An experimental study of intra- and international cooperation: Chinese and American play in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

We study whether intra- and international groups have different cooperation rates in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. We report on an experiment in which university students in China and America engage in a single iteration of the game, complete belief elicitation tasks regarding their counterparts' play, and complete a survey including attitudinal measurements regarding their in- and out-group attitudes. We find that Chinese overall cooperation rates are less than American ones. Further, female participants are more cooperative than males. With respect to international cooperation, Chinese participants accurately estimate the likelihood of cooperative behavior of their American counterparts, while Americans overestimate the same likelihood of their Chinese counterparts. Our results further show that Chinese participants cooperate more conditionally than American ones. Finally, we find a more positive attitude towards one's living country is related to less international cooperative behavior, and a more positive attitude towards the other country is related to more international cooperation.     

电网建设项目内部主体利益博弈与激励机制分析

通过博弈混合策略纳什均衡求解,对电网公司与承包商或监理单位之间的利益博弈关系进行了分析,解释了不确定环境下的多元利益相关者的合作博弈模型的可操作性;针对电网建设项目存在的信息不对称,同时借鉴委托代理理论的激励约束机制基本分析框架,建立了信息不对称条件下的最优激励与监控约束模型,并探讨分析了激励机制与监控约束机制在电网建设项目委托代理关系中的作用。     

基于演化博弈的民航干支线联合运营策略研究

为实现我国“干支通,全网联”航空运输服务网络建设,促进我国干支线航空公司协同发展,给人们的出行创造便利条件,基于演化博弈理论,通过构建干线航空公司和支线航空公司两方之间的演化博弈模型,分别对干线航空公司、支线航空公司、干支联运系统的稳定条件和稳定性进行讨论,研究博弈双方在演化过程中的策略选择。研究发现,系统合作策略的选择与鞍点的位置有关。当鞍点的位置越接近合作策略时,博弈双方选择不合作的概率越大,则博弈双方更倾向于选择不合作策略;当鞍点的位置越接近不合作策略时,博弈双方选择合作的概率越大,博弈双方则更倾向于选择合作策略。     

政府激励下的建筑废弃物资源化博弈研究

针对中国建筑废弃物持续增多、建筑原料匮乏等问题，运用动态博弈理论，构建建筑企业与建材企业的双寡头博弈市场，建立适应度函数并进行求解，分析政府奖惩制度对博弈双方策略选择的影响，并利用MATLAB软件进行仿真模拟。结果显示：政府因素在促进资源化发展的过程中具有重要作用；不同的奖惩力度对博弈双方策略的选择、演化速度影响不同；合适的政府奖惩力度对资源化发展具有推进作用，单一一方实现资源化会对另一方产生阻碍作用。因此政府需要从补贴和惩处两个方面同时加强管控，才能促使建筑企业和建材企业均选择资源化的策略，从而实现资源化发展。     

新能源装备智能制造协同演化研究

新能源装备制造向智能制造转型过程中，企业、用户和研发机构形成的互联协同是产业智能化转型的关键。构建新能源装备制造企业、用户和研发机构的三方演化博弈模型，通过算例分析参与方协同策略的演化特征，探究协同智造的经济可行性及引导协同智造形成的产业组织原理。研究表明：新能源装备制造商通过整合社会智能制造资源提升产业智能制造协同度，对于智能制造体系向完全协同演化具有积极作用；新能源装备智能制造核心技术在应用中的成熟性影响协同智造的形成；智造化转型初期，政府提供适当的扶持政策是帮助制造商在智能制造技术不成熟时期协同演化平稳过渡的有效手段。根据研究结论提出3个新能源装备智能制造协同情景方案并验证其有效性，为促进产业协同体系的形成提供政策建议。     

网络权力、资源占用与合作行为——组织间信任与标杆效应的调节作用

企业间网络化合作已成为经济实践的新常态,网络权力配置是合作行为的重要决定因素。通过理论分析构建网络权力、资源占用与合作行为的研究模型并提出研究假设,运用具有典型网络合作特征的315 家高科技企业数据进行实证检验,探索网络权力配置对合作行为的作用机理。结果表明：集权式权力配置正向影响合作行为,而分权式配置并不对合作行为产生显著影响;资源占用在集权式权力配置与合作行为之间起部分中介作用;组织间信任不仅正向调节资源占用对合作行为的影响,而且对资源占用的中介效应同样起正向调节作用;标杆效应在资源占用与合作行为之间起正向调节作用,但并不对资源占用的中介效应产生调节。研究成果对企业网络权力配置实践具有重要的指导作用。     

Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers: A Comment

This note shows that Proposition 5 in Chang and Weisman (Southern Economic Journal 71:821–36) contains a mistake. Although not affecting the paper's basic intuition, our result shows that the parental transfer under the noncooperative game could be less than under the cooperative one if the children oversupply family services.     

Asymmetric Information,Bargaining, and Comparative Advantage in Trade Relationships: An Interactive Game

The concept of comparative advantage is a fundamental tool in economics. Yet, it is a concept that new students of economics frequently find challenging to grasp. In this interactive classroom game, I highlight the three essential lessons of comparative advantage: (i) individuals can have a comparative advantage (and thus benefit from specialization) in an activity despite not having an absolute advantage, (ii) the gains from specialization are greatest when individuals have the most heterogeneous skill sets, and (iii) the extent of each individual's share of the gains from specialization is often left to negotiation, with asymmetric information playing an influential role. This classroom game allows each player to possess a unique production function, thus better resembling the diverse pool of potential trade partners that characterizes real life.     

创业激励下创业家与风险投资的合作博弈

风险投资与创业家的合作博弈,是一种理想的状况,需要资本市场的良好环境。本文认为,创业板的设立将不仅是对中国多层次资本市场的重大改进,更重要的是在企业层面对创业投资的激励,这种创业激励将全方位地推动中国科技创新活动和创业投资活动。     

A dynamic common property resource problem with amenity value and extraction costs

An analytically tractable differential game is presented that describes the exploitation of a common-property resource by finitely many competing players. The resource stock has an amenity value and there are positive extraction costs. We derive both the cooperative solution and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative game. After a comparative analysis of the equilibrium strategies and payoffs with respect to all model parameters, we study the effect of a unilateral extraction restriction and discuss the design of a revenue-neutral tax/transfer scheme that supports the cooperative solution.     

电网科研企业研发策略博弈选择及专利交易增值期权分析

电网科研企业目前还是以自主研发为主,但企业与企业之间的交流也愈发频繁,促使合作研发效率也在不断提高。合作研发能够互补长短,资源利用效率更高,也将成为未来的重要研发策略。研发项目具有不确定性、不可逆性和竞争性的特点,本文结合这些特性,应用博弈理论,对两个企业在自主研发与合作研发的博弈问题提出了均衡分析的解决办法。此外,针对电网企业专利价值难以体现的问题,本文结合了实物期权理论,研究了专利进入技术市场进行交易的时机问题,顺利实现电网企业专利的增值。     

一种改进的权重信息不完全多目标决策方法

针对权重信息不完全的多目标决策问题,提出了在模糊约束条件下求解局部最优权,空间距离函数确定全局最优权的决策方法。首先利用模糊线性规划求解在模糊约束条件下的各方案最优权向量;然后利用各方案最优权向量与全局最优权向量距离和最小确定全局最优权向量;最后同其他方法进行比较,结果验证本方法可靠性更高,适合对权重精度要求较高的决策问题。     

Cournot竞争条件下异质企业最优创新技术获取策略分析

针对现实经济中企业创新技术获取问题,首先运用包括创新及产出阶段的博弈模型分析了合作创新模式;然后构建了包括创新、许可及产出阶段的博弈模型,并根据此模型重点分析了技术许可模式;最后通过比较分析得出企业最优的技术获取策略。研究表明：当创新为非显著水平且产品差异较小时,技术许可模式下通过两部制策略许可将是最优的;当创新为显著水平或产品差异较大时,合作创新模式下的合资企业或卡特尔是最优的。     

Buyer‐Induced Exclusive Dealing

Large retailers may exercise buyer power in their interactions with manufacturers. This article explores the use of exclusive dealing arrangements by a monopoly retailer when purchasing a differentiated product from competing manufacturers. Interactions among the firms are modeled as a bargaining game. When consumers' brand preferences are weak and/or when one brand is preferred by a significant majority of consumers, it is more profitable for the retailer to negotiate an exclusive dealing arrangement with one of the manufacturers than to distribute both products. Also, it is more profitable for the retailer to induce exclusive dealing if the manufacturer of the excluded brand has a lot of bargaining power when negotiating with the retailer. If buyer‐induced exclusive dealing reduces the retail price of the exclusive brand in order to encourage “brand switching” by consumers who favor the excluded brand, the practice may increase consumer welfare and even total welfare.     

国产车规级芯片合作研发演化博弈分析

为解决国产车规级芯片合作研发的问题,建立新能源汽车生产企业、芯片研发企业和地方政府为博弈参与主体的演化博弈模型,根据收益矩阵得到各参与主体稳定策略的约束条件,并仿真模拟各主体在不同参数下的动态演化过程。研究发现,各主体行为相互影响且在一定条件下可收敛到理想的稳定策略,主体的初始参与意愿、合作的利益分配以及政府对企业的合作激励等均是影响车规级芯片合作研发的重要因素。     

Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers

This paper develops a noncooperative Nash model in which two siblings compete for their parents' financial transfers. Treating sibling rivalry as a “rent-seeking contest” and using a Tullock-Skaperdas contest success function, we derive the conditions under which more financial resources are transferred to the sibling with lower earnings. We find that parental transfers are compensatory and that the family as an institution serves as an “income equalizer.” Within a sequential game framework, we characterize the endogeneity of parental transfers and link it to parents' income, altruism, and children's supply of merit goods (e.g., parent-child companionship or child services). We show that merit goods are subject to a “moral hazard” problem from the parents' perspective.     

Discussion of “The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting”

Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior's pay is higher than the subordinate's, subordinates display more self‐serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL's design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay‐level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL's surprising findings.     

共享单车生态系统的动态演化分析

针对共享单车生态系统中各种群在所掌握信息不对称条件下,因追求各自利益最大化所导致的各种群间的长期持续博弈现状,以共享单车生态系统中的3个主要种群为博弈主体,运用博弈理论,建立有限理性及信息不对称假设条件下,关于三方合作共生的动态演化博弈模型和复制动态方程。研究发现影响共享单车生态系统稳定演化的主要因素为合作策略的收益率,共享单车生态系统趋于合作状态的概率与合作策略的收益率成正比。     

从博弈论视角看商业银行金融服务收费问题

本文从博弈论视角出发,对商业银行之间、商业银行与金融消费者之间在金融服务收费过程中的博弈行为进行分析,指出合作博弈是解决博弈主体利益冲突的较好办法,并得出相关的结论。     

以旧换新情境下动力电池梯次利用闭环供应链决策研究

针对制造商、经销商和梯次利用商组成的动力电池双闭环供应链,考虑动力电池以旧换新后进行梯次利用和拆解情境,运用博弈分析方法研究无补贴和有补贴情况下供应链内部各利益主体的最优决策,采用数值仿真分析各参数对于博弈主体利润的影响。研究发现：随着政府对以旧换新补贴的增加,梯次利用率会随之增加,进而促进梯次利用商利润增长;消费者对旧产品的评价折扣越大,动力电池的批发价和零售价越高,会促进消费者以旧换新行为,梯次利用率亦呈缓慢上升趋势;将以旧换新补贴及梯次利用难度维持在合理范围内可以在提升梯次利用率的同时保证梯次利用商和制造商利润的提升。