Futures market equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty

This paper examines the effects of Knightian uncertainty on a commodity futures market within the Newbery‐Stiglitz framework. It is shown that Knightian traders act more conservatively. In a partial trade equilibrium, risk aversion and Knightian uncertainty have qualitatively similar effects on the equilibrium price and the equilibrium trading volume. Full‐trade and no‐trade equilibria are likely to prevail when the producer and the speculator incur different Knightian uncertainty. Herein different impacts of risk aversion and Knightian uncertainty are observed. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:701–718, 2003     

Risk aversion,disappointment aversion,and futures hedging

This article examines the effect of disappointment aversion on futures hedging. We incorporated a constant‐absolute‐risk‐aversion (CARA) utility function into the disappointment‐aversion framework of Gul (1991). It is shown that a more disappointment‐averse hedger will choose an optimal futures position closer to the minimum‐variance hedge than will a less‐disappointment‐averse hedger. The effect of disappointment aversion is stronger when the hedger is less risk averse. A small disappointment aversion will cause a near‐risk neutral hedger to take a drastically different position. In addition, a more‐risk‐averse or disappointment‐averse hedger will have a lower reference point. Numerical results indicate that the reference point of a disappointment‐averse hedger tends to be lower than that of a conventional loss‐averse hedger. Consequently, the disappointment‐averse hedger will act more conservatively, not exploiting profitable opportunities as much as the conventional loss averse hedger will. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:123–141, 2002     

Market Reforms and Commodity Price Volatility: The Case of East African Coffee Market

The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of commodity market reforms on producer price volatility using evidence from the East African coffee market. The results, based on time‐varying volatility models and key summary statistics, show that coffee market reforms in the East African Community (EAC) are associated with changes in producer price volatility and volatility persistence at both country and regional levels. However, reforms were not the only cause of changes in price volatility. The study further shows that reforms had different effects on prices volatilities of Arabica and Robusta varieties of coffee grown in individual EAC countries. These findings have wider implication for commodity market reforms and producer price stabilisation policies in the EAC and coffee producing countries in sub‐Sahara Africa.     

Futures Hedging Under Disappointment Aversion

This article considers optimal futures hedging decisions when the hedger is disappointment‐averse (Gul, 1991). When the futures contract is a perfect hedge instrument, a disappointment‐averse hedger always holds a position closer to the full hedge than a nondisappointment‐averse hedger. In the presence of basis risk, the optimal futures position is either a partial hedge or a full hedge. Neither Texas hedge nor overhedge could be optimal. The effects of different degrees of disappointment aversion on futures trading are also analyzed. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21:1029–1042, 2001     

Hedging long‐term commodity risk

This study focuses on the problem of hedging longer‐term commodity positions, which often arises when the maturity of actively traded futures contracts on this commodity is limited to a few months. In this case, using a rollover strategy results in a high residual risk, which is related to the uncertain futures basis. We use a one‐factor term structure model of futures convenience yields in order to construct a hedging strategy that minimizes both spot‐price risk and rollover risk by using futures of two different maturities. The model is tested using three commodity futures: crude oil, orange juice, and lumber. In the out‐of‐sample test, the residual variance of the 24‐month combined spot‐futures positions is reduced by, respectively, 77%, 47%, and 84% compared to the variance of a naïve hedging portfolio. Even after accounting for the higher trading volume necessary to maintain a two‐contract hedge portfolio, this risk reduction outweighs the extra trading costs for the investor with an average risk aversion. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:109–133, 2003     

What to do if a dollar is not a dollar? The impact of inflation risk on production and risk management

An entrepreneur faces two types of risk: one from income generation, one from income spending. His income from firm profits is risky due to output price fluctuations and other risks. As a consumer, he is also exposed to inflation risk since he maximizes expected utility of real income. This article focuses on optimal production and risk management decisions of a risk‐averse entrepreneur jointly facing tradable output price risk and untradable inflation risk. Inflation risk applies multiplicatively to the entrepreneur's entire nominal income. Relative risk aversion and the risks' joint distribution determine the effect of introducing a futures market on production. For dependent risks, this effect may be negative if relative risk aversion is above one. Relative risk aversion and the joint distribution also determine optimal risk management with futures contracts where speculation on a real risk premium and cross hedging may be conflicting objectives. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:371–386, 2002     

A maximal affine stochastic volatility model of oil prices

This study develops and estimates a stochastic volatility model of commodity prices that nests many of the previous models in the literature. The model is an affine three‐factor model with one state variable driving the volatility and is maximal among all such models that are also identifiable. The model leads to quasi‐analytical formulas for futures and options prices. It allows for time‐varying correlation structures between the spot price and convenience yield, the spot price and its volatility, and the volatility and convenience yield. It allows for expected mean‐reversion in the short term and for an increasing expected long‐term price, and for time‐varying risk premia. Furthermore, the model allows for the situation in which options' prices depend on risk not fully spanned by futures prices. These properties are desirable and empirically important for modeling many commodities, especially crude oil. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 30:101–133, 2010     

Volatility and commodity price dynamics

Commodity prices are volatile, and volatility itself varies over time. Changes in volatility can affect market variables by directly affecting the marginal value of storage, and by affecting a component of the total marginal cost of production, the opportunity cost of producing the commodity now rather than waiting for more price information. I examine the role of volatility in short‐run commodity market dynamics and the determinants of volatility itself. I develop a structural model of inventories, spot, and futures prices that explicitly accounts for volatility, and estimate it using daily and weekly data for the petroleum complex: crude oil, heating oil, and gasoline. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:1029–1047, 2004     

Natural Selection and Market Efficiency in a Futures Market with Random Shocks

Even when participants know very little about their environment, the market itself, by serving as a selection process of information, promotes an efficient aggregate outcome. To emphasize the role of the market and the importance of natural selection rather than the strategic actions of participants, an evolutionary model of a commodity futures market is presented, in which there is a continual inflow of unsophisticated traders with predetermined distributions of prediction errors with respect to the fundamental value of the spot price. The market acts as a selection process by constantly shifting wealth from traders with less accurate information to those with more accurate information. Consequently, with probability 1, if the volatility of the underlying spot market is sufficiently small, the proportion of time that the futures price is sufficiently close to the fundamental value converges to one. Furthermore, the width of the interval containing the fundamental value, where the futures price eventually lies, increases as the volatility of the underlying spot market increases. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21:489–516, 2001     

An analysis of the profiles and motivations of habitual commodity speculators

The focus of this study is the habitual speculator in commodity futures markets. The speculator's activity broadens a market, creates essential liquidity, and performs an irreplaceable pricing function. Working knowledge of the profiles and motivations of habitual speculators is essential to both market theorists and policy makers. Responses to a 73-question survey were collected directly from retail commodity brokers with offices in Alabama. Each questionnaire recorded information on an individual commodity client who had traded for an extended period of time. The typical trader studied is a married, white male, age 52. He is affluent and well educated. He is a self-employed business owner who can recover from financial setbacks. He is a politically right-wing conservative involved in the political process. He assumes a good deal of risk in most phases of his life. He is both an aggressive investor and an active gambler. This trader does not consider preservation of his commodity capital to be a very high trading priority. As a result, he rarely uses stop loss orders. He wins more frequently than he loses (over 51% of the time) but is an overall net loser in dollar terms. In spite of recurring trading losses, he has never made any substantial change in his basic trading style. To this trader, whether he won or lost on a particular trade is more important than the size of the win or loss. Thus he consistently cuts his profits short while letting his losses run. He also worries more about missing a move in the market by being on the sidelines than about losing by being on the wrong side of a market move; that is, being in the action is more important than the financial consequences. Participating brokers confirmed that for the majority of the speculators studied, the primary motivation for continuous trading is the recreational utility derived largely from having a market position. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 18:765–801, 1998     

Illiquidity transmission from spot to futures markets

We develop a model of illiquidity transmission from spot to futures markets that formalizes the derivative hedge theory of Cho and Engle (1999). The model shows that spot market illiquidity does not translate one to one to the futures market but, rather, interacts with price risk, liquidity risk, and the risk aversion of the market maker. The model's predictions are tested empirically with data from the stock market and markets for single-stock futures and index futures. The results support our model and show that the derivative hedge theory provides an explanation for the liquidity link between spot and futures markets.     

CEO's Total Wealth Characteristics and Implications on Firm Risk

We study the connections between firm risk and the CEO's personal wealth characteristics, using a unique dataset on CEO wealth and its components. Consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion, we find that wealthier CEOs are associated with higher risk firms. Riskier firms tend to have CEOs whose wealth is more independent of the firm. We also find that CEOs with high personal portfolio betas run firms with higher betas. CEO's tenure is negatively associated with firm risk measured either as beta, idiosynchratic risk, or volatility of accounting profitability. A possible interpretation is that risk‐averse managers are better able to imprint their risk preferences on the firm over time. Stronger corporate governance weakens the connection between CEO wealth characteristics and firm risk.     

Does the More Risk‐Averse Investor hold a Less Risky Portfolio?*

We study the suitability of using absolute risk aversion as a measure of willingness to take risk in the Arrow–Debreu portfolio framework. We define a global measure of risk for the Arrow–Debreu portfolio, which is measured by the sensitivity of an individual's Arrow–Debreu portfolio payoff to the change in the market return. We call this measure ‘conservatism’ and show that the concept of ‘more conservative’ is stronger than that of ‘more risk‐averse.’ A higher absolute risk aversion is only necessary but not sufficient to induce a less risky Arrow–Debreu portfolio. Our results not only challenge the well‐accepted notion that a more risk‐averse investor holds a less risky portfolio, but also suggest a stronger measure – conservatism – for evaluating the riskiness of portfolio.     

The economic advantage of learners in a spot/futures market

This article examines the economic advantage of learners in a futures market. We develop a dynamic model of learning in which a spot market and futures market both exist for a real good. The economy is composed of producers who can engage in hedging activities, speculators who trade in the futures market, and consumers who are described by an inverse demand function for the underlying commodity. Producers and speculators are heterogeneous and are differentiated based upon the predictive equations they employ when formulating forecasts of next period's spot price. We derive the dynamic rational‐expectations equilibrium of the model and show that learners enjoy an economic advantage in the futures market. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:151–167, 2003     

Response to price and production risk: The case of Australian wheat

A model of Australian wheat grower supply response was specified under the constrainsts of price and yield uncertainty, risk aversion, partial adjustment, and quadratic costs. The model was solved to obtain area planted. The results of estimation indicate that risk arising from prices and climate have had a significant influence on producer decision making. The coefficient of relative risk aversion and short‐run and long‐run elasticities of supply with respect to price were calculated. Wheat growers' risk premium, expected at the start of the season for exposed price and yield risk, was 2.8 percent of revenue or 10.4 percent of profit as measured by producer surplus. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20: 345–359, 2000.     

THE STOCHASTIC VOLATILITY MODEL OF BARNDORFF‐NIELSEN AND SHEPHARD IN COMMODITY MARKETS

We consider the non‐Gaussian stochastic volatility model of Barndorff‐Nielsen and Shephard for the exponential mean‐reversion model of Schwartz proposed for commodity spot prices. We analyze the properties of the stochastic dynamics, and show in particular that the log‐spot prices possess a stationary distribution defined as a normal variance‐mixture model. Furthermore, the stochastic volatility model allows for explicit forward prices, which may produce a hump structure inherited from the mean‐reversion of the stochastic volatility. Although the spot price dynamics has continuous paths, the forward prices will have a jump dynamics, where jumps occur according to changes in the volatility process. We compare with the popular Heston stochastic volatility dynamics, and show that the Barndorff‐Nielsen and Shephard model provides a more flexible framework in describing commodity spot prices. An empirical example on UK spot data is included.     

A paradox of price–quality and market efficiency: a comparative study of the US and China markets

The price–quality schema rests on an assumption that price is credible information about product quality. However, the credibility of price information varies across different markets. In an inefficient market, consumers would believe in the price–quality relationship to a lesser extent because price information is less credible. Paradoxically, in such a market, sometimes consumers have to rely more on price to infer quality because other product information is less available. With a cross-national perspective, this study investigated the influences of market efficiency and consumer risk aversion on the price–quality schema between the China and the US markets. We found that due to the inefficient market environment, Chinese consumers possess a weaker price–quality schema than American consumers. Chinese consumers are more risk averse than their American counterparts. However, in China, risk-averse consumers are more likely to use price to infer product quality. Implications for global marketing are discussed, and directions for future research are suggested.     

浅析套期保值中棉花套利的应用

套保套利是指以规避现货价格风险为目的的期货交易行为.企业开展套保套利交易,是将期货市场当作转移价格风险的场所,利用期货合约作为将来在现货市场上买卖商品的临时替代物,对其现在买进但准备以后售出的商品或对将来需要买进的商品的价格进行"锁定"的交易活动.套保套利的本质在于"风险对冲"和"风险转移".     

Delivery risk and the hedging role of options

Multiple delivery specifications exist on nearly all commodity futures contracts. Sellers typically are allowed to deliver any of several grades of the underlying commodity and at any of several locations. On the delivery day, the futures price as such needs not converge to the spot price of the par‐delivery grade at the par‐delivery location, thereby imposing an additional delivery risk on hedgers. This article derives the optimal hedging strategy for a risk‐averse hedger in the presence of delivery risk. In particular, it is shown that the hedger optimally uses options on futures for hedging purposes. This article provides a rationale for the hedging role of options when futures markets allow for multiple delivery specifications. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:339–354, 2002     

Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management

We study the problem of demand response contracts in electricity markets by quantifying the impact of considering a continuum of consumers with mean–field interaction, whose consumption is impacted by a common noise. We formulate the problem as a Principal–Agent problem with moral hazard in which the Principal—she—is an electricity producer who observes continuously the consumption of a continuum of risk‐averse consumers, and designs contracts in order to reduce her production costs. More precisely, the producer incentivizes each consumer to reduce the average and the volatility of his consumption in different usages, without observing the efforts he makes. We prove that the producer can benefit from considering the continuum of consumers by indexing contracts on the consumption of one Agent and aggregate consumption statistics from the distribution of the entire population of consumers. In the case of linear energy valuation, we provide closed‐form expression for this new type of optimal contracts that maximizes the utility of the producer. In most cases, we show that this new type of contracts allows the Principal to choose the risks she wants to bear, and to reduce the problem at hand to an uncorrelated one.