Lessons from the financial crisis: failure of markets or failure of regulation?

The popular, demagogic narrative after the global financial system's collapse in 2008 has held that the financial crisis signalled the failure of capitalism. However, regulators across the world must realize that the financial crisis was not brought about by the failure of markets but by the failure of governments to appropriately regulate markets. Beginning in the 1980s, and continuing over the quarter-century that followed, regulators afforded the world of big finance an unaffordable luxury: insurance against possible failure. As a result, banks and financial institutions became adept at turning their insulation from disorderly failure, as enforced by free markets, into insulation from market discipline, as inflicted by myopic regulators. This ‘too big to fail’ syndrome combined with the incorrect belief perpetrated by the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that financial companies, powered by a rational motive not to lose money, could police themselves and one another. In turn, such sanguine beliefs led to considerable over-supply of financial innovation. The supply created its own demand as the financial world operated under the implicit guarantee (and market distortion) created by the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome.

The errors laid bare by the financial crisis clearly call for regulatory reform. But in designing that reform, regulators across the world should avoid the temptation to seek heavy-handed new approaches. Instead, policymakers should look to the long-term success of the system of rules whose decay brought about the crisis. Prudent regulations must seek to reinforce the fundamental principle that no one, however big or small, can be made immune to failure. Such pro-market regulation of finance is essential to preserving and fostering countries’ economic futures.     

Stock market correlations during the financial crisis of 2008–2009: Evidence from 50 equity markets

Using data from 50 equity markets we examine conditional and unconditional correlations around two major banking events during the financial crisis of 2008–09. To measure the value of covariance information on the augmented DCC model used in the study, a portfolio in-sample estimation is performed. We show that by taking into account the change in the level of variance in high volatility periods, the estimates of the conditional covariance are more efficient in capturing the dynamics of the stock markets variance. Furthermore, in a two-asset allocation framework, the model consistently generates relatively low portfolio variances, implying substantial benefits in portfolio diversification.     

What do equity issuances signal? A study of equity issuances in the UK before and during the financial crisis

The financial crisis provides an ideal setting to study how quality signalling by firms, and information asymmetries, might explain the stock price reactions around seasoned equity offerings. The heightened information asymmetry levels during the GFC should have increased the importance of issuance quality and information asymmetries in explaining announcement returns. However, we document new and, in some cases, surprising findings, using a sample of 700 UK seasoned equity offerings between 2003 and 2012: (1) Contrary to expectations, announcement returns during the crisis were driven less by signalling and asymmetric information effects and more by macroeconomic conditions and general uncertainty. (2) In constrained capital markets, firms that were able to move more quickly to raise significant amounts of capital, made the capital-raising environment more challenging for firms that followed, such that the latter had to incur additional costs. (3) Contrary to the traditional view that the low book-to-market ratios may proxy for overvaluation and thus lower announcement returns, we found a negative relationship during the crisis period. The latter is consistent with the view that book-to-market ratios may also proxy for a distressed firm effect which may have dominated the conventional ‘market timing’ effect during the GFC. (4) Announcement returns were strongly positive for many firms at the peak of the crisis, possibly because the market was relieved to see that equity issues might potentially save firms from insolvency; an equity issuance could, in such circumstances, be a positive signal, even though equity issues are conventionally seen as negative signals. Overall, our paper documents fresh and surprising results about equity capital-raising during the GFC, and also offers insights for corporate finance that are of interest beyond the current crisis.     

Baltic stock markets and the financial crisis of 2008–2009

This study presents new evidence on stock market integration by investigating the linkages between developed European stock markets and emerging stock markets. We focus on three countries in the Baltic region, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with particular attention to the recent financial crisis of 2008–2009. The study is motivated by traditional stock market studies of integration, which show that developed stock markets are highly integrated, while emerging markets may be segmented. How integrated these emerging stock markets are in a crisis period with respect to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index is an empirical question investigated in this study. While the results of this study demonstrate that the Baltic stock markets were apparently segmented before the crisis, they were highly integrated during the crisis. The results of the variance decomposition analysis show that a large proportion of the forecast variance of the Baltic stock markets can be explained by the EUROSTOXX50 during the crisis. The results from the quantile regressions demonstrate that during the crisis the returns of the lowest quantile were most sensitive to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index. All these results imply less diversification benefits during crises when investors would need them the most.     

Baltic stock markets and the financial crisis of 2008–2009

This study presents new evidence on stock market integration by investigating the linkages between developed European stock markets and emerging stock markets. We focus on three countries in the Baltic region, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with particular attention to the recent financial crisis of 2008–2009. The study is motivated by traditional stock market studies of integration, which show that developed stock markets are highly integrated, while emerging markets may be segmented. How integrated these emerging stock markets are in a crisis period with respect to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index is an empirical question investigated in this study. While the results of this study demonstrate that the Baltic stock markets were apparently segmented before the crisis, they were highly integrated during the crisis. The results of the variance decomposition analysis show that a large proportion of the forecast variance of the Baltic stock markets can be explained by the EUROSTOXX50 during the crisis. The results from the quantile regressions demonstrate that during the crisis the returns of the lowest quantile were most sensitive to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index. All these results imply less diversification benefits during crises when investors would need them the most.     

Conglomerates on the rise again? A cross-regional study on the impact of the 2008–2009 financial crisis on the diversification discount

This paper investigates how the 2008–2009 financial crisis affected the value of diversification in different regions of the world, thereby emphasizing the role of the institutional context. We show that the effect of the credit crunch upon the diversification discount varied with the regions' level of capital market maturity and legal environment. In developed Asia Pacific, the British Isles, and North America, we find that the discount on conglomerates fell significantly during the crisis years; however, in Continental Europe – the region possessing the least developed capital markets and lowest legal investor protection in our sample – the impact of the financial meltdown upon the relative value of diversified firms was insignificant. Our study provides additional evidence on factors influencing the relative costs and benefits of diversified firms and highlights in particular the importance of accounting for different institutional settings.     

Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism

We hypothesize debt markets—not equity markets—are the primary influence on “association” metrics studied since Ball and Brown (1968 J Account Res 6:159–178). Debt markets demand high scores on timeliness, conservatism and Lev’s (1989 J Account Res 27(supplement):153–192) R ², because debt covenants utilize reported numbers. Equity markets do not rate financial reporting consistently with these metrics, because (among other things) they control for the total information incorporated in prices. Single-country studies shed little light on debt versus equity influences, in part because within-country firms operate under a homogeneous reporting regime. International data are consistent with our hypothesis. This is a fundamental issue in accounting.     

On the effects of banks�� equity ownership on credit markets

Recent deregulation of the banking sector in the US and in Europe allows commercial banks to hold equity in non-financial firms. We develop a model to investigate the effects of bank equity stakes in firms on credit market competition. The main result is that an equity stake confers a competitive advantage to the holding bank, which in equilibrium results in decreased competition in credit markets and higher interest rates being charged to firms. However, regulatory limits on the size of a bank’s stake may, under certain conditions, be counterproductive: they could actually strengthen the equity-owning bank’s competitive advantage. Our findings shed new light on the role of equity in lending relationships, and highlight that, in addition to the well-known prudential aspects, there is an antitrust dimension in the separation of banking and commerce.     

Returns and volatility spillover in the European banking industry during global financial crisis: Flight to perceived quality or contagion?

This paper empirically investigates return, volatility and leverage spillover effects between banking industrial stock markets of the major economies (ME) (Germany, UK and US) and the smaller stressed European Union countries (SE), (Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) from 2002 to 2014 which includes the global financial crisis period (2007–2014). Thus the paper investigates the influence of the global crisis on the spillover between the banking industrial stock markets of Europe and the US. We apply a multivariate GARCH–GJR framework to investigate the effects of the financial crisis with respect to spillover. Our results indicate an increase in both means and volatility spillover between the major economies and the stressed EU economies from the pre-crisis to the crisis period. During the pre-crisis period there is ample evidence of spillover from Germany, UK and the US to the smaller EU economies. Little evidence of a significant spillover from the smaller economies to the major economies is found during this period. We find that return and volatility transmission mechanisms between the major economies and the smaller EU countries are asymmetric during the crisis period. During the crisis, the level and amount of spillover from the major economies increase. But now there is also clear evidence of spillover from smaller EU economies to the major economies, this is especially true for Germany and the UK. Evidence of spillover effects suggests the existence of exploitable trading strategies and has important implications to investors in the areas of option pricing, portfolio optimization and risk management.     

Explicit deposit insurance design: International effects on bank lending during the global financial crisis✰

Studies find that during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, loan spreads rose and corporate lending tightened, especially for foreign borrowers (a flight-home effect). We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance (DI) made smaller reductions in total lending and foreign lending, experienced smaller increases in loan spreads, and had quicker post-crisis recoveries. These effects are more pronounced for banks heavily relying on deposit funding. Evidence also reveals that more generous or credible DI design is associated with a stronger stabilization effect on bank lending during the crisis, confirmed by the difference-in-differences analysis based on expansion of DI coverage during the crisis. The stabilization effect is robust to the use of country-specific crisis measures and control of temporary government guarantees.     

International income risk-sharing and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis on the degree of international income and consumption risk-sharing among industrial economies using returns on cross-border portfolio holdings (e.g., debt, equity, FDI). We split the returns from the net foreign holdings as receipts (inflows) and payments (outflows) to investigate which of the two sides exhibited the greater resilience for income risk-sharing during the recent crisis. First, we find that debt delivered better risk-sharing than equity, mainly reflecting the deficit deterioration in EMU countries during the post-crisis period. FDI, by contrast, did not correspond to noticeable risk diversification. Second, separating output shocks into positive and negative components reveals that debt holding receipts (equity liability payments) performed better under negative (positive) realizations of the shock variable. Third, the unwinding of capital flows resulted in a sharp fall in income dis-smoothing via the debt liability channel in the new EU countries.     

Does the equity premium puzzle persist during financial crisis? The case of the French equity market

This paper examines the effects of the financial crisis that began in 2008 on the equity premium of 6 French sector indices. Since the systematic risk coefficient beta remains the most common explanatory element of risk premium in most asset pricing models, we investigate the impact of the crisis on the time-varying beta of the six sector indices cited. We selected daily data from January 2003 to December 2012 and we applied the bivariate MA-GARCH model (BEKK) to estimate time-varying betas for the sector indices. The crisis was marked by increased volatility of the sector indices and the market. This rise in volatility led to an increase in the systematic risk coefficient during the crisis and first post-crisis period for all the major indices. The results are intuitive and corroborate findings in the empirical literature. The increase of the time-varying beta is considered by investors as an additional risk. Therefore, as expected, investors tend to increase their equity premiums to b ear the impact of financial crisis.     

Impact of the 2008–2009 financial crisis on the external and internal linkages of European frontier stock markets

This study investigates the impact of the 2008–2009 financial crisis on (i) external linkages of European frontier stock markets (Croatia, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) with the developed equity markets (the US, the UK, and Germany) and (ii) internal linkages within the frontier markets. The results demonstrate that both long- and short-run external linkages were strengthened during the crisis. The analysis of internal linkages reveals strong relationship only between the Croatian and Slovenian markets. However, the other frontier markets in the group were weakly linked, implying that European frontier stock markets may constitute a good alternative source of diversification benefits during crises periods.     

Oil prices implied volatility or direction: Which matters more to financial markets?

We examine the impact of oil price uncertainty on US stock returns by industry using the US Oil Fund options implied volatility OVX index and a GJR-GARCH model. We test the effect of the implied volatility of oil on a wide array of domestic industries’ returns using daily data from 2007 to 2016, controlling for a variety of variables such as aggregate market returns, market volatility, exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation expectations. Our main finding is that the implied volatility of oil prices has a consistent and statistically significant negative impact on nine out of the ten industries defined in the Fama and French (J Financ Econ 43:153–193, 1997) 10-industry classification. Oil prices, on the other hand, yield mixed results, with only three industries showing a positive and significant effect, and two industries exhibiting a negative and significant effect. These findings are an indication that the volatility of oil has now surpassed oil prices themselves in terms of influence on financial markets. Furthermore, we show that both oil prices and their volatility have a positive and significant effect on corporate bond credit spreads. Overall, our results indicate that oil price uncertainty increases the risk of future cash flows for goods and services, resulting in negative stock market returns and higher corporate bond credit spreads.     

Trade credit research before and after the global financial crisis of 2008 – A bibliometric overview

This study presents an overview of the state-of-the-art in trade credit research by examining 1191 publications between 1955 and 2019. Applying bibliometrics and econometrics, the study compares the extant research across the three sub-domains of banking and finance, production and operations, and accounting. Findings suggest that the financial emergency in the global market had resulted in a watershed moment in trade credit research. About 69 % of the literature was found to have emerged after the global economic crisis of 2008. A network analysis grouped the trade credit articles into four major and four minor clusters. The banking and financing cluster exhibited the highest growth followed by the production and operation cluster while the perspectives of accounting are yet to gain traction. Conversely, reputation of the publishing hub, empirical studies, and the production and operational dimensions of the research positively and significantly influence citations. Alongside a thorough introspection, the study also provides new areas to direct the course of future research.     

Structural breaks in volatility spillovers between international financial markets: Contagion or mere interdependence?

This paper conducts an investigation of volatility transmission between stock markets in Hong Kong, Europe and the United States covering the time period from 2000 up to 2011. Using intra-daily data we compute realized volatility time series for the three markets and employ a Heterogeneous Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model as our baseline econometric specification. Motivated by the presence of various crisis events contained in our sample, we detect time-variation and structural breaks in volatility spillovers. Particularly during the financial crisis of 2007, we find effects consistent with the notion of contagion, suggesting strong and sudden increases in the cross-market synchronization of chronologically succeeding volatilities. Investigating the role of mean breaks and conditional heteroskedasticity in the realized volatilities, however, we find the latter to be the main driver of breaks in volatility spillovers. Taking the volatility of realized volatilities into account, we find no evidence of contagion anymore.     

The impact of the global financial crisis on the cross-currency linkage of LIBOR–OIS spreads

This article examines the impact of global financial crisis on cross-currency linkage of the LIBOR–OIS spread, a financial stress measure in interbank markets. The impulse response analysis is conducted in a multivariate setting, adopting the bias-corrected bootstrap as a means of statistical inference. The overall evidence suggests that the crisis has substantially changed the nature of the cross-currency interactions in liquidity stress. Also global money markets have failed to contain stress in US dollar funding and the role of the Japanese yen as a liquidity source appears to be significant, while these two currencies drive the cross-currency system of liquidity stress.     

How common are credit-less recoveries? Firm-level evidence on the role of financial markets in crisis recovery

We study firm recoveries from systemic sudden stops in developing countries, where firms' cash flows suffer exogenous shocks. Contrary to macro studies suggesting that output recovery precedes that of the financial sector, firm-level data shows that only in less than a third of firms, operating cash flows recover without a recovery in external credit, and even these firms have access to other sources of cash. Specifically, firms with high prior short-term debt exposure do experience a sharp reduction in short-term credit but increase operating cash flows during a crisis. Firms with high prior cash holdings experience negative cash flows and deplete their cash holdings. Thus, firms' financial prepositioning predicts recovery in cash flows and is consistent with trade-off theories of capital structure and with precautionary motives for cash holdings. We find no support for the maturity mismatch hypothesis, which predicts that firms with high short-term debt should have harder recoveries post crisis.     

The 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic: How safe are the safe haven assets?

We compare the performance of safe-haven assets during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and COVID-19 pandemic. First, regarding the GFC, we find, intermediate (weak) safe haven evidence for US dollar, Swiss franc and T-bonds (Gold, Silver and T-bills). Second, with regard to COVID, we find gold is very risky in some settings, while silver has become extremely risky. Collectively, our findings suggest that the character of safe-haven assets has changed between the crises. Therefore, investors should exercise extreme care when investing in potential safe-haven assets during times of market stress.