The Political Economy of Greater China

Since 1979, China has made tremendous progress in its economic reforms, and in these developments Hong Kong and Taiwan have beeen most deeply involved, so much so that the three economies have been collectively called ‘Greater China’. This article investigates the integration process from the perspective of the political economy, pointing out the promises as well as the problems. The author is cautiously optimistic about the future, provided that far-sightedness can prevent any dominant urge for short-term profits and political compulsion. The logic of economic interests seems power enough to ensure that even the more formidable political barriers can eventually be overcome. As a result, Greater China looks likely to be increasingly open to the rest of the world.     

The Political Economy of State-Owned Lotteries

An incomplete contracts approach is applied to analyse the lottery industry. It is argued that lottery services are more efficiently provided by private enterprises than by public enterprises, even if the addictive potential of lotteries is taken into account and government is assumed to be benevolent. However, in most countries, state-owned enterprises provide lottery services. In Germany, the 16 states each own a monopoly lottery-providing enterprise. This apparent puzzle is resolved by dropping the assumption that members of government are perfectly benevolent. The narrow self-interest of members of the state governments and other influential stakeholders in Germany helps to explain the persistence of the current structure of the lottery industry.     

Intellectual Property Rights in China: The Changing Political Economy of Chinese–American Interests

We review the evolution of modern Chinese intellectual property right (IPR) laws and enforcement and explore economic and political forces involved in international conflicts over Chinese IPR protection. Our analysis considers why the US and China moved from conflict to cooperation over intellectual property rights. Structural and institutional aspects of the political economy of IPRs within each country are considered, and data on Chinese‐US trade in intellectual property‐intensive goods are examined. We conclude that although enforcement of IPRs within China continues to be relatively weak, Chinese IPR institutions are converging on those in the OECD nations.     

The Political Economy of Distribution Systems:

The political economy paradigm is a unifying framework that has fostered a richer understanding of distribution systems. This essay outlines theoretical developments and empirical trends within the internal polity and economy of marketing channels. Directions for research are outlined.     

The Political Economy of Distribution Systems:

The policital economy paradigm is a unifying framework that has fostered a richer understanding of distribution systems. Dahlstrom and Dwyer (1992) recently outlined theoretical developments and empirical trends within the internal polity and economy of marketing channels. In this follow-up article a network approach supports the development of illustrative propositions to advance simultaneous assessment of the political and economic components of multiparty exchange systems.     

The Political Economy of Multinational Conglomerates in Nigeria

Abstract

The paper analyzes the operations of the multinational conglomerates so as to determine the impact of their operations on the Nigerian economy, and especially on the manufacturing sector. It also investigated the possible problems hindering their operations. In an attempt to accomplish these objectives, we employed both survey and investigative research methods using regression modeling and estimation. The analysis of the secondary evidence indicates that, generally, the investment activities of conglomerates are found to positively and significantly relate to the output performance of the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy. The primary data analysis confirms this finding. On the other hand, they are seen to exploit natural resources and the workforce to the detriment of the country, and by repatriating all available funds and profits to overseas economies, the economy is starved of needed funds. However, their positive contributions to the Nigerian economy were seen to outweigh their negative contributions. This is particularly true of the manufacturing sector. Two perennial problems confronting the conglomerates in their investment activities relate to environmental hostilities and communal disturbances/social upheavals. Other problems relate to political risks, instability and impasse, and unstable economic climate.     

美国经济结束不稳定复苏状态

<正> 美国商务部去年12月23日公布的报告显示,去年第三季度美国经济以年率计算的增长速度最终确定为8.2%,与一个月前公布的数字相同,为1983年第四季度以来的最高记录。商务部同时对一些重要数据进行了修订。报告说,美国经济增长的主要动力个人消费开支第三季度的增长速度为6.9%,高于上月公布的6.4%,是1986年第三季度以来的最大值。其中,消费者用于购买耐用品和非耐用品的开支分别增长了28%和7.3%,用于购买服务的开     

美国经济放缓波及亚洲

<正> 世界著名的路透社近日先后公布对亚洲主要国家和地区今明两年国内生产总值(GDP)的增长预测。由于受到以美国为主的全球经济放缓的影响,今年亚洲主要国家和地区的 GDP 增长率将显著下降,分别降至7.7%至2.76%不等。韩国、新加坡、马来西亚和中国台湾等电子产品与半导体出口导向的国家和地区,因受全球电子业不景气及库存高升所累,出口都将不如以往强劲,从而拖累 GDP 的增长。印尼和菲律宾两国的经济表现均将受到国内政局的冲击。中国中国2001年国内生产总值(GDP)平均预测增长7.76%,2002年预计将增长8.0%。     

The New Political Economy of EU State Aid Policy

Despite its importance and singularity, the EU’s state aid policy has attracted less scholarly attention than other elements of EU competition policy. Introducing the themes addressed by the special issue, this article briefly reviews the development of EU policy and highlights why the control of state aid matters. The Commission’s response to the current economic crisis notably in banking and the car industry is a key concern, but the interests of the special issue go far beyond. They include: the role of the European Commission in the development of EU policy, the politics of state aid, and a clash between models of capitalism. The special issue also examines the impact of EU policy. It investigates how EU state aid decisions affect not only industrial policy at the national level (and therefore at the EU level), but the welfare state and territorial relations within federal member states, the external implications of EU action and the strategies pursued by the Commission to limit any potential disadvantage to European firms, and the conflict between the EU’s expanding legal order and national.     

自愿出口限制的经济学困惑及政治经济学解释

与其他的贸易保护措施相比,从经济学的角度解释自愿出口限制安排,特别是进口国为什么要使用自愿出口限制而不是关税和配额似乎存在着一定的困难。本文在解析自愿出口限制的诸多经济学困惑中寻找到了实施自愿出口限制的政治经济学答案。     

Bringing Political Economy Back in

Like so many of the fields that have flourished in history departmentsin recent years, business history has an uneasy relationshipwith political history. When business history first emergedin the United States as a separate field in the 1920s, its foundersstressed the importance of lavishing on business records thesame reverence that political historians accorded the personalpapers of lawmakers. Only in this way, business historians assumed,would it be possible to convince other historians of the centralityof business leaders—and, more broadly, of economic institutions—tothe making of the nation. Much has changed since the 1920s. Yet the adversarial relationshipof business historians toward political history persists. Thismindset is evident     

The Political Economy of Basle II: The Costs for Poor Countries

The financial crises of the 1990s triggered many changes to the design of the international financial system. We use the formulation of the new Basle capital accord for banks (B‐II) to illustrate that, while much affected, developing countries have had very little influence on this so‐called new international financial architecture. We argue that B‐II has been formulated largely to serve the interests of powerful market players, with developing countries being left out. At the same time, we demonstrate that B‐II is likely to raise the costs and reduce the supply of external financing for developing countries in particular. Furthermore, and importantly, B‐II may well increase the pro‐cyclicality of external financing, an unfortunate outcome given that developing countries already face much volatility in terms of capital flows. Overall, while B‐II may indeed compensate for a range of weaknesses of Basle I, the exclusionary policy process and costs which B‐II imposes on developing countries require a re‐think of the way in which crucial elements of financial governance, such as the Basle capital accords, are developed and implemented.     

The Political Economy of Reforming the Anti‐dumping Laws

In the idealised economic world in which economists usually begin their theoretical analyses, the first‐best international policy for dealing with dumping is to eliminate the economic distortions that make dumping possible, e.g., tariffs, subsidies and monopoly power, and deal with relevant equity considerations through lump‐sum income redistribution. But this combination of policies generally is not politically feasible, and the use of second‐best policies is the only realistic option. Consequently, for academic economists seeking achievable AD reform, the most promising approach may be to work toward the elimination of the many current administrative practices that unfairly injure groups not directly involved in the petitioning process but accept that there can be practical circumstances where the equity concerns of petitioners trump overall efficiency objectives.