Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies

At least one monopoly in a two-sector model must be advantageous, according to the Shapley value. If the elasticity of substitution is a constant at least equal to one, then each monopoly has an advantage if the other sector is not monopolized. For elasticity of substitution less than one, monopoly may be disadvantageous, depending on the distribution parameter.     

Indirect public control of self-managed monopolies

How difficult is it and by what means is it possible to control a self-managed firm that has some monopoly power? To answer this question, classical modeling options are adopted: static framework, maximization by the firm of value added per capita. Three assumptions are added: perfect information on technologies by the Center, availability of unlimited lump-sum transfers and linear excise taxes, and market clearing. Attention is thus restricted to allocational problems, ruling out concern for distribution and regulation.     

State monopolies and alcoholic beverage consumption

Fifteen states have state monopolies to regulate the retail distribution of distilled spirits or wine. One objective of state ownership is the reduction of consumption. However, previous research supports both no effect and a negative effect of state monopoly (control) states on consumption.Using improved data on prices, this paper provides a mixture of classical and Bayesian estimates of beverage-specific demand functions. The analysis is carried out at the state level for the year 1982. Independent variables include the real own-price, substitute prices, income, tourism activity, religious sentiment, youth proxy, and several regulatory measures including monopoly control, bans on price advertising, minimum legal drinking age, and restrictions on the number and type of retail outlets.The results indicate no direct effect of monopoly control on consumption that is separate from effects manifested by higher prices or, for beer, limited outlets. Furthermore, average prices are not significantly greater in the monopoly states. Several possible explanations are advanced to explain these results, including the likelihood that the higher transaction costs in the monopoly states are a tax on consumption of alcohol.     

Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.     

Complex dynamics of monopolies with gradient adjustment

This paper aims to show that delay matters in continuous- and discrete-time framework. It constructs a simple dynamic model of a boundedly rational monopoly. First the existence of the unique equilibrium state is proved under general price and cost function forms. Conditions are derived for its local asymptotical stability with both continuous and discrete time scales. The global dynamic behavior of the systems is then numerically examined, demonstrating that the continuous system is globally asymptotically stable without delay and in the presence of delay if the delay is sufficiently small. Then stability of the continuous system is lost via Hopf bifurcation. In the discrete case without delay, the steady state is locally asymptotically stable if the speed of adjustment is small enough, then stability is lost via period-doubling bifurcation. If the delay is one or two steps, then stability loss occurs via Neimark–Sacker bifurcation.     

Dictator monopolies and essential goods: experimental evidence

Monopolists set prices and if the good is unessential this may place the consumer in an uncomfortable position. But if the good is essential the consumer faces a pay-to-live or -die choice. Dictator and ultimatum games are superficially similar in that one game offers the right of refusal, while the other does not. The dictator monopoly is, however, not a game, and behaviour could be radically different in the market environment versus game environment. We recast the dictator game as a dictator monopoly experiment and find that the fairness characteristic of the game evaporates quickly as rounds progress.     

比较优势理论中的定价权

比较优势理论作为倡导国际贸易自由化的核心理论,在国际经济学领域有很高的地位。但实际上,发展中国家利用比较优势,却容易陷入比较优势陷阱。为了在理论上对此进行解释,文章从传统比较优势理论忽视的价格问题入手,说明了在国际贸易中各方获益大小的决定性因素正是国际贸易的价格。弱势国家从国际贸易中获得的利益较少,无法从国际贸易中获得足够的资源以促进经济发展。     

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap talk messages – hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders. We find that, when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component, in equilibrium information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. The market for information is in most cases a monopoly, and there is underinvestment in information acquisition. We also show that regulatory interventions, in the form of firewalls, only make the inefficiency worse. Efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked.     

The Coase conjecture need not hold for durable good monopolies with depreciation

We consider the optimal sales policy for a monopoly seller of a durable good in a non-stationary rational expectations equilibruim with replacement sales. We show that Coase's conjecture that the monopolist will sell the competitive stock as period length approaches zero may not hold under these assumptions.     

企业竞争优势系统的营造与维持

随着企业国际化的深入，国外企业的大量涌入，企业面临的竞争会越来越激烈。中国企业要想在此竞争中获胜，必须具有一定的竞争优势。本对企业竞争优势的组成元素之间相互影响、相互作用得人心形成的动态的竞争优势系统进行分析，对如何营造与保持企业的竞争优势提出一些建议。     

制定有利于贫困地区经济开发的优惠政策

为了加快贫困地区脱贫致富的步伐,缩小区域发展的差距,国务院在"七五"和"八五"期间,相继对贫困地区制定了若干休养生息的扶贫开发优惠政策.为了进一步加快贫困地区的经济开发,除了把国家在"七五"和"八五"期间对贫困地区制定的各项优惠政策用好、用足外,还需要进一步完善和制定有利于贫困地区经济开发的各项政策.     

福建工业竞争优势初探——工业分行业评价与分析

工业是国民经济的主导部门,是推动一个国家或地区现代化进程的主要力量。在新型工业化道路的转折点上,如何科学地重新审视和准确估计福建的工业竞争力,已成为推进工业化和工业现代化的一个长远问题。从福建的经济发展来看,推进工业转型升级,提升工业竞争力是应对金融危机,化解外部恶劣环境实现工业增长目标迫在眉睫的任务。本文收集了福建省及相邻省市区域39类工业的产值、销售和利润等数据,     

中国优势产业组合的动态演化机制研究——基于TERGM的实证分析

基于产品空间理论,利用1962―2015年128个国家和地区783个产业出口贸易数据,借助最新发展的时间指数随机图模型（TERGM）,深度剖析中国优势产业组合的动态演化机制。研究发现,中国优势产业组合存在显著的中心―边缘宏观网络结构特征,且由星型和三角形两种结构依赖所驱动,分别意味着轴式发展路径和链式发展路径。进一步地,动态ERGM研究结果表明,我国实施的渐进式发展战略存在时间依赖,且呈现出较强的“自稳定性”。结论表明,TERGM能够有效解决产品空间中的结构依赖和时间依赖问题,是系统描述和检验网络演化的有力分析工具,并且透过微观网络构局揭示中国优势产业组合的动态演化机制,为更好地分析产业结构的网络互赖性,实现产业转型升级提供指导。     

On the scope of indirect regulation of monopolies in the presence of large entry cost

This paper reexamines the ingenious regulation scheme put forward by Burnovsky and Zang (1991), that features a regulator who promises to subsidize entry into a market, which exhibits properties of a natural monopoly. If the subsidy promise is sufficiently high, the monopolist is led to increase output and lower price at no cost of regulation. The assumption that the monopolist always honors his pre-entry commitment has been shown to be crucial for the results obtained. This motivated our inquiry into the scope of costless indirect regulation in situations in which the incumbent's commitment cannot be inforced. It then turns out that no commitment on behalf of the incumbent can be credible that deters entry by choosing an output (capacity) at a level in excess of the monopoly output after successful entry deterrence. This represents an additional constraint for the regulator's behavior.I like to thank Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Economics Department at Boston University for generous support.     

新疆优势资源、特色产业与对外贸易发展

从新疆对外贸易发展的现状看,解决外贸结构性问题,促进新疆外贸持续发展的关键在于发挥新疆的优势资源,以此形成特色产业并培育特色产业群。在对新疆的优势资源进行分析的基础上,本文确定了农、牧、林,石油和天然气开采业,金属采选业,石油加工业,农副食品加工与制造业,纺织业,运输业和旅游业等12个特色产业。通过分析认为,新疆目前需要培育农业产业群,石油、矿产开采和加工产业群,食品加工制造产业群,纺织产业群,旅游产业群,运输和物流等6大产业群。     

基于创新的优势制造业选择及优化路径研究

在清晰界定优势制造业概念内涵的基础上,进一步探讨了优势制造业的选择方法。采用区位商和多元回归模型,构建了优势制造业选择矩阵及其优化路径,为促进区域制造业又快又好发展提出建议。