Estimation of market power in the presence of firm level inefficiencies

“The quiet life hypothesis” (QLH) by Hicks (1935) argues that, due to management’s subjective cost of reaching optimal profits, firms use their market power to allow inefficient allocation of resources. Increasing competitive pressure is therefore likely to force management to work harder to reach optimal profits. Another hypothesis, which also relates market power to efficiency is “the efficient structure hypothesis” (ESH) by Demsetz (1973). ESH argues that firms with superior efficiencies or technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits. These firms are assumed to gain larger market shares which lead to higher concentration. Ignoring the efficiency levels of the firms in a market power model might cause both estimation and interpretation problems. Unfortunately, the literature on market power measurement largely ignores this relationship. In the context of a dynamic setting, we estimate the market power of US airlines in two city-pairs by both allowing inefficiencies of the firms and not allowing inefficiencies of the firms. Using industry level cost data, we estimate the cost function parameters and time-varying efficiencies. An instrumental variables version of the square root Kalman filter is used to estimate time-varying conduct parameters.     

Real options game models of R&D competition between asymmetric firms with spillovers

Using real options game models, we consider the characterization of strategic equilibria associated with an asymmetric Research and Development (R&D) race between an incumbent firm and an entrant firm in the development of a new innovative product under market and technological uncertainties. The random arrival time of the discovery of the patent protected innovative product is modeled as a Poisson process. Input spillovers on the R&D effort are modeled by the change in the leader’s hazard rate of success of innovation upon the follower’s entry into the R&D race. Asymmetry between the two competing firms include sunk costs of investment, stochastic revenue flow rates generated from the product, and hazard rates of arrival of success of R&D efforts of the two firms. Under asymmetric duopoly, we obtain the complete characterization of the three types of Markov perfect equilibria (sequential leader–follower, preemption and simultaneous entry) of the firms’ optimal R&D entry decisions with respect to various sets of model parameters. Our model shows that under positive input spillover, preemptive equilibrium does not occur in the R&D race due to the presence of dominant second mover advantage. The two firms choose optimally to enter simultaneously if the sunk cost asymmetry is relatively small; otherwise, sequential equilibrium would occur. When the initial hazard rate is low relative to the level of input spillover, simultaneous entry would occur as an optimal decision, signifying another scenario of dominant second mover advantage. On the other hand, when the initial hazard rate is sufficiently high so that the first mover advantage becomes more significant, simultaneous equilibrium does not occur even under high level of positive input spillover.     

Secretary problems with inspection costs as a game

A secretary problem without recall, with given rewards and inspection costs is considered as a game of an opponent against a statistician. Probability distributions on the set of arrangements of the arrivals and randomized stopping rules are the strategies for the two players. We give a condition under which minimax strategies may be obtained in a systematic way.     

Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games

A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff.We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game terminates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than 1.We prove that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. If the game is not degenerate this ε-equilibrium is actually in pure strategies.     

The foreclosure discount: Myth or reality?

Foreclosed properties sell at lower prices than do nearby non-distressed properties. Of particular concern, is whether there is a “stigma” foreclosure discount whereby REO properties sell at lower prices simply because they have been involved in foreclosure proceedings. To the extent that such a discount exists, arbitrage opportunities exist and the associated market failure has significant policy implications. We examine the foreclosure discount from a different perspective than prior researchers by comparing holding period returns earned by purchasers of REOs with those earned by purchasers of similar non-distressed properties. Our results show that the majority of REO purchasers do not earn economically significant excess returns. On average, the implied market discount is less than typical transaction costs. We also find evidence that REO properties and buyers vary systematically from their counterparts in the non-distressed market segment and that REO attribute prices differ from those of non-distressed properties. Overall, our evidence suggests that the market for REOs operates efficiently: lenders are not irrationally dumping REO properties and REO investors are not reaping extraordinary profits.     

Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks

We study the coevolution of networks and action choices in a Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents in our model learn about both action choices and choices of interaction partners (links) by imitating successful behavior of others. The resulting dynamics yields outcomes where both cooperators and defectors coexist under a wide range of parameters. Two scenarios can arise. Either there is “full separation” of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is “marginalization” of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors.     

Bargaining over incentive contracts

The incentive contract theory assumes that the principal holds all of the bargaining power. By introducing alternating offers and strategic delay into the nonlinear pricing model, we relax this assumption and analyze an infinite-horizon contract bargaining game. We attain either the “sequential separating equilibrium” or the “simultaneous separating equilibrium”, depending on the parameter values. We prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium, and claim that multidimensionality and strategic delay can help resolve the multiple equilibria problem of bargaining theory. When the time between offers approaches zero, either quantity distortion or delay persists.     

Bounds for best response functions in binary games

This paper studies the identification of best response functions in binary games without making strong parametric assumptions about the payoffs. The best response function gives the utility maximizing response to a decision of the other players. This is analogous to the response function in the treatment-response literature, taking the decision of the other players as the treatment, except that the best response function has additional structure implied by the associated utility maximization problem. Further, the relationship between the data and the best response function is not the same as the relationship between the data and the response function in the treatment-response literature. We focus especially on the case of a complete information entry game with two firms. We also discuss the case of an entry game with many firms, non-entry games, and incomplete information. Our analysis of the entry game is based on the observation of realized entry decisions, which we then link to the best response functions under various assumptions including those concerning the level of rationality of the firms, including the assumption of Nash equilibrium play, the symmetry of the payoffs between firms, and whether mixed strategies are admitted.     

Second‐Mover Advantages with Asymmetric Costs and Information Updates: A Product Life Cycle Perspective

Two firms with asymmetric costs engage in a Stackelberg game under multiple levels of uncertainty with information updating. A product life cycle perspective is employed to reveal when and why a second‐mover may have an advantage. At early stages in the product life cycle, when uncertainty is the dominating factor, the impact of uncertainty may be either positive or negative. As a result, the Stackelberg leader faces the possibility of either overshooting or losing its market leadership position to the second‐mover. In later market stages, when cost is more important, a process‐innovating second‐mover may accrue higher profits. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

四阶段直线供应链定价策略与利润分析及信息不对称分析及闭环供应链研究

应用博弈论相关理论及基本数学方法,研究四阶段供应链定价策略,分析其利润分配。同时对信息完全对称与信息不对称情况下模型进行分析。最后试图以以旧换为切入点建立闭环供应链模型,并对其进行分析。     

Convergence to competitive equilibria and elimination of no-trade (in a strategic market game with limit prices)

The strategic market games literature contains many results that predict Walrasian equilibria in the competitive limit. However, they usually come at the expense of ad hoc assumptions that rule out “pathological” no trade equilibria. This paper studies a strategic market game with limit prices. The set of Nash equilibrium allocations of this game converges to the set containing all competitive equilibria and no-trade, when players are replicated. Moreover, two rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies eliminate the no-trade equilibria. Hence, replication paired with two rounds of iterated dominance gives a clean prediction of competitive equilibrium.     

The construction of empirical credit scoring rules based on maximization principles

We examine the econometric implications of the decision problem faced by a profit/utility-maximizing lender operating in a simple “double-binary” environment, where the two actions available are “approve” or “reject”, and the two states of the world are “pay back” or “default”. In practice, such decisions are often made by applying a fixed cutoff to the maximum likelihood estimate of a parametric model of the default probability. Following (Elliott and Lieli, 2007), we argue that this practice might contradict the lender’s economic objective and, using German loan data, we illustrate the use of “context-specific” cutoffs and an estimation method derived directly from the lender’s problem. We also provide a brief discussion of how to incorporate legal constraints, such as the prohibition of disparate treatment of potential borrowers, into the lender’s problem.     

Real options game analysis of sleeping patents

Using the real options game approach, we analyze the two-stage preemptive patent-investment race between an incumbent and a challenger (new entrant) in a product market with profit flow uncertainty. The challenger can gain entry into the monopolized product market dominated by the incumbent by patenting related technologies for a substitute product. To maintain its monopolized advantage, the incumbent has an incentive to block challenger’s entry by patenting the substitute product before the challenger. Either firm can pay an upfront fee to gain an immediate acquisition of the patent and subsequently holding the real option to develop the new substitute product. Under our simplified real options game model, there is no potential patent litgation risk. Also, the costs of holding the patent, like the payment of annual fees, are taken to be zero. We provide a full characterization of the optimal strategies adopted by the incumbent and challenger firm in this asymmetric patent-investment race. In particular, we examine the phenomena of sleeping patent, where the patented product is not launched immediately into the product market.     

Quantity precommitment and price-matching

We study the effects of price-matching in a capacity-constrained duopoly setting. We show that no firm does worse at any pure equilibrium under price-matching relative to Bertrand, but as capacity increases, one or both firms do better relative to Bertrand. If the firms choose their capacities simultaneously before making pricing decisions, then the effect of price-matching varies with the cost of capacity. Specifically, when the cost is “high” price-matching either (i) has no effect on the market price, i.e., the market price associated with the pure SPEs is the Cournot one, or (ii) weakly decreases the market price relative to Cournot. Furthermore, when the cost is “low” price-matching leads to a set of (pure) SPE prices that includes the Cournot price in the interior. Therefore, price-matching does not necessarily benefit the firms when firms select their capacities before competing in price.     

产品成本内生化的企业定价选址博弈分析

运用三阶段博弈模型研究了双寡头厂商面对需求非对称、产品成本内生时的定价选址决策问题,并分别分析了供应商Nash谈判参数的变化对生产商均衡位置以及均衡利润的影响.研究发现,与产品成本外生的情形相比,供应商的存在改变了生产商的均衡位置.当某一供应商的相对谈判能力增强时,与之形成双边垄断关系的生产商就会远离其垄断市场,均衡利润将会减少,而竞争对手则会靠近其对应的垄断市场,均衡利润将会增加.两个生产商之间的均衡距离会随供应商谈判能力的增强而缩小.     

Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents

One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is “discrimination” between the two agents and that the available information for agents determines the extent of this discrimination, even though the theoretical solution of the game implies equal treatment of agents. Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against react negatively by withholding effort.     

中国债券市场开放度的博弈分析

本文从信息是否完全的角度出发,运用博弈论和信息经济学的相关理论,对债券市场信息不对称、境外机构发行人民币债券和境外机构市场准入问题进行了静态和动态博弈分析。求解了不同情况下的纳什均衡,对债券融资中现实问题给予了理论阐述和证明,并分析了境外机构在境内发行人民币债券的各种影响。     

Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game

We consider a two-player asymmetric differential game of pollution control. One player is non-vulnerable to pollution, or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non-cooperative game. We characterize the feedback-Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution. We establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non-vulnerable player to control her emissions. We further use the Nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time-consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff.     

Real Asset Valuation under Imperfect Competition: Can We Forget About Market Fundamentals?

Real assets are usually valued by computing the stream of profits they can bring to a price‐taking firm in a liquid market. This method ignores market fundamentals by assuming that all the relevant information is included in the spot price. Our article analyses the bias resulting from such an approach when the market is imperfectly competitive. We propose a stylised two‐period model of the natural gas market with no uncertainty, focusing on strategic interactions between two types of oligopolistic players—pure traders and suppliers with downstream customers—who have access to storage. We show that the true value of storage capacity is not the same for traders and for suppliers. Comparing the latter value with the traditional price‐taking valuation reveals a systematic bias that tends to induce underinvestment.