“一带一路”倡议与公司债信用利差

本文以中国“一带一路”倡议的出台作为准自然实验,采用双重差分法考察国家倡议对微观企业债券信用利差的影响。研究发现:(1)相对于非支持企业,“一带一路”倡议实施能够显著降低支持企业的公司债二级市场信用利差,该结论在一系列稳健性检验之后仍然成立。(2)通过考察“一带一路”倡议的债券市场反应,我们发现相比于非支持企业,支持企业在倡议提出后有显著更高的债券累计超额回报率。(3)进一步检验后发现,“一带一路”倡议对公司债二级市场信用利差的降低作用主要通过资源效应和信息效应来实现。并且,政策影响范围主要集中在重点对接行业以及重点对接省份的企业。(4)“一带一路”倡议还对公司债一级市场的发行表现产生影响。具体表现为:在倡议实施之后,受倡议支持企业发行的公司债,其一级市场发行利差下降幅度更大,且包含的担保条款以及限制性契约条款显著更少。本研究探讨了“一带一路”倡议对公司债券市场的政策效应,对未来推进“一带一路”建设,提高资金融通效率具有参考意义。     

Do Credit Markets Respond to Macroeconomic Shocks? The Case for Reverse Causality

The response of corporate bond credit spreads to three exogenous macro shocks—oil supply, investment-specific technology, and government spending—is large, significant, and a mirror image of macroeconomic activity. This countercyclicality is driven largely by credit risk premia and translates into significant return predictability. Equity risk premia exhibit similar responses, providing external validity. Information rigidities and leverage play a key role in the transmission of the shocks. Since causal evidence linking macro shocks to credit markets is scarce and recent work highlights the real effects of credit fluctuations, our findings contribute to understanding the joint dynamics of credit markets and the macroeconomy.     

CORPORATE BONDS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION

I examine the effect of product market competition on the yield spread of corporate bonds. I find that firms that face more competitive threats also face a higher cost of corporate bond debt. After controlling for common bond-level, firm-level, and macroeconomic variables, my results show that bondholders of firms that are subject to increased competition demand significantly higher credit spreads than holders of otherwise similar bonds. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for firms that have assets that are difficult to redeploy. Overall, my findings provide evidence that competitive threats are being reflected in corporate debt prices.     

Credit lines as monitored liquidity insurance: Theory and evidence

We propose a theory of credit lines provided by banks to firms as a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior of firms insured by credit lines. The cost of credit lines is thus greater for firms with high liquidity risk, which in turn are likely to use cash instead of credit lines. We test this implication for corporate liquidity management by identifying exogenous shocks to liquidity risk of firms in corporate bond and equity markets. Firms experiencing increases in liquidity risk move out of credit lines and into cash holdings.     

信息不对称与企业债券信用风险估价——基于2008-2011年中国企业债券数据

企业债券发行者与投资者之间的信息不对称,导致投资者因为承担更大的风险而要求更高的回报,从而推高企业债券发行者的信用利差。本文利用2008年12月31日至2011年12月31日中国非上市企业债券数据,实证检验企业债券发行者和投资者之间的信息不对称对企业债券信用利差的影响。我们发现,企业债券发行者和投资者之间的信息不对称程度与企业债券信用利差之间存在显著的正相关性。同时,本文构建了包含信息不对称的企业债券信用风险估价模型。与传统的BS估价模型相比,本文构建的估价模型能更好地拟合实际信用利差。     

Liquidity or Credit Risk? The Determinants of Very Short‐Term Corporate Yield Spreads

Employing a comprehensive database on transactions of commercial paper issued by domestic U.S. nonfinancial corporations, we study the determinants of very short‐term corporate yield spreads. We find that liquidity plays a role in the determination of spreads but, somewhat surprisingly, credit quality is the more important determinant of spreads, even at horizons of less than 1 month. These results are robust across a variety of proxies for liquidity and credit risk, and have important implications for the literature on the modeling of corporate bond prices.     

Analyst forecast characteristics and the cost of debt

We examine the relation between analyst forecast characteristics and the cost of debt financing. Consistent with the view that the information contained in analysts’ forecasts is economically significant across asset classes, we find that analyst activity reduces bond yield spreads. We also find that the economic impact of analysts is most pronounced when uncertainty about firm value is highest (that is, when firms have high idiosyncratic risk). Our findings are robust to controls for private information in equity prices and level of corporate disclosures. Overall, the results indicate that the information contained in analyst forecasts is valued outside the equity market and provide an additional channel in which better information is associated with a lower cost of capital.     

Corporate Credit Spreads and the Sovereign Ceiling in Latin America

We exploit a panel of 72 US dollar-denominated bonds issued by Latin American publicly listed firms between 1996 and 2004, a period of regional financial crises, to answer the following three questions: (1) Is sovereign risk a statistically and economically significant determinant of the corporate credit spread, controlling for firm- and bond-specific characteristics? (2) If yes, do market participants apply the sovereign ceiling rule adopted by rating agencies in the pricing of our bond market data? And (3) how do market views compare with the rating agencies ceiling policy for each corporate bond? We find strong evidence of an economically and statistically significant effect of sovereign risk on corporate spreads across different panel econometric specifications and bonds. Moreover, markets do not apply the ceiling rule in 77–90% of the bonds we sample and these findings are consistent with rating agencies’ policies toward the latter for about 50% of the firms. These results are robust to the inclusion of firm- and bond-specific variables derived from the structural approach to credit risk and to the business cycle in each country.     

THE EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY ON CREDIT SPREADS

We analyze the effect of monetary policy on yield spreads between corporate bonds with different credit ratings over the business cycle. We use futures contracts to distinguish between expected and unexpected changes in the Fed funds target rate and several indicators to distinguish between different phases of the business cycle. In line with the predictions of imperfect capital market theories, we find that yields on corporate bonds with low credit ratings widen (narrow) with respect to those with high credit ratings following an unexpected increase (decrease) in the Fed funds target rate during recession periods. Several tests suggest that our results are robust to outliers, potential endogeneity problems, empirical specification, control variables, countercyclical risk premium in futures, and alternative definitions of credit spreads and economic conditions.     

Corporate bond credit spreads and forecast dispersion

Recent research establishes a negative relation between stock returns and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, arguing that asset prices more reflect the views of optimistic investors because of short-sale constraints in equity markets. In this article, we examine whether a similar effect prevails in corporate bond markets. After controlling for common bond-level, firm-level, and macroeconomic variables, we find evidence that bonds of firms with higher dispersion demand significantly higher credit spreads than otherwise similar bonds and that changes in dispersion reliably predict changes in credit spreads. This evidence suggests a limited role of short-sale constraints in our corporate bond data sets. Consistent with a rational explanation, dispersion appears to proxy largely for future cash flow uncertainty in corporate bond markets.     

Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is it Feasible?

Although accurate bond prices are difficult to come by, many have advocated that bank supervisors use subordinated debt spreads in the surveillance of large banking organizations. Our findings indicate that subordinated debt spreads are most consistent across data sources for the most liquid bonds (i.e., those of relatively large issuance size, relatively young age, issued by relatively large firms) traded in a relatively robust overall bond market. We also find a high degree of concordance in rankings of firms by their minimum spreads across bonds with especially strong agreement about which large firms are in the tails of the spread distribution at each point in time. Our time-series results further support and provide additional guidance for the use of subordinated debt spreads in supervisory monitoring, support the need for careful judgment when interpreting such spreads, highlight difficulties with currently available data sources, and motivate the need for further research.     

The Impact of the Federal Reserve's Large‐Scale Asset Purchase Programs on Corporate Credit Risk

Estimating the effect of Federal Reserve's announcements of Large‐Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs on corporate credit risk is complicated by the simultaneity of policy decisions and movements in prices of risky financial assets, as well as by the fact that both interest rates of assets targeted by the programs and indicators of credit risk reacted to other common shocks during the recent financial crisis. This paper employs a heteroskedasticity‐based approach to estimate the structural coefficient measuring the sensitivity of market‐based indicators of corporate credit risk to declines in the benchmark market interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements. The results indicate that the LSAP announcements led to a significant reduction in the cost of insuring against default risk—as measured by the CDX indexes—for both investment‐ and speculative‐grade corporate credits. While the unconventional policy measures employed by the Federal Reserve to stimulate the economy have substantially lowered the overall level of credit risk in the economy, the LSAP announcements appear to have had no measurable effect on credit risk in the financial intermediary sector.     

Do significant risk warnings in annual reports increase corporate bond credit spreads? Evidence from China

Based on listed companies issuing bonds on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2017, this study analyzes the relationship between significant risk warnings in Chinese companies’ annual reports and corporate bond credit spreads. The main findings are as follows. First, in the Chinese market, “substantial warnings of significant risks” can significantly improve corporate bond credit spreads, reflecting the risk-warning effect; second, state-owned property rights weaken this effect, which only pertains to listed companies with poor risk management and low information quality; third, significant risk warnings increase investors’ heterogeneous beliefs, also affecting credit spreads; and fourth, through textual analysis, it is found that the corporate bond credit spread is greater when the disclosed risk factors are more pessimistic and less similar to those of the previous year. The findings of this paper help to enrich the literature on credit spreads and risk disclosure.     

The Illiquidity of Corporate Bonds

This paper examines the illiquidity of corporate bonds and its asset‐pricing implications. Using transactions data from 2003 to 2009, we show that the illiquidity in corporate bonds is substantial, significantly greater than what can be explained by bid–ask spreads. We establish a strong link between bond illiquidity and bond prices. In aggregate, changes in market‐level illiquidity explain a substantial part of the time variation in yield spreads of high‐rated (AAA through A) bonds, overshadowing the credit risk component. In the cross‐section, the bond‐level illiquidity measure explains individual bond yield spreads with large economic significance.     

Information in CDS spreads

We investigate how public and private information affects corporate CDS spreads prior to rating announcements. First, CDS spreads of firms with high news intensity change significantly earlier and more strongly prior to negative rating announcements than those of firms with low news intensity. Second, the contents of daily corporate news significantly influence the direction in which the CDS spreads move. Third, CDS spreads change more strongly for firms with more bank relationships and days with no news but large abnormal CDS spread changes are more frequent prior to negative rating announcements than prior to positive ones. The study provides new evidence on the informational efficiency of the CDS market, the impact of credit rating announcements, and insider trading.     

Hedge Fund Contagion and Liquidity Shocks

Defining contagion as correlation over and above that expected from economic fundamentals, we find strong evidence of worst return contagion across hedge fund styles for 1990 to 2008. Large adverse shocks to asset and hedge fund liquidity strongly increase the probability of contagion. Specifically, large adverse shocks to credit spreads, the TED spread, prime broker and bank stock prices, stock market liquidity, and hedge fund flows are associated with a significant increase in the probability of hedge fund contagion. While shocks to liquidity are important determinants of performance, these shocks are not captured by commonly used models of hedge fund returns.     

Corporate taxes,strategic default,and the cost of debt

The current US tax code’s loss carry provisions provide implicit tax subsidies to financially troubled firms. Since shareholders ultimately decide when to announce bankruptcy, such tax subsidies can incentivize them to strategically postpone default. Therefore, corporate taxation can influence corporate cost of debt. Using a large panel of corporate bonds, we find supporting evidence: credit spreads become smaller as tax loss carries grow larger. In contrast, tax shields such as depreciation, which limit loss carry gains, lead to wider spreads. Interestingly, when stockholders hold greater bargaining power – due to large managerial ownership – larger corporate tax shields lead to even narrower credit spreads.     

Recognition versus disclosure of finance leases: Evidence from Japan

This study examines whether credit market participants—bond investors and credit rating agencies—treat recognized and disclosed finance leases differently when assessing firms’ credit risk in Japan. I use firms’ credit risk, measured by bond spreads and credit ratings, to investigate the relations between recognized versus disclosed finance lease obligations and firms’ credit risk following the adoption of Statement No. 13, Accounting Standard for Lease Transactions. For a sample of firms issuing new bonds, I find that, unlike recognized finance leases, disclosed finance leases are not associated with bond spreads. Moreover, the associations between recognized versus disclosed finance leases and bond spreads are substantially different. Conversely, recognized and disclosed finance leases are associated with credit ratings and are processed similarly when credit ratings are determined. Taken together, my results suggest that the sophistication of capital market participants influences their credit risk assessments of recognized versus disclosed finance leases.     

Lead indicator models and UK analysts' earnings forecasts

This study examines the predictive ability of models which adjust random walk forecasts of corporate earnings, to incorporate past changes in economic lead indicators. The results suggest that changes in the broad money supply measure M4 contain predictive ability, beyond equivalent changes in other lead indicators or an individual firm's earnings. When forecasts from the broad-money model are compared with forecasts generated by financial analysts a size effect is evident: the superiority of analysts' forecasts is apparent much earlier for large firms than for small firms. This result is consistent with studies suggesting a size-related differential in the collection and dissemination of information by market participants.     

Corporate bond default risk: A 150-year perspective

We study corporate bond default rates using an extensive new data set spanning the 1866-2008 period. We find that the corporate bond market has repeatedly suffered clustered default events much worse than those experienced during the Great Depression. For example, during the railroad crisis of 1873-1875, total defaults amounted to 36% of the par value of the entire corporate bond market. Using a regime-switching model, we examine the extent to which default rates can be forecast by financial and macroeconomic variables. We find that stock returns, stock return volatility, and changes in GDP are strong predictors of default rates. Surprisingly, however, credit spreads are not. Over the long term, credit spreads are roughly twice as large as default losses, resulting in an average credit risk premium of about 80 basis points. We also find that credit spreads do not adjust in response to realized default rates.