What is the systemic risk exposure of financial institutions?

I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.     

Deposit insurance around the world: A comprehensive analysis and database

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.     

A comprehensive approach to measuring the relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.     

Fragility,stress, and market returns

We propose a novel risk measure that relates to subsequent negative conditional stock market returns. Our risk measure considers both the fragility and stress of the market. Fragility is measured by the Fragility Index developed by Berger and Pukthuanthong (2012) and market stress is based on several economic variables. Results show that incorporating both market stress and fragility improves the information content of a risk measure. Our risk measure relates to poor subsequent monthly market returns. We show the risk measure contains predictive information in a purely ex-ante specification.     

Tail dependence and indicators of systemic risk for large US depositories

In this study, we investigate the extreme loss tail dependence between stock returns of large US depository institutions. We find that stock returns exhibit strong loss dependence even in their limiting joint extremes. Motivated by this result, we derive extremal dependence-based systemic risk indicators. The proposed systemic risk indicators reflect downturns in the US financial industry very well. We also develop a set of firm-level average extremal dependence measures. We show that these firm-level measures could have been used to identify the firms that were more vulnerable to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Additionally, we explore the performance of selected systemic risk indicators in predicting the crisis performance of large US depository institutions and find that the average stock return correlations are also good predictors of crisis period returns. Finally, we identify factors predictive of extremal dependence for the US depository institutions in a panel regression setting. Strength of extremal dependence increases with asset size and similarity of financial fundamentals. On the other hand, strength of extremal dependence decreases with capitalization, liquidity, funding stability and asset quality. We believe the proposed indicators have the potential to inform the prudential supervision of systemic risk.     

Assessing the contribution of banks,insurance and other financial services to systemic risk

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on systemic risk by assessing the extent to which distress within the main different financial sectors, namely, the banking, insurance and other financial services industries contribute to systemic risk. To this end, we rely on the $\mathrm{\Delta }\mathit{CoVaR}$ systemic risk measure introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). In order to provide a formal ranking of the financial sectors with respect to their contribution to systemic risk, the original $\mathrm{\Delta }\mathit{CoVaR}$ approach is extended here to include the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test developed by Abadie (2002), based on bootstrapping. Our empirical results reveal that in the Eurozone, for the period ranging from 2004 to 2012, the other financial services sector contributes relatively the most to systemic risk at times of distress affecting this sector. In turn, the banking sector appears to contribute more to systemic risk than the insurance sector. By contrast, the insurance industry is the systemically riskiest financial sector in the United States for the same period, while the banking sector contributes the least to systemic risk in this area. Beyond this ranking, the three financial sectors of interest are found to contribute significantly to systemic risk, both in the Eurozone and in the United States.     

Liquidity risk and policy options

On the basis of a liquidity management model, liquidity risks, defined as the probability of payment failures in a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payment system, may either stem from liquidity management inefficiencies or insufficient cash balances. I will show that penalties charged on the amount of payment failures minimise liquidity risks without interfering with the bank’s technology preferences. I will instead show that liquidity requirements, although as effective as penalties to contain the risk of liquidity shortage, may distort the bank’s technology preferences and cannot stem liquidity management inefficiencies. I will also show that liquidity risks within RTGS payment systems are potentially smaller because they depend more on the liquidity management efficiency than on the randomness of cash inflows and outflows.     

Elimination of systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax

Financial markets are exposed to systemic risk (SR), the risk that a major fraction of the system ceases to function, and collapses. It has recently become possible to quantify SR in terms of underlying financial networks where nodes represent financial institutions, and links capture the size and maturity of assets (loans), liabilities and other obligations, such as derivatives. We demonstrate that it is possible to quantify the share of SR that individual liabilities within a financial network contribute to the overall SR. We use empirical data of nationwide interbank liabilities to show that the marginal contribution to overall SR of liabilities for a given size varies by a factor of a thousand. We propose a tax on individual transactions that is proportional to their marginal contribution to overall SR. If a transaction does not increase SR, it is tax-free. With an agent-based model (ABM) (CRISIS macro-financial model), we demonstrate that the proposed ‘Systemic Risk Tax’ (SRT) leads to a self-organized restructuring of financial networks that are practically free of SR. The SRT can be seen as an insurance for the public against costs arising from cascading failure. ABM predictions are shown to be in remarkable agreement with the empirical data and can be used to understand the relation of credit risk and SR.     

Diversification disasters

The recent financial crisis has revealed significant externalities and systemic risks that arise from the interconnectedness of financial intermediaries’ risk portfolios. We develop a model in which the negative externality arises because intermediaries’ actions to diversify that are optimal for individual intermediaries may prove to be suboptimal for society. We show that the externality depends critically on the distributional properties of the risks. The optimal social outcome involves less risk-sharing, but also a lower probability for massive collapses of intermediaries. We derive the exact conditions under which risk-sharing restrictions create a socially preferable outcome. Our analysis has implications for regulation of financial institutions and risk management.     

Does financial connectedness predict crises?

The global financial crisis has reignited interest in models of crisis prediction. It has also raised the question whether financial interconnectedness—a possible source of systemic risk—can serve as an early warning indicator of crises. In this paper, we examine the ability of connectedness in the global network of financial linkages to predict systemic banking crises during the 1978–2010 period. Our results indicate that increases in a country’s own connectedness and decreases in its neighbours’ connectedness are associated with a higher probability of banking crises after controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals. Our findings suggest that financial interconnectedness has early warning potential, especially for the 2007–2010 wave of systemic banking crises.     

Has the financial system become safer after the crisis? The changing nature of financial institution risk

Six years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the question of whether the U.S. financial system has become less risky remains unanswered. On the one side, new regulations including Dodd-Frank and Basel III have made improvements by requiring higher bank capital, and financial institutions themselves have reduced risk-taking activities. On the other side, it has been argued that “the fundamental risks remained and the efforts of regulators and politicians were simply rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.” (Baily and Elliott, 2013) This paper highlights the changing nature of financial institution risk from 2005 to 2011. It finds that while these institutions have become less risky individually after the crisis, the financial market has become more vulnerable to systemic contagion. The causal inference that the crisis and the post-crisis legislation have gradually changed the nature of financial institution risk is drawn from a quasi-experimental design. This finding suggests that the ever more integrated financial system might experience more synchronized contractions in future crises, providing empirical support for the proposals of the inter-bank collective regulation of banks by Acharya (2009) in addition to the intra-bank collective regulations as in Froot and Stein (1998) and BIS (1996, 1999).     

An options-based approach to evaluating the risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac assume a significant amount of interest and prepayment risk and all of the credit risk for about half of the $8 trillion U.S. residential mortgage market. Their hybrid government-private status, and the perception that they are too big to fail, make them a potentially large, but largely unaccounted for, risk to the federal government. Measuring the size and risk of this liability is technically difficult, but important for the debate over the appropriate regulation of these institutions. Here we take an options pricing approach to evaluating these costs and risks. Under the base case assumptions, the estimated value of the guarantees is $7.9 billion over 10 years, with a combined .5 percent value at risk of $122 billion. We evaluate the sensitivity of these estimates to various modeling assumptions, and also to the regulatory regime, including forbearance policies and capital requirements. The analysis highlights the benefits, but also the challenges, of taking an options-based approach to evaluating the value of federal credit guarantees.     

A semiparametric model for the systematic factors of portfolio credit risk premia

The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical relationship between daily fluctuations in the risk premium for holding a large diversified credit portfolio, which we approximate by a benchmark credit index, and some tradeable market factors which capture systematic risk. The analysis is based on an adaptive nonparametric modelling approach which allows for the data-driven estimation of the nonlinear dynamic relationship between portfolio credit risk premia and their hypothetical components. Our main finding is that the empirical weights of the systematic factors display sudden jumps during market crises and a less intense time-dependent behaviour during normal market conditions. In addition, we find that during market crises the directions of the empirical relationships are often inconsistent with ordinary economic intuition, as they are influenced by the specific circumstances of financial markets distress.     

The impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk

This paper examines the impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk. We use a static model on financial institutions’ risk-taking behavior to quantify the systemic risk in the cross-sectional dimension in both regulated and unregulated systems. Although imposing a capital requirement can lower individual risk, it simultaneously enhances systemic linkage within the system. By using a proper systemic risk measure combining both individual risk and systemic linkage, we show that systemic risk in a regulated system can be higher than that in an unregulated system. In addition, we analyze a sufficient condition under which the systemic risk in a regulated system is always lower.     

Systemic risk and the refinancing ratchet effect

The combination of rising home prices, declining interest rates, and near-frictionless refinancing opportunities can create unintentional synchronization of homeowner leverage, leading to a “ratchet” effect on leverage because homes are indivisible and owner-occupants cannot raise equity to reduce leverage when home prices fall. Our simulation of the U.S. housing market yields potential losses of $1.7 trillion from June 2006 to December 2008 with cash-out refinancing vs. only $330 billion in the absence of cash-out refinancing. The refinancing ratchet effect is a new type of systemic risk in the financial system and does not rely on any dysfunctional behaviors.     

Derivatives and systemic risk: Netting, collateral, and closeout

In the U.S., as in most countries with well-developed securities markets, derivative securities enjoy special protections under insolvency resolution laws. Most creditors are “stayed” from enforcing their rights while a firm is in bankruptcy. However, many derivatives contracts are exempt from these stays. Furthermore, derivatives enjoy netting and closeout, or termination, privileges which are not always available to most other creditors. The primary argument used to motivate passage of legislation granting these extraordinary protections is that derivatives markets are a major source of systemic risk in financial markets and that netting and closeout reduce this risk. To date, these assertions have not been subjected to rigorous economic scrutiny. This paper critically re-examines this hypothesis. These relationships are more complex than often perceived. We conclude that it is not clear whether netting, collateral, and/or closeout lead to reduced systemic risk, once the impact of these protections on the size and structure of the derivatives market has been taken into account.     

The impact of enterprise risk management on the marginal cost of reducing risk: Evidence from the insurance industry

We test the hypothesis that practicing enterprise risk management (ERM) reduces firms’ cost of reducing risk. Adoption of ERM represents a radical paradigm shift from the traditional method of managing risks individually to managing risks collectively allowing ERM-adopting firms to better recognize natural hedges, prioritize hedging activities towards the risks that contribute most to the total risk of the firm, and optimize the evaluation and selection of available hedging instruments. We hypothesize that these advantages allow ERM-adopting firms to produce greater risk reduction per dollar spent. Our hypothesis further predicts that, after implementing ERM, firms experience profit maximizing incentives to lower risk. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms adopting ERM experience a reduction in stock return volatility. We also find that the reduction in return volatility for ERM-adopting firms becomes stronger over time. Further, we find that operating profits per unit of risk (ROA/return volatility) increase post ERM adoption.     

Diversification and systemic risk

Portfolio diversification makes investors individually safer but creates connections between them through common asset holdings. Such connections create “endogenous covariances” between assets and investors, and enhance systemic risk by propagating shocks swiftly through the system. We provide a theoretical model in which shocks spread through constrained selling from N diversified portfolio investors in a network of asset holdings with home bias, and study the desirability of diversification by comparing the multivariate distribution of implied losses for every level of diversification. There may be a region on the parameter set for which the propagation effect dominates the individually safer one. We derive analytically the general element of the covariance between two assets i and j. We find agents may minimize their exposure to endogenous risk by spreading their wealth across more and more distant assets. The resulting network enhances systemic stability.