Takeovers: English and American

Viewed against the backdrop of European company law generally, the UK and US systems of corporate governance are remarkably similar. However, there are several salient differences between the system, including the fact that the UK has a more robust and less regulated takeover market than the USA, while the USA is more permissive towards derivative litigation. This paper explains the differences as a function of politics. In the USA, where corporate law is dominated by state governments, the political forces aligned against hostile takeovers are quite potent, generating legislation and judicial decisions that have suppressed takeover activity. In the UK, with a more unitary system, the political forces play out differently, and the system accordingly generates rules more accommodating to unfriendly takeovers.     

Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis

This paper analyses the agency explanation for the cross-sectional variation of corporate dividend policy in the UK by looking at the managerial entrenchment hypothesis drawn from the agency literature. Consistent with predictions, a significant U-shaped relationship between dividend payout ratios and insider ownership is observed for a large (exceeding 600 firms) sample of UK companies and two distinct periods. These results strongly suggest the possibility of managerial entrenchment when insider ownership reaches a threshold of around 30%. Evidence is also presented that non-beneficial holdings by insiders can lead to entrenchment in conjunction with shares held beneficially.     

The 'Independence' of Expert Opinions in Corporate Takeovers: Agreeing With Directors' Recommendations

Abstract:   The impact of non‐audit services on auditor independence has been the recent focus of regulators worldwide. Using expert reports provided in Australian takeovers, this study investigates a context where the audit independence issue is reversed. As approximately a quarter of expert reports are prepared by the target firm's auditor, concerns have been expressed over the independence of the opinion provided. This paper finds that, relative to other experts, there is no difference in the rate at which experts with other business dealings with the target, including the target's auditor, provide an opinion that agrees with that of directors. However, the capital market reaction around the release of the report indicates that reports produced by auditors are viewed as non‐independent.     

The Motivation for Takeovers in the UK

Abstract:  The motives for takeovers in the UK are investigated by examining the correlations between wealth gains for the target and both acquirer wealth gains and total wealth gains. The results are sensitive to whether the gains are measured over a long or short window, the method of measuring abnormal returns, and whether controls are included for the form of the bid consideration and the sign of total bid gains. There is evidence of bids motivated by synergy, but there is also evidence of the presence of hubris and weak evidence of bids with an agency motivation. Once controls for bid consideration and the sign of total gains are introduced the explanatory power of the models increases substantially and diversity of results about bid motivation also increases.     

代理问题、投资者保护与公司价值——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2002～2004年2238家上市公司为样本，按照最终控制人性质，将样本公司分为国有和民营金字塔控制两种主要类别，研究了代理问题在哪些公司较为严重，法律对于投资者保护是否能起到有效的治理作用。研究结果表明，国有和民营上市公司价值并无显著差异；随着政府层级的提升，国有控制公司价值提高；民营金字塔控制公司最终控制人所有权与控制权的分离对公司价值有负向作用；法治水平高的地区，其所属公司价值较高；海外上市提高了民营公司价值，但对国有公司的作用不显著；证券监管机构发挥的作用尚存不足。     

Evaluating the Behavioural Performance of Alternative Logit Models: An Application to Corporate Takeovers Research

Abstract:  Econometric models involving a discrete outcome dependent variable abound in the finance and accounting literatures. However, much of the literature to date utilises a basic or standard logit model. Capitalising on recent developments in the discrete choice literature, we examine three advanced (or non-IID) logit models, namely: nested logit, mixed logit and latent class MNL. Using an illustration from corporate takeovers research, we compare the explanatory and predictive performance of each class of advanced model relative to the standard model. We find that in all cases the more advanced logit model structures, which correct for the highly restrictive IID and IIA conditions, provide significantly greater explanatory power than standard logit. Mixed logit and latent class MNL models exhibited the highest overall predictive accuracy on a holdout sample, while the standard logit model performed the worst. Moreover, the analysis of marginal effects of all models indicates that use of advanced models can lead to more insightful and behaviourally meaningful interpretations of the role and influence of explanatory variables and parameter estimates in model estimation. The results of this paper have implications for the use of more optimal logit structures in future research and practice.     

Directors' Recommendations on Takeover Bids and the Management of Earnings: Evidence from Australian Takeovers

This article investigates whether Australian companies manage their earnings during takeover bids in a manner consistent with the earnings-management hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that directors who reject a bid use accrual accounting to increase current earnings, supporting their claim that the bid, relative to earnings, is inadequate. Likewise, directors who accept a bid are predicted to use accrual accounting to decrease current earnings. Overall, the results are not consistent with the earnings-management hypothesis. However, some components of unexpected accruals (our proxy for managed earnings) change in the direction predicted by the earnings-management hypothesis, although these changes are not statistically significant. Using industry adjusted performance measures the conclusion is that unexpected accruals are primarily a manifestation of poor financial performance of target firms in the period leading up to the takeover bid.     

The Relevance of Western Corporate Governance in Mitigating Management Misconduct in Thailand

This article provides empirical evidence on the relevance of structures central to Western models of corporate governance in mitigating management misconduct in Thailand. We find no evidence supporting the effectiveness of Western-based corporate governance structures such as board independence, audit committee effectiveness, and separating the roles of CEO and Board Chair in limiting management misconduct. However, we do find evidence supportive of independent directors with more experience and longer tenure, the presence of institutional ownership, and concentrated controlling ownership in limiting management misconduct. This provides some support for the validity of resource dependency theory in an emerging economy setting.     

Derivatives Use, Corporate Governance, and Legislative Change: An Empirical Analysis of New Zealand Listed Companies

Abstract:   This paper examines if board composition has any systematic bearing on derivatives usage by New Zealand listed companies. We also test if derivative usage changed following the introduction of the new 1993 Companies Act. The Act raised expectations of directors' fiduciary responsibilities and the perceived risk of liability on outside directors for poor investment decisions. Using a dataset of listed New Zealand companies in 1994 and 1997, we find companies with higher growth opportunities and a greater proportion of outside directors were less likely to use financial derivatives following the introduction of the new Act. Our results supplement the US‐based literature on derivatives usage by illustrating that internal governance mechanisms can play a role in corporate derivatives policy, and that the legislative and regulatory environment may affect this role.     

Rationalizable and Coalition Proof Shareholder Tendering Strategies in Corporate Takeovers

This paper determines the set of rational responses by shareholders to unconditional takeover offers at prices between the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition price of the firm. Two cases are considered. In the first case, coordination across shareholders is not presumed. In this case, the game is analyzed using the Rationalizability criteria (Bernheim, 1984). It is demonstrated that the Rationalizable strategy vectors include all pure strategy vectors. In the second case, the set of strategies consistent with coordination through preplay communication, the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) are analyzed. It is shown that, given even a minimal degree of divisibility of shareholdings, the raider's per share profit is bounded from below by a positive constant independent of the number of shareholders. These results imply that preplay coordination between shareholders eliminates the free-rider problem.     

国家治理与国家审计:基于国家建构理论的分析

基于福山的国家构建理论,本文从本源上对国家治理与国家审计的关系及其互动机制进行了详细剖析,认为国家治理与国家审计的互动主要是透过组织的设计与管理、政治制度的设计、合法化的基础、文化与社会等四个决定制度供给的要素展开的。具体而言,组织的设计与管理、政治制度的设计、合法化的基础、文化与社会等要素的完善有助于国家审计的完善,同时国家审计通过对组织的设计与管理、政治制度的设计、合法化的基础、文化与社会等要素的反向作用改进国家治理。     

The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm

The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity. The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important role in reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporate restructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which counters existing models of agency driven takeover activity. The model can therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictions which discriminate between the agency paradigm and the corporate restructuring paradigm of takeover activity. Negative post-merger performance (Agrawal et al., 1992), which is inconsistent with corporate restructuring is consistent with this model, and that takeover targets' investment levels are below or at the average (Servaes 1994), which is inconsistent with the free cash flow theory is also consistent with this model.     

The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm

The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity.The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important rolein reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporaterestructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which countersexisting models of agency driven takeover activity. The modelcan therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictionswhich discriminate between the "agency paradigm" and the "corporaterestructuring paradigm" of takeover activity. Negative post-mergerperformance (Agrawal et al., 1992), which is inconsistent withcorporate restructuring is consistent with this model, and thattakeover target's investment levels are below or at the average(Servaes 1994), which is inconsistent with the free cash flowtheory is also consistent with this model. JEL numbers: G14,G31, G32, G34.     

我国上市商业银行公司治理绩效的实证研究

商业银行公司治理结构是现代银行制度的核心,对于商业银行的发展具有决定意义的作用。我国上市商业银行是按照现代企业制度的要求建立起来的,在公司治理方面相对我国其他类型银行具有一定的借鉴意义,因此对我国上市商业银行进行研究具有一定的理论和应用价值。本文采用实证研究方法,通过对于商业银行年报中披露的有关公司治理数据的统计分析,考察了公司治理结构中股权结构、董事会特征、监事会特征、高级管理层激励特征等各类治理指标对于商业银行公司业绩的影响关系。     

中国创业板上市公司治理与绩效的实证研究

公司治理的直接目标是提升公司绩效,公司绩效是衡量公司治理有效性的重要指标。本文以截至2010年9月30日在中国创业板上市的123家公司为样本,构建公司绩效与公司治理各变量的多元线性回归模型,对中国创业板上市公司的治理与绩效进行实证分析,并在实证研究的基础上,对如何完善我国创业板上市公司治理,提升公司绩效提出了政策建议。     

公司治理与会计稳健性——基于上市公司的实证研究

会计稳健性是财务报告的一个重要特征和惯例，已成为会计盈余的重要质量特征之一。本文运用basu（1997）模型，将会计稳健性定义为会计报告对坏消息的确认比好消息更及时，探讨了有关公司治理的几个重要因素对会计稳健性的影响。研究发现：在影响会计稳健性的治理因素中，银行借款比例与会计稳健性正相关，国家股比例与会计稳健性负相关，在国家股比例低的分组，会计稳健性较高。发行有B股的企业，会计稳健性与只有A股的企业没有显著差异。研究表明，会计稳健性作为会计报告质量的一种量度，随着会计制度和准则的国际接轨与完善，证券市场监管的加强，取得了一定成效，但是会计准则和会计制度不能保证会计报告的质量，尚需改革国内相关的制度背景，如公司治理、法律实施环境等。     

商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势研究

公司治理机制是现代公司制度的基本架构。从公司制度诞生至今,良好的公司治理机制始终和公司的健康运行密切相关。由于商业银行区别于一般公司的特殊性,构建良好的公司治理机制一直是国际银行业所关注的焦点。本文从公司治理机制的理论和制度两个层面分析商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势,并探讨这种变化趋势对中国商业银行公司治理改革的借鉴意义。作者认为商业银行应当按照国际会计准则提高信息披露的质量,利用市场竞争的力量来改善公司治理机制,注重外部审计和内部审计力量的结合,注重法律在公司治理机制中的作用,实现商业银行激励与约束机制的创新。     

商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势研究

公司治理机制是现代公司制度的基本架构。从公司制度诞生至今，良好的公司治理机制始终和公司的健康运行密切相关。由于商业银行区别于一般公司的特殊性，构建良好的公司治理机制一直是国际银行业所关注的焦点。本文从公司治理机制的理论和制度两个层面分析商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势，并探讨这种变化趋势对中国商业银行公司治理改革的借鉴意义。作者认为商业银行应当按照国际会计准则提高信息披露的质量，利用市场竞争的力量来改善公司治理机制，注重外部审计和内部审计力量的结合，注重法律在公司治理机制中的作用，实现商业银行激励与约束机制的创新。     

利益相关者理论与国有商业银行公司治理

从利益相关者理论出发,结合我国国有商业银行改革与发展的特殊性,提出构建和完善我国国有商业银行公司治理结构应充分考虑各利益相关群体的利益,实施利益相关者治理。同时,应当在考虑我国经济条件、法律制度、文化传统等方面特点的情况下,充分借鉴发达国家公司治理模式,以促进我国国有商业银行国际竞争力和资源配置效率的提高。     

我国上市公司债权人治理弱化及其对策

我国公司治理准则的指导思想是利益相关者共同治理,它涉及股东、债权人、顾客、供应两等共同治理。但我国债权人作为公司外部治理的主要力量并没有发挥其应有的作用,特别是银行在公司治理中的作用非常有限。为此,重点研究我国上市公司债权人治理的现状,以及治理弱化的原因,并对完善上市公司债权人治理提出若干建议。