DEA evaluations of long- and short-run efficiencies of digital vs. physical product “dot com” companies

This paper applies Data Envelopment Analysis to determine relative efficiencies between internet dot com companies that produce only physical products and those that produce only digital products. To allow for the fact that the latter are relatively inexperienced, a distinction is made between long- and short-run efficiencies and inefficiencies, with a finding of no statistically significant difference in the short run but digital product companies are significantly more efficient in the long run. A new way of distinguishing between long- and short-run performances is utilized that avoids the need for identifying the time periods associated with long-run vs. short-run efficiencies and inefficiencies. In place of “time,” this paper utilizes differences in the “properties” that economic theory associates with long- and short-run performances.     

Quantity precommitment and price-matching

We study the effects of price-matching in a capacity-constrained duopoly setting. We show that no firm does worse at any pure equilibrium under price-matching relative to Bertrand, but as capacity increases, one or both firms do better relative to Bertrand. If the firms choose their capacities simultaneously before making pricing decisions, then the effect of price-matching varies with the cost of capacity. Specifically, when the cost is “high” price-matching either (i) has no effect on the market price, i.e., the market price associated with the pure SPEs is the Cournot one, or (ii) weakly decreases the market price relative to Cournot. Furthermore, when the cost is “low” price-matching leads to a set of (pure) SPE prices that includes the Cournot price in the interior. Therefore, price-matching does not necessarily benefit the firms when firms select their capacities before competing in price.     

Inefficient entry order in preemption games

In a preemption game, players decide when to take an irreversible action. Delaying the action exogenously increases payoffs, but there is an early mover advantage. Riordan (1992) shows that in a preemption game with two asymmetric players, players act in decreasing order of efficiency. This provides a microfoundation to the assumption that entry in a market occurs in the order of profitability, commonly used in the empirical analysis of market entry. We provide a counterexample showing that with more than two players this intuitive result can be reversed. We present a preemption game of entry into a new market. The potential entrants are three asymmetric firms: one “efficient” firm with high post-entry profits, and two “inefficient firms”. We show that the set of parameters such that the equilibrium entry order does not reflect the efficiency ranking is nonempty, and analyse which changes in post-entry profits preserve this entry order.     

A martingale approach for testing diffusion models based on infinitesimal operator

I develop an omnibus specification test for diffusion models based on the infinitesimal operator. The infinitesimal operator based identification of the diffusion process is equivalent to a “martingale hypothesis” for the processes obtained by a transformation of the original diffusion model. My test procedure is then constructed by checking the “martingale hypothesis” via a multivariate generalized spectral derivative based approach that delivers a N(0,1) asymptotical null distribution for the test statistic. The infinitesimal operator of the diffusion process is a closed-form function of drift and diffusion terms. Consequently, my test procedure covers both univariate and multivariate diffusion models in a unified framework and is particularly convenient for the multivariate case. Moreover, different transformed martingale processes contain separate information about the drift and diffusion specifications. This motivates me to propose a separate inferential test procedure to explore the sources of rejection when a parametric form is rejected. Simulation studies show that the proposed tests have reasonable size and excellent power performance. An empirical application of my test procedure using Eurodollar interest rates finds that most popular short-rate models are rejected and the drift misspecification plays an important role in such rejections.     

The Welfare Effects of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and the National Cooperative Production Amendments (NCPA) of 1993

A bstract .   Cooperative R&D and production joint ventures may enable firms to achieve significant cost efficiencies. However, they can also be a means of controlling industry output and raising product prices. A review of the literature on the welfare implications of allowing rival firms to cooperate in the R&D and production stages indicates that the issue is controversial from a theoretical perspective. There is need to examine the motivations of R&D and production joint ventures in order to assess the welfare implications of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and National Cooperative Production Amendments (NCPA) of 1993, which relaxed the antitrust treatment of R&D and production joint ventures. Using samples of 127 cooperative R&D joint ventures and 342 cooperative production joint ventures announced by U.S. domestic firms during 1979–1999, this article finds that these endeavors do not meet the criteria for collusive behavior specified by the market power doctrine. We interpret these findings as suggesting that cooperative R&D and production joint ventures are motivated by cost efficiencies and are, therefore, welfare enhancing. Our results pose some challenges to the doctrine that antitrust actions by regulatory authorities are always welfare improving.     

The construction of empirical credit scoring rules based on maximization principles

We examine the econometric implications of the decision problem faced by a profit/utility-maximizing lender operating in a simple “double-binary” environment, where the two actions available are “approve” or “reject”, and the two states of the world are “pay back” or “default”. In practice, such decisions are often made by applying a fixed cutoff to the maximum likelihood estimate of a parametric model of the default probability. Following (Elliott and Lieli, 2007), we argue that this practice might contradict the lender’s economic objective and, using German loan data, we illustrate the use of “context-specific” cutoffs and an estimation method derived directly from the lender’s problem. We also provide a brief discussion of how to incorporate legal constraints, such as the prohibition of disparate treatment of potential borrowers, into the lender’s problem.     

Fitting dynamic factor models to non-stationary time series

Factor modelling of a large time series panel has widely proven useful to reduce its cross-sectional dimensionality. This is done by explaining common co-movements in the panel through the existence of a small number of common components, up to some idiosyncratic behaviour of each individual series. To capture serial correlation in the common components, a dynamic structure is used as in traditional (uni- or multivariate) time series analysis of second order structure, i.e. allowing for infinite-length filtering of the factors via dynamic loadings. In this paper, motivated from economic data observed over long time periods which show smooth transitions over time in their covariance structure, we allow the dynamic structure of the factor model to be non-stationary over time by proposing a deterministic time variation of its loadings. In this respect we generalize the existing recent work on static factor models with time-varying loadings as well as the classical, i.e. stationary, dynamic approximate factor model. Motivated from the stationary case, we estimate the common components of our dynamic factor model by the eigenvectors of a consistent estimator of the now time-varying spectral density matrix of the underlying data-generating process. This can be seen as a time-varying principal components approach in the frequency domain. We derive consistency of this estimator in a “double-asymptotic” framework of both cross-section and time dimension tending to infinity. The performance of the estimators is illustrated by a simulation study and an application to a macroeconomic data set.     

Competition with Aftermarket Power When Consumers Are Heterogeneous

We study a model of competitive foremarkets and partly monopolized aftermarkets. We show that high aftermarket power prompts firms to engage in inefficiently aggressive below‐cost pricing in the foremarket. This inefficiency is driven by the presence of consumers with valuations below marginal cost. While for intermediate aftermarket power their presence leads to a competition‐softening effect, for high aftermarket power firms attract increasing numbers of unprofitable consumers by aggressively pricing below cost. For high aftermarket power, firms' equilibrium profits can therefore be decreasing in aftermarket power but are always higher than for low aftermarket power. If firms engage in price discrimination by bundling the foremarket and aftermarket goods or by reducing their aftermarket power, they avoid selling to unprofitable consumers but also reduce the competition‐softening effect. This decreases firms' equilibrium profits but increases consumer and social welfare.     

Estimation of technical and allocative inefficiency: A primal system approach

The estimation of technical and allocative inefficiencies using a flexible (translog) cost system is found to be quite difficult, especially when both the inefficiencies are random. In this paper we use the alternative primal system consisting of the production function (translog) and the first-order conditions of cost minimization. The estimation of the primal system is more straightforward and it enables us to estimate observation-specific technical and allocative inefficiencies, and their impact on input demand and cost. We use data on steam-electric generating plants from the U.S. to estimate the model using both Cobb–Douglas and translog production functions.     

New product introduction with costly search

In the usual model of product market search, a low search cost can turn out to have detrimental incentives on new product introduction as the low search cost erodes firms’ market power, attenuating the profit from innovation. This paper studies a model of monopolistic competition with costly search, where the point of departure is that of a fixed cost of initiating search. In this environment, a low search cost could turn out to be favorable to innovation. At a low search cost, more consumers may decide to start searching, possibly resulting in higher profits for firms in the larger market, despite the erosion of market power.     

Stochastic frontier models with multiple time-varying individual effects

This paper proposes a flexible time-varying stochastic frontier model. Similarly to Lee and Schmidt [1993, In: Fried H, Lovell CAK, Schmidt S (eds) The measurement of productive efficiency: techniques and applications. Oxford University Press, Oxford], we assume that individual firms’ technical inefficiencies vary over time. However, the model, which we call the “multiple time-varying individual effects” model, is more general in that it allows multiple factors determining firm-specific time-varying technical inefficiencies. This allows the temporal pattern of inefficiency to vary over firms. The number of such factors can be consistently estimated. The model is applied to data on Indonesian rice farms, and the changes in the efficiency rankings of farms over time demonstrate the model’s flexibility.

A robust version of the KPSS test based on indicators

This paper proposes a test of the null hypothesis of stationarity that is robust to the presence of fat-tailed errors. The test statistic is a modified version of the so-called KPSS statistic. The modified statistic uses the “sign” of the data minus the sample median, whereas KPSS used deviations from means. This “indicator” KPSS statistic has the same limit distribution as the standard KPSS statistic under the null, without relying on assumptions about moments, but a different limit distribution under unit root alternatives. The indicator test has lower power than standard KPSS when tails are thin, but higher power when tails are fat.     

The Effect of Performance Standards on Health Care Provider Behavior: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation

Performance standards are designed to ensure a basic level of quality, and through public reporting of firm performance, encourage firms to compete on quality thus allowing the market to determine the optimal level of quality. In markets with substantial excess demand, however, demand effects may be insufficient to induce any change in firm behavior and enforcement may be required to ensure high quality. Even with enforcement, quality still may not improve at underperforming firms if gaming the system is less costly than improving quality. We test whether information alone or with regulatory enforcement improves outcomes or elicits gaming behavior in our study of 266 kidney transplant centers between 2001 and 2012. In a context of excess demand induced by price controls, we show that information alone has no impact and enforcement may actually increase market inefficiencies; firms respond to costly quality requirements, not by improving quality, but by reducing supply, which exacerbates the disequilibrium between supply and demand, and by cream‐skimming, which reduces access to transplantation among sicker patients.     

South Korean Labor Market Discrimination Against Women: Estimating Its Cost

A bstract . South Korean chaebols (large family owned firms) have extensive government ties which provide them with favorable treatment. In turn, the government obtains support from the chaebols. The chaebols have gained economic or excess profits through exploiting monopolistic power in the domestic South Korean product market and through exploiting monopsonistic power in the domestic factor market.
How a monopsonistic firm obtains excess profits is illustrated and related to the behavior of the chaebols as a whole. Major focus is on the labor market. The chaebols have discretionary power over how to exploit their monopsonistic position. The status of women in the South Korean work force in light of this discretionary power is considered. An estimate of the income loss involved is made.     

Improved likelihood ratio tests for cointegration rank in the VAR model

We suggest improved tests for cointegration rank in the vector autoregressive (VAR) model and develop asymptotic distribution theory and local power results. The tests are (quasi-)likelihood ratio tests based on a Gaussian likelihood, but as usual the asymptotic results do not require normally distributed innovations. Our tests differ from existing tests in two respects. First, instead of basing our tests on the conditional (with respect to the initial observations) likelihood, we follow the recent unit root literature and base our tests on the full likelihood as in, e.g., Elliott et al. (1996). Second, our tests incorporate a “sign” restriction which generalizes the one-sided unit root test. We show that the asymptotic local power of the proposed tests dominates that of existing cointegration rank tests.     

Explaining Firm Emergence: Specialization,Transaction Costs,and the Integration Process

This article explains firm emergence and the role of firms in the market structure using the productive power of specialization. Based on productivity efficiencies through technological specialization, a model for firm emergence is drafted alongside Coasean transaction cost theory. I find that transaction costs cannot explain firm emergence, but the entrepreneurial specialization perspective here adopted provides a promising approach to understanding the firm's function to the entrepreneur and its internal organization and capabilities. It suggests a foundational framework for studying the creation of capabilities and the interplay between markets, firms, and entrepreneurs. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cost efficiency and value driver analysis of insurers in an emerging economy

This study investigated cost inefficiencies and its relationship with value drivers of insurers in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The study revealed that there were 21–33% cost inefficiencies in these insurers under different model specifications of stochastic frontier and DEA; value drivers such as lower leverage risk, lower capital risk significantly improved cost efficiencies consistent with Basel II norms; ROE positively influenced cost efficiencies with further trade off between increased profit margin, decreased asset utilization and/or reduced equity multiplier by the insurer managements to achieve a target‐ROE; and the trend of cost efficiency was improving during 2000–2004. The study suggests that stock insurers could overcome their cost inefficiencies through adoption of efficient measures such as risk mapping of clients, risk prioritization besides ALM techniques. The study has direct implications for individual and institutional investors in making their portfolio investment decisions in insurance sector, policymakers, and regulators to closely monitor inefficient insurers consistent with Basel II norms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

Breaking the curse of dimensionality in nonparametric testing

For tests based on nonparametric methods, power crucially depends on the dimension of the conditioning variables, and specifically decreases with this dimension. This is known as the “curse of dimensionality”. We propose a new general approach to nonparametric testing in high dimensional settings and we show how to implement it when testing for a parametric regression. The resulting test behaves against directional local alternatives almost as if the dimension of the regressors was one. It is also almost optimal against classes of one-dimensional alternatives for a suitable choice of the smoothing parameter. The test performs well in small samples compared to several other tests.