Endogenous price leadership in a duopoly: Equal products, unequal technology

In the present paper we study endogenous price leadership in the context of a homogeneous product Bertrand duopoly model in which the firms have different, strictly convex cost functions. In such a framework it is well known that a simultaneous move price choice game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, but it has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In the Stackelberg games with an exogenous price leader, we show that a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) always exists. Although the SPNE might not be unique, the payoffs are the same across all SPNE. Finally, we analyze the issue of endogenous price leadership using the continuous version of the Robson (1990) timing game. The result is unexpected. One would expect the more efficient firm to emerge as the endogenous price leader. This is not always true. In most cases the endogenous leader is the firm with the highest "threshold" price. However, we also provide conditions under which the more efficient firm emerges as the leader. Our paper essentially complements Yano (2001) , which is based on the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) framework.     

双寡头竞争下最优进口贸易政策选择

文章在水平差别产品的伯川德模型中对从量和从价关税进行了分析比较。研究发现,效用函数必须满足一些严格的假设,才能保证征收关税将改善本国社会福利。从量关税的进口限制效果明显强于从价关税。但对于均衡从量关税,总存在一个对能给本国带来更高社会福利的从价关税。两者的差距取决于均衡点本国市场对外国产品的需求弹性,需求弹性越小,社会福利差距越大。     

Strategic corporate social responsibility of high-speed rail in China

This paper investigates the strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) of a high-speed rail (HSR) firm when competing with an airline firm in a differentiated transportation market and the interactions with government environmental policies in the context of a Cournot–Bertrand comparison. We find that a standard CSR chosen by the government is lower under Cournot than that under Bertrand when both the marginal cost of HSR and product substitutability are low enough, while a voluntary CSR chosen by the HSR operator is always higher under Cournot than that under Bertrand. We also find that the voluntary CSR could be higher or lower than the standard CSR, depending on marginal costs, product substitutability, and competition modes. We then show that when the government imposes an environmental tax together with CSR activities, both the strategic CSR and environmental tax are always lower under Cournot than those under Bertrand. Finally, we show that equilibrium traffic volumes, ticket fares, consumer welfare, and social welfare are independent of competition modes with environmental tax.     

技术扩散条件下的产业集群研究

本文首次在圆周城市模型的假定下．研究了技术扩散条件下的厂商地址选择问题。在没有技术进步的条件下，厂商选择离散的地址设厂，不可能形成产业集群；在有技术进步和技术溢出的条件下，如果一个厂商进行研究开发而另一个厂商选择搭便车，则不存在厂址选择的对称纯策略均衡，也不可能形成产业集群；如果两个厂商都进行研究开发，且存在技术的互补性，则产业集群肯定可以形成。     

A Psychological Reexamination of the Bertrand Paradox

The Bertrand paradox describes a situation in which two competing firms reach an outcome where both price at marginal cost. In laboratory experiments, this equilibrium is not generally observed. Existing empirical works on Bertrand competition have found evidence for boundedly rational models. We find that such models are useful in organizing behavior in early stages of the game, but less so in later stages. We show that a new model, coarse grid Nash equilibrium, based on the assumption that subjects discretize the strategy space, explains the data better.     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

需求与生产成本扰动下的供应链最优定价订货模型

文章分析了供应链运作过程中由于突发事件引起的各种扰动,构建了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的单周期单一产品供应链的Stackelberg博弈模型。在这个模型中,假设需求函数是指数函数,而生产成本函数为严格凸的两元一次函数,将订货量及其他影响生产成本的扰动因素引入模型,分析了不同情况下的供应链最优定价订货策略,并对各种结果进行了分析。结果表明,扰动发生后,供应链的定价、订货及收益均会发生变化。供应链将扰动带来的部分成本转嫁到消费者身上,供应商和零售商需要重新确立新的合作契约以确保供应链有序平稳的运行。     

The bubble game: A classroom experiment

We propose a simple classroom experiment on speculative bubbles: the Bubble Game. This game is useful to discuss about market efficiency and trading strategies in a financial economics course, and about behavioral aspects in a game theory course, at all levels. The Bubble Game can be played with any number of students, as long as this number is strictly greater than one. Students sequentially trade an asset which is publicly known to have a fundamental value of zero. If there is no cap on asset prices, speculative bubbles can arise at the Nash equilibrium because no trader is ever sure to be last in the market sequence. Otherwise, the Nash equilibrium involves no trade. Bubbles usually occur with or without a cap on prices. Traders who are less likely to be last and have less steps of reasoning to perform to reach equilibrium are in general more likely to speculate.     

Variety,Globalization, and Social Efficiency

The standard formal presentation of the Dixit‐Stiglitz‐Krugman (DSK) model of monopolistic competition with a constant‐elasticity‐of‐substitution (CES) utility function supposes a sufficient number of firms so that the elasticity of demand facing each variety is approximated by a constant elasticity of substitution. Such a formulation forces economies of scale to be frozen so that firm size never changes. We use a Bertrand‐Nash interpretation of the equilibrium that allows the elasticity of demand facing each variety to depend on the number of varieties, thus allowing the gains from globalization to reflect both the increase in variety and the exploitation of economies of scale. We also develop a precise expression for per capita real income with any number of sectors and examine the age‐old question of the socially optimal number of varieties.     

Sticky prices as a coordination success

Recent contributions have articulated ways in which price rigidities signal breakdowns of coordination. These contributions are aimed at unifying New Keynesian economics by linking the issue of nominal price flexibility with that of between-firm coordination. By contrast, this paper demonstrates that sticky prices can signal a coordination success rather than a coordination failure. A model is developed in which N firms face a stochastic industry demand and engage in (infinitely) repeated Bertrand competition. In each period, firms are able to learn the realization of the demand shock but at a positive cost. The existence of two equilibria—one featuring sticky prices and the other featuring flexible prices—is proved. These equilibria are then compared. The equilibrium featuring sticky prices Pareto-dominates that featuring the flexible ones.     

Process and product innovation: A differential game approach to product life cycle

We investigate the timing of adoption of product and process innovation using a differential game where firms may invest in both activities. We consider horizontal product innovation that reduces product substitutability, and process innovation that reduces marginal cost. First, we demonstrate that the incentive for cost‐reducing investment is relatively higher than the incentive to increase product differentiation. Second, depending on initial conditions: (i) firms activate both types of investment from the very outset to the steady state; (ii) firms initially invest in only one R&D activity and then reach the steady state either carrying out only this activity or carrying out both; or (iii) firms do not invest at all in either type of innovation. Comparing R&D investments under Cournot and Bertrand behavior shows that quantity competition entails lower R&D incentives than price competition in both directions.     

Entry and the accumulation of capital: A two state variable extension to the Ramsey model

In this paper we consider the entry and exit of firms in a dynamic general equilibrium model with capital. At the firm level, there is a fixed cost combined with increasing marginal cost, which gives a standard U‐shaped cost curve with optimal firm size. Entry is determined by a free entry condition such that the cost of entry is equal to the present value of incumbent firms. The cost of entry (exit) depends on the flow of entry (exit). Equilibrium is saddle‐point stable and the stable manifold is two‐dimensional. Transitional dynamics can, under certain circumstances, be non‐monotonic.     

Bifurcation and sunspots in the continuous time equilibrium model with capacity utilization

In the present paper, we construct a continuous time model of economic growth with positive externalities and with variable capacity utilization, and study the global equilibrium paths in this model. If there is a homoclinic orbit or a periodic solution in this model, equilibrium is globally indeterminate. We show that positive externalities can yield multiple steady states, a one-parameter family of homoclinic orbits, and a two-parameter family of periodic solutions. It is also shown that there exists a sunspot equilibrium in this model.     

Testing Oil Refiners' Conduct in Korea: A Differentiated Product Approach

This paper investigates oil refiners' conduct in the Korean gasoline market. Specifically, I examine which of two modes of conduct, Bertrand–Nash competition or collusion, better fits the data. Unlike previous literature, this paper employs a differentiated product approach to address the stylized discrepancy in refiners' brands' prices: stable stratification of prices among refiners, but an unlikely equilibrium outcome in the homogenous goods market. Correct understanding of refiners' conduct is important because appropriate policy responses to collusion differ significantly from appropriate responses to competition‐driven outcomes. The results of this paper support the hypothesis that Bertrand–Nash competition better explains refiners' conduct.     

Relating Product Prices to Long‐Run Marginal Cost: Evidence from Solar Photovoltaic Modules

A basic tenet of microeconomics is that for a competitive industry in equilibrium the market price of a product will be equal to its marginal cost. This paper develops a model framework and a corresponding empirical inference procedure for estimating long‐run marginal cost in industries where production costs decline over time. In the context of the solar photovoltaic (PV) module industry, we rely primarily on firm‐level financial accounting data to estimate the long‐run marginal cost of PV modules for the years 2008–2013. During those years, the industry experienced both unprecedented price declines and significant expansions of manufacturing capacity. We compare the trajectory of average sales prices with the estimated long‐run marginal costs in order to quantify the extent to which actual price declines were attributable to reductions in production costs. The trajectory of estimated product costs is then extrapolated to forecast an equilibrium trend line for future PV module prices.     

Regulating the Anticommons: Insights from Public‐Expenditure Theory

This article offers a new interpretation of the traditional Cournot complements problem, or anticommons, by using the theory of public goods to gain a perspective on the problem. Specifically, I examine the pricing strategies and regulation of multiple monopolies that produce products which consumers view as perfect complements. I show that collusion by the firms increases total social welfare and that the collusion problem can be reinterpreted as a problem of provision of public goods from the point of view of the firms. I take this insight further and derive the familiar concepts of the Samuelson marginal condition and the ratio equilibrium for the firms. I compare these outcomes to the first best solution and then apply incentive‐compatible mechanisms to strategically implement the Pareto superior ratio‐equilibrium outcome and the optimal marginal‐cost pricing outcome. Finally, I show how this methodology can be applied to the more familiar Cournot model of oligopoly.     

广告影响需求下的新产品竞争性动态定价策略

文章在广告影响需求条件下,考虑了双寡头垄断企业竞争下的新产品动态定价问题,提出了一个竞争性动态定价策略。当顾客不仅考虑当前的价格和广告水平而且也考虑以往的交易价格和广告水平条件下,提出了一个具有"学习"功能的竞争性需求函数。运用多周期动态博弈理论给出了均衡的销售价格和广告水平,分析了三种情形下(竞争双方仅有价格竞争而广告竞争强度为0、竞争双方既有价格竞争又有广告竞争且广告竞争强度大于0小于1和竞争双方存在价格竞争而广告竞争强度为1)竞争双方的动态定价策略。结果发现企业可以选择五种定价策略——提高价格、降低     

广告影响需求下的新产品竞争性动态定价策略

文章在广告影响需求条件下,考虑了双寡头垄断企业竞争下的新产品动态定价问题,提出了一个竞争性动态定价策略。当顾客不仅考虑当前的价格和广告水平而且也考虑以往的交易价格和广告水平条件下,提出了一个具有“学习”功能的竞争性需求函数。运用多周期动态博弈理论给出了均衡的销售价格和广告水平,分析了三种情形下（竞争双方仅有价格竞争而广告竞争强度为0、竞争双方既有价格竞争又有广告竞争且广告竞争强度大于0小于．1和竞争双方存在价格竞争而广告竞争强度为1）竞争双方的动态定价策略。结果发现企业可以选择五种定价策略——提高价格、降低价格、维持原价、振荡收敛于常数和发散定价,这些定价策略在一定程度上受企业广告的成本系数和初始给定的价格及广告水平的影响。     

Will the Sarb always Succeed in Fighting Inflation with Contractionary Policy?

The conventional view is that a monetary policy shock has both supply‐side and demand‐side effects, at least in the short run. Barth and Ramey show that the supply‐side effect of a monetary policy shock may be greater than the demand‐side effect. We argue that it is crucial for monetary authorities to understand whether an increase in expected future inflation is due to supply shocks or demand shocks before applying contractionary policy to forestall inflation. We estimate a standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the cost channel of monetary policy for the South African economy to show that whether the South African Reserve Bank should apply contractionary policy to fight inflation depends critically on the nature of the disturbance. If an increase in expected future inflation is mainly due to supply shocks, the South African Reserve Bank should not apply contractionary policy to fight inflation, as this would lead to a persistent increase in inflation and a greater loss in output. Our estimation results also show that with a moderate level of cost‐channel effect and nominal rigidities, a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the cost channel of monetary policy is able to mimic the price puzzle produced by an estimated vector autoregressive model.     

超额管理费用与企业“真实”业绩:促进还是抑制

企业支付超额管理费用超额管理费用^①指超过企业正常组织与管理生产经营活动的费用（如高于正常水平的业务招待费、差旅费、通讯费等）。若企业管理费用"激增",则可能说明企业支付了高额费用寻求政治庇佑,从而影响企业业绩。寻求政治庇佑,对企业业绩会产生什么影响呢?本文利用中国A股上市公司财务数据,实证检验了超额管理费用与企业"真实"业绩之间的内在关系。研究发现,短期内超额管理费用能够促进企业"真实"业绩,但随着超额管理费用的提高,将对企业"真实"业绩产生越来越强的抑制作用,两者之间呈倒U型关系。并且,超额管理费用对企业"真实"业绩的影响在不同企业中表现出了差异性：国有股比例较高的企业其"真实"业绩对超额管理费用的敏感性敏感性（Sensitivity）是约瑟夫奈和基欧汉在《权利与相互依赖》中创造的用于分析国际政治的概念,它是指依赖效应的大小与快慢,用来描述体系中某个部分的变化会在多短的时间内导致其它部分也发生变化。在本文中用来表示超额管理费用对企业业绩的影响程度^②更强烈;市场化程度较高的企业其"真实"业绩对超额管理费用促进作用的敏感性更强烈,对超额管理费用抑制作用的敏感性较弱。文章验证了超额管理费用与企业业绩的非线性关系,企业通过支付超额管理费用不能促进业绩的实质增长,必须通过创新与改革来推动企业业绩发展。