Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics

The Czech and Slovak Republics' mass privatization scheme used voucher points distributed to the population and a competitive bidding process to change the governance of a large number of firms. Voucher prices and following secondary market prices are shown to depend upon the resulting ownership structures. The more concentrated ownership is, the higher prices are. High absolute ownership by a single domestic investor is associated with even higher voucher prices. I find some evidence that initially prices are relatively lower when a bank-sponsored investment fund has a relatively large stake in a firm. This suggests conflicts of interest.     

Efficiency of French privatizations: a dynamic vision

We interpret privatization in light of corporate governance theory. After replicating some traditional tests, we test our new model on a sample of privatized French firms. We cannot confirm for French privatizations the positive effect on overall static and dynamic efficiency of the firm traditionally attributed to privatizations. In addition, we find that whatever positive value accrues from privatization is affected by the contextual, organizational, governance, and strategic variables that influence the privatization process.     

Firm size,information acquisition and price efficiency

We present a model in a competitive market where traders choose between a small and a large firm to acquire costly private information, but they also obtain free public information by observing equilibrium share prices. Our major finding is the existence of a noisy rational expectation competitive equilibrium, in which there are more informed traders of the large firm than those of the small firm. As a result, share prices of the large firm are more informative than those of the small firm. Our empirical study supports the analytical results. By using a bivariate vector autoregressive regression, we are able to conduct a variance decomposition of share prices for different size portfolios. We find that prices of large-size portfolios are more informative because non-value-related price shocks are less important in driving price changes of large-size portfolios than in the case of small-size portfolios.     

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST HEDGING BY MATCHING THE CURRENCIES OF COSTS AND REVENUES

One way for multinationals to manage their exposures to foreign currency fluctuations is by matching the currencies of costs and revenues, a practice sometimes referred to as "natural hedging." Proponents of this risk-management technique argue that matching currencies decreases profit variability.
Using the example of a U.S. firm competing with a French firm for sales in France, the authors analyze the desirability of the U.S. firm's matching currencies of costs and revenues by sourcing in France rather than in the U.S. They find that in such settings with limited competition, while matching reduces profit variability, it also causes a reduction in expected profitability–a potential drawback that appears to have been overlooked in previous discussions.
The authors demonstrate that the U.S. firm, by choosing not to match currencies, retains the strategic flexibility to adjust its prices and quantities in order to exploit the competitive cost differentials caused by exchange rate shifts. The expected profit effects of matching depend on the tradeoff between expected cost savings, if any, of sourcing abroad versus the reductions in expected profits due to the loss of strategic flexibility . They argue that the benefits of strategic flexibility associated with sourcing in the U.S. can yield an increase in expected profits that may outweigh the cost savings and hedging benefits of currency matching.     

Fundamental Investors Reduce the Distraction on Management from Random Market “Noise”: Evidence from France

The authors find that financial markets have real effects on corporate decisions but that, unfortunately, some temporary market enthusiasm, unrelated to firm intrinsic value, may cause management to make value‐destroying decisions as the result of random and uninformed stock market volatility. In particular, they are prone to making bad decisions after stock market overreactions to “surprise” earnings announcements. This study shows a positive effect of greater long‐term ownership on French listed firms. Fundamental investor ownership reduces the degree of market mispricing which serves long‐run shareholder value maximization. A fundamental investor is one that, on average, hold his shares for at least two years, is in the top quartile of a firm ownership, and has an active allocation strategy. They are about 8% of all investors. Compared to non‐fundamental investors, fundamental investors hold their positions on average three times longer and have positions 1.5 times larger. Fundamental investors are more present in firms which have more liquid stocks, which pay dividends, and which are relatively poorer performers and have relatively lower market‐to‐book than their industry peers.     

Government Stakes as an Insurance Policy: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings of Chinese Firms

While privatization has attracted much more attention in the literature, one type of reverse privatization, a privately-controlled firm inviting government ownership as its minority shareholders, is neglected in the literature. Using large-scale census firm data from China, we investigate the determinants of this kind of reverse privatization and its impact on firm performance. We find that (1) the decision of reverse privatization by Chinese private firms is affected by local political risk, firm-level financial characteristics, and industry-level characteristics, (2) the reverse privatization significantly affects the firm’s performance, which is measured in different proxies but the effects are not consistent, and (3) moreover, we find that the benefit of reverse privatization decreases as government ownership increases. Our results suggest that the prevalence of reverse privatization in China is a political outcome, which is affected by the trade-off of political risk and political privilege. Our work suggests that political risk and political considerations are the main driving factors of privatization, or its opposite, reverse privatization. Reverse privatization, to some extent, is a rational choice in some transition economies. Our findings offer clear policy implications to the nationalization phenomenon taking place around the world recently.     

Does the response of competitors to privatization announcements reflect competitive or industry-wide information effects? International evidence

We examine the stock price reaction of rival firms to the announcement of the privatization of their industry counterparts to infer information about the intra-industry effects of privatization. We find that the rival firms reacted negatively to the privatization announcements, suggesting that the announcement effects reflect competitive rather than positive industry effects. The reaction is stronger for industry counterparts in low economic freedom countries than those in high economic freedom countries. Interestingly, we also find that full privatization announcements generate larger negative abnormal returns for rival firms than partial privatization announcements where the privatized firm gains only partial autonomy from the government. In this regard, we find that, as the proportion of government ownership reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcement elicits stronger market reaction from rival firms. The negative abnormal returns earned by shareholders of rival firms are not due to price pressure and portfolio rebalancing effects resulting from index composition changes. We conclude that the negative effects documented for the rival firms reflect investors' concern about the potential competitive effects resulting from privatization of the state enterprise.     

The Decision to Privatize: Finance and Politics

We investigate the influence of political and financial factors on the decision to privatize government‐owned firms. The results show that profitable firms and firms with a lower wage bill are likely to be privatized early. We find that the government delays privatization in regions where the governing party faces more competition from opposition parties. The results also suggest that political patronage is important as no firm located in the home state of the minister in charge is ever privatized. Using political variables as an instrument for the privatization decision, we find that privatization has a positive impact on firm performance.     

The Financial and Economic Lessons of Italy's Privatization Program

Since 1994 the Italian government has sold equity stakes in some 75 large state enterprises, in the process raising over $125 billion‐more than any other country during the same period. In this article, a U.S. academic collaborates with the Italian government's Director of Privatization in summarizing the accomplishments and disappointments of Italy's privatization program, assessing its impact on Italian capital markets, and offering lessons for other countries embarking on new privatization programs. The article also describes the share issuance methods used by the government to execute several massive offerings, including the largest IPO in history. The principal benefits of Italian privatization have been dramatic increases in the size and efficiency of Italy's stock markets and in the safety and stability of its banking system. Despite such improvements, however, privatization has failed to bring about the increased competition in key industries and lower prices for consumers its planners originally envisioned. And based on this experience, the authors offer a number of lessons for government planners. Perhaps most important, privatization is likely to yield decisive benefits only if the divestment program is properly designed and sequenced. Governments should begin by privatizing state‐owned banks and other financial institutions, and as quickly as economically and politically feasible. Especially in less developed economies, commercial banks are for many companies both the only suppliers of credit and the only effective source of market discipline‐which explains why results have often been disastrous when governments have retained control of banks while privatizing other industries. Privatizing governments should also emphasize privatizations accomplished through share issuances rather than asset sales, with the aim of developing liquid and efficient stock markets and promoting effective corporate governance.     

Local Risk,Local Factors,and Asset Prices

Firm location affects firm risk through local factor prices. We find more procyclical factor prices such as wages and real estate prices in areas with more cyclical economies, namely, high “local beta” areas. While procyclical wages provide a natural hedge against aggregate shocks and reduce firm risk, procyclical prices of real estate, which are part of firm assets, increase firm risk. We confirm that firms located in higher local beta areas have lower industry‐adjusted returns and conditional betas, and show that the effect is stronger among firms with low real estate holdings. A production‐based equilibrium model explains these empirical findings.     

Corporate Governance and Value: Evidence from “Close Calls” On Shareholder Governance Proposals

The authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the effects of specific corporate governance provisions on firm value. Using a sample of governance provisions that were subjected to shareholder votes during the period 1997–2011, this study analyzes cases in which shareholder‐sponsored corporate governance proposals were either rejected or passed by a small margin (no more than 5% of the vote). By so doing, this study helps correct two limitations of the existing governance literature: (1) that the effects of expected governance changes are already incorporated in share prices (the “expectations” problem); and (2) that governance policies are often a consequence rather than a cause of other variables such as corporate performance and are thus correlated with many other firm characteristics (the “endogeneity” problem). The authors' findings show that expected improvements in corporate governance through the adoption of particular corporate governance provisions—particularly the removal of anti‐takeover provisions—is associated with both positive abnormal stock returns and improvements in long‐term firm operating performance. The authors estimate that the adoption of such governance proposals increases shareholder value by 2.6%, on average. Moreover, these returns are consistent with, and thus accurate predictors of, future changes in corporate investment (reductions of capital spending, in most cases) and improvements in operating performance.     

Colluding through suppliers

This article investigates downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.     

Firm Value and the Quality of Sustainability Reporting in Australia

This paper investigates the relationship between firm value and the quality of Australian listed corporations’ sustainability reporting. We examine whether firms that make higher‐quality sustainability disclosures exhibit systematically higher equity prices, through either (or both) cost of capital or expected future performance effects. Using proprietary data obtained from a specialist responsible investment research firm, we document a significant negative association between quality sustainability reporting and the cost of equity capital for ASX 200 firms from 2003–2005, and a significant positive association between expected future performance and the quality of sustainability reporting. We also test for industry‐specific associations and find that our main results are driven heavily by the reporting behaviour of, and market response to, firms in environmentally sensitive industries.     

The effect of SFAS 131 on the stock market’s ability to predict industry‐wide and firm‐specific components of future earnings

This study examines the impact of SFAS 131 on the extent to which stock prices incorporate industry‐wide and firm‐specific components of future earnings. By decomposing earnings into industry‐wide and firm‐specific components, this paper finds that the firms that aggregated segments under the old rule experience significant acceleration in the incorporation of future earnings into current stock prices upon adoption of SFAS 131. However, the acceleration of future earnings is mostly driven by the improved incorporation of industry‐wide components of future earnings, which indicates the market’s ability to predict firm‐specific components is not significantly changed. Supplemental analysis suggests that the reduced geographic earnings information is one possible reason for lack of improvement in incorporating firm‐specific earnings into price.     

Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation

We document a robust cross‐sectional positive association across industries between a measure of the economic efficiency of corporate investment and the magnitude of firm‐specific variation in stock returns. This finding is interesting for two reasons, neither of which is a priori obvious. First, it adds further support to the view that firm‐specific return variation gauges the extent to which information about the firm is quickly and accurately reflected in share prices. Second, it can be interpreted as evidence that more informative stock prices facilitate more efficient corporate investment.     

Corporate Governance,Companies’ Disclosure Practices and Market Transparency: A Cross Country Study

We examine the link between corporate governance, companies’ disclosure practices and their equity market transparency in a study of more than 5,000 listed companies in 23 countries covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008. Our results confirm the belief that better‐governed firms make more frequent disclosures to the market. We also find greater disclosure in common law relative to code law countries. However firms with better governance in both code and common law countries make more frequent disclosures. We measure market transparency by the timeliness of prices. In contrast to single country studies, results show, for the 23 countries collectively, better corporate governance is associated with less timely share prices. This would suggest that a firm substitutes better corporate governance for transparency. We are thus led to the conclusion that even if information is disclosed more frequently by better‐governed firms, it does not necessarily follow that information is reflected in share prices on a timelier basis.     

A Bayesian view of temporary components in asset prices

This paper studies models in which the a stock price contains a random walk and a stationary component, as in Fama and French [Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1988, Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Returns, Journal of Political Economy 96, 246–273.] and Poterba and Summers [Poterba, James, and Lawrence Summers, 1988, Mean Reversion in Stock Prices: Evidence and Implications, Journal of Financial Economics 22, 27–59.]. We extend this model to allow for two latent factors which generate short term and long term autocorrelations, respectively. To facilitate econometric identification, we assume that these factors are common across multiple asset returns, and we estimate the factor loadings. In an application to size and book/market sorted portfolios, we find the short term factor economically and statistically insignificant. Estimates of parameters relating to the long range component suggest that portfolios of small firm stock display about three times the amount of mean reversion than for large firm stocks. Overall, the evidence suggests that mean reversion is largely a small firm phenomenon. The evidence is consistent with dynamic equilibrium models in which asset prices co-integrate with aggregate consumption or dividends.     

An Assessment of Privatization

Mounting empirical evidence of privatization's benefits coincideswith increasing dissatisfaction and opposition among citizensand policymakers. This dissatisfaction reflects the growingquestioning of the benefits of privatization, the general downturnof global markets in the past few years and the resulting swingof the pendulum back toward increased governmental supervision,the overselling of privatization as a panacea for all economicproblems, and the concern that privatization does not producemacroeconomic and distributional gains equivalent to its microeconomicbenefits. This article takes stock of the empirical evidenceand shows that in competitive sectors privatization has beena resounding success in improving firm performance. In infrastructuresectors, privatization improves welfare, a broader and crucialobjective, when it is accompanied by proper policy and regulatoryframeworks. The article argues that despite the growing concernsprivatization should be neither abandoned nor reversed. Rather,there should be a strengthening of efforts to privatize correctly:by better tailoring privatization to local conditions, deepeningefforts to promote competition and regulatory frameworks, enforcingtransparency in sales processes, and introducing mechanismsto ensure that the poor have access to affordable essentialservices.      

Feedback Effects and Asset Prices

Feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented. This finding raises a question for asset pricing: How are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value, which in turn affects price? In this environment, by buying assets that others are buying, investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves. Hence, investors have an incentive to coordinate, which may generate self‐fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria. Using insights from global games, we pin down investors' beliefs, analyze equilibrium prices, and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility.     

A Dynamic Model of Firm Valuation

We propose a dynamic version of the dividend discount model, solve it in closed form, and assess its empirical validity. The valuation method is tractable and can be easily implemented. We find that our model produces equity value forecasts that are very close to market prices, and explains a large proportion of the observed variation in share prices. Moreover, we show that a simple portfolio strategy based on the difference between market and estimated values earns considerably positive returns. These returns cannot be simply explained either by the Fama‐French three‐factor model (even after adding a momentum factor) or the Fama‐French five‐factor model.