Competitive subsidization in regional development

This paper uses a game-theoretic bidding model to analyze the process in which regional areas attract new companies by offering subsidies. It is shown that this is not a ‘negative-sum game’, and that companies tend to locate in those regions for which they have the greatest value. A constructive methodology for quantifying the value of the firm to a region including both direct and indirect benefits is developed. A non-cooperative equilibrium bidding strategy is developed for competing regions which expands on some of the behavioral conclusions in Hands and Mann (1987). Dependent value estimates by the regions and the region's attitudes toward risk are shown to influence optimal bidding strategies for new companies.     

An empirical model of the multi‐unit,sequential, clock auction

We construct a model of participation and bidding at multi‐unit, sequential, clock auctions when bidders have multi‐unit demand. We describe conditions sufficient to characterize a symmetric, perfect‐Bayesian equilibrium and then demonstrate that this equilibrium induces an efficient allocation. We propose an algorithm, based on the generalized Vickrey auction, to calculate the expected winning bid for each unit sold. This algorithm allows us to construct a simulation‐based estimator of the parameters for both the participation process and the distribution of latent valuations. We apply our method to data from 37 multi‐lot, sequential, English auctions of export permits for timber held in Russia. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information Precision and Common Value Partnership Dissolution: An Experimental Study

This paper develops a simple model of ½ auctions in a partnership dissolution game with common values, analyzes how information precision affects the equilibrium, and uses a laboratory study to test the model's predictions. Consistent with the model's prediction, the study shows that when bidders have the same quality information, higher precision leads to more extreme bids. In the case of unequal precision, bidders must use the same bidding functions regardless of their own information quality, and thus, the equilibrium strategy should be the same for both bidders. The experimental results, however, contradicts this prediction. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于演化博弈的工程投标中的围标行为及对策分析

本文分析了工程招投标市场中的围标行为。应用演化博弈方法构建了工程项目投标过程中招投标双方的效用模型,并分析了招投标策略的动态演化过程及影响策略均衡的决定因素,同时,揭示了其演化稳定策略的特征。最后,给出了工程项目招投标规避围标行为的策略选择及改进措施。     

An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of preemptive jump bidding in English auctions with a flexible reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the seller to adjust his decision to accept an offer based on the bidding history makes the existence of a signaling equilibrium questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump bidding behavior and the use and interpretation of opening bids as a signaling device.     

Signaling in Takeover Auctions with Flexible Reserve Price

This paper develops a model of takeover auctions with a two‐step information acquisition process. It shows that the threat of extra information acquisition allows the existence of the signaling jump‐bidding equilibrium even when the seller is able to change its reserve price on the basis of the bidding history. The paper shows that although a higher cost of the secondary information leads to a higher expected price, the precision of the preliminary information has an ambiguous effect on the target's expected profit and that such an effect depends on the number of potential acquirers. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No unbounded arbitrage,weak no market arbitrage and no arbitrage price system conditions; Equivalent conditions

Page and Wooders [Page Jr., F.H., Wooders, M., 1996. A necessary and sufficient condition for compactness of individually rational and feasible outcomes and existence of an equilibrium. Economics Letters 52, 153–162] prove that the no unbounded arbitrage (NUBA), a special case of a condition in Page [Page, F.H., 1987. On equilibrium in Hart’s securities exchange model. Journal of Economic Theory 41, 392–404], is equivalent to the existence of a no arbitrage price system (NAPS) when no agent has non-null useless vectors. Allouch et al. [Allouch, N., Le Van, C., Page F.H., 2002. The geometry of arbitrage and the existence of competitive equilibrium. Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, 373–391] extend the NAPS introduced by Werner [Werner, J., 1987. Arbitrage and the existence of competitive equilibrium. Econometrica 55, 1403–1418] and show that this condition is equivalent to the weak no market arbitrage (WNMA) of Hart [Hart, O., 1974. On the existence of an equilibrium in a securities model. Journal of Economic Theory 9, 293–311]. They mention that this result implies the one given by Page and Wooders [Page Jr., F.H., Wooders, M., 1996. A necessary and sufficient condition for compactness of individually rational and feasible outcomes and existence of an equilibrium. Economics Letters 52, 153–162]. In this note, we show that all these conditions are equivalent.     

Arbitrage, equilibrium, and gains from trade: A counterexample

We present a counterexample to a theorem due to Chichilnisky (Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1993, 29, 189–207; American Economic Review, 1994, 84, 427–434). Chichilnisky's theorem states that her condition of limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in an economy with unbounded short sales. Our counterexample shows that the condition defined by Chichilnisky is not sufficient for existence of equilibrium. We also discuss difficulties in Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–107).     

Existence of an equilibrium for infinite horizon economies with and without complete information

This work proves the existence of an equilibrium for an infinite horizon economy where trade takes place sequentially over time. There exist two types of agents: the first correctly anticipates all future contingent endogenous variables with complete information as in Radner [Radner, R. (1972). Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations in a sequence of markets. Econometrica, 289–303] and the second has exogenous expectations about the future environment as in Grandmont [Grandmont, J. M. (1977). Temporary general equilibrium theory. Econometrica, 535–572] and information based on the current and past aggregate variables including those which are private knowledge. Agents with exogenous expectations may have inconsistent optimal plans but have predictive beliefs in the context of Blackwell and Dubbins [Blackwell, D., Dubins, L. (1962). Merging of opinions with increasing information. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 882–886] with probability transition rules based on all observed variables. We provide examples of this framework applied to models of differential information and environments exhibiting results of market selection and convergence of an equilibrium. The existence result can be used to conclude that, by adding the continuity assumption on the probability transition rules, we obtain the existence of an equilibrium for some models of differential information and incomplete markets.     

The set of equilibria of first-price auctions

I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. A formula to recover the distribution of valuations for any equilibrium bidding strategy is given.     

房地产建设项目招标投标策略风险管理与防范

房地产建设项目招投标存在的主要风险有:招标文件设计风险、资格审查风险、质量风险、投标策略风险、定标签约风险等。本文主要讨论的是投标策略风险。产生投标策略风险的主要原因是自身准备工作不够周密和主观能动性的缺乏。     

On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions

Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-price auctions assume that the price is given by the highest losing bid. In practice, however, the price is usually given by the lowest winning bid. We derive the equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction when there are k objects for sale and n bidders with unit demand, and prove that it converges to the bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction if and only if the number of losers n−k gets large. When the number of losers grows large, the bidding functions converge at a linear rate and the prices in the two auctions converge in probability to the expected value of an object to the marginal winner.     

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller’s expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer’s expected bribe and the seller’s expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.     

Pure strategy equilibria in games with countable actions

In this paper, we extend the Radner–Rosenthal theorem with finite action spaces on the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for a finite game to the case that the action space is countable and complete. We also prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for a game with a continuum of players of finite types and with a countable and complete action space. To work with the countably infinite action spaces, we prove some regularity properties on the set of distributions induced by the measurable selections of a correspondence with a countable range by using the Bollobás–Varopoulos extension of the marriage lemma.     

The efficiency of top agents: An analysis through service strategy in tennis

We consider the question whether top tennis players in a top tournament (Wimbledon) employ an optimal (efficient) service strategy. While we show that top players do not, in general, follow an optimal strategy, our principal result is that the estimated inefficiencies are not large: the inefficiency regarding winning a point on service is on average 1.1% for men and 2.0% for women, implying that–by adopting an efficient service strategy–players can (on average) increase the probability of winning a match by 2.4%-points for men and 3.2%-points for women. While the inefficiencies may seem small, the financial consequences for the efficient player at Wimbledon can be substantial: the expected paycheck could rise by 18.7% for men and even by 32.8% for women. We use these findings to shed some light on the question of whether economic agents are successful optimizers.     

On the strictly descending multi-unit auction

We analyze the bidding behavior in a strictly descending multi-unit auction where the price decreases continuously without going back to the initial start price once an object is sold. We prove that any equilibrium in the multi-unit descending auction is inefficient. We derive a symmetric equilibrium for general distribution functions as well as an arbitrary number of bidders and objects. Moreover, equilibrium bidding is characterized by a set of initial value problems. Our analysis thus generalizes previous results in the literature.     

Slack in incomplete markets with nominal assets: A symmetric proof

In this paper, we provide an equilibrium analysis in the framework of incomplete markets where some agents’ preferences are possibly satiated at some state of the nature. We will consider nominal assets with exogenously fixed asset prices. We extend the notion of equilibrium with slack – introduced by Drèze and Müller [Drèze, J., Müller, H., 1980. Optimality properties of rationing schemes. Journal of Economic Theory 23, 150–159] in a fixed price setting – to the GEI framework.     

Equilibria without the survival assumption

It is well known that an equilibrium in the Arrow–Debreu model may fail to exist if a very restrictive condition called the survival assumption is not satisfied. We study two approaches that allow for the relaxation of this condition. Danilov and Sotskov [Danilov, V.I., Sotskov, A.I., 1990. A generalized economic equilibrium. Journal of Mathematical Economics 19, 341–356], and Florig [Florig, M., 2001. Hierarchic competitive equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Economics 35, 515–546] developed a concept of a generalized equilibrium based on a notion of hierarchic prices. Marakulin [Marakulin, V., 1988. An equilibrium with nonstandard prices and its properties in mathematical models of economy. Discussion Paper No. 18. Institute of Mathematics, Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, 51 pp. (in Russian); Marakulin, V., 1990. Equilibrium with nonstandard prices in exchange economies. In: Quandt, R., Triska, D. (Eds.), Optimal Decisions in Market and Planned Economies. Westview Press, London, pp. 268–282] proposed a concept of an equilibrium with non-standard prices. In this paper, we establish the equivalence between non-standard and hierarchic equilibria. Furthermore, we show that for any specified system of dividends the set of such equilibria is generically finite. As a consequence, we have generic finiteness of Mas-Colell’s equilibria with slack, uniform dividend equilibria, and other special cases of our concept.     

Multiple and last-minute bidding in competing internet auctions

The present paper proposes a theoretical model of the equilibrium bidding behavior in simultaneous competing private-value Internet auctions such as those on eBay. It shows that last-minute bidding and multiple bidding, two commonly observed bidding strategies, arise in equilibrium. It also suggests that last-minute bidding may lead to inefficient outcomes.     

Equilibrium price dynamics in an overlapping-generations exchange economy

An extension to the Yaari (1965)–Blanchard (1985) continuous time overlapping generations model for an endowment Arrow–Debreu economy with an age-structured population is presented. It is proved that Arrow–Debreu equilibrium prices are represented by a double linear integral equation, and depend on the age-distributions of population and endowments. For an economy with a balanced growth, and logarithmic utility, we prove that bubbles may exist if endowments are distributed earlier than some critical age.