Strategy and society: the link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility

Governments, activists, and the media have become adept at holding companies to account for the social consequences of their actions. In response, corporate social responsibility has emerged as an inescapable priority for business leaders in every country. Frequently, though, CSR efforts are counterproductive, for two reasons. First, they pit business against society, when in reality the two are interdependent. Second, they pressure companies to think of corporate social responsibility in generic ways instead of in the way most appropriate to their individual strategies. The fact is, the prevailing approaches to CSR are so disconnected from strategy as to obscure many great opportunities for companies to benefit society. What a terrible waste. If corporations were to analyze their opportunities for social responsibility using the same frameworks that guide their core business choices, they would discover, as Whole Foods Market, Toyota, and Volvo have done, that CSR can be much more than a cost, a constraint, or a charitable deed--it can be a potent source of innovation and competitive advantage. In this article, Michael Porter and Mark Kramer propose a fundamentally new way to look at the relationship between business and society that does not treat corporate growth and social welfare as a zero-sum game. They introduce a framework that individual companies can use to identify the social consequences of their actions; to discover opportunities to benefit society and themselves by strengthening the competitive context in which they operate; to determine which CSR initiatives they should address; and to find the most effective ways of doing so. Perceiving social responsibility as an opportunity rather than as damage control or a PR campaign requires dramatically different thinking--a mind-set, the authors warn, that will become increasingly important to competitive success.     

Getting real about virtual commerce

In its first generation, electronic commerce has been a landgrab. Space on the Internet was claimed by whoever got there first with enough resources to create a credible business. It took speed, a willingness to experiment, and a lot of cybersavvy. Companies that had performed brilliantly in traditional settings seemed hopelessly flat-footed on the Web. And despite their astronomical valuations, the new e-commerce stars have appeared to be just as confused. Many have yet to make a profit, and no one has any idea when they will. Now, the authors contend, we are entering the second generation of e-commerce, and it will be shaped more by strategy than by experimentation. The key players--branded-goods suppliers, physical retailers, electronic retailers, and pure navigators--will shift their attention from claiming territory to defending or capturing it. They will be forced to focus on strategies to achieve competitive advantage. Success will go to the businesses that get closest to consumers, the ones that help customers navigate their way through the Web. Indeed, the authors argue, navigation is the battlefield on which competitive advantage will be won or lost. There are three dimensions of navigation: Reach is about access and connection. Affiliation is about whose interests the business represents. And richness is the depth of the information that a business gives to or collects about its customers. Navigators and e-retailers have the natural advantage in reach and affiliation, while traditional product suppliers and retailers have the edge in richness. The authors offer practical advice to each player on competing in the second generation of e-commerce.     

Price smarter on the Net

Companies generally have set prices on the Internet in two ways. Many start-ups have offered untenably low prices in a rush to capture first-mover advantage. Many incumbents have simply charged the same prices on-line as they do off-line. Either way, companies are missing a big opportunity. The fundamental value of the Internet lies not in lowering prices or making them consistent but in optimizing them. After all, if it's easy for customers to compare prices on the Internet, it's also easy for companies to track customers' behavior and adjust prices accordingly. The Net lets companies optimize prices in three ways. First, it lets them set and announce prices with greater precision. Different prices can be tested easily, and customers' responses can be collected instantly. Companies can set the most profitable prices, and they can tap into previously hidden customer demand. Second, because it's so easy to change prices on the Internet, companies can adjust prices in response to even small fluctuations in market conditions, customer demand, or competitors' behavior. Third, companies can use the clickstream data and purchase histories that it collects through the Internet to segment customers quickly. Then it can offer segment-specific prices or promotions immediately. By taking full advantage of the unique possibilities afforded by the Internet to set prices with precision, adapt to changing circumstances quickly, and segment customers accurately, companies can get their pricing right. It's one of the ultimate drivers of e-business success.     

Value innovation: the strategic logic of high growth

Why are some companies able to sustain high growth in revenues and profits--and others are not? To answer that question, the authors, both of INSEAD, spent five years studying more than 30 companies around the world. They found that the difference between the high-growth companies and their less successful competitors was in each group's assumptions about strategy. Managers of the less successful companies followed conventional strategic logic. Managers of the high-growth companies followed what the authors call the logic of value innovation. Conventional strategic logic and value innovation differ along the basic dimensions of strategy. Many companies take their industry's conditions as given; value innovators don't. Many companies let competitors set the parameters of their strategic thinking; value innovators do not use rivals as benchmarks. Rather than focus on the differences among customers, value innovators look for what customers value in common. Rather than view opportunities through the lens of existing assets and capabilities, value innovators ask, What if we start anew? The authors tell the story of the French hotelier Accor, which discarded the notion of what a hotel is supposed to look like in order to offer what most customers want: a good night's sleep at a low price. And Virgin Atlantic challenged industry conventions by eliminating first-class service and channeling savings into innovations for business-class passengers. Those companies didn't set out to build advantages over the competition, but they ended up achieving the greatest competitive advantages.     

Making business sense of the Internet

For managers in large, well-established businesses, the Internet is a tough nut to crack. It is very simple to set up a Web presence and very difficult to create a Web-based business model. Established businesses that over decades have carefully built brands and physical distribution relationships risk damaging all they have created when they pursue commerce through the Net. Still, managers can't avoid the impact of electronic commerce on their businesses. They need to understand the opportunities available to them and recognize how their companies may be vulnerable if rivals seize those opportunities first. Broadly speaking, the Internet presents four distinct types of opportunities. First, it links companies directly to customers, suppliers, and other interested parties. Second, it lets companies bypass other players in an industry's value chain. Third, it is a tool for developing and delivering new products and services to new customers. Fourth, it will enable certain companies to dominate the electronic channel of an entire industry or segment, control access to customers, and set business rules. As he elaborates on these four points, the author gives established companies a systematic way to sort through the risks and rewards of doing business in cyberspace.     

The 2001 HBR list. Breakthrough ideas for today's business agenda

Business is shaped by ideas. But how do you separate enduring ideas from passing fancies? In this, the first edition of the annual HBR List, our editors spotlight five break-through ideas that are truly shaping the future of business. EVEN A GREAT BUSINESS MODEL IS NOT ENOUGH: The rise and fall of dot-coms left markets reeling and CEOs scratching their heads. The most important lesson of the debacle: squishy thinking about "business models" is no substitute for a distinctive strategy. CHANGE IS CHANGING: In recent years, pundits have urged executives to incite revolutions within their companies. But a growing group of experts now suggests that the best companies actually evolve through incremental change--change that builds on rather than subverts their heritage. EGO MAKES THE LEADER: By looking deeply into executives' psyches, we are beginning to unlock the enigma of leadership. While there will never be a single recipe for successful corporate stewardship, an understanding of the human ego can shed light on leadership's most fundamental components. ONLY CONNECT: In business organizations, what's really important about people is not their individual skills but the relationships they form with one another. By investing in "social capital," companies can often push their performance to a whole new level. THE BIOLOGY CENTURY DAWNS: In the twentieth century, product innovations tended to spring from physics. But in the new century, biology may be the central source of innovation. From genomics to biomimicry, the study of life promises to change what companies sell and even how they operate.     

Don't homogenize, synchronize.

To be more responsive to customers, companies often break down organizational walls between their units--setting up all manner of cross-business and cross-functional task forces and working groups and promoting a "one-company" culture. But such attempts can backfire terribly by distracting business and functional units and by contaminating their strategies and processes. Fortunately, there's a better way, says the author. Rather than tear down organizational walls, a company can make them permeable to information. It can synchronize all its data on products, filtering the information through linked databases and applications and delivering it in a coordinated, meaningful form to customers. As a result, the organization can present a single, unified face to the customer--one that can change as market conditions warrant--without imposing homogeneity on its people. Such synchronization can lead not just to stronger customer relationships and more sales but also to greater operational efficiency. It allows a company, for example, to avoid the high costs of maintaining many different information systems with redundant data. The decoupling of product control from customer control in a synchronized company reflects a fundamental fact about business: While companies have to focus on creating great products, customers think in terms of the activities they perform and the benefits they seek. For companies, products are ends, but for customers, products are means. The disconnect between how customers think and how companies organize themselves is what leads to inefficiencies and missed opportunities, and that's exactly the problem that synchronization solves. Synchronized companies can get closer to customers, sustain product innovation, and improve operational efficiency--goals that have traditionally been very difficult to achieve simultaneously.     

Take command of your growth

Ask senior managers to pare costs by 10%, and they know just what to do. Ask them to boost growth by 10%, and they're stymied, assuming that growth is not really something they can influence. But managers can control their company's growth if they have better information about where their revenues are coming from. Rather than sort sales by geographic market, business unit, or product line, they should break them out in a way that reveals which part of their strategy is responsible for what part of their revenue. This article presents a tool--the sources of revenue statement (SRS)--that does just that. Through straightforward calculations using data taken from a company's balance sheet, along with estimations of customer-churn and industry growth rates, the SRS enables managers to classify their revenue according to five sources of growth: continuing sales to established customers (base retention); sales won from the competition (share gain); sales that fell into their laps because the market was expanding (market position); sales from moves into adjacent markets; and sales from entirely new lines of business. Once sorted in this way, revenue can be viewed as the outgrowth of manageable circumstances. At one company, seemingly healthy 10% total revenue growth masked substantial customer defections counter-balanced only by sales in a fast-expanding market--a market that actually grew faster than the company did. Rather than doing well, the company was ceding customers and market share to competitors. Comparing the sources of revenue across divisions can uncover similarly profound insights, which can suggest smart ways to change strategy or set stretch goals. Hundreds of companies are perched atop enormous potential that they can't see and so don't exploit. The SRS can endow them with sight and, more important, with understanding.     

Strategy as simple rules

The success of Yahoo!, eBay, Enron, and other companies that have become adept at morphing to meet the demands of changing markets can't be explained using traditional thinking about competitive strategy. These companies have succeeded by pursuing constantly evolving strategies in market spaces that were considered unattractive according to traditional measures. In this article--the third in an HBR series by Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald Sull on strategy in the new economy--the authors ask, what are the sources of competitive advantage in high-velocity markets? The secret, they say, is strategy as simple rules. The companies know that the greatest opportunities for competitive advantage lie in market confusion, but they recognize the need for a few crucial strategic processes and a few simple rules. In traditional strategy, advantage comes from exploiting resources or stable market positions. In strategy as simple rules, advantage comes from successfully seizing fleeting opportunities. Key strategic processes, such as product innovation, partnering, or spinout creation, place the company where the flow of opportunities is greatest. Simple rules then provide the guidelines within which managers can pursue such opportunities. Simple rules, which grow out of experience, fall into five broad categories: how- to rules, boundary conditions, priority rules, timing rules, and exit rules. Companies with simple-rules strategies must follow the rules religiously and avoid the temptation to change them too frequently. A consistent strategy helps managers sort through opportunities and gain short-term advantage by exploiting the attractive ones. In stable markets, managers rely on complicated strategies built on detailed predictions of the future. But when business is complicated, strategy should be simple.     

Competing on capabilities: the new rules of corporate strategy

In the 1980s, companies discovered time as a new source of competitive advantage. In the 1990s, they will discover that time is only one piece of a more far-reaching transformation in the logic of competition. Using examples from Wal-Mart and other highly successful companies, Stalk, Evans, and Shulman of the Boston Consulting Group provide managers with a guide to the new world of "capabilities-based competition." In today's dynamic business environment, strategy too must become dynamic. Competition is a "war of movement" in which success depends on anticipation of market trends and quick response to changing customer needs. In such an environment, the essence of strategy is not the structure of a company's products and markets but the dynamics of its behavior. To succeed, a company must weave its key business processes into hard-to-imitate strategic capabilities that distinguish it from its competitors in the eyes of customers. A capability is a set of business processes strategically understood--for example, Wal-Mart's expertise in inventory replenishment, Honda's skill at dealer management, or Banc One's ability to "out-local the national banks and out-national the local banks." Such capabilities are collective and cross-functional--a small part of many people's jobs, not a large part of a few. Finally, competing on capabilities requires strategic investments in support systems that span traditional SBUs and functions and go far beyond what traditional cost-benefit metrics can justify. A CEO's success in building and managing a company's capabilities will be the chief test of management skill in the 1990s. The prize: companies that combine scale and flexibility to outperform the competition.     

Tailored logistics: the next advantage

How many top executives have ever visited with managers who move materials from the factory to the store? How many still reduce the costs of logistics to the rent of warehouses and the fees charged by common carriers? To judge by hours of senior management attention, logistics problems do not rank high. But logistics have the potential to become the next governing element of strategy. Whether they know it or not, senior managers of every retail store and diversified manufacturing company compete in logistically distinct businesses. Customer needs vary, and companies can tailor their logistics systems to serve their customers better and more profitably. Companies do not create value for customers and sustainable advantage for themselves merely by offering varieties of goods. Rather, they offer goods in distinct ways. A particular can of Coca-Cola, for example, might be a can of Coca-Cola going to a vending machine, or a can of Coca-Cola that comes with billing services. There is a fortune buried in this distinction. The goal of logistics strategy is building distinct approaches to distinct groups of customers. The first step is organizing a cross-functional team to proceed through the following steps: segmenting customers according to purchase criteria, establishing different standards of service for different customer segments, tailoring logistics pipelines to support each segment, and creating economics of scale to determine which assets can be shared among various pipelines. The goal of establishing logistically distinct businesses is familiar: improved knowledge of customers and improved means of satisfying them.     

Why business models matter

"Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.     

Finally, a way to put your Internet portfolio in order

Eager to capitalize on the Internet's potential, many companies have allowed scores of on-line projects to bubble up throughout their organizations. The result? More harm than good, as companies find themselves confusing customers, aggravating employees, and wasting bushels of money. In this article, consultant Anthony Tjan explains how companies can do better. By adapting classical portfolio strategy to the digital age, executives can coordinate their Internet initiatives to avoid the needless headaches and spending, he says. Much of the market and industry data that underpin traditional portfolio analysis is unavailable for the Internet space, so Tjan replaces the two criteria used in traditional portfolio analysis--market position and industry attractiveness--with business viability and business fit. Viability captures the available quantitative data about an investment's likely payoff. Fit is qualitative; it measures the degree to which an investment dovetails with a company's existing processes, capabilities, and culture. Using viability and fit to assess their online initiatives, companies can then plot these efforts onto a simple matrix, called an Internet portfolio map. Their location on the matrix will suggest whether each initiative should be invested in, redesigned, sold or spun out, or killed. As Tjan notes, the process of organizing and evaluating new investment options against coherent, meaningful criteria isn't new. In the digital era, what is new are the tools you use. Internet portfolio planning is one such tool.     

Finding your next core business

How do you know when your core needs to change? And how do you determine what should replace it? From an in-depth study of 25 companies, the author, a strategy consultant, has discovered that it's possible to measure the vitality of a business's core. If it needs reinvention, he says, the best course is to mine hidden assets. Some of the 25 companies were in deep crisis when they began the process of redefining themselves. But, says Zook, management teams can learn to recognize early signs of erosion. He offers five diagnostic questions with which to evaluate the customers, key sources of differentiation, profit pools, capabilities, and organizational culture of your core business. The next step is strategic regeneration. In four-fifths of the companies Zook examined, a hidden asset was the centerpiece of the new strategy. He provides a map for identifying the hidden assets in your midst, which tend to fall into three categories: undervalued business platforms, untapped insights into customers, and underexploited capabilities. The Swedish company Dometic, for example, was manufacturing small absorption refrigerators for boats and RVs when it discovered a hidden asset: its understanding of, and access to, customers in the RV market. The company took advantage of a boom in that market to refocus on complete systems for live-in vehicles. The Danish company Novozymes, which produced relatively low-tech commodity enzymes such as those used in detergents, realized that its underutilized biochemical capability in genetic and protein engineering was a hidden asset and successfully refocused on creating bioengineered specialty enzymes. Your next core business is not likely to announce itself with fanfare. Use the author's tools to conduct an internal audit of possibilities and pinpoint your new focus.     

Building deals on bedrock

The headlines are filled with the sorry tales of companies like Vivendi and AOL Time Warner that tried to use mergers and acquisitions to grow big fast or transform fundamentally weak business models. But, drawing on extensive data and experience, the authors conclude that major deals make sense in only two circumstances: when they reinforce a company's existing basis of competition or when they help a company make the shift, as the industry's competitive base changes. In most stable industries, the authors contend, only one basis--superior cost position, brand power, consumer loyalty, real-asset advantage, or government protection--leads to industry leadership, and companies should do only those deals that bolster a strategy to capitalize on that competitive base. That's what Kellogg did when it acquired Keebler. Rather than bow to price pressures from lesser players, Kellogg sought to strengthen its existing basis of competition--its brand--through Keebler's innovative distribution system. A company coping with a changing industry should embark on a series of acquisitions (most likely coupled with divestitures) aimed at moving the firm to the new competitive basis. That's what Comcast did when changes in government regulations fundamentally altered the broadcast industry. In such cases, speed is essential, the investments required are huge, and half-measures can be worse than nothing at all. Still, the research shows, successful acquirers are not those that try to swallow a single, large, supposedly transformative deal but those that go to the M&A table often and take small bites. Deals can fuel growth--as long as they're anchored in the fundamental way money is made in your industry. Fail to understand that and no amount of integration planning will keep you and your shareholders from bearing the high cost of your mistakes.     

IT doesn't matter

As information technology has grown in power and ubiquity, companies have come to view it as ever more critical to their success; their heavy spending on hardware and software clearly reflects that assumption. Chief executives routinely talk about information technology's strategic value, about how they can use IT to gain a competitive edge. But scarcity, not ubiquity, makes a business resource truly strategic--and allows companies to use it for a sustained competitive advantage. You only gain an edge over rivals by doing something that they can't. IT is the latest in a series of broadly adopted technologies--think of the railroad or the electric generator--that have reshaped industry over the past two centuries. For a brief time, as they were being built into the infrastructure of commerce, these technologies created powerful opportunities for forward-looking companies. But as their availability increased and their costs decreased, they became commodity inputs. From a strategic standpoint, they became invisible; they no longer mattered. that's exactly what's happening to IT, and the implications are profound. In this article, HBR's editor-at-large Nicholas Carr suggests that IT management should, frankly, become boring. It should focus on reducing risks, not increasing opportunities. For example, companies need to pay more attention to ensuring network and data security. Even more important, they need to manage IT costs more aggressively. IT may not help you gain a strategic advantage, but it could easily put you at a cost disadvantage. If, like many executives, you've begun to take a more defensive posture toward IT, spending more frugally and thinking more pragmatically, you're already on the right course. The challenge will be to maintain that discipline when the business cycle strengthens.     

Get the right mix of bricks & clicks

The bright line that once distinguished the dot-com from the incumbent is rapidly fading. Success in the new economy will go to those who can execute clicks-and-mortar strategies that bridge the physical and virtual worlds. But how executives forge such strategies is under considerable debate. Despite the obvious benefits that integration offers--cross-promotion, shared information, purchasing leverage, distribution economies, and the like--many executives now assume that Internet businesses have to be separate to thrive. They believe that the very nature of traditional business--its protectiveness of current customers, its fear of cannibalization, its general myopia--will smother any Internet initiative. Authors Ranjay Gulati and Jason Garino contend that executives don't have to make an either- or choice when it comes to their clicks-and-mortar strategies. The question isn't, "Should we develop our Internet channel in-house or launch a spin-off?" but rather, "What degree of integration makes sense for our company?" To determine the best level of integration for their companies, executives should examine four business dimensions: brand, management, operations, and equity. Drawing on the experiences of three established retailers--Office Depot, KB Toys, and Rite Aid--the authors show the spectrum of strategies available and discuss the trade-offs involved in each choice. By thinking carefully about which aspects of a business to integrate and which to keep distinct, companies can tailor their clicks-and-mortar strategy to their own particular market and competitive situation, dramatically increasing their odds of e-business success.     

The ten deadly mistakes of wanna-dots

Increasingly, it seems, there are just two types of companies left in the world: dot-coms, born on the Internet, and "wanna-dots," established organizations that are seeking to incorporate the Internet into their businesses. Some wanna-dots manage the deep mind-shift required to cross the digital divide. These are the pacesetters--the first movers and fast followers that exhibit organizational curiosity and the desire to innovate. But most wanna-dots are laggards; they don't rise to the challenge with the same resolve. In a global research effort involving more than 800 companies, the author uncovered so many wanna-dots making the same kinds of mistakes that it almost seemed they were following a How Not to Change guide. In this article, Kanter creates just such a guide, offering ten pieces of antiadvice that expose the tendency of wanna-dots to make only cosmetic changes when deep transformation is required. Beyond delineating what not to do, Kanter serves up two examples of wanna-dots that got it right. First, Williams-Sonoma, which successfully made up for a slow start to create a strong Web presence. Second, Honeywell, a pacesetter led by e-believers from the start, which still found the road to the Web a challenging one. For companies not born digital, the fundamental problem is change. And the real place to look for change is not on the Internet but inside your company--at your own organizational culture and your attitude toward change.     

Business marketing: understand what customers value

How do you define the value of your market offering? Can you measure it? Few suppliers in business markets are able to answer those questions, and yet the ability to pinpoint the value of a product or service for one's customers has never been more important. By creating and using what the authors call customer value models, suppliers are able to figure out exactly what their offerings are worth to customers. Field value assessments--the most commonly used method for building customer value models--call for suppliers to gather data about their customers firsthand whenever possible. Through these assessments, a supplier can build a value model for an individual customer or for a market segment, drawing on data gathered form several customers in that segment. Suppliers can use customer value models to create competitive advantage in several ways. First, they can capitalize on the inevitable variation in customers' requirements by providing flexible market offerings. Second, they can use value models to demonstrate how a new product or service they are offering will provide greater value. Third, they can use their knowledge of how their market offerings specifically deliver value to craft persuasive value propositions. And fourth, they can use value models to provide evidence to customers of their accomplishments. Doing business based on value delivered gives companies the means to get an equitable return for their efforts. Once suppliers truly understand value, they will be able to realize the benefits of measuring and monitoring it for their customers.     

Making strategy: learning by doing

Companies find it difficult to change strategy for many reasons, but one stands out: strategic thinking is not a core managerial competence at most companies. Executives hone their capabilities by tackling problems over and over again. Changing strategy, however, is not usually a task that they face repeatedly. Once companies have found a strategy that works, they want to use it, not change it. Consequently, most managers do not develop a competence in strategic thinking. This Manager's Tool Kit presents a three-stage method executives can use to conceive and implement a creative and coherent strategy themselves. The first stage is to identify and map the driving forces that the company needs to address. The process of mapping provides strategy-making teams with visual representations of team members' assumptions, those pictures, in turn, enable managers to achieve consensus in determining the driving forces. Once a senior management team has formulated a new strategy, it must align the strategy with the company's resource-allocation process to make implementation possible. Senior management teams can translate their strategy into action by using aggregate project planning. And management teams that link strategy and innovation through that planning process will develop a competence in implementing strategic change. The author guides the reader through the three stages of strategy making by examining the case of a manufacturing company that was losing ground to competitors. After mapping the driving forces, the company's senior managers were able to devise a new strategy that allowed the business to maintain a competitive advantage in its industry.