Institutional investors,intangible information,and the book-to-market effect

This paper establishes a robust link between the trading behavior of institutions and the book-to-market effect. Building on work by Daniel and Titman (2006), who argue that the book-to-market effect is driven by the reversal of intangible returns, I find that institutions tend to buy (sell) shares in response to positive (negative) intangible information and that the reversal of the intangible return is most pronounced among stocks for which a large proportion of active institutions trade in the direction of intangible information. Furthermore, the book-to-market effect is large and significant in stocks with intense past institutional trading but nonexistent in stocks with moderate institutional trading. This influence of institutional trading on the book-to-market effect is distinct from that of firm size. These results are consistent with the view that the tendency of institutions to trade in the direction of intangible information exacerbates price overreaction, thereby contributing to the value premium.     

The role of institutional investors in seasoned equity offerings

Do institutional investors possess private information about seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)? If so, do they use this private information to trade in a direction opposite to this information (a manipulative trading role) or in the same direction (an information production role)? We use a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data to distinguish between these two roles of institutional investors. We explicitly identify institutional SEO allocations for the first time in the literature. We analyze the consequences of the private information possessed by institutional investors for SEO share allocation, institutional trading before and after the SEO and realized trading profitability, and the SEO discount. We find that institutions are able to identify and obtain more allocations in SEOs with better long-run stock returns, they trade in the same direction as their private information, and their post-SEO trading significantly outperforms a naive buy-and-hold trading strategy. Further, more pre-offer institutional net buying and larger institutional SEO allocations are associated with a smaller SEO discount. Overall, our results are consistent with institutions possessing private information about SEOs and with an information production instead of a manipulative trading role for institutional investors in SEOs.     

THE EFFECT OF CROSS‐LISTING ON TRADING VOLUME: REDUCING SEGMENTATION VERSUS SIGNALING INVESTOR PROTECTION

We examine the relation between cross‐listing on the U.S. and UK regulated and unregulated exchanges and trading volume for a sample of 500 foreign firms from 34 countries. We find that the increase in trading volume is a function of both reducing segmentation and signaling investor protection. In addition, we find that home market trading volume, firm size, firm returns, and analyst forecast accuracy are the major determinants of a firm's trading volume. We also show that U.S. and UK investors trade foreign securities that originate from low‐investor‐protection countries more than they trade those from high‐investor‐protection countries, which is consistent with the bonding hypothesis.     

TRADE SIZE AND INFORMED TRADING: WHICH TRADES ARE “BIG”?

We find adverse‐selection spread components increase sharply in the ratio of trade size to quoted depth, and spike when trade size equals quoted depth. We find that two previously documented and prominent indicators of informed trading, raw trade size and high‐trading volume half‐hours, offer almost no explanatory power for informed trading measures beyond trade size to quoted depth, and a third indicator, time of day, offers no explanatory power among trades with high trade size to quoted depth. Our results suggest trade size to quoted depth is perhaps the single most important indicator that a trade is informed.     

The market for new issues of municipal bonds: The roles of transparency and limited access to retail investors

I examine how transparency and interdealer trading affects prices investors pay in municipal bond offerings. Real-time trade reporting for municipal bonds started January 31, 2005. The dispersion of purchase prices fell sharply at that time. There was little impact on average markups for most trades, but they increased for purchases of more than $100,000. Bonds often pass through a series of dealers before being placed with a buy-and-hold investor. As the interdealer trades progress, trade sizes decline and trade prices rise. Markups on investor purchases increase with the amount of interdealer trading before the trade.     

Who is the more overconfident trader? Individual vs. institutional investors

Guided by the Gervais and Odean (2001) overconfident trading hypothesis, we comprehensively investigate the trading behavior of individual vs. institutional investors in Taiwan in an attempt to identify who is the more overconfident trader. Conditional on the various states of the market, on market volatility, and on the risk level of the securities they trade, we find that both individual and institutional investors trade more aggressively following market gains in bull markets, in up-market states, in up-momentum market states, and in low-volatility market states and that only individual investors trade more in riskier securities following market gains. More importantly, we find that individual investors trade more aggressively following market gains in the three conditional states of the market and in high-volatility market states than institutional investors. Also, individual investors trade more in relatively riskier securities following gains than institutional investors. These findings provide evidence that individual investors are more overconfident traders than institutional investors.     

The dynamics of quote adjustments

Liquidity providers on the NYSE make faster quote adjustments towards equilibrium spreads and depths than they do on NASDAQ. Liquidity providers in both markets make faster spread and depth adjustments for stocks with more frequent trading, greater return volatility, higher prices, smaller market capitalizations, and smaller trade sizes. We find that stocks with greater information-based trading and in more competitive trading environments exhibit faster quote adjustments. The speed of quote adjustment is faster after decimalization in both markets. These results are robust and not driven by differences in stock attributes between the two markets or time periods. Overall, our results indicate that stock attributes, market structure, and tick size exert a significant impact on the speed of quote adjustment.     

Transaction duration and asymmetric price impact of trades—Evidence from Australia

This paper investigates the asymmetric price impact of buyer and seller initiated trades and the informational role of the trade duration. Using trade data from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), our results indicate that buyer initiated trades increase the ask price more than the bid price, and seller initiated trades decrease the bid price more than the ask price. The transaction duration is modeled in a Box-Cox ACD framework. The unexpected portion of the duration is found to play a more significant role in causing price impact in both purchases and sales than the expected duration. A trade shortly after the previous trade results in higher price impact than one after a long period. We found evidence that increased trading activity is associated with larger price impact, therefore implying a higher degree of information-based trading.     

Dealer attention,the speed of quote adjustment to information,and net dealer revenue

Using trade and quote data from the NYSE, we examine the relation between dealer attention, dealer revenue, and the probability of informed trade. We find that dealer revenue net of losses to better-informed traders in NYSE stocks is positively related to the speed at which quotes adjust to full information levels. The speed of quote adjustment is faster for stocks with greater dealer attention, as measured by a stock’s relative prominence at its post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The level of dealer attention in turn is positively related to a stock’s probability of information-based trading. The results are consistent with a theoretical model we derive in which dealers trade multiple securities and must optimally allocate their limited attention to monitoring order flow to minimize losses to better-informed traders.     

SWITCHING TO A TEMPORARY CALL AUCTION IN TIMES OF HIGH UNCERTAINTY

We evaluate a stock-specific circuit breaker implemented in several European stock exchanges, which consists of a short-lived call auction triggered by intraday stock-specific price limits. It differs from U.S. trading halts in that it is short-lived and nondiscretionary, and a trading mechanism (continuous or discrete) is always going. It differs from daily price limits in that trade prices are not restricted once the limit is hit. Intraday price ranges are smaller and adjusted to the recent volatility, so that limit hits are more frequent. We contribute to the debate about circuit breakers by enlarging the span of these mechanisms studied.     

Understanding commonality in liquidity around the world

We examine how commonality in liquidity varies across countries and over time in ways related to supply determinants (funding liquidity of financial intermediaries) and demand determinants (correlated trading behavior of international and institutional investors, incentives to trade individual securities, and investor sentiment) of liquidity. Commonality in liquidity is greater in countries with and during times of high market volatility (especially, large market declines), greater presence of international investors, and more correlated trading activity. Our evidence is more reliably consistent with demand-side explanations and challenges the ability of the funding liquidity hypothesis to help us understand important aspects of financial market liquidity around the world, even during the recent financial crisis.     

Migration,spillovers, and trade diversion: The impact of internationalization on domestic stock market activity

This paper studies the relation between internationalization (firms cross-listing, issuing depositary receipts, or raising capital in international stock markets) and the trading activity of the remaining firms in domestic markets. Using a panel of 3000 firms from 55 emerging economies during 1989–2000, we find that internationalization is negatively related to the trading activity of domestic firms. We identify two channels. First, the trading of international firms migrates from domestic to international markets and this migration along with the reduction in domestic trading of international firms has negative spillover effects on domestic firm trading activity. Second, there is trade diversion within domestic markets as trading activity shifts out of domestic firms and into international firms.     

Information,sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance

Using an intraday transaction dataset with trader identity, we study foreign and domestic investors’ trading activities and investment performance ahead of open-ending events of Taiwanese closed-end funds. Simply buying the funds at a discount and holding until open-ending generates large abnormal returns. All information required to execute this strategy is made public, so the events set up natural experiments to examine how investors trade, holding constant access to information. Foreign investors are net buyers ahead of the open-endings, more than doubling their positions and earning large abnormal returns. Domestic investors are net sellers while the discounts are still large, and forego large abnormal returns. The results suggest that investor sophistication in interpreting the same information is potentially an important determinant of investment performance differences across foreign and domestic investors.     

INSTITUTIONAL TRADING AND OPENING PRICE BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A FAST‐EMERGING MARKET

Using daily and intraday data, we investigate the cross‐sectional relation between stock prices and institutional trading in the Taiwan stock market. Consistent with the investigative herding hypothesis, we find that institutional herding exists because of institutional positive feedback trading behavior rather than following trades made by other institutions, as suggested by the information cascade hypothesis. Moreover, the positive correlation between institutional trade imbalance and stock returns mainly comes from institutional positive feedback trading. The institutional trading decisions rely on returns measured not only over the lagged trading day but also over the opening session during the same day.     

Delegated trading and the speed of adjustment in security prices

Institutional trading arrangements often involve the portfolio manager delegating the task of trade execution to a separate division within the firm. We model the agency conflict that arises in this setting and show that optimal performance benchmarks often create an incentive to execute orders contrary to concurrent information flow. We hypothesize that aggregate contrarian trading resulting from widespread application of such benchmarks leads to delays in the assimilation of information in security prices. Using institutional trading data, we document the hypothesized contrarian trading pattern and relate the pattern to price-adjustment delays in the response of individual stocks to index futures returns. The evidence supports the assertion that delegated institutional trading contributes to these delays.     

Circuit Breakers,Trading Collars,and Volatility Transmission Across Markets: Evidence from NYSE Rule 80A

The NYSE's Rule 80A attempted to delink the futures and equity markets by limiting index arbitrage trades in the same direction as the last trade to reduce stock market volatility. Rule 80A leads to a small but statistically significant decline in intraday U.S. equity market volatility. In addition, the results are asymmetric: volatility is dampened more in a rising market than in a declining one. These results suggest that, to a limited extent, rule restrictions on trading can sufficiently delink the futures and equity markets enough to reduce the transmission of volatility.     

Latent liquidity: A new measure of liquidity,with an application to corporate bonds

We present a new measure of liquidity known as “latent liquidity” and apply it to a unique corporate bond database. Latent liquidity is defined as the weighted average turnover of investors who hold a bond, in which the weights are the fractional investor holdings. It can be used to measure liquidity in markets with sparse transactions data. For bonds that trade frequently, our measure has predictive power for both transaction costs and the price impact of trading, over and above trading activity and bond-specific characteristics thought to be related to liquidity. Additionally, this measure exhibits relationships with bond characteristics similar to those of other trade-based measures.     

Trader see,trader do: How do (small) FX traders react to large counterparties’ trades?

We show that information about the counterparty of a trade affects the future trading decisions of individual traders. The effect is such that traders tend to reverse their order flow in line with the better-informed counterparties. Informed traders primarily incorporate their own private as well as publicly available information into prices, whereas uninformed traders mainly magnify the effect of the informed. This pattern of interaction among traders extends to different order types: traders treat their own and others’ market orders as more informative than limit orders.     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND TRADING VOLUME

Historically, trading volume reported for NASDAQ stocks has been overstated vis‐à‐vis New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks, both because of the dealer's participation in trades as a market maker and because of interdealer trading. Beginning in 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission changed order‐handling rules and trade‐reporting rules, which may have reduced or eliminated the overstatement of NASDAQ trading. We examine trading volumes of firms changing from NASDAQ to the NYSE since 1997 and document that reported trading volume for NASDAQ stocks continues to be overstated. Moreover, the degree of overstatement is much larger for firms with high trading volume.     

A dynamic limit order market with fast and slow traders

This paper considers the role of high-frequency trading in a dynamic limit order market. Fast traders? ability to revise their quotes quickly after news arrivals helps to reduce the inefficiency that is rooted in the risk of being picked off, which increases trade. However, their presence induces slow traders to strategically submit limit orders with a lower execution probability, thereby reducing trade. Because speed is a source of market power, it enables fast traders to extract rents from other market participants and triggers a costly arms race that reduces social welfare. The model generates a number of testable implications concerning the effects of high-frequency trading in limit order markets.