Informed principal and information gathering agent

We study a principal–agent model in which the principal has a production technology. The efficiency parameter of the principal’s technology is not known to the agent. Alternatively, the principal can make the agent use a technology from a different channel. By gathering information at a cost, the agent can be informed privately of the efficiency of the technology that he may acquire from another source. We find that the principal requires the agent to adopt the principal’s technology more (less) often when the cost of gathering information on the other technology is small (large). Also, with two states of nature, the outcome is first-best when the information gathering cost is intermediate.      

Arbitrage and equilibrium in unbounded exchange economies with satiation

In his seminal paper on arbitrage and competitive equilibrium in unbounded exchange economies, Werner (1987) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium, under a price no-arbitrage condition, without assuming either local or global nonsatiation. Werner’s existence result contrasts sharply with classical existence results for bounded exchange economies which require, at minimum, global nonsatiation at rational allocations. Why do unbounded exchange economies admit existence without local or global nonsatiation? This question is the focus of our paper. First, we show that in unbounded exchange economies, even if some agents’ preferences are satiated, the absence of arbitrage is sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibria, as long as each agent who is satiated has a nonempty set of useful net trades– that is, as long as agents’ preferences satisfy weak nonsatiation. Second, we provide a new approach to proving existence in unbounded exchange economies. The key step in our new approach is to transform the original economy to an economy satisfying global nonsatiation such that all equilibria of the transformed economy are equilibria of the original economy. What our approach makes clear is that it is precisely the condition of weak nonsatiation – a condition considerably weaker than local or global nonsatiation – that makes possible this transformation.     

Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations

This paper introduces a general framework for the fair allocation of indivisible objects when each agent can consume at most one (e.g., houses, jobs, queuing positions) and monetary compensations are possible. This framework enables us to deal with identical objects and monotonicity of preferences in ranking objects. We show that the no-envy solution is the only solution satisfying equal treatment of equals, Maskin monotonicity, and a mild continuity property. The same axiomatization holds if the continuity property is replaced by a neutrality property.     

Slack in incomplete markets with nominal assets: A symmetric proof

In this paper, we provide an equilibrium analysis in the framework of incomplete markets where some agents’ preferences are possibly satiated at some state of the nature. We will consider nominal assets with exogenously fixed asset prices. We extend the notion of equilibrium with slack – introduced by Drèze and Müller [Drèze, J., Müller, H., 1980. Optimality properties of rationing schemes. Journal of Economic Theory 23, 150–159] in a fixed price setting – to the GEI framework.     

Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

We consider a principal who is keen to induce his agents to work at their maximal effort levels. To this end, he samples n days at random out of the T days on which they work, and awards a prize of B dollars to the most productive agent. The principal’s policy (B, n) induces a strategic game Γ(B, n) between the agents. We show that to implement maximal effort levels weakly (or, strongly) as a strategic equilibrium (or, as dominant strategies) in Γ(B, n), at the least cost B to himself, the principal must choose a small sample size n. Thus less scrutiny by the principal induces more effort from the agents.The need for reduced scrutiny becomes more pronounced when agents have information of the history of past plays in the game. There is an inverse relation between information and optimal sample size. As agents acquire more information (about each other), the principal, so to speak, must “undo” this by reducing his information (about them) and choosing the sample size n even smaller.     

Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is nonobservable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve both incentive and selection purposes. If harder working agents respond less to intensified effort incentives, we find that the principal puts less emphasis on individual performance pay when selection becomes more important. Thus, we provide a possible explanation as to why, in practice, individual performance pay is less prevalent than promotion‐based incentives.     

A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies

To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies, we look for mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: efficiency, (individual and coalitional) strategy proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility), and fairness. We show that only a uniform mechanism satisfies all three. We also show that all efficient and strategy proof mechanisms must function by assigning budget sets to the agencies and letting them freely choose their optimal bundle. In choosing these budget sets, the agencies’ private information has to be taken into account in a particular way. The only way to additionally satisfy a weak fairness requirement (regions with identical preferences should be treated equally) is to assign all agencies the same budget set, as does the uniform mechanism. Finally and maybe more importantly, we show that the central government should not impose constraints on how much to fund an activity (e.g. by reserving some funds only for a particular activity): otherwise, there are no efficient, strategy proof and fair mechanisms, no matter how small these constraints are.     

On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making

Holmström (Groves' schemes on restricted domains,Econometrica 47, 1979, pp. 1137–1144) showed for public decision making problems with a smoothly connected domain of preferences that Groves' schemes are the unique direct revelation mechanisms satisfying incentive compatibility. This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the domain of preferences for which these Groves' schemes are the unique incentive compatible transfer schemes when the number of alternatives is finite. Furthermore, we give an example of a decision making problem that arises from a sequencing problem for which budget balanced Groves' schemes exist and show that these transfer schemes are not individually rational.     

Incentives in academics: Collaboration under weak complementarities

This paper considers a contracting relationship with multiple agents in a repeated setting under voluntary team formation. In each period, an opportunity to collaborate arrives stochastically but whether this opportunity has arrived is the agents' private information. The principal thus cannot simply tell them when to collaborate; she must instead guide them through incentives. The optimal contract in the repeated setting can drastically be different from that in the static setting and is often characterized as high-powered team incentives complemented with inefficiently low-powered individual incentives, which endogenously raise the cost of shirking. We then argue that low-powered incentives offered for non-collaborative works, as often observed in our profession, can be seen as an important part of optimal incentive schemes in an attempt to endogenously raise the cost of shirking. The mechanism presented here also has implications for internal team competition (team competition within firms) which has become increasingly popular these days.     

Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution

This paper studies a bargaining model where n   players negotiate how to share a pie through (n−1)$(n-1)$ bilateral bargaining sessions. In each session, two players bargain for a partial agreement that specifies who exits and who moves on to the next session (if there is any) via the alternating-proposal framework of Rubinstein [Rubinstein, A., 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50, 97–109]. We consider two bargaining procedures under which the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes converge to the Nash [Nash, J., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162] bargaining solution for the corresponding bargaining problem as the players’ discount factor goes to one. Hence, the model studied here provides a non-cooperative foundation for the Nash cooperative bargaining solution in the multilateral case.     

Risk aversion in RDEU

Various notions of risk aversion can be distinguished for the class of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) preferences. We discuss the relationships amongst five of these, and describe simple (testable) characterizations in terms of elementary probability transformations for all but the weakest notion. The paper also provides the first complete characterization of the RDEU orderings that are risk-averse in the sense of Jewitt [Jewitt, I., 1989. Choosing between risky prospects: the characterization of comparative static results and location independent risk. Management Science 35, 60–70]. We also extend Chew et al.’s [Chew, S.H., Karni, E., Safra, Z., 1987. Risk aversion in the theory of utility with rank-dependent probabilities. Journal of Economic Theory 42, 370–381] important characterization of strong risk aversion [Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J.E., 1970. Increasing risk: I. A definition. Journal of Economic Theory 2, 225–243] by relaxing strict monotonicity and differentiability assumptions, and allowing for discontinuities in the probability transformation function. The important special case of maximin choice falls within this relaxed RDEU class. It is shown that any strongly risk-averse RDEU order is a convex combination of maximin and another RDEU order with concave utility and continuous, concave probability transformation. Our proof of the result on strong risk aversion is also simpler (as well as more general) than that of Chew et al. [Chew, S.H., Karni, E., Safra, Z., 1987. Risk aversion in the theory of utility with rank-dependent probabilities. Journal of Economic Theory 42, 370–381].     

Maximizing bidder surplus in simultaneous online art auctions via dynamic forecasting

This paper presents a novel intelligent bidding system, called SOABER (Simultaneous Online Auction BiddER), which monitors simultaneous online auctions of high-value fine art items. It supports decision-making by maximizing bidders’ surpluses and their chances of winning an auction. One key element of the system is a dynamic forecasting model, which incorporates information about the speed of an auction’s price movement, as well as the level of competition both within and across auctions. Other elements include a wallet estimator, which gauges the bidders’ willingness to pay, and a bid strategizer, which embeds the forecasting model into a fully automated decision system. We illustrate the performance of our intelligent bidding system on an authentic dataset of online art auctions for Indian contemporary art. We compare our system with several simpler ad-hoc approaches, and find it to be more effective in terms of both the extracted surplus and the resulting winning percentage.     

Incentive schemes for executive officers when forecasts matter

This paper develops a new perspective on results‐based incentive schemes for non‐CEO managers. It shows that it is possible to establish incentive schemes that take into account both the actual output obtained and the forecast figure previously established as a target, without the negative consequences derived from the perverse loop of hiding‐ratchet effects. A general linear two‐staged scheme is proposed. In addition, relevant properties of this incentive system are stated that show how principals (corporate management) may determine the expected forecasting behavior of agents (executive officers) by suitably choosing the scheme parameters according to a simple set of rules. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A class of adaptive importance sampling weighted EM algorithms for efficient and robust posterior and predictive simulation

A class of adaptive sampling methods is introduced for efficient posterior and predictive simulation. The proposed methods are robust in the sense that they can handle target distributions that exhibit non-elliptical shapes such as multimodality and skewness. The basic method makes use of sequences of importance weighted Expectation Maximization steps in order to efficiently construct a mixture of Student-t$t$ densities that approximates accurately the target distribution–typically a posterior distribution, of which we only require a kernel–in the sense that the Kullback–Leibler divergence between target and mixture is minimized. We label this approach Mixture of  t$t$by Importance Sampling weighted Expectation Maximization (MitISEM). The constructed mixture is used as a candidate density for quick and reliable application of either Importance Sampling (IS) or the Metropolis–Hastings (MH) method. We also introduce three extensions of the basic MitISEM approach. First, we propose a method for applying MitISEM in a sequential manner, so that the candidate distribution for posterior simulation is cleverly updated when new data become available. Our results show that the computational effort reduces enormously, while the quality of the approximation remains almost unchanged. This sequential approach can be combined with a tempering approach, which facilitates the simulation from densities with multiple modes that are far apart. Second, we introduce a permutation-augmented MitISEM approach. This is useful for importance or Metropolis–Hastings sampling from posterior distributions in mixture models without the requirement of imposing identification restrictions on the model’s mixture regimes’ parameters. Third, we propose a partial MitISEM approach, which aims at approximating the joint distribution by estimating a product of marginal and conditional distributions. This division can substantially reduce the dimension of the approximation problem, which facilitates the application of adaptive importance sampling for posterior simulation in more complex models with larger numbers of parameters. Our results indicate that the proposed methods can substantially reduce the computational burden in econometric models like DCC or mixture GARCH models and a mixture instrumental variables model.     

‘Carrots for Corporate Sustainability’: Impacts of Incentive Inclusiveness and Variety on Environmental Performance

In this paper we explore the role that managerial incentives play in improving corporate environmental performance, finding that greater inclusiveness of incentive beneficiaries and greater variety of incentive types are important factors in firms' incentive schemes. Drawing on a large dataset of multinational enterprises, our results suggest that including more beneficiaries from different levels within the corporate hierarchy and offering both monetary and non‐monetary rewards are generally more likely to lead to reductions in corporate greenhouse gas emissions. Developing two principles of incentive design, inclusiveness and variety, and the conceptualization of patterns of these in organizations as configurations of incentives, our research contributes substantially to normative advice regarding the relative effectiveness of alternative systems of environmental incentives. Such an understanding of the potential of incentives is critical to informing how firms address complex problems such as sustainability in the context of increasingly extended organizational hierarchies and designs. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.     

On the importance of the long-term seasonal component in day-ahead electricity price forecasting with NARX neural networks

Daily and weekly seasonalities are always taken into account in day-ahead electricity price forecasting, but the long-term seasonal component has long been believed to add unnecessary complexity, and hence, most studies have ignored it. The recent introduction of the Seasonal Component AutoRegressive (SCAR) modeling framework has changed this viewpoint. However, this framework is based on linear models estimated using ordinary least squares. This paper shows that considering non-linear autoregressive (NARX) neural network-type models with the same inputs as the corresponding SCAR-type models can lead to yet better performances. While individual Seasonal Component Artificial Neural Network (SCANN) models are generally worse than the corresponding SCAR-type structures, we provide empirical evidence that committee machines of SCANN networks can outperform the latter significantly.     

Locally robust contracts for moral hazard

We consider a moral hazard problem in which the principal has a slight uncertainty about how the agent’s actions translate into output. An incentive contract can be made robust against an $ϵ$ amount of uncertainty, at the cost of a loss to the principal on the order of $\sqrt{ϵ}$, by refunding a small fraction of profit to the agent. We show that as $ϵ$ goes to zero, this construction is essentially optimal, in the sense of minimizing the worst-case loss, among all modifications to the contract that do not depend on the details of the environment.     

Refinements and incentive efficiency in Walrasian models of insurance economies

The literature on Walrasian markets in large economies with adverse selection has used various equilibrium refinements, but has obtained no general incentive efficiency of equilibrium, namely when cross-subsidies are needed for efficiency. We show that the same refined equilibria may also be incentive inefficient even when general mechanisms that allow for such cross-subsidies are priced and can be traded. In the process, we also prove existence of some type of forward induction equilibria in this context.     

Incentive Contracting Under Limited Liability

We examine the nature of incentive schemes between the principal and the risk-neutral agent in the presence of the agent's limited liability and ex ante action choice. We consider alternative schemes when a simple rental contract is infeasible due to the limited liability of the agent and study the effectiveness of a performance bonus scheme in achieving the first-best outcome. We also discuss some implications of such schemes in real practices.