How much should inflation targeters care about the exchange rate?

A DSGE model is used to examine whether including the exchange rate in the central bank’s policy rule can improve economic performance. Smoothing the exchange rate helps both financially-robust economies and financially-vulnerable emerging economies in handling risk premium shocks and, given a small weight placed on the exchange rate, the effects on inflation and output volatility are minimal with demand and cost-push shocks. Financially-vulnerable economies are especially likely to benefit from exchange rate smoothing due to perverse movements of the exchange rate they experience when hit by demand shocks and being more prone to risk premium shocks.     

How important is the financial sector to price indices in an inflation targeting regime? An empirical analysis of the UK and the US

This paper investigates whether there are benefits in terms of higher economic stability from incorporating stock prices into the price index targeted by the central banks. It also looks into the question of whether central banks should use stock prices as a component of the output stability index and how the index can be constructed. An optimization technique is employed to estimate weights for the various sectoral prices. The obtained weights, which depend on sectoral parameters, differ from those used in the construction of the consumer price index, CPI. Using data from the UK and the US, our analysis demonstrates that in comparison to the CPI, our measure of inflation leads to a higher output stability. Thus, in an inflation-targeting monetary policy environment, it is important to adopt a broader inflation benchmark than the CPI for the general macroeconomic stability.     

How much is the gap?—Efficient jump risk-adjusted valuation of leveraged certificates

This paper develops a novel and highly efficient numerical algorithm for the gap risk-adjusted valuation of leveraged certificates. The existing literature relies on Monte Carlo simulations, which are not fast enough to be used in a market-making environment. This is because issuers need to compute thousands of price updates per second. By valuing leveraged certificates as multi-window barrier options, we explicitly model random jumps that occur at known times, such as between the exchange closing and re-opening. Our algorithm combines the one-day transition probability with Simpson’s numerical integration rule. This yields a backward induction scheme which requires a significantly coarser spatial and time grid than finite-difference methods. We confirm its robustness and accuracy through Monte Carlo simulations.     

How resilient is the German banking system to macroeconomic shocks?

Macroeconomic stress testing studies often rely on rather short sample periods due to the limited availability of banking data. They may fail to appropriately account for the cyclicality in the interaction between the banking system and macroeconomic developments. In this paper, we use a newly constructed data set on German banks’ income and loss statements over the past 39 years to model the interaction between the banking sector and the macroeconomy. Our VAR analysis indicates that the level of stress in the banking sector is strongly affected by monetary policy shocks. The results rationalize the active behavior of central banks observed during periods of financial market crises.     

How arbitrage-free is the Nelson-Siegel model?

We test whether the Nelson and Siegel (1987) yield curve model is arbitrage-free. Theoretically, the Nelson-Siegel model does not ensure the absence of arbitrage opportunities, as shown by Bjork and Christensen (1999) and Filipovic (1999). Still, central banks and wealth managers rely heavily on it. Using zero-coupon yield curve data from the US market, we find that the no-arbitrage parameters are not statistically different from those obtained from the Nelson-Siegel model. We therefore conclude that the Nelson-Siegel yield curve model is compatible with the no-arbitrage constraints on the US market. To corroborate this result, we also show that the Nelson-Siegel model performs as well as its no-arbitrage counterpart in an out-of-sample forecasting experiment.     

How much should portfolios shrink?

This paper develops a portfolio model that penalizes the deviation from a reference portfolio. The proposed model renders a robust portfolio that performs superior under parameter uncertainty. Penalizing the deviation also improves the performance of existing shrinkage portfolio models that are suboptimal due to model parameter uncertainty. The equal-weight portfolio turns out to be a better reference portfolio than the currently holding portfolio even in the presence of transaction costs. A data-driven method for determining the degree of penalization is offered. Comprehensive simulation and empirical studies suggest that the proposed model significantly outperforms various existing models.     

Public transfers to the poor: is Europe really much more generous than the United States?

Fighting poverty is an important concern in most societies. This usually involves transferring resources to the poor. There exists a widespread view that European countries are much more generous to the poor than the United States. We study whether this is really the case. First, we argue that using data on aggregate spending does not allow us to conclude who the final recipients of social expenditure are. We then analyze microeconomic evidence from the Current Population Survey and the European Community Household Panel and find mixed results. In particular, when the concept of relative poverty is used, we find that every individual below the poverty line receives an average transfer in the United States that is 45% higher than in the European Union. When the old are excluded from the sample, this difference is reduced to 14%.     

Sand in the wheels or wheels in the sand? Tobin taxes and market crashes

The recent economic crisis revived interest in financial transaction taxes (FTTs) as a means to offset negative risk externalities. However, up-to-date academic research does not provide sufficient insights into the effects of transaction taxes on financial markets as the literature has here-to-fore been focused too narrowly on Gaussian variance as a measure of volatility. In this paper, we argue that it is imperative to understand the relationship between price jumps, Gaussian variance, and FTTs. While Gaussian variance is not necessarily a problem in itself, the non-normality of return distribution caused by price jumps affects not only the performance of many risk-hedging algorithms but directly influences the frequency of catastrophic market events. To study the aforementioned relationship, we use an agent-based model of financial markets. Its results show that the relationship between FTTs and price jumps is intricate. This result implies that regulators may face a trade-off between overall variance and price jumps when designing optimal tax.     

Assessing the role of option grants to CEOs: How important is heterogeneity?

This paper revisits the question of whether CEO compensation practices are in keeping with those justified by agency theory. We develop and analyze a new panel Tobit model, estimated by modern Bayesian methods, in which the heterogeneity of covariate effects across firms is modeled in a hierarchical way. We find that our specification of heterogeneity provides a significantly improved fit to the data. Our results show support for the hypothesis that companies increase option awards to their CEOs when agency problems become more pronounced. We also find that liquidity constraints matter in defining the cash–option mix of CEO compensation.     

How much discretion for risk regulators?

We analyze the regulation of firms that undertake socially risky activities but can reduce the probability of an accident inflicted on third parties by carrying out non verifiable effort. Congress delegates regulation to an agency, although these two bodies may have different preferences toward the industry. The optimal level of discretion left to the agency results from the following trade‐off: the agency can tailor discretionary policies to its expert knowledge about potential harm, but it implements policies that are too “pro‐industry.” The agency should be given full discretion when the firm is solvent; partial discretion is preferred otherwise. We then investigate how this trade‐off changes as the political and economic landscapes are modified.     

How important is capital structure policy to firm survival?

If there is an economically important optimal capital structure, then firms that deviate too far from the optimum will face greater risk of failure or acquisition. Using data from the oil industry we find no significant evidence that capital structure policy affects acquisition or failure probability. Firms appear to increase leverage when they face attractive growth opportunities or when poor operating performance reduces equity value or compels borrowing. Firms are acquired when rapid growth has reduced financial slack. In a clinical examination, we address the question of how firms with persistently low leverage can operate and survive for many years without being targeted for acquisition. Our evidence supports the pecking-order hypothesis, including acquisition among potential financing sources.     

How much is reasonable? The size of termination fees in mergers and acquisitions

We investigate termination fee size in mergers. Although the deal premium does not significantly affect fee size, smaller targets and targets with lower institutional ownership offer larger fees. Low or moderate fees do not eliminate post-announcement competing bids, while large fees do. Fee size is generally positively correlated with deal completion. However, large fees are negatively correlated with the consummation of high-premium deals. Fee size is generally unrelated to announcement-date cumulative abnormal returns. However, returns are significantly lower for deals including fees larger than 5%. Overall, the study provides evidence that low- or moderate-size fees serve as efficient contractual devices, while large fees are less beneficial to shareholders and therefore tend to suggest agency conflicts.     

How much cash does your company need?

In late 2001, the directors of Pfizer asked that very question. And with good reason. After its 2000 merger with rival Warner-Lambert, the New York-based pharmaceutical giant found itself sitting on a net cash position of $8 billion, which seemed extraordinarily conservative for a company whose products generated $30 billion in revenues. Most large companies with revenues that healthy would increase leverage, thereby unlocking tremendous value for shareholders. But knowledge-intensive companies like Pfizer, this author argues, are in a class apart. Because their largely intangible assets (like R&D) are highly volatile and cannot easily be valued, they are more vulnerable to financial distress than are firms with a preponderance of tangible assets. To insure against that risk, they need to maintain large positive cash balances. These companies' decisions to run large cash balances is one of the key reasons their shares sustain consistent premiums. Only by investing in their intangible assets can knowledge-based companies hope to preserve the value of those assets. A company that finds itself unable to do so because unfavorable market conditions reduce its operating cash flows will see its share price suffer almost as much as if it were to default on its debts. By the same token, with the right balance sheet, knowledge companies can profitably insure against the risk of failing to sustain value-added investments in difficult times. An optimal capital structure that calls for significant cash balances is certainly at odds with the results of a traditional capital structure analysis, the author demonstrates, but it explains the financial policies of many well-run companies, from Pfizer to Intel to ChevronTexaco.     

How is illiquidity priced in the Chinese stock market?

This study investigates the liquidity premium in the Chinese stock market. We found that the expected stock returns increase monotonically with the quintile sort on characteristic liquidity with descending patterns. The characteristic liquidity premium ranges from 0.82% to 1.28% per month, which is much higher than that of their US counterparts. Moreover, our multivariate decomposition approach highlights that characteristic illiquidity premiums can be explained mainly by size, idiosyncratic volatility and momentum. The net systematic liquidity premium reaches 0.84% per month, driven mainly by commonality beta. The finding shows that a liquidity-based strategy forecasts cross-section and time-series expected returns.     

How biased is the behavior of the individual investor in warrants?

Based on the actual trading behavior of individual investors in the Portuguese financial market during almost ten years this paper examines the socio-demographic characteristics of retail investors in warrants, and discusses the hypothesis that some behavioral biases do have an impact on the investors’ predisposition to invest and trade in warrants, a complex financial instrument. One finds that there is a profile of investors in warrants: younger and less educated men are more likely to invest in warrants and that overconfident, disposition-prone and investors exhibiting a gambling attitude are more likely to invest and trade in warrants. Secondly, the gambling motive seems to be a distinguishing characteristic of investors in warrants. In other words, when investors are driven to trade in financial markets for pleasure/fun they tend to trade complex products more and to trade simple and easier to understand financial instruments less. Finally, the higher the intensity of trading the more relevant are the disposition and the gambler’s biases.     

Can aggregation explain the persistence of inflation?

An aggregation exercise is proposed that aims at investigating whether the fast average adjustments of the disaggregate inflation series of the euro area CPI is coherent with the slow adjustment of euro area aggregate inflation. Estimating a dynamic factor model for 404 inflation sub-indices of the euro area CPI allows to decompose the dynamics of inflation sub-indices into a part due to a common macroeconomic shock and to sector specific idiosyncratic shocks. Although idiosyncratic shocks dominate the variance of sectoral prices, one common factor appears to be the main driver of aggregate dynamics. In addition, the heterogenous propagation of this common shock across sectoral inflation rates, and in particular its slow propagation to inflation rates of services, generates the persistence of aggregate inflation. We conclude that the aggregation mechanism explains a significant amount of aggregate inflation persistence.     

How much is enough? An investigation of nonprofessional investors information search and stopping rule use

Regulators are concerned that the information overload in the current Internet-based disclosure environment may cause investors to overlook important information. To gain a better understanding of the information set gathered by investors, this study incorporates theories from information systems research to examine the cognitive stopping rules used by investors to terminate information search. We survey nonprofessional investors to gain insight into what information they gather and when they determine they have enough information to stop searching and make an investment decision. Demographic analysis shows that investor characteristics are associated with the particular stopping rule used. In addition, results show that the stopping rule used affects the amount and type of information gathered. We find that, in general, investors include very little financial information in their search, and the amount gathered depends on the stopping rule employed. Our results call into question the decision usefulness of accounting information for nonprofessional investors and should be of interest to accounting information systems researchers, regulators, and accounting practitioners.     

How hardwired is human behavior?

Time and time again managers have tried to eliminate hierarchies, politics, and interorganizational rivalry--but to no avail. Why? Evolutionary psychologists would say that they are working against nature--emotional and behavioral "hardwiring" that is the legacy of our Stone Age ancestors. In this evolutionary psychology primer for executives, Nigel Nicholson explores many of the Science's central tenets. Of course, evolutionary psychology is still an emerging discipline, and its strong connection with the theory of natural selection has sparked significant controversy. But, as Nicholson suggests, evolutionary psychology is now well established enough that its insights into human instinct will prove illuminating to anyone seeking to understand why people act the way they do in organizational settings. Take gossip. According to evolutionary psychology, our Stone Age ancestors needed this skill to survive the socially unpredictable conditions of the Savannah Plain. Thus, over time, the propensity to gossip became part of our mental programming. Executives trying to eradicate gossip at work might as well try to change their employees' musical tastes. Better to put one's energy into making sure the "rumor mill" avoids dishonesty or unkindness as much as possible. Evolutionary psychology also explores the dynamics of the human group. Clans on the Savannah Plain, for example, appear to have had no more than 150 members. The message for managers? People will likely be most effective in small organizational units. As every executive knows, it pays to be an insightful student of human nature. Evolutionary psychology adds another important chapter to consider.