纳税人对税法的遵从度和对税务机关的信赖度。如果从习惯法来理解偷税的故意性,从偷税与偷税罪的关系以及近期国家税务总局一些相关的规范性文件来进行分析,可以拓宽解决这一问题的思路。     

电子商务环境下的国际逃税与避税

由于电子商务的迅速发展和各国税收立法的相对滞后,电子商务逃、避税问题日益突出。各国根据电子商务环境下的国际逃、避税的新特点,在原有防范措施的基础上,采取了一些新的措施,如加强税务机关自身信息化建设、提高网络技术、推行电子商务税收登记制度、从支付体系入手解决电子商务税收的征管问题,加强国际间的交流与合作等。     

Tax Havens,Tax Evasion and Tax Information Exchange Agreements in the OECD

Using data on Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), we find a positive relationship between higher tax burden and OECD residents’ tax evasion, especially via tax havens. Contrary to established investor preference for certain country characteristics, we find they are less important to tax evaders who value privacy and want to remain undetected by their home tax authorities. We find very limited evidence that OECD Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAS) reduce tax evasion, controlling for other determinants of overall OECD FPI. Without the US in the OECD sample, tax havens play a lesser role and OECD policies appear to make a marginal impact.     

刍议“逃税罪”案件行政程序与刑事程序的关系

随着《中华人民共和国刑法修正案(七)》的颁布实施,偷税罪被逃税罪取而代之。本文分析了行政程序与刑事程序的关系,并对逃税罪进行了法律解释,提出了行政处罚前置是符合逃税罪立法与司法实践应有的程序选择。     

税务风险、税收规避与企业资本结构调整

基于上市公司数据构建双重差分策略,研究税务风险对企业资本结构调整的影响.结果显示:企业税务风险的下降会减缓企业资本结构调整,平均而言,处理组企业的资本结构降低了约2％,且这一关系在动态条件下依然存在;在规模较小、市场化程度较高的企业,这种抑制效应越明显;税务风险的降低会影响企业避税,进而减缓资本结构的调整速度.因此,完善企业税务风险管理,有助于"稳杠杆"战略的顺利实施.     

Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach

Traditional economic theory assumes rational individuals with stable preferences who, given an array of options and probabilities, maximize their expected utility. However, experimental research finds that individuals make systematic mistakes when attempting to maximize their expected utility. The economic psychology approach includes aspects of the traditional economic approach and the psychological approach that emphasizes values, attitudes, norms, conformity and morals.This paper investigates equity theory and tax evasion using the framework of prospect theory pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman. We design an investigation to identify if individual behavior follows the usual results of prospect theory, given a scenario that frames a perception of inequity. The investigation frames a scenario to invoke a controlled tax regime. The frame varies according to which inequity is being measured, exchange or social. Once the scenario is established, a questionnaire is designed to determine how the individual responds when filing taxes. The responses to the control questions are consistent with prospect theory. However, in general the responses to the framed questions, depicting inequity, are more consistent with expected utility theory.     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

结合逃税的最优税收理论研究评述

最优税收理论主要研究税制的最优设计问题,而逃税理论主要致力于政府的最优执行问题,最近出现了将这两种理论结合起来的研究趋势。结合逃税的最优税收理论,包括最优所得税和最优商品税等内容,研究结果表明:结合逃税的最优税收理论并不能得出比标准最优税收理论更为明确的政策结论,其还有待于进一步的研究和发展。     

Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India

This paper evaluates effects on tax compliance of simple reforms in personnel policy in the Indian income tax administration. Taxpayers voluntarily disclosing higher incomes are currently assigned to special assessment units. To avoid this, high income taxpayers have an added incentive to understate their incomes. Empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis is found. It explains spillover effects of enforcement efforts across assessment units. We incorporate these spillovers in estimating revenue effects of increased support staff. The results imply significant compliance gains would accrue from expanded staff employment and changes in assignment procedures for staff and taxpayers.     

偷税罪“二次行政处罚”犯罪成立标准的立法缺陷及其完善

我国刑法对于偷税罪"二次行政处罚"犯罪成立标准的规定存在诸多立法缺陷,而且不符合税收征管实际,在实践中难以操作。应对此进行相应的修改予以完善:明确规定"二次行政处罚"的时限与数额;将扣缴义务人因偷税被税务机关二次行政处罚又偷税的行为犯罪化。     

Taxpayers' Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: A Critique and a New Measure

The work of Feldstein (1995 and 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in economists' approaches to analysing taxpayers' behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of tax non‐compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. In this context, measures of ‘tax gaps’ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures of tax non‐compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper, we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which ignore the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of non‐compliance. This potentially applies both to indirect taxes (such as the ‘VAT gap’) and direct (income) taxes. Further, where these conventional tax gap measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax compliance rate, they will likely have a tax‐base‐reducing effect and hence generate a smaller increase in realised tax revenues than would be anticipated from the tax gap estimate.     

Tax Amnesties and Income Tax Compliance: The Case of Spain

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the long‐term impact on Spanish individual income tax (IRPF) compliance of the amnesty measures granted in 1991 within the framework of the 1988–91 income tax reform programme. To that end, we combine time‐series techniques with outlier detection methods and the Bai and Perron (1998) test for the endogenous estimation of structural breaks. On the basis of the analysis of the monthly IRPF tax collection series from 1979 to 1998, we find that the amnesty had no effect on tax collection in either the short or the long term. By contrast, we find evidence of the permanent positive impact caused by the legislative and administrative measures linked to the IRPF reform process begun in 1988.     

Transparency and Tax Evasion: Evidence from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)

We examine how U.S. individuals respond to regulation intended to reduce offshore tax evasion. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requires foreign financial institutions to report information to the U.S. government regarding U.S. account holders. We first document an average $7.8 billion to $15.3 billion decrease in equity foreign portfolio investment to the United States from tax-haven countries after FATCA implementation, consistent with a decrease in “round-tripping” investments attributable to U.S. investors’ offshore tax evasion. When testing total worldwide investment out of financial accounts in tax havens post-FATCA, we find an average decline of $56.6 billion to $78.0 billion. We next provide evidence of other important consequences of this regulation, including increased expatriations of U.S. citizens and greater investment in alternative assets not subject to FATCA reporting, such as residential real estate and artwork. Our study contributes to both the academic literature and policy analysis on regulation, tax evasion, and crime.     

When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information,Peer Effects and Tax Compliance

In this paper, we suggest that individuals’ tax compliance behaviours are affected by the behaviour of their ‘neighbours’, or those about whom they may have information, whom they may know, or with whom they may interact on a regular basis. Individuals are more likely to file and to report their taxes when they believe that other individuals are also filing and reporting their taxes; conversely, when individuals believe that others are cheating on their taxes, they may well become cheaters themselves. We use experimental methods to test the role of such information about peer effects on compliance behaviour. In one treatment setting, we inform individuals about the frequency that their neighbours submit a tax return. In a second treatment setting, we inform them about the number of their neighbours who are audited, together with the penalties that they pay. In both cases, we examine the impact of information on filing behaviour and also on subsequent reporting behaviour. We find that providing information on whether one's neighbours are filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, this ‘neighbour’ information does not always improve compliance, depending on the exact content of the information.     

Response of Tax Credit Claims to Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment in Chile

Diesel in Chile receives different tax treatments depending on its use. If diesel is used in industrial activities, the diesel taxes paid can be fully used as a credit against VAT, but if it is used in freight or public transportation – basically trucks and buses – only a fraction of diesel taxes paid can be claimed as a tax credit for VAT payments. As a result of this different tax treatment, firms have incentives to use ‘tax‐exempted’ diesel in activities requiring ‘non‐tax‐exempted’ diesel. This tax wedge therefore generates an opportunity for tax evasion, especially for firms with multiple economic activities, one of them being transport. In this paper, we analyse the impact of a tax enforcement programme implemented by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (IRS), where letters requiring information about diesel purchases and use and vehicle ownership were sent to around 200 firms in 2003. Using different empirical strategies to consider the non‐randomness of the selection of firms, the empirical results show consistently that firms receiving a letter decreased their diesel tax credits by around 10 per cent.     

Tax Evasion,Investment Shocks,and the Consumption Puzzle: A DSGE Analysis with Financial Frictions

Recent studies identify Marginal Efficiency of Investment (MEI) shocks as important drivers of the business cycle. However, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models struggle to explain macroeconomic comovements between consumption and the key real variables after a MEI shock. Moreover, engaging in tax evasion practices is often an answer to financial constraints, which have been recognized as important determinants of cyclical fluctuations as well. We use a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model, that combines tax evasion with financial frictions, to simulate a MEI shock. We show that entrepreneurial tax evasion can solve the comovement problem to a fair extent.     

缴纳税款后又骗取出口退税行为的性质之辨

缴纳税款后又骗取出口退税行为应当定性为骗取出口退税行为。学界对此行为性质产生争议的根本原因在于我国刑法第204条第2款的规定立法本意有误;违背犯罪构成理论,混淆了偷税罪与骗取出口退税罪的界限;违背罪刑相适应原则;违背禁止分割评价的定罪原则;违背罪数理论;是立法随意的表现。本款规定既不科学也不合理,应予删除。