Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights

We demonstrate that auctioning market licenses may result in higher market prices than assigning them via more random allocation mechanisms. When future market profit is uncertain, winning an auction is like winning a lottery ticket. If firms differ in risk attitudes, auctions select the least risk-averse firm, which, in turn, set a higher price (or a higher quantity, in case quantity is the decision variable) in the marketplace than an average firm.     

Ability, Education, and Income Inequality

A model of education where the distribution of abilities is the source of heterogeneity is investigated. Ability is a key determinant of human capital accumulated when young, which in turn determines income and its distribution. The assumption of heterogeneous abilities leads to steady‐state income distributions that exhibit income inequality. Of particular interest is the result that symmetric distributions of ability generate positively skewed income distributions. Models of private and public education are analyzed and compared. It is found that private education results in higher incomes and less income inequality than observed in the public education model.     

Political turnover and the accumulation of democratic capital

Certain democratic institutions tend to persist in some countries whereas they are frequently reversed in others. Focusing on strong constraints on executive power as one such institution, this paper theoretically studies the cross-country differences in the costs of relaxing these constraints. The model features two political parties that stochastically alternate in office according to a political uncertainty parameter. In each period, the incumbent can make reversible investments into the future government's ability to reform executive constraints. The main results indicate that more competitive elections and higher degrees of policy polarization between the political parties lead to high and persistent levels of investment into the society's stock of “democratic capital”. These higher costs of institutional reform in turn result in durable strong executive constraint-regimes.     

Price as a quality signal in a strategic competition context: The role of a disclosure law

This paper analyses a firm's incentive to use price as a signal of quality in a duopoly competition, even though she can credibly and costlessly disclose her true quality. When a firm sets a higher price to signal higher quality, it has strategic effects on the price chosen by her rival. This could result in higher equilibrium prices and profits. Hence, a mandatory disclosure law is useful to prevent the practice of using of higher price as a device to signal higher quality, and in turn equilibrium prices would be lower. From a welfarist point of view, this argument justifies the establishment of such disclosure law.JEL Classification: D43, D82, K29I would like to thank Dolors Berga, Nicolas Boccard, Ramon Caminal, Carmen Matutes, José Luis Moraga and Ricard Torres for their useful comments. This paper has benefited from the comments of two anonymous referees. All the surviving mistakes are mine. Financial support from SEC2001-2793-C03-03 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Accountability in government and regulatory policies: Theory and evidence

A key market institution is the degree of accountability to which the officials involved in regulation are exposed. While elected officials strive for re-election, appointed ones are career-concerned. Provided that the effort exerted to uncover the firm’s unknown cost is sufficiently effective in swaying votes, elected officials produce more information than appointed ones do. As a result, when the demand is inelastic, appointment induces wider allocative distortions and higher profits which, in turn, yield stronger incentives to invest. Hence, appointment will prevail on election when investment inducement is sufficiently relevant and shareholders are sufficiently more powerful than consumers. Data on electricity rates and costs, and the methods of selecting regulators and appellate judges for a panel of forty-seven US states confirm these predictions.     

Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game

History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs.     

基于市场周转率的股票市场收益预测

我国许多股票交易者在交易时追求流行,偏爱交易高周转率的热门股票,偏爱在市场火热时入市。这种行为使高周转率的股票以及高周转率的市场时期可能具有超额利润。我们利用两个自回归求积移动平均法模型成功地发现中国股票市场的周转率可以预测股票收益。     

商业银行信贷配给对中国房地产业波动的影响*

商业银行信贷配给控制中国房地产业信贷规模和结构,造成供给和需求的规模与结构扭曲,影响货币政策和财政政策的调控效果,容易引起房地产业波动。本文通过构建信贷配给模型,测算不同波动时期当中,商业银行信贷配给程度的变化趋势,以及对房地产业的影响。实证结果显示,信贷配给程度的变化与房地产业波动显著相关,信贷配给改变了投资和消费在推动房地产产出过程中的结构,并制约路径依赖对产出的影响,同时影响财政政策和数量型货币政策稳定房地产业的效果。本文认为,可以通过逐渐弱化商业银行在房地产金融市场中的垄断地位,丰富房地产信贷供给层次和结构,以及加强信贷供给监督来缓解信贷配给的消极作用。     

On the welfare implications of restricting bankruptcy information

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) dictates that adverse events such as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing must be removed from an individual’s credit record after 10 years. The intent of the law is to provide partial consumption insurance by giving an individual a fresh start. However, the law obviously weakens incentives not to default, which can result in higher interest rates that in turn reduce intertemporal insurance. Because of this tradeoff, it is unclear how long is the optimal length of time that an adverse event remains on an individual’s credit record. In this paper we assess the welfare consequences of varying the length of time that adverse events can be on one’s credit record. We calibrate the model to US data where the exclusion parameter is set to be 10 years on average. Then we run a counterfactual to find the length that maximizes ex-post economywide welfare using a consumption equivalent measure. The model predicts agents prefer to remove the bankruptcy flag after one year, though the gains are small.     

地方产业集群内部网络关系及其绩效考察——以盛泽丝绸纺织业集群为例

关系转向已经成为西方经济地理学的重要研究热点之一.文章引入关系经济地理学中的"弱关系(weakties)"、"嵌入性(embeddeness)"、"氛围(atmosphere and milieu)"等概念工具,考察产业集群内部网络关系及其经济绩效,以盛泽丝绸纺织业集群为例,通过对调查问卷数据的多分变量Logstic 回归(Multinomial Logistic Regression)分析认为,集群本地的企业间网络关系越广,企业的经营绩效就越高;集群企业同本地行业协会、政府的关系越密切,企业的经营绩效越高;而企业的经营绩效与企业间关系强度之间并不呈正相关关系,部分验证了格兰若维特"弱关系优势"原理.     

Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions

A natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions: Firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees, and larger investments translate into higher wages. In particular, when wages are determined by ex post bargaining, the equilibrium is always inefficient: Recognizing that capital-intensive production relations have to pay higher wages, firms reduce their investments. This can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers, but this, in turn, depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive entry of firms. In contrast to this benchmark, we show that efficiency is achieved when firms post wages and workers can direct their search toward more attractive offers. This efficiency result generalizes to an environment with imperfect information where workers only observe a few of the equilibrium wage offers. We show that the underlying reason for efficiency is not wage posting per se, but the ability of workers to direct their search toward more capital-intensive jobs.     

The economics of production systems: Segmentation and skill-biased change

In this paper, the concept of production systems is introduced. I assume a standard thick-market externality together with the idea that higher quality goods also require higher skills from workers. Firms face a trade-off between low-quality goods with low skill-requirements for which the potentially abundant labour force generates strong thick-market externalities and higher quality goods with higher skill-requirements. In equilibrium, the economy is partitioned into production systems, i.e., clusters of firms producing the same quality. The distribution of skills determines the boundaries of the production systems, which in turn determine the wages. In this framework an increase in the supply of skilled workers can induce first higher wages for all workers and then higher wages for the skilled but lower wages for the unskilled. This is consistent with the late 20th century evolution of the US labour market.     

Asymmetric Information,Auditing Commitment,and Economic Growth

We analyze in this paper the growth and welfare consequences stemming from the lack of auditing commitment in a credit market with costly state verification. By studying two endogenous growth models, one of which allows lenders to commit to costly auditing strategies, whereas the other does not, we show that the inability to commit serves as a source of informational friction that results in more stringent contractual terms, which, in turn, result in lower capital accumulation, growth, and welfare. From the policy perspective, our analysis suggests a new micro‐economic channel through which institutional failings hinder economic growth and social welfare.     

论工业发展重型化倾向——以广东省为例

近年来,广东省为了提升、优化工业结构,提出工业发展的适度重型化发展战略,并取得了一定的成效。但是．全省某些地方有不顾工业发展适度重型化的工业结构性和市经济性的内在要求,出现工业发展重型化的倾向。为克服这一倾向,要以全球视野构建合理的现代重化工业体系,分类制定重化工业产业指导目录,按区别对待重化工业的政绩考量指标。     

On the measurement of dynamic effects of integration

By allowing a freer interplay of market forces, the market liberalization involved in closer economic integration can improve the efficiency of productive factors. This permits greater output from the same inputs. A side effect of this improved efficiency is an improved investment climate in the integrating region. This in turn will result in a higher investment rate, thereby augmenting the initial output gains by providing the economy with more resources. The same sort of induced capital formation can also boost investment in human capital and knowledge capital. Primitive calculations of the size and timing of these induced capital formation can be made using an aggregate GDP function. A rough approximation of the adjustment path shows that the extra investment will stimulate growth for decades, although half of the total effect will occur in the first 10 to 50 years.     

Antecedents and consequences of nurse managers' perceptions of organizational support

The antecedents and consequences of nurse managers' perceptions of organizational support were evaluated. Study results revealed that changeable work environment factors are important precursors of perceptions of organizational support, which, in turn, result in positive work attitudes and better health.     

Fiscal federalism and economic growth

This paper uses an endogenous-growth model with overlapping generations to explore the connection between fiscal federalism and economic growth. The analysis shows that federalism, which allows public-good levels to be tailored to suit the differing demands of young and old consumers, who live in different jurisdictions, increases the incentive to save. This stronger incentive in turn leads to an increase in investment in human capital, and a byproduct of this higher investment is faster economic growth.     

Political booms and currency crises

This paper shows evidence that political booms, defined as the rise in governments’ popularity, are associated with a higher likelihood of currency crises. The reasoning behind this finding is that prudent economic policies to address underlying weaknesses in the economy may be political costly for incumbent governments in the short-term. Hence, popularity-concerned governments may not have enough incentives to take such corrective actions in a timely manner. This approach, in turn, can deteriorate economic fundamentals and increase related risks in the economy which can eventually lead to crises. This paper sheds light on this phenomenon in the case of currency crises, suggesting that currency crises can be viewed as “political booms gone bust” events. Moreover, it finds that higher international reserves, higher exports, and a higher degree of financial openness alleviate the effect of political booms on currency crises.     

以教学为中心强化教学质量监控

高校督导工作是近年来高校开展的一项加强教学质量监控的重要内容。高校教学督导工作的性质、任务、机制已引起教学科研同行的重视。新疆财经学院的教学督导工作是以教学为中心，主要围绕督教、督学、督管三大内容开展的，在工作中履行检查、监督、评价和指导职能，发挥了院领导的参谋助手作用、系部之间的桥梁作用、教学专家的督导作用等，对培养良好的教风、学风起到了一定的促进作用。     

Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment

To construct their Equilibrium Binding Agreements, Ray and Vohra (J. Econ. Theory, 73 (1997) 30-78) define a concept of an equilibrium between coalitions and prove its existence for any coalition structure. We show that this result crucially depends on the quasi-concavity of the utility functions, which in turn depends on the type of mixed strategies used by the coalitions. When coalitions use uncorrelated mixed strategies utility functions may not be quasi-concave and an equilibrium may not exist. However, if coalitions use correlated strategies, an equilibrium always exist.