Maximizing bidder surplus in simultaneous online art auctions via dynamic forecasting

This paper presents a novel intelligent bidding system, called SOABER (Simultaneous Online Auction BiddER), which monitors simultaneous online auctions of high-value fine art items. It supports decision-making by maximizing bidders’ surpluses and their chances of winning an auction. One key element of the system is a dynamic forecasting model, which incorporates information about the speed of an auction’s price movement, as well as the level of competition both within and across auctions. Other elements include a wallet estimator, which gauges the bidders’ willingness to pay, and a bid strategizer, which embeds the forecasting model into a fully automated decision system. We illustrate the performance of our intelligent bidding system on an authentic dataset of online art auctions for Indian contemporary art. We compare our system with several simpler ad-hoc approaches, and find it to be more effective in terms of both the extracted surplus and the resulting winning percentage.     

Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions

Should a seller use a multi-unit auction for identical and indivisible units of a good? We show, under specific assumptions on the value distributions of the bidders, that in large markets the multi-unit format generates higher (lower) expected revenue compared to the bundled format when the supply is relatively scarce (abundant). In contrast, a large market is shown to be always more efficient under the multi-unit format than its bundled counterpart. Thus under these assumptions a profit maximizing seller is expected to choose the relatively efficient multi-unit format when supply is scarce.     

Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions

Research on bidder collusion in procurement auctions is reasonably successful in unveiling the mechanisms of collusion among the bidders. But it is relatively weak in forwarding effective practical methods of collusion detection before the winner is declared, because they presuppose the knowledge of collusion in specific auctions. Past studies, however, point out the need for working with bid price-to-reserve price ratios rather than bid prices or winning bid prices, to be free from the problem of heteroscedasticity. They also draw an important inference that the set of collusive data are significantly different from the set of competitive data. On the basis of these basic facts, the current paper outlines a seven-step approach to collusion detection. The approach makes rudimentary statistical analysis of bid price-to-reserve price ratios for all the bidders. The analysis comprises tests of equality of means, medians and variance and tests of skewness, autocorrelation and normality of the ratios. It divides the ratios into two significantly different clusters. The cluster with the higher mean and variance values of the ratios corresponds to collusive bidding with the other cluster corresponding to competitive bidding. The paper proposes the construction of a process control chart to detect occurrence of collusion in an auction immediately after the price bids are opened. The approach is illustrated by applying it to data from procurement auctions for construction projects in a State Department of the Republic of India.     

Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions

This paper compares the first-price auction and the second-price auction with several asymmetric bidders who are either weak or strong. The ranking of these auctions in terms of profit may flip as the exogenous reserve price or the number of weak or strong bidders change. Similarly, with endogenous reserve prices the ranking may depend on the seller’s own-use valuation. In other words, the ranking may be fragile to changes along these dimensions. Existing models rule out such ranking reversals by imposing substantial structure on type distributions. The current paper relies on simple mechanism design arguments that require less structure.     

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential second-price auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indifferent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the first object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller's revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net effect on the seller's revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine a special case with asymmetric players who have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline.Received: 12 December 2000, Accepted: 1 May 2002, JEL Classification: D44Flavio Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (Grant A000000055) and CNPq. Monteiro acknowledges the financial support from CNPq and the hospitality of CERSEM where part of this paper has been written. We thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Peter Sørensen and two anonymous referees for useful comments.     

在线拍卖中的代理研究综述

在线拍卖站点的不断增加给在线竞买人提出了具大的挑战,竞买人需要从大量的拍卖站点中选择一个恰当的拍卖站点,以保证在满足他们偏好的前提下得到他们希望的物品。不同的拍卖站点采用的拍卖方式和竞价策略是不同的,因此,不同的拍卖站点其竞价代理的设计策略也不同。本文主要对目前在线拍卖代理研究进行综述。     

Optimal fees in internet auctions

An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.      

Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result.     

An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of preemptive jump bidding in English auctions with a flexible reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the seller to adjust his decision to accept an offer based on the bidding history makes the existence of a signaling equilibrium questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump bidding behavior and the use and interpretation of opening bids as a signaling device.     

Online reverse auctions and their role in buyer–supplier relationships

Despite the move in recent years towards supplier partnerships, buying firms need at times to make use of competitive procurement strategies for certain purchases. This study examines the impact of reverse auctions on buyer–supplier relationships through six case studies, analysing primarily the supplier perspective through participant interviews. The authors identify that there are potential benefits for both parties in a reverse auction, which can offer tendering and transactional cost advantages. For buyers, it offers a competitive procurement process. The effect on relationships will depend on the extent to which buyers employ the auction as a price weapon, or whether it is used primarily as a process improvement tool.     

Existence of optimal auctions in general environments

We provide a unified approach to the problem of existence of optimal auctions for a wide variety of auction environments. We accomplish this by first establishing a general existence result for a particular Stackelberg revelation game. By systematically specializing our revelation game to cover various types of auctions, we are able to deduce the existence of optimal Bayesian auction mechanisms for single and multiple unit auctions, as well as for contract auctions with moral hazard and adverse selection. In all cases, we allow for risk aversion and multidimensional, stochastically dependent types.     

The use of bundling in B2B online reverse auctions

In industrial purchasing a request for quotation (RFQ) can consist of a single item, but is most often composed of two or more products and/or services bundled together. While such bundles are used in offline purchase negotiations, their criticality is heightened in online auctions due to their usual short duration and constrained bidding environment. Despite this importance, little systematic discussion or evaluation has taken place concerning bundling practice, especially as it relates to the individual items included in the bundle, the overall bundle composition, and the resulting supply base and ultimate bundle performance. This study investigates these issues by developing a conceptual model and testing it with a large-scale survey completed by purchasing professionals practicing bundling in B2B online auctions. Results indicate that crafting a more homogeneous bundle is most important in achieving a successful outcome. Furthermore, more complex or difficult-to-specify items do not impact perceived bundle performance, but do influence the supply base that is willing and able to bid on the business.     

Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions

We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries lead to inefficient allocations, thereby creating a motive for resale after the auction is over. In our model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner of the auction makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. Our goal is to compare equilibria of the first-price auction without resale (FPA) with those of the first-price auction with resale (FPAR). For the three major families of distributions for which equilibria of the FPA are available in closed form, we show that resale possibilities increase the revenue of the original seller. We also show by example that, somewhat paradoxically, resale may actually decrease efficiency.     

依托现代信息技术构建科学规范的涉诉资产运行机制

本文主要对现阶段我国司法拍卖改革中引入第三方交易平台作为中间机构,以及在改革中引入电子竞价方式处置涉诉资产的现状做了调研;并就文章作者所在单位采取的做法做了利弊得失的分析,并对涉诉资产处置采取竞价的方式提出了建议。     

Power and efficiency in production pillage games

A pillage game is a formal model of Hobbesian anarchy as a coalitional game. The technology of pillage is specified by a power function that determines the power of each coalition as a function of its members and their wealth. A coalition can despoil any other coalition less powerful than itself. The present paper studies the problem of achieving an efficient allocation of resources when the required reallocation changes the distribution of power. For example, land redistribution may increase total production, but may also deprive the original owners of the power they need to compel compensation. In this case the original owners would block the redistribution. Previous work on pillage games has focused on the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution) as a representation of a stable balance of power. However, the balance of power is typically too delicate to support all efficient allocations. The present paper shows that for a large class of power functions, a recently developed extension of the stable set, called the legitimate set, can be rich enough to support all efficient allocations.      

Measuring efficiency in Australian Schools: A preliminary analysis

In this paper, we apply a public sector Data Envelopment Analysis model to estimate the efficiency of Australian primary and secondary schools. Standard microeconomic production theory showing the transformation of inputs into outputs is extended to allow nondiscretionary environmental variables characteristic of educational production. Failure to properly control for the socioeconomic environment leads to inappropriate comparisons and biased efficiency estimates. We employ a conditional estimator that does not allow a school with a better environment to serve as a benchmark for a school with a worse environment. The results suggest that Australian schools are moderately inefficient and that efficiency increases for the quintile of schools with the most favorable environment. Further, efficiency gains are realized with increasing enrollment.     

Technical efficiency in farming: a meta-regression analysis

A meta-regression analysis including 167 farm level technical efficiency (TE) studies of developing and developed countries was undertaken. The econometric results suggest that stochastic frontier models generate lower mean TE (MTE) estimates than non-parametric deterministic models, while parametric deterministic frontier models yield lower estimates than the stochastic approach. The primal approach is the most common technological representation. In addition, frontier models based on cross-sectional data produce lower estimates than those based on panel data whereas the relationship between functional form and MTE is inconclusive. On average, studies for animal production show a higher MTE than crop farming. The results also suggest that the studies for countries in Western Europe and Oceania present, on average, the highest levels of MTE among all regions after accounting for various methodological features. In contrast, studies for Eastern European countries exhibit the lowest estimate followed by those from Asian, African, Latin American, and North American countries. Additional analysis reveals that MTEs are positively and significantly related to the average income of the countries in the data set but this pattern is broken by the upper middle income group which displays the lowest MTE.

Financial liberalization and banking efficiency: evidence from Turkey

This paper examines the banking efficiency in a pre- and post-liberalization environment by drawing on the Turkish experience by using DEA. The paper also investigates the scale effect on efficiency. Our findings suggest that liberalization programs were followed by an observable decline in efficiency. Another finding of the study is that the Turkish banking system had a serious scale problem during the study period. The second part of our analysis relied on econometric methods and found that one major reason for such system-wide efficiency decline has been the growing macroeconomic instability of the Turkish economy in general and financial sector in particular.

Productivity and efficiency in the US: effects of business cycles and public capital

We add to the literature on the US productivity slowdown and effects of public capital on productivity by employing Malmquist productivity indexes to measure productivity. These indexes allow us to decompose productivity growth into efficiency change and technological innovation. We derive these components for each observation, which we exploit to explore factors which may lead to differences in productivity across regions, including business cycles, both own-state and cross-border public infrastructure investment, and relative sizes of the manufacturing, service and public sector. Our results suggest that the components of total factor productivity change lend important insights into the fairly complex effects of public capital on productivity growth.