企业家精神会影响资本账户开放的风险效应吗?

本文基于面板平滑转换模型及97个国家和地区的跨国面板数据,实证研究企业家精神对资本账户开放风险效应的影响。结果表明,一国的企业家精神越强,则越有利于防范和化解由资本账户开放引起的金融风险;反之,一国企业家精神越弱,则开放资本账户越有可能加剧一国面临的金融风险。以上结论在不同的稳健性检验下均显著成立。基于这一发现,本文认为,企业家精神是影响资本账户开放风险效应的重要因素之一,因此,我国应将资本账户开放与企业家精神的培育相结合,在推进资本账户开放的进程中大力培育企业家精神,以防范和化解金融风险。这同时表明,"大众创业、万众创新"对于我国资本账户开放具有重要意义。     

The flight from maturity

Why did the failure of Lehman Brothers make the financial crisis dramatically worse? Our answer is that the financial crisis was a process of a build-up of risk during the crisis prior to the Lehman failure. During the crisis market participants tried to preserve an option to withdraw by shortening maturities — the “flight from maturity”. We show that the flight from maturity was manifested in a steepening of the term structures of spreads in money markets. With increasingly short maturities, lenders created the possibility of fast exit. The failure of Lehman Brothers was the tipping point of this build-up of systemic fragility. A crisis is a dynamic process in which “tail risk” is endogenous.     

“Analysis of Incremental Returns of Canadian Mutual Funds”, J. F. Carrière; C. F. Hill,April 2001

Abstract

The determination and allocation of economic capital is important for pricing, risk management, and related insurer financial decision making. This paper considers the allocation of economic capital to lines of business in insurance. We show how to derive closed-form results for the complete markets, arbitrage-free allocation of the insurer default option value, or insolvency exchange option, to lines of business for an insurer balance sheet. We assume that individual lines of business and the surplus ratio are joint log-normal although the method we adopt allows other assumptions. The allocation of the default option value is required for fair pricing in the multiline insurer. We discuss and illustrate other methods of capital allocation, including Myers-Read, and give numerical examples for the capital allocation of the default option value based on explicit payoffs by line.     

An Approach to Fair Valuation of Insurance Liabilities Using the Firm’s Cost of Capital

Abstract

There are two competing and seemingly different methodologies for calculating fair values—the direct and indirect methods. The direct approach has the advantage of providing a more reliable assessment of the risk of financial leverage. The indirect method can be structured to adjust for financial leverage, however, the methodology becomes excessively complex. The advantage of the indirect method is that it can be more easily related to exit prices. Intuitively, an exit price should reflect both the creditworthiness of the firm and the cost of capital of the firm. How are these two concepts related? This paper attempts to advance the fair valuation methodology by addressing these questions and presenting a methodology for deriving the firm or own credit risk assumption (to be used with the direct method) that is consistent with the cost of capital assumption used with the indirect method.     

Underinvestment,capital structure and strategic debt restructuring

This paper shows that shareholders' option to renegotiate debt in a period of financial distress exacerbates Myers' (1977) underinvestment problem at the time of the firm's expansion. This result is a consequence of a higher wealth transfer from shareholders to creditors occurring upon investment in the presence of the option to renegotiate. This additional underinvestment is eliminated by granting creditors the entire bargaining power. In such a case, renegotiation commences at shareholders' bankruptcy trigger so no additional wealth transfer occurs. In addition to deriving the firm's policies, we provide results on the values of corporate claims, the agency cost of debt, and the optimal capital structure. Empirically, we predict, among others, a lower sensitivity of capital investment to shocks to Tobin's q and cash flow for firms financed with renegotiable debt, and a negative effect of debt renegotiability on the relationship between growth opportunities and systematic risk as well as leverage.     

普惠金融与创业:“授人以鱼”还是“授人以渔”？

在“大众创业,万众创新”战略推进的关键时期,本文考察了普惠金融对创业的影响和作用。基于中国家庭金融调查数据的实证研究发现,普惠金融的发展对创业具备显著的增进效应。考虑多种模型设定、不同自变量和因变量度量方式以及内生性问题讨论的稳健性检验均不改变本文的主要结论。在此基础上,本文对普惠金融影响创业的作用机制进行了检验。结果发现,普惠金融并没有通过缓解家庭资金约束来促进创业,普惠金融对创业的增进作用主要来源于对居民金融能力的提升。随后,本文实证检验了金融教育对普惠金融影响创业的调节作用。结果发现,随着金融教育的普及,普惠金融发展对创业的促进作用将加强。区分普惠金融不同维度可以发现,金融教育对普惠金融影响创业的调节作用,是通过提高金融服务使用度对创业的增进效应实现的。本文的研究表明,相较于传统金融发展,实现金融广化更有助于居民创业精神的激发。     

Why ‘Basel II’ may need a leverage ratio restriction

We analyze regulatory capital requirements where the amount of required capital depends on the level of risk reported by the banks. It is shown that if the supervisors have a limited ability to identify or to sanction dishonest banks, an additional, risk-independent leverage ratio restriction may be necessary to induce truthful risk reporting. The leverage ratio helps to offset the banks’ potential capital savings of understating their risks by (i) reducing banks’ put option value of limited liability ex ante, and by (ii) increasing the banks’ net worth, which in turn enhances the supervisors’ ability to sanction banks ex post.     

Testing macroprudential stress tests: The risk of regulatory risk weights

We compare the capital shortfall measured by regulatory stress tests, to that of a benchmark methodology — the “V-Lab stress test” — that employs only publicly available market data. We find that when capital shortfalls are measured relative to risk-weighted assets, the ranking of financial institutions is not well correlated to the ranking of the V-Lab stress test, whereas rank correlations increase when required capitalization is a function of total assets. We show that the risk measures used in risk-weighted assets are cross-sectionally uncorrelated with market measures of risk, as they do not account for the “risk that risk will change.” Furthermore, the banks that appeared to be best capitalized relative to risk-weighted assets were no better than the rest when the European economy deteriorated into the sovereign debt crisis in 2011.     

Human capital investment and optimal portfolio choice

We analyze how an individual should optimally invest in human capital when he also has financial wealth. We treat the individual's possibilities to take more education as expansion options and apply real option analysis. In addition, we characterize the individual's optimal consumption strategy and portfolio weights. The individual has a demand for hedging financial risk, labor income risk, and also wage level risk.     

What’s the contingency? A proposal for bank contingent capital triggered by systemic risk

Contingent capital (coco) automatically recapitalizes the banking system during financial crises if the trigger mechanism is properly designed. We propose a dual trigger mechanism based on: (1) aggregate systemic risk in the banking system, measured using CATFIN, and (2) the individual bank’s contribution to overall systemic risk, measured using delta CoVaR. The dual trigger is highly correlated with system-wide insolvency risk and prices systemic risk. We set different triggers for banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers. Using the 99% cut-off, systemic coco issued by Lehman and Bear Stearns would have been triggered in November 2007, months prior to their actual demise.     

Capital mobility and international sharing of cyclical risk

This paper investigates whether the international globalization of financial markets allows for significant cross-country risk-sharing at the business cycle frequency. We find that cross-country risk-sharing is still limited and this is unlikely to be the result of financial frictions that limit state-contingent contracts. Part of the limited international risk sharing could be the consequence of frictions that de-facto reduce the short-term mobility of financial capital. But even with these frictions we find significant divergence between model predictions and the data.     

The exit decision in the European venture capital market

This article analyses the exit decision in the European venture capital market, studying when to exit and how it interacts with the exit form. Using a competing risks model we study the impact on the exit decision of the characteristics of venture capital investors, of their investments and of contracting variables. Our results reveals that the hazard functions are non-monotonic for all exit forms and suggest that, in Europe, Initial Public Offering candidates take longer to be selected than trade sales. Moreover our results show that, in Europe, venture capitalists associated with financial institutions have quicker exits (stronger for trade sales), and highlight the importance of contracting variables on the exit decision. An unexpected result is that the presence on the board of directors leads to longer investment durations.     

When more is less: Using multiple constraints to reduce tail risk

Financial institutions suffered large trading losses during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. These losses cast doubt on the effectiveness of regulations and risk management systems based on a single Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. While some researchers have recommended using Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) to control tail risk, VaR remains popular among practitioners and regulators. Accordingly, our paper examines the effectiveness of multiple VaR constraints in controlling CVaR. Under certain conditions, we theoretically show that they are more effective than a single VaR constraint. Furthermore, we numerically find that the maximum CVaR permitted by the constraints is notably smaller than with a single constraint. These results suggest that regulations and risk management systems based on multiple VaR constraints are more effective in reducing tail risk than those based on a single VaR constraint.     

Efficiency in Islamic vs. conventional banking: The role of capital and liquidity

We show that higher capital and liquidity ratios increase the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks. Using conditional quantile regressions, we further show that the effect is stronger for highly efficient, small, highly liquid, and highly capitalized conventional banks. We also find that more capitalized and liquid banks were efficient during the 2008/2009 financial crisis and the Arab Spring. Our findings support the view that the constraints imposed by Shari'a law may widen the efficiency gap between the two bank types, at the expense of Islamic banks. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the efficiency of conventional banks not only depends on bank capital and liquidity, but also on the level of bank efficiency while the relationship is inconclusive for Islamic banks. These findings provide insight into how capital and liquidity can shape bank efficiency. They suggest that higher capital and liquidity buffers serve a constraint on policymakers and may function very differently depending on the level of bank efficiency.     

The pernicious effects of contaminated data in risk management

Banks hold capital to guard against unexpected surges in losses and long freezes in financial markets. The minimum level of capital is set by banking regulators as a function of the banks’ own estimates of their risk exposures. As a result, a great challenge for both banks and regulators is to validate internal risk models. We show that a large fraction of US and international banks uses contaminated data when testing their models. In particular, most banks validate their market risk model using profit-and-loss (P/L) data that include fees and commissions and intraday trading revenues. This practice is inconsistent with the definition of the employed market risk measure. Using both bank data and simulations, we find that data contamination has dramatic implications for model validation and can lead to the acceptance of misspecified risk models. Moreover, our estimates suggest that the use of contaminated data can significantly reduce (market-risk induced) regulatory capital.     

Incentives and financial crises: Microfounded macroprudential regulation

We provide a micro-based rationale for macroprudential capital regulation of financial intermediaries (banks) by developing a model in which bankers can privately undertake a costly effort and reduce the probability of adverse shocks to their asset holdings that force liquidation (deterioration risk). A decline in the fundamental risk of assets ameliorates funding conditions, boosting the banks’ ability to expand their balance sheets. In principle, a higher continuation value would improve incentives to put effort. However, the rise in asset demand and prices also increases the payoff in liquidation, eventually reducing the equilibrium optimal effort. Poor incentives impose socially inefficient liquidation and can be corrected through a regulatory capital requirement. We show that the requirement should be high when fundamental risk is low. Therefore, the model suggests a theoretical foundation for macroprudential regulation and the countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III.     

Disappearing internal capital markets: Evidence from diversified business groups in Korea

This paper examines how the onset of a financial crisis affects the operation of internal capital markets among firms within a diversified business group. We find that active internal capital markets within Korean business groups (chaebols) attenuate the financial constraints of the group-affiliated firms, allowing them to make efficient capital allocations during the early 1990s. However, these markets barely function after the financial crisis of 1997. Instead, we observe public debt markets serving as a substitute for internal capital markets. Our results suggest that chaebol firms’ coordinated attempts to achieve healthier financial structures in the wake of the crisis have taken place at the expense of investment efficiency.     

Entrepreneurship and household portfolio choice: Evidence from the China Household Finance Survey

The efficient allocation of household assets is important for household wealth and entrepreneurial activities. However, there is scarce evidence on how entrepreneurial activities influence household financial decisions. We use a simple model to characterize the impact of entrepreneurship on household portfolio choice and the two underlying channels—the diversification effect and the risk substitution effect. We also empirically examine the impact of entrepreneurship using data from the 2013, 2015, and 2017 waves of the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS). The empirical results show that entrepreneurship significantly decreases both household risky market participation and risky asset holding. These findings are robust to alternative measurements of key variables, different model specifications, and Lewbel’s two-stage estimators. This study also verifies the co-existence of both the diversification and risk substitution effects. In particular, the net effect of entrepreneurship on household portfolio choice varies between urban and rural areas due to the different offsetting results between the two effects.     

Dividend change announcements,ROE, and the cost of equity capital

We hypothesize and present strong evidence that dividend increases (decreases) result in a general decrease (increase) in the opportunity cost of equity capital (K_e), measured by the discount rate implicit in analysts' forecasts. Estimates of K_e obtained from analyst forecast data likely capture priced information risk that is not reflected in cost of equity capital estimates customarily obtained from empirical excess returns data. In the presence of a full menu of control variables, our measured changes in the cost of equity capital are shown to provide high explanatory power for the market reaction to dividend change announcements. We also hypothesize and demonstrate that the impact of dividend changes on the cost of equity is conditional on how preannouncement K_e relates to preannouncement return on equity (ROE). Specifically, dividend increases result in a reduction in the cost of equity capital only when currently experienced ROE < K_e. This is consistent with shareholders preferring earnings to be reinvested by managers to earn a higher rate than their opportunity rate. When ROE > K_e, on the other hand, the cost of equity capital actually increases. For dividend decreases, the cost of equity capital increases only when ROE > K_e, consistent with firms currently experiencing positive economic income using dividend cuts to signal anticipated permanent earnings declines. Together with extensive robustness tests, our results indicate that dividend changes significantly affect shareholder value, contrary to the longstanding dividend irrelevance argument.     

Capital requirements and mortgage pricing: Evidence from Basel II

As a result of the Basel II reforms, capital requirements on UK mortgages fell substantially in coincidence with the financial crisis. We exploit a novel, loan-level dataset on within-lender variation in risk-weighted capital requirements and a triple-difference identification strategy to estimate the pass through of capital requirements to mortgage rates. We find that a 1pp lower risk-weighted capital requirement leads to a reduction in rates by 10–16bp on average, with stronger effects for less-capitalized lenders. The competitive advantage induced by multi-tier regulation also affects the composition of banks mortgage portfolios, with larger lenders specializing in lower risk loans. Finally, our results support the use of countercyclical capital requirements to sustain lending in a crisis.