Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Did the value premium survive the subprime credit crisis?

We provide evidence that value stocks significantly underperformed growth stocks during the subprime credit crisis, despite a positive value premium before the crisis. The reversal in the value premium concentrates in financially constrained firms, suggesting it was due to the adverse influence of the crisis rather than confounding effects. These findings are robust to alternative financial constraint proxies and asset pricing models. The observation that value stocks are vulnerable to losses during extreme downturns like the crisis is consistent with them being riskier than growth stocks. Our findings have implications for the academic debate on the underlying cause of the value premium and for investors on the profitability of value investing strategies.     

Is ex-post credit risk affected by the cycles? The case of Italian banks

The objective of this research is to empirically examine if both credit and business cycle affect the ex-post credit risk (i.e. non-performing loans) in the banking system of Italy for the period 1995Q1–2014Q1. The increase in NPLs post-2008 has put into question the robustness of many European banks and the stability of the whole sector. It still remains a serious challenge, especially in Italy which is one of the countries that hit by the financial crisis. By employing fixed and random effects and a dynamic GMM estimation as econometric methodologies I find results that underline common causes for NPLs. Higher NPLs in Italy are mostly due to worse macroeconomic conditions (i.e. bad phase of business cycle) and due to excess credit. Through a Granger causality test, my arguments found even more support. Such findings can be helpful when designing macro-prudential as well as NPL resolution policies.     

Did the rating standard for banks change after the crisis?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Did rating agencies tighten their rating standard after the overwhelming critique on their generous ratings before 2008? This study aims to examine...     

Is small beautiful? The resilience of small banks during the European debt crisis

We examine the lending behaviour of small and large banks in the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis. Relative to large banks, small banks are less pro-cyclical in that they exhibit more stable lending growth across credit expansion and contraction periods. In peripheral countries, the portfolio rebalancing of small banks towards higher public debt (substitution effect) does not appear to cause a reduction of their lending to the private sector. Instead, the level of public debt seems to provide a liquidity buffer that influences bank-specific loan growth positively (complementarity effect), particularly during market-wide lending contractions. Our findings show that for small peripheral banks the substitution effect found in the literature can coexist with a complementarity effect when public debt grows faster than private loans. Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the regulatory treatment of public debt in banks and supports incentives embedded in new banking regulation that penalise bank size.     

Did the crisis induce credit rationing for French SMEs?

This paper focuses on the access of independent French SMEs to bank lending and analyzes whether the observed evolution of credit to SMEs over the recent period was “demand driven” as a result of the decrease in firms’ activity and investment projects or was “supply driven” with an increase in credit “rationing” stemming from a more cautious behavior of banks. Based on a sample of around 60,000 SMEs, we come to the conclusion that, despite the stronger standards used by banks when granting credit, French SMEs do not appear to have been strongly affected by credit rationing since 2008. This result goes against the common view that SMEs suffered from a strong credit restriction during the crisis but is perfectly in line with the results of several surveys about the access to finance of SMEs recently conducted in France.     

Can pure play internet banking survive the credit crisis?

This paper positions the pure-play internet banking model (PPI) as a hybrid business model that combines features of both relationship and transaction banking. Although in terms of customer orientation PPI banks may partly resemble relationship banks, they lack their comparative advantage in generating borrower-specific information. Instead, the characteristic features of PPI banks are low costs and easy scalability. While the latter may enable PPI banks to quickly capture market share, it may also generate overexposure in risky markets. We present a case study on ING Direct, one of the leading global PPI banks and address the sustainability of the PPI business model by comparing the ING Direct foreign operations. The findings for ING Direct are validated using data for E-Trade Bank. We conclude that managing growth appears to be the prime challenge to PPI banks.     

Did family firms perform better during the financial crisis? New insights from the S&P 500 firms

This paper provides new evidence on whether family firms performed better during the global financial crisis (2008–2010). Using the dataset of the S&P 500 nonfinancial firms during the period 2006–2010, we find that family firms outperformed nonfamily firms during the crisis. Among family firms, the ones that contributed to the outperformance were those where the founder was still present. We also find that during the global financial crisis, founder firms invested significantly less and had better access to the credit market than nonfamily firms. Our analysis suggests that the superior performance of founder firms is largely caused by their having less incentive to overinvest in order to boost short-term earnings during the crisis.     

Why are some modes of acquisition more profitable? A study of the credit card industry

A key challenge in financial services marketing is attracting good customers to the firm. For most financial services firms, including credit card firms, a good customer is also a profitable customer. Managers would like to use marketing tactics that attract the most profitable customers while closely monitoring and perhaps limiting expenditures on marketing tactics that tend to attract relatively less profitable customers. Therefore, managers need to understand the relative effectiveness of different modes of new account acquisition and the impact that the various modes of acquisition may have on overall account profitability. To date, there have been very few studies that have calculated individual level customer profitability and then investigated the relationship between new customer acquisition source and customer profitability. That is, how do modes of acquisition differ in their ability to attract profitable customers? We answer this question using a proprietary and novel data set from the credit card industry. Of the four modes of acquisition used in this industry, we find that Internet and direct mail efforts generate more profitable customers than telemarketing and direct selling. We provide possible explanations for these findings. Our work adds to the growing literature in customer relationship management and our results have important managerial implications for resource allocation among acquisition strategies.     

Forecasting exchange rates: Do banks know better?

We first evaluate the performance of major commercial banks in forecasting future spot exchange rates, using the random-walk model as the benchmark. We then investigate the sources of forecast errors, and the forecasting tendencies of banks. Our analysis is based on the forecasts made for the US dollar exchange rates of the British pound (BP), German mark (DM), Swiss franc (SF), and Japanese yen (JY), over 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month forecast horizons. Key findings include: first, a majority of banks shows some evidence of outperforming the random-walk model for the three currencies other than the JY. Second, the imperfect correlation between predicted and actual exchange rate changes is the dominant source of prediction errors of banks. Third, the home-country bank generally forecasts the country's currency rate more accurately than the other banks, suggesting a degree of information asymmetry. Fourth, the forecasts of a majority of banks exhibit a bandwagon type effect. That is, most banks are momentum forecasters, tending to extrapolate the recent currency changes. Interestingly, a “contrarian” bank is found to outperform the other banks.     

What drives foreign expansion of the top 100 multinational banks? The role of the credit reporting system

This study explores how information costs, proxied by characteristics of credit reporting systems, affect the foreign expansion of the top 100 multinational banks. We find that banks prefer to expand operations in countries where private credit bureaus exist or where the credit reporting system is of better quality. This preference is particularly strong for banks’ branch decisions. Furthermore, banks prefer subsidiary entry only in countries where private credit bureaus exist with better credit information quality. Overall, our results indicate that banks are attracted to countries where the credit reporting system helps reduce banks’ information costs.     

Systemic risk measures: The simpler the better?

This paper estimates and compares two groups of high-frequency market-based systemic risk measures using European and US interbank rates, stock prices and credit derivatives data from 2004 to 2009. Measures belonging to the macro group gauge the overall tension in the financial sector and micro group measures rely on individual institution information to extract joint distress. We rank the measures using three criteria: (i) Granger causality tests, (ii) Gonzalo and Granger metric, and (iii) correlation with an index of systemic events and policy actions. We find that the best systemic measure in the macro group is the first principal component of a portfolio of Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads whereas the best measure in the micro group is the multivariate densities computed from CDS spreads. These results suggest that the measures based on CDSs outperform measures based on interbank rates or stock market prices.     

Trust no more? The impact of the crisis on citizens’ trust in central banks

Citizens’ trust in economic institutions has generally declined since the onset of the crisis. In particular, Eurobarometer surveys show that trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) has fallen significantly during the crisis. This paper studies the determinants of public trust in the ECB over the lifetime of the euro. Net trust in the ECB has decreased significantly in those countries which have experienced increasing sovereign bond yields and financial market turbulence. The finding that country-specific variables affect citizens’ trust in the ECB may seem counterintuitive. However, it is consistent with strong evidence in the political science literature showing that domestic considerations play a significant role when citizens get an opportunity to express their opinion on EU matters.     

Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy

This paper investigates the ex ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.     

Brazilian retail banking and the 2008 financial crisis: Were the government-controlled banks that important?

We revisit the interest rate pass-through effect using weekly retail banking data from May 2006 to March 2010. Our choice of data avoids caveats of previous studies concerning excessive data aggregation and the estimation of how fast changes in benchmark interest rates impact those charged on short-term loans in Brazil. Our analysis focuses on four large retail banks – two of them privately owned and run, two of them government-controlled – before and after September 2008. They account for 60% of the total credit supplied by retail banks. Results indicate that government control over two of the largest banks, supposedly an asset for crisis management, may have had higher welfare costs than assumed. We find no evidence of asymmetry in adjustments of retail rates charged by private and government-controlled banks.     

Credit CARD Act of 2009: What did banks do?

The Credit CARD Act of 2009 was intended to prevent practices in the credit card industry that lawmakers viewed as deceptive and abusive. Among other changes, the Act restricted issuers’ account closure policies, eliminated certain fees, and made it more difficult for issuers to change terms on credit card plans. Critics of the Act argued that because of the long lag between approval and implementation of the law, issuing banks would be able to take preemptive actions that might disadvantage cardholders before the law could take effect. Using credit bureau data as well as individual data from a survey of U.S. consumers, we test whether banks closed consumers’ credit card accounts or otherwise restricted access to credit just before the enactment of the CARD Act. Because the period prior to the enactment of the CARD Act coincided with the financial crisis and recession, causality in this case is particularly difficult to establish. We find evidence that a higher fraction of credit card accounts were closed following the Federal Reserve Board’s adoption of its credit card rules, but not between May 2009, when the CARD Act was signed, and when most of its provisions became law in February 2010. However, we do find evidence that banks deteriorated terms of credit card plans at a higher rate during this period, especially lowered the credit limits. Among the survey respondents whose bank accounts were closed during that period, account holders were much more likely to close their own credit card accounts than to have them closed by their card issuers.     

The EONIA spread before and during the crisis of 2007–2009: The role of liquidity and credit risk

This paper provides an empirical assessment of the factors affecting the spread between the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) and the main policy rate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Up until the period when Lehman Brothers collapsed in mid-September 2008, the spread was small and positive. After this point, the liquidity surplus that developed from the fixed rate full allotment tendering arrangement in refinancing operations drove the widening of EONIA spread (trading below the ECB policy rate), although other factors also played a significant role. This paper explains the drivers of spread across alternative non-crisis/crisis regimes. In addition, the paper examines how the EONIA spread reacts to shocks imposed on a range of liquidity and credit risk factors in alternative crisis/non-crisis regimes. The results have implications for factors that should be monitored closely across both regimes, and also the implications that this may have for steering an unsecured overnight rate in crisis times.     

Is less information better information? Evidence from the credit rating withdrawal

This paper examines the stock market reaction to two different types of credit rating withdrawals by Moody’s. The first type of withdrawal occurs when a firm stops being rated. This happens, for example, when firms choose to no longer pay for a rating. We find that the stock market reaction depends on the information which remains available. The second type of withdrawal is due to Moody’s policy of removing the issuer rating and keeping the corporate family rating for the same firm. The corporate family rating is usually more favorable than the issuer rating. The paper shows that the removal of the issuer rating leads to positive stock market reaction. We conclude that lower disclosure of rating information is not necessarily associated with higher cost of equity. Instead, our findings emphasize the incentive for firms to engage in ratings shopping by publishing only the most favourable ratings.     

The US financial crisis and corporate dividend reactions: for better or for worse?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine how changes in dividend policy in 2008 as the financial crisis was unfolding influenced firm risk-adjusted returns in the following years....