The impact of monetary policy announcements on the stock price of large European banks during the financial crisis

Since 2007, the European Central Bank responded decisively to the challenges posed by the global financial crisis, reducing key policy interest rates to unprecedented low levels and intervening with non-standard policy measures (i.e., monetary easing and liquidity provision). This paper aims to assess the impact of ECB monetary policy announcements on the stock price of large European banks. As a first step, an event study is conducted in order to measure cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcements over June 2007–June 2013; the second step is a regression analysis aimed at identifying the determinants of CARs. Results show that banks were more sensitive to non-conventional measures than to interest rate decisions, and that the same type of intervention may have a different impact depending on the stage of the crisis. In addition, banks with weaker balance sheets and operating with high-risk were more sensitive to monetary policy interventions.     

Credit distortion and financial crisis

A simple and consistent theory based on credit distortion is developed to understand the origin of financial crises in the emerging markets. We prove that without the guarantee of various government agencies on the credit risk of foreign loans, the interest rate on foreign loans would be the same as the domestic loans, which would eliminate the incentive to borrow foreign loans on a great scale. We demonstrate that the common phenomena preluding the crisis, such as heavy foreign borrowing and overinvestment in real estate, are rational choices when a particular currency is overvalued and cheap credit is available.     

Trade credit and company performance during the 2008 financial crisis

We investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis had an impact on companies’ trade credit, and whether changes in trade credit mitigated the crisis’s impact on firm profitability. We document that the availability of trade credit decreased, and that this decline is more pronounced, the higher the companies’ pre‐crisis reliance on short‐term debt. We further report evidence that the redistribution hypothesis holds during crisis periods. Finally, we show that the crisis had a negative impact on company performance, but that this impact was lower (greater) for firms that report an increase in trade receivables (payables) in crisis compared to pre‐crisis periods.     

Financial sector structure and financial crisis burden

We consider an overlapping generations model in the presence of financial intermediation. The paper focuses on the analysis of the consequences of a sudden negative repayments shock on financial intermediation capacity and consequently on the economy as a whole. The model exhibits a property of the ‘chain reaction’ when a single macroeconomic shock can lead to the exhaustion of credit resources and subsequently to the collapse of the banking system. To maintain the capability of the system to recover, a regulatory intervention is needed even in presence of the state guarantees on agents’ deposits in the banks. We compare the results for an intermediated economy with those derived for the market economy and draw some broad conclusions regarding the crisis consequences depending on the financial sector structure. We also compare the model predictions with the stylised facts about the Russian financial crisis of 1998.     

The performance of banks in the MENA region during the global financial crisis

This paper examines the impact of the global financial crisis on the banking sector in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as the main determinants of the profitability of both domestic and foreign banks. The empirical findings suggest that during the crisis the former outperformed the latter in that region. As for the determinants of profitability, size does not appear to play a role, whilst the liquidity ratio and net interest revenues seem to have a negative and positive effect respectively; GDP has a positive effect in the case of domestic banks.     

Individual financial risk tolerance and the global financial crisis

We investigate individual investors’ tolerance towards financial risk by focusing on changes associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009. Financial risk tolerance (FRT) is analysed longitudinally controlling for demographic, socio‐economic and regional variations. In absolute terms, the change in FRT is small and contrasts with a popular view that risk tolerance is an elastic psychological state overly influenced by the pervading market conditions. Even in the presence of significant financial events, FRT tends to be a reasonably stable attribute in the shorter term but possibly influenced and reshaped by events more gradually over time.     

论财务会计与管理会计的整合

文章主要就财务会计与管理会计整合的必然性及可能性（基础与条件）两方面进行了阐述。认为两者本质的同一性和目标的一致性是走向整合的必然。随着信息技术的不断发展,财务会计与管理会计的界限越来越模糊,整合的条件越来越成熟,整合的趋势日益明显。     

The 2008 financial crisis: Stock market contagion and its determinants

In this paper, we investigate worldwide contagion and its determinants during the 2008 financial crisis. Utilizing an international sample of returns from 2003 to 2009, we consider both uni- and bi-directional contagion. After controlling for crisis-related volatility, we find strong evidence that cross-market linkages increase among many financial markets. In contrast to previous crises, contagion following the 2008 global financial crisis is not confined to emerging markets. The United States and other mature financial markets in the sample transmit and receive contagion. Country markets are less influenced by regions than they are by other country markets. We also construct variables that represent relative changes in economic variables before and during the crisis. We find that both economic fundamentals such as trade structure, interest rates, inflation rates, industrial production, and regional effects, and investors’ risk aversion contribute to international contagion.     

The real effects of financial constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.     

Has the financial system become safer after the crisis? The changing nature of financial institution risk

Six years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the question of whether the U.S. financial system has become less risky remains unanswered. On the one side, new regulations including Dodd-Frank and Basel III have made improvements by requiring higher bank capital, and financial institutions themselves have reduced risk-taking activities. On the other side, it has been argued that “the fundamental risks remained and the efforts of regulators and politicians were simply rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.” (Baily and Elliott, 2013) This paper highlights the changing nature of financial institution risk from 2005 to 2011. It finds that while these institutions have become less risky individually after the crisis, the financial market has become more vulnerable to systemic contagion. The causal inference that the crisis and the post-crisis legislation have gradually changed the nature of financial institution risk is drawn from a quasi-experimental design. This finding suggests that the ever more integrated financial system might experience more synchronized contractions in future crises, providing empirical support for the proposals of the inter-bank collective regulation of banks by Acharya (2009) in addition to the intra-bank collective regulations as in Froot and Stein (1998) and BIS (1996, 1999).     

Valuation-based accounting research: Implications for financial reporting and opportunities for future research

This paper discusses the relation between financial reporting research and practice, particularly standard setters. Many studies addressing financial reporting issues use a valuation approach. The paper describes alternative approaches to valuation research and summarises the findings relating to four major current issues: fair value accounting for financial, tangible, and intangible assets, cash flows versus accruals, recognition versus disclosure, and international harmonisation of accounting standards. The summaries include identifying what standard setters and others would like to learn from research, what we have learned, and what is left to learn. The paper concludes with observations about future financial reporting academic research.     

Crisis transmission: Some evidence from the Asian financial crisis

We used a crisis measure of financial market as defined by Sexena (1998) to study the nature of crisis transmission and the channels through which the 1997 crisis was transmitted among Asian financial markets. Estimated with a vector autoregression (VAR) and an OLS model on Asian financial markets from January 1990 to December 1998, we found that:

1.

During the crisis period, crisis transmission was more significant than during other noncrisis periods;

2.

Comparing the crisis transmission within the industrialized countries (Taiwan, Korea, and Japan), within the emerging countries (Thailand, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Indonesia), and between the industrialized and emerging groups, it is shown that

2.1.

The crisis transmission among the three industrialized countries was not significant.

2.2.

The crises originated from Thailand and Malaysia were transmitted to other emerging countries.

2.3.

The crisis transmission between industrialized and emerging countries was not found to be significant. There was evidence showing that Singapore served as an intermediary transmitting crisis between industrialized and emerging countries during this particular crisis.

3.

The transmission through the wake-up call effect was found to be more significant than other transmission channels. Trade relationship and cash-in effects only existed in Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia.

     

Bank ownership,lending, and local economic performance during the 2008–2009 financial crisis

Although government banks are frequently associated with political capture and resource misallocation, they may be well-positioned during times of crisis to provide counter-cyclical support. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Brazil׳s government banks substantially increased lending. Localities in Brazil with a high share of government banks received more loans and experienced better employment outcomes relative to localities with a low share of government banks. While increased government bank lending mitigated an economic downturn, we find that this lending was politically targeted, inefficiently allocated, and reduced productivity growth.     

The influence of accounting enforcement on earnings quality of banks: Implications of bank regulation and the global financial crisis

We study the effects of country-level accounting enforcement on earnings quality of banks and whether bank regulation substitutes or complements the effect of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality. We also examine whether the influence of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality changed after the global financial crisis. Using a sample of listed banks from 40 countries between 2001 and 2014, and abnormal loan loss provisions (ALLP) as our main proxy for earnings quality, we document a consistent and strong association between accounting enforcement and bank earnings quality. More specifically, an increase in accounting enforcement decreases the level of ALLP and decreases the propensity to manage earnings to avoid losses. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence that bank regulation complements the effect of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality. Finally, unlike in the pre-crisis period, we find a positive association between accounting enforcement and income-decreasing ALLP in the post-crisis period, which indicates that stronger accounting enforcement is associated with more conservative earnings and higher loan loss reserves. Overall, our results indicate that accounting enforcement reduces opportunistic earnings management.     

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.     

Capital and income financialization: Accounting for the 2008 financial crisis

Financialization is recognised as a key feature of the 2008 financial crisis. We argue that a lesson is the need for an accounting framework which focuses upon financialization allowing it to be monitored and controlled by stakeholders. We argue that financialization has been permitted through the failure of accounting to distinguish distributable income from capital gains/transfers and to distinguish productive from speculative capital. We introduce an accounting presentation (4S accounting) which effectively makes these distinctions. We use a stylized example to illustrate how it should be applied to the financial reporting of banks.     

关于“发起人金融资产转移会计处理方法”的评判

次贷危机爆发以来,美国的金融风险管理体制和监管机制受到了全球性的抨击。本文从财务会计角度对资产证券化最主要的会计问题,即发起人转移资产会计处理进行阐述、分析和反思。本文认为,长期以来,FASB采用的金融合成分析法在次贷危机当中发挥了负面作用。本文建议修改金融资产转移终止确认观点,并应该合理应用参与利益在终止确认中的作用,谨慎但不禁止采用销售方式处理转移资产。     

On the rationality of Korea's stock market: was the recent Korean financial crisis due to fundamental factors?

This paper examines whether the recent financial crisis in Korea was due to fundamental factors. To address this issue, we identify various components of Korea's stock market prices (KOSPI) and examine their responses to different types of shocks. Given the stationary behavior of KOSPI dividends, we relate stock price directly to earnings by deriving and using a log-linear model of the spread between price and earnings with a time-varying discount factor. Therefore, stock-price movements are explained by earnings (numerator component), time-varying discount factors (denominator component), and non-fundamental factors. Although we find evidence of substantial non-fundamental components in Korea's stock market prices, the sudden decline in Korea's stock market prices during the 1997 financial crisis was primarily due to fundamental components, in particular, the numerator component (e.g. earnings) combined with the denominator component (i.e. time-varying discount factor) rather than non-fundamental factors.     

Bank performance and convergence during the financial crisis: Evidence from the ‘old’ European Union and Eurozone

This paper investigates the process of banking integration in the EU15 countries and the Eurozone by testing for convergence in bank efficiency among commercial banks. We use a two-step approach: First we estimate efficiency by applying an innovative methodological approach that treats banks’ non-performing loans as an undesirable output. Second, we apply the Phillips and Sul (2007) panel convergence methodology to assess the convergence process in European banking. Our results indicate an overall decline in efficiency and no evidence of group convergence following the financial crisis. However, we find the presence of club formation with typically weak convergence. The heterogeneity displayed by the transition parameters for the individual countries and the notable decrease in competition levels post 2008 highlight the impact of the financial crisis on the integration process.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.