On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code

This paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor productivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare. These beneficial effects of a progressive tax system have to be traded off against the efficiency loss arising from distorting endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions.Using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we find that the optimal US income tax is well approximated by a flat tax rate of 17.2% and a fixed deduction of about $9,400. The steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 1.7% higher consumption in each state of the world. An explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates that a majority of the population currently alive (roughly 62%) would experience welfare gains, suggesting that such fundamental income tax reform is not only desirable, but may also be politically feasible.     

Second-best income taxation and education policy with endogenous human capital and borrowing constraints

We formulate a two-period life cycle model of saving, labor supply, and human capital investment when individuals differ in their ability and initial wealth. Borrowing constraints result in sub-optimal choices for consumption and investments in human capital. We analyze optimal linear income taxes and education subsidies. The optimal income tax is shown to be positive—even in the absence of any redistributional concerns. A redistributive income tax relaxes borrowing constraints by redistributing resources from the unconstrained to the borrowing constrained stages of the life cycle. The income tax thus alleviates preexisting non-tax distortions in the capital market. Human capital is subsidized on a net basis in the absence of redistributional concerns. Education subsidies help to relax credit constraints and to reduce distortions from explicit and implicit taxes on human capital formation. When redistributional concerns are present, education is subsidized more if this helps to alleviate distortions on labor supply, but is subsidized less if education subsidies have a very regressive incidence. Simulations demonstrate that optimal income taxes are substantially higher when credit constraints are present. Education is generally subsidized on a net basis, and the more so if credit constraints are more severe.     

Optimal income taxation and migration

We tackle the issue of optimal dynamic taxation of capital income in an economy with disconnection as in Weil (J Public Econ 38:183–198, 1989), generated by migration and intra-family altruism. We show that, when the government aims at correcting such a disconnection using time-varying weights in the social welfare function, then there is room for nonzero capital income taxation, both in the short and in the long run.     

Disability insurance and optimal income taxation

This paper studies the design of disability insurance scheme when agents differ in their privately known productivity. We extend the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) two period model to allow for agents differing ex-ante in their productivity and characterize the optimal nonlinear tax transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when per-period earnings and age are observable while individuals’ productivity and health status are not observable. We show that the induced tax/benefit scheme should exhibit a marginal income tax that decreases with age for some agents. A marginal subsidy on the young high productive income may be desirable. While the disability scheme always involves the old low productive agents to be indifferent between working and claiming disability benefits, this result is not always true for the old high productive agents. JEL Classification H55 · H23 · E62     

Nordic dual income taxation of entrepreneurs

The paper shows how entrepreneurial taxes interact with the career choice of individuals, the quality of entrepreneurs, and their investment behavior. It is particularly relevant to differentiate the early effects on start-up enterprises with substantial uncertainty from the tax effects on mature firms where the uncertainty is resolved. Conditions are derived for the Nordic dual income tax to be neutral and they are found to be stringent. Profit expectations matter. The Nordic dual encourages (discourages) the establishment of new enterprises by entrepreneurs who anticipate high (low) profitability.     

National income taxation and the geographic distribution of population

We study how different national taxation schemes interact with geographic variation in productivity and consumption amenities in determining regional populations. A neoclassical migration equilibrium model is used to analyze the current nominal income tax system in Norway. The analysis is based on estimated regional income differences accounting for both observable and unobservable individual characteristics and the value of experience. Given regional differences in incomes and housing prices, quality of life and productivity are calibrated to model equilibrium. Compared to an undistorted equilibrium with lump-sum taxation, nominal income taxation creates a disincentive to locate in productive high-income regions. The deadweight loss due to locational inefficiencies is 0.18% of gross domestic product (GDP). We study real income taxation and equal real taxes as alternative tax systems. Both alternatives generate a geographic distribution of the population closer to the undistorted equilibrium, and hence with lower deadweight loss. In an extension of the analysis, we take into account payroll taxes. The existing regionally differentiated payroll taxes to the disadvantage of cities generate a deadweight loss of 0.22% of GDP in an economy with lump-sum income taxation. The two distortionary taxes interact and strengthen each other and the combined distortionary effect of income and payroll taxation in the Norwegian system is 0.46% of GDP.     

Uninsurable investment risks and capital income taxation

This paper studies the capital accumulation and welfare implications of reducing capital income taxation in a general equilibrium economy with uninsurable investment risks. It has been shown that, with uninsurable investment risks, under-accumulation of capital may result compared to the complete markets economy. We show that reducing somewhat the capital income tax rate increases the capital stock and leads to a welfare gain. The complete elimination of the capital income tax, however, is not necessarily welfare improving.     

Beyond the labour income tax wedge: the unemployment-reducing effect of tax progressivity

In this paper, we argue that, for a given overall level of labour income taxation, a more progressive tax schedule increases employment. From a theoretical point of view, higher progressivity increases overall employment through a wage moderating effect and also because employment of low-paid workers is more elastic to wages. We test these theoretical predictions on a panel of 21 OECD countries over 1998–2008. Controlling for the burden of taxation at the average wage, our estimates suggest that a more progressive tax schedule reduces the unemployment rate and increases the employment rate. These findings are confirmed when we account for the potential endogeneity of both average taxation and progressivity. Overall, our results suggest that policy-makers should not only focus on the detrimental effects of tax progressivity on in-work effort, but also consider the employment-enhancing effects.     

2010年税策走势与影响

在出席“第六届中国CFO高峰论坛”时,中国社会科学院财贸研究所副所长高培勇博士发表了主题演汫,并对2010年税收政策安排做了梳理和展望。     

Decomposition of progressivity and inequality indices: Inferences from the US federal income tax system

Vertical equity is an important criterion in evaluating a tax system. Vertical equity has two elements: progressivity and income equality. In this paper, we analyze the vertical equity effects of the US income tax system during 1995–2006 and show that income inequality increased substantially during the period combined with a significant reduction in real progressivity.     

Assessing the international spillover effects of capital income taxation

Changes in capital taxes by one economy spill onto other economies with internationally mobile capital. We evaluate these impacts using a two-region, intertemporal general equilibrium model. The foreign economy's unilateral reduction in corporate income taxation has positive but small effects on U.S. welfare. In contrast, unilateral reductions in personal income taxation impose large negative spillovers. The differences result from CIT being source-based and PIT residence-based. The CIT cut reduces tax burdens to U.S. residents who invest abroad, while the PIT cut reduces foreigners' tax burdens only. Through general equilibrium adjustments neglected in simpler models, the PIT cut lowers U.S. residents' welfare.     

Optimal income taxation and social norms in the labor market

This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-type model extended to allow for social interaction and social norms in the labor market. One norm refers to “normal behavior” with respect to work hours (the hours of work norm), whereas another means that “one should earn one’s living by working” (the participation norm). The results show how the hours of work norm gives rise to a corrective motive for using income taxation. We also show how the interaction between the hours of work norm and the private incentive to participate in the labor market (which reflects the participation norm) gives rise to an employment motive for using the income tax.     

Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing

When liquidity plays an important role as in financial crises, asset prices may reflect the amount of liquidity available rather than the asset's future earning power. Using market prices to assess financial institutions’ solvency in such circumstances is not desirable. We show that a shock in the insurance sector can cause the current market value of banks’ assets to fall below their liabilities so they are insolvent. In contrast, if values based on historic cost are used, banks can continue and meet all their future liabilities. We discuss the implications for the debate on mark-to-market versus historic cost accounting.     

Human capital and optimal positive taxation of capital income

This paper analyzes optimal linear and non-linear taxes on capital and labor incomes in a life-cycle model of human capital investment, financial savings, and labor supply with heterogenous individuals. A dual income tax with a positive marginal tax rate on not only labor income but also capital income is optimal. The positive tax on capital income serves to alleviate the distortions of the labor tax on human capital accumulation. The optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is lower than that on labor income if savings are elastic compared to investment in human capital, substitution between verifiable and non-verifiable inputs in human capital formation is difficult, and most investments in human capital are verifiable so that education subsidies can directly reduce the tax wedge on learning. Numerical calculations suggest that the optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is substantial.     

Personal taxation of capital income and the financial leverage of firms

Tax competition for capital has led to a trend where many countries levy lower taxes on interest income, often introducing differential taxation between interest and business income. This study analyzes the effect on firm debt usage. We exploit Germany’s 2009 tax reform, which introduced a final withholding tax on interest income with a flat rate 18 percentage points below the unchanged tax rate on income from unincorporated businesses, as a quasi-experiment. The results, based on firm-level panel data, indicate that firms increase their leverage when the tax rate on interest income decreases, albeit to a small degree.     

Capital income taxation and economic growth in open economies

Can reductions in domestic capital income taxes attract foreign capital and, at the same time, foster economic growth? Using a two-country overlapping generations model with endogenous growth and internationally mobile capital, this paper shows that the effect of domestic capital taxes on the international allocation of capital and on the rate of economic growth do not necessarily go in the same direction. A country can attract capital by reducing its taxes, but this may lower the rate of economic growth depending on the elasticity of saving to the net-of-tax interest rate and on the effect of taxes on domestic factor productivity.     

Tax competition and fiscal equalization under corporate income taxation

This paper challenges the view that tax base equalization by the so-called representative tax system (RTS) removes inefficient undertaxation in corporate tax competition. The innovation of the paper is that it focuses on a tax on corporate income, instead of the unit tax on capital considered in previous studies. We employ a tax competition model with fiscal equalization and show that the RTS fails to fully internalize pecuniary and fiscal externalities. As a consequence, the RTS yields inefficiently low tax rates in the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game between governments. Tax revenue equalization performs even worse, but combined with equalization of private income it implements the efficient tax rates on corporate income.     

Corporate income taxation in Lithuania in the context of the EU

This paper explores Lithuania's competitiveness in the area of corporate income taxation. In order to assess how much freedom of action the country has in designing its own corporate income tax policy, the process of EU tax harmonization is analyzed by evaluating justification for tax harmonization, the major developments and the main outcomes of this process. Lithuania's corporate income tax system is compared with the systems in the other EU countries. Following a macro backward-looking approach, the paper calculates the measures of effective profit tax burden. Effective tax burden measures are computed for the whole enlarged EU. Such calculations are still rare in the economic literature.     

Capital income taxation and risk taking under prospect theory

This research examines capital income taxation for a prospect theory investor under some acceptable in the literature reference levels relative to which are the changes in the level of wealth valued. Depending on the reference level, some results indicate that it is possible for a capital income tax increase not to stimulate risk taking even if the tax code provides attractive full loss offset provisions. However, risk taking can be stimulated when investors compare their reference level with others. Risk taking can increase also if the investor interprets part of the tax as a loss instead as a reduced gain. Then the investor becomes risk seeking and moves away from the discomfort zone of relative losses. This later response to taxation causes private risk taking to increase.     

Direct evidence on the marginal rate of taxation on dividend income

Miller and Scholes (1978) hypothesize that the marginal tax rate on dividend income may be less than the marginal rate of tax on capital gains. Their hypothesis is dependent upon individuals utilizing existing provisions of the Code which serve to reduce the taxation of dividends. In this study, estimates of the marginal and effective rates of tax on dividend income for the year 1979 are presented using the Statistics of Income sample of returns. The average marginal rate of tax on dividend income is estimated to be 40%, while the average effective rate of tax is estimated to be 30%.