The public and private provision of pure public goods and the distortionary effects of income taxation: a political economy approach

Abstract .  A pure public good is provided by the government and the voluntary contributions of two types of households. The government finances its contribution by means of income taxation. The latter has distortionary effects. A third type of household never makes contributions. We analyse the effects of changes in the income tax rate on (a) the provision of the public good, (b) the private contributions of the households, and (c) changes in the distribution of income and welfare between contributing and non-contributing households. We derive a simple and testable condition under which the lowering of the income tax entails a Pareto improvement.     

The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.     

A reconciliation between equity and efficiency in public goods economy

Journal of Economics -     

Expenditure taxes,income taxes,and time-inconsistency

Traditional welfare-based comparisons of different tax structures implicitly assume that the government can precommit to its future optimal policy. When optimal tax rates are time- inconsistent, however, such comparisons may be misleading. This paper uses a two-period representative-consumer optimal taxation model to study the implications of time-consistency for the welfare rankings of expenditure and income taxation. I show that the welfare rankings of optimal policies may not be preserved by time-consistent ones.     

Multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences

This article examines multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences across countries. Under a planner who uses linear approximation for utility maximization, we show that (1) a country is an income receiver if it has a higher productivity than the average in producing public goods, enabling it to provide more public goods; (2) the amount of transfers can be pinned down for all countries with an adjustment cost; (3) each country obtains an identical utility increment; and (4) the country with the lowest adjustment cost is the best candidate for the planner country. All results are derived based on well-known information regarding the cost of producing the public goods and income levels.     

Migration and optimal income taxes

The issue addressed in this paper is the optimal taxation of incomes earned in the home economy, and of incomes earned abroad, when people can migrate. As a preliminary, the optimal taxation of home incomes when there is migration and no taxation of foreign incomes, is discussed. Then in a more general setting, we deal with optimal taxation of different kinds of labour when another kind of labour is not taxable, and show how this bears on the taxation of foreign incomes. The last sections of the paper analyse a simple model in which people choose between taxable labour at home, taxable labour abroad, and untaxable labour. A condition is found implying that the optimal tax on foreign income is higher than on the home income of a person of equal utility.     

Efficiency wages and income taxes

The paper was written during a visit at the Ludwig-Maximilian-University of Munich in the summer of 1988. The hospitality of this institution, as well as the financial support from a Ruhrgas Scholarship under the West German Norwegian Scholarship Scheme, is gratefully acknowledged. Participants at various seminars have given useful comments and criticism. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments to an earlier version of the paper.     

A note on lindahl taxes when public goods are inputs to household production

This note explores the incidence of benefit taxation when public goods yield utility only indirectly, as inputs to household production. It provides a condition for tax progression in terms of measurable parameters. The result is contrasted with the usually considered case of public goods being ordinary consumption goods, in which the parameters that indicate whether benefit taxation would be progressive are inestimable because of the preference revelation problem.I am grateful to two referees for insisting on clarifications and for providing useful suggestions.     

Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good

Guesnerie and Oddou [J. Econom. Theory25 (1981), 67–91] raised the open question whether an economy, in which the production of a public good is financed via proportional taxation, has a stable structure. By means of the first example a negative answer to this question is provided. The second example shows that a stable structure may fail to exist even if all the individuals have the same initial endowments in private good.     

Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes

This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed).     

Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach

This paper takes a fresh look at the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. It argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. When spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives, this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature. Depending on precisely how the legislature behaves, the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts. The extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending. Thus, the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending, but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature.     

Public goods provision,inequality and taxes

The impact of redistributive policies on voluntary contributions is still not well understood. While a higher level of redistributive taxation decreases the price of voluntary giving, it also changes the income distribution by decreasing income inequality. This paper provides a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the net impact of the tax rate on public goods provision. The experimental findings show that while the participants decrease their voluntary contributions as the pre-tax income distribution becomes more equal, they increase their contributions with taxation. These findings have important implications for government policies regarding privately provided public goods.     

Linearly progressive income taxes and stabilization

It has been shown that progressive income taxes may lead to saddle-point convergence when the marginal tax rate is assumed to be a continuously increasing function of income. This note shows that linearly progressive taxes may also immunize the economy against indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. Therefore, our analysis suggests that exemption thresholds, as featured by prevailing tax codes, may help to stabilize the economy.     

The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India

We are interested in how public goods get allocated by a centralized state. We use data on public goods and social structure from parliamentary constituencies in rural India to understand the allocation of these goods over the 1970s and 1980s. National policies and political agendas during this period emphasized universal access to basic amenities and financed a rapid expansion in rural infrastructure. We find evidence of considerable equalization in many of these facilities, reflecting perhaps the importance of these commitments. Among the historically disadvantaged social groups, those that mobilized themselves politically gained relative to the others. Measures of social heterogeneity that have been emphasized in the recent empirical literature on public goods are relevant but not overwhelming in their importance.     

Minimum income in a transition economy

The Albanian Ndihma Ekonomike is one of the first poverty reduction programmes launched in transitional economies. Its record has been judged positively during the recession period of the 1990s and negatively during the more recent growth phase. This article reconsiders the programme using a regression‐adjusted local linear matching estimator first suggested by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). We find the programme to have a weak targeting capacity and a non‐significant impact on different household outcomes.     

Corporate taxes, growth and welfare in a Schumpeterian economy

I take a new look at the long-run implications of taxation through the lens of modern Schumpeterian growth theory. I focus on the latest vintage of models that sterilize the scale effect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce. I show that the following interventions raise welfare: (a) granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated firms; (b) eliminating the corporate income tax and/or the capital gains tax; (c) reducing taxes on labor and/or consumption. What makes these results remarkable is that in all three cases the endogenous increase in the tax on dividends necessary to balance the budget has a positive effect on growth. A general implication of my analysis is that corporate taxation plays a special role in Schumpeterian economies and provides novel insights on how to design welfare-enhancing tax reforms.     

Inflation and capital gains taxes in a small open economy

Inflation distorts an economy through many channels. This paper highlights the interaction between inflation and capital gains tax and their distortions to a small open economy through the financial market. This research captures several observations. First, capital formation or investment is an important channel for consumption smoothing over the life cycles. Second, capital gains are taxed only when the gains are realized. Third, inflation introduces an upward bias in the calculation of tax base. Thus, a capital gains tax in the presence of inflation can have a significant welfare effect even though its contribution to the government revenue is relatively small. The quantitative analysis shows that high inflation alone can lower social welfare. This problem becomes more severe when capital gains tax is introduced in an inflationary economy. The implicit inflation tax can be more hazardous to the economy than the explicit counterpart.     

Growth, income taxes and consumption aspirations

In a Barro-type economy with exogenous consumption aspirations, raising income taxes favors growth even in the presence of lump-sum taxes. Such a policy is compatible with the behavior of private consumption, income taxes and growth rates observed in actual economies.