The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.     

Profit-sharing in a unionized cournot duopoly

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze when it is optimal for firms in a unionized duopoly to introduce profit-sharing. It is shown that a firm only prefers a profit-sharing system if its own union does not have “too much” bargaining power, and if the union in the other firm does not have “too much” bargaining power. However, if a firm introduces profit-sharing, the employment increases, and the price in the goods market decreases. Hence, even if it is not in the own interest of a firm to introduce profit-sharing, it may be in the interest of the society.     

Licensing a quality-enhancing innovation to an upstream firm

This paper examines the case where a patent holder who is not a producer licenses its quality-enhancing innovation to an upstream firm, which sells its product through a downstream monopoly. It is found that the patent holder prefers a two-part tariff contract, which includes both a fixed-fee and per-unit output royalty. However, the royalty included in the licensing contract makes each firm price at a markup over marginal cost and therefore makes both consumers and the society worse off, if the innovation is small and the supplier is weak. From a welfare perspective, licensing by means of an ad valorem tax is more efficient, as it allows the upstream firm to be less aggressive when trading with the downstream firm.     

Trade policy in the face of price and non-price strategies

When selling their products domestically or internationally, firms rely on more than just price as a strategic variable. They also rely on non-price instruments such as advertising and/or R&D investments. Any trade policy that affects or limits the use of one variable will likely have strategic consequences for the use of all the others. Using a Hotelling model with vertical differentiation we focus on how trade policy barriers alter price and non-price competition on the goods market. The main results are as follows: first, no matter whether the trade restriction (tariff) is placed on the non-price instrument or on the good itself, the foreign (domestic) firm prefers to increase (decrease) its use of its pricing tool and give up some of (increase) its use of the non-price instrument. Second, in the presence of a non-price instrument, tariffs do not always lead both firms to increase their price: it can lead the foreign firm to decrease its (final) price.     

Mixed Competition and Patent Licensing

This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot–Bertrand). If the two‐part tariff is applied, then the two‐part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot–Bertrand than under Bertrand–Cournot competition.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers’ transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling. When transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits with asymmetric information than with perfect information. Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is ex‐ante advantageous for both firms, but ex‐post damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.     

The economics of posted prices in a concentrated market where demand is uncertain

This paper analyses the theory of the optimal output decision for a firm whose policy is to post a non-negotiable price for a good or service in a concentrated market where the demand facing the firm is determined, in part, by a random variable. The theoretical findings are the opposite of those in competitive markets; Proposition 1 states that the optimal output of a risk-averse firm is expected to be larger than that of a risk-neutral firm if the expected payoff of its marginal profit is less than or equal to 1. Proposition 2 states that the optimal output of a risk-seeking firm is expected to be smaller than that of a risk-neutral firm if the expected payoff of its marginal profit is greater than 1.     

MONOPOLY POWER AND DOWNWARD PRICE RIGIDITY UNDER COSTLY PRICE ADJUSTMENT

A method of 'backward deduction' is used to analyse the decisions of a firm, setting price and quantity before demand observations are made, with the option to adjust price at a cost after demand is observed. It is shown for such a firm that the events of (1) downward price rigidity; (2) overproduction; and (3) a high degree of monopoly power are closely related. The paper distinguishes itself from the previous literature on costly price adjustment in its treatment of disequilibrium situations and focus on monopoly power in relation to price rigidity. The main results are obtained for a linear demand curve and a uniform demand distribution.     

Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders

We investigate bidders’ and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the FPA, are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the SPA, and prefer the SPA to the FPA. If bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller prefers to conceal the number of bidders in the FPA, and prefers the FPA to the SPA.     

Contracts payments for ecosystem services: the case of bio-pospecting

We examine the economics of royalties in bioprospecting contracts between a pharmaceutical and genetic resource supplier (local), with an eye to understanding the relative advantages of indexing royalty payments to gross revenue or net revenue. We show a risk-averse firm facing only production or only cost risks will index royalties to net revenue. When facing both types of risk, the choice of royalty type depends on the relative magnitudes of the production and cost risk. In each case, the risk-averse firm chooses the royalty type that shifts as much risk as possible to the local. When the local is risk neutral, the pharmaceutical's and local's preferences are compatible. If the local is risk averse and there is only one type of risk, it will prefer a gross revenue royalty, and shift as much risk as possible to the firm: here the local and firm preferences are compatible only if the firm is risk-neutral, Lastly, we show if the firm sets the terms of the contract, and both agents are risk averse, the firm will not likely volunteer to implement the socially optimal royalty arrangement as it prefers to shift as much risk to the local, who now also prefers a more certain return. This last outcome is at the heart of the benefit sharing discussion and suggests if risk sharing and equity are a concern in benefit sharing, then the choice of royalty type can be an important part of negotiations between pharmaceuticals and locals for the phytochemical from nature for new drug discovery.     

Learning through experimentation in an oligopoly market with asymmetric information

Unlike previous literature, in which firms compete in the market with the same information, this article analyses a two‐period duopoly game in which only one firm is completely informed about the market conditions, whereas the other firm is unaware of one parameter of the demand curve. In this setting, we describe how the informed firm uses its price set in period 1 in order to reveal or to hide its private information and how the uninformed firm uses its own price in period 1 in order to learn the market conditions when they are not revealed by its rival. Specifically, we obtained the conditions under which the informed firm sets a higher price than its optimum in the first period to hide its private information in certain cases and to reveal that information in others. Likewise, this paper describes the conditions under which the uninformed firm sets a lower price than its optimum in period 1 in order to learn the unknown parameter. We found that the informed firm's cost of revealing its private information to its rival is lower than the uninformed firm's cost of learning the market conditions.     

Forward Markets and the Behaviour of the Competitive Firm with Production Flexibility

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when a forward market for its output is available. The firm possesses production flexibility in that it makes its production decision after the resolution of the output price uncertainty, albeit subject to a capacity constraint on production. We show that the firm optimally acquires a higher level of capacity investment than an otherwise identical firm with no production flexibility. We further show that production flexibility allows the firm to implicitly hedge against its output price risk exposure by the ex post production decision. The firm as such under‐hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a non‐positive risk premium.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

Price–quality competition in a mixed duopoly

We examine competition between a private and a public provider in markets for merit goods, such as education, healthcare, housing, recreation, or culture. The private firm provides a high‐price/high‐quality variety of the good and serves richer individuals, whereas the public firm provides a low‐price/low‐quality variety and serves poorer individuals. We first characterize the private competitor’s best response to changes in the public firm’s price and quality. This enables us to examine the distributional effects of policies that affect the price or quality of the public firm’s product. We then numerically characterize the public firm’s optimal provision policy, taking the private response into consideration. Our results have implications for the financing of publicly provided goods, and for whether additional resources, if available, should be spent on reducing the price or enhancing the quality of these goods.     

Beyond the need to boast: Cost concealment incentives and exit in Cournot oligopoly

This paper studies the incentives for production cost disclosure in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Whereas the efficient firm (consumers) prefers information sharing (concealment) when the firms choose accommodating strategies in the product market, the firm (consumers) may prefer information concealment (sharing) when it can exclude its competitors from the market. Hence, the rankings of expected profit and consumer surplus can be reversed if exit of the inefficient firms is possible. Although the efficient firm has stronger incentives to share information when it shares strategically, there remain cases in which the firm conceals information in equilibrium to induce exit.     

诺贝尔奖得主泽尔滕对杭州房地产泡沫的看法

杭州的房地产问题具有普通性,2005年3月和11月,诺贝尔经济学奖得主泽尔滕教授两次来华讲学.在华其间,他与其博士后高雷博士深入地探讨了杭州市房地产市场的泡沫问题.泽尔滕教授认为必须警惕杭州房地产市场泡沫,他注意到杭州房地产市场交易量的增长已落后于房价的增长.泽尔滕教授和高雷博士认为从众效应会促使房价一路攀升直至最后崩溃.对我国房地产市场存在的问题,他们提出了具体的政策建议,如放宽对利率的限制、完善房地产金融体系、改进房地产贷款和抵押政策、封堵境外投机资金等.     

Collusion and Price Rigidity

We consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria, wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each firm is strictly increasing in its cost level: such "fully sorting" schemes offer efficiency benefits, as they ensure that the lowest-cost firm makes the current sale, but they also imply an informational cost (distorted pricing and/or equilibrium-path price wars), since a higher-cost firm must be deterred from mimicking a lower-cost firm by charging a lower price. A rigid-pricing scheme, where a firm's collusive price is independent of its current cost position, sacrifices efficiency benefits but also diminishes the informational cost. For a wide range of settings, the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires (i) the absence of equilibrium-path price wars and (ii) a rigid price. If firms are sufficiently impatient, however, the rigid-pricing scheme cannot be enforced, and the collusive price of lower-cost firms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat. When the model is modified to include i.i.d. public demand shocks, the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a firm's lower-cost realization may occur only when current demand is high.     

Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis

We use laboratory experiments to examine the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a price-setting duopoly with capacity constraints. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our timing game predicts that the large firm is the price leader. Experimental data show that price leadership by the large firm is frequent, but simultaneous moves are also often observed. Profit outcomes in the previous period affect the subjects’ decisions to announce or wait in a way that hampers convergence to the equilibrium. Furthermore, while both small and large firms display a strong tendency to wait to announce their price when firm size asymmetry is low, they often set prices early when size asymmetry is high. Prices are higher when price setting is sequential rather than simultaneous and when firm size asymmetry is high. Hence, price leadership by either type of firm has an anti-competitive effect that is more pronounced when the size difference between firms is large.     

Product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly

Abstract This paper examines the joint pricing decision of products in a firm’s product line. When products are distinguished by a vertical characteristic, those with higher values of that characteristic will command higher prices. We investigate whether, holding the value of the characteristic constant, there is an additional price premium for products on the industry and/or the firm frontier, that is, for the products with the highest value of the characteristic in the market or in a firm’s product line. We also investigate the existence of price premia for lower‐ranked products and other product line pricing questions. Using personal computer price data, we show that prices decline with the distance from the industry and firm frontiers, even after holding absolute quality constant. We find evidence that consumer tastes for brands is stronger for the consumers of frontier products (and thus competition between firms weaker in the top end of the market). There is also evidence that a product’s price is higher if a firm offers products with the immediately faster and immediately slower computer chip (holding the total number of a firm’s offerings constant), possibly as an attempt to reduce cannibalization. Finally, a product’s price declines with the time it is offered by a firm, suggesting intertemporal price discrimination.