Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance

When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.     

Factors Influencing Farmers' Crop Insurance Decisions

Farmers' decisions to purchase crop insurance and their choices among alternative products are analyzed using a two-stage estimation procedure. The influences of risk perceptions, competing risk management options, as well structural and demographic differences are evaluated. The likelihood for crop insurance usage is found to be higher for larger, older, less tenured, more highly leveraged farms, and by those with higher perceived yield risks. The marginal effects of size, age, perceived yield risk, perceived importance of risk management activities, and other structural and demographic variables are identified in terms of their influences on choices among alternative crop insurance products.     

Crop Insurance Valuation under Alternative Yield Distributions

Considerable disagreement exists about the most appropriate characterization of farm-level yield distributions. Yet, the economic importance of alternative yield distribution specifications on crop insurance valuation has not been well documented. The results of this study demonstrate that large differences in expected payouts from popular crop insurance products can arise solely from the parameterization chosen to represent yield distributions. The results suggest that the frequently unexamined yield distribution specification may lead to economically significant errors in crop insurance policy rating and assessment of expected payouts from policies.     

Is There a Viable Market for Area-Based Crop Insurance?

The performance of area yield insurance and farm-level multiple peril crop insurance is analyzed for cotton and soybean production in Georgia and South Carolina. The analysis improves on many previous studies by utilizing actual farm-level yield data and by comparing the two types of insurance products not only for actuarially fair premium rates but also for actual unsubsidized and subsidized premium rates. Results suggest that, even in heterogeneous production regions, area yield insurance may be a viable alternative to farm-level insurance when premium rates for farm-level insurance contain large positive wedges.     

Advantageous Selection in Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence

We extend the recently proposed multi‐dimensional asymmetric information model to show that advantageous selection could be present in crop insurance with two types of coverage: (i) multiple perils (e.g. a multi‐peril, ‘all risk’ policy), and (ii) a specific named peril (or set of perils). Our theoretical model suggests that certain characteristics of an insured farmer (or farm) under both types of coverage can be sources of advantageous selection. Farmers who advantageously select are more likely to purchase insurance coverage and less likely to realise a loss. A supplementary empirical analysis, based on data from the Philippine crop insurance market, illustrates how sources of advantageous selection can be identified econometrically.     

Optimal Area-Yield Crop Insurance Reconsidered

The implementability of area-yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer's "beta" linking his yield to the risk-pool's yield is examined. In the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information Mahul's result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer's beta is confirmed. When there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer, however, this full-insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection, and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures. The optimal area-yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized.     

Developing Experience-Based Premium Rate Discounts in Crop Insurance

This article addresses the feasibility of implementing an experience-based premium rate discount system in crop insurance. While adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance have been extensively studied in the past, discount systems or bonus–malus incentives have not, to our knowledge, been investigated. Our empirical analysis indicates that a crop insurance discount system could be implemented based on a measure of favorable past insurance experience. The estimated average discounts based on the rating methods developed in this study ranged from 5% to 9% (depending on the crop being considered).     

An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program

The extent to which crop insurance programs have resulted in additional land being brought into production has been a topic of considerable debate. We consider multiequation structural models of acreage response, insurance participation, CRP enrollment, and input usage. Our analysis focuses on corn and soybean production in the Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in the Upper Great Plains. Our results confirm that increased participation in insurance programs provokes statistically significant acreage responses in some cases, though the response is very modest in every case. In the most extreme cases, 30% decreases in premiums as a result of increased subsidies provoke acreage increases ranging from 0.2% to 1.1%. A number of policy simulations involving increases in premium subsidies are considered.     

Aggregation in Area-Yield Crop Insurance: The Linear Additive Model

Previous analyses of area yield crop insurance have used a linear additive model (LAM) to express the relationship between individual and area yield. However, the theoretical foundations of the LAM are unknown. This shortcoming is addressed by establishing two conditions linking microvariables and LAM parameters. The conditions relate to the interaction of risks in individual technologies and the extent of aggregation. If systemic and individual risks are additive in individual yields, and if the law of large numbers hold, then the LAM obtains. This article also shows how departures from these conditions affect the results derived from a LAM analysis.     

Crop Insurance as a Strategy for Adapting to Climate Change

Financial insurance for extreme events can play an important role in hedging against the implications of climate change. This paper combines a comprehensive estimation strategy and a unique panel dataset to study the role of financial insurance in farmers' welfare under uncertainty. Data are drawn from a large Italian farm panel dataset. We find that (i) demand for insurance products is likely to increase in response to climatic conditions, and (ii) that the use of insurance reduces the extent of risk exposure. We also find that farms growing more crops are less likely to adopt the insurance scheme. This confirms what is found in the theoretical literature. Crop diversification can be a substitute for financial insurance in hedging against the impact of risk exposure on welfare.     

Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India

Determining farmers’ real demand for crop insurance is difficult, especially in developing countries, where there is a lack of formal financial sector integration and a high reliance on informal risk mitigation options. We provide some new estimates of farmers’ willingness‐to‐pay for insurance in the context of a large‐scale subsidised programme in India. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households across four states in India, enabling us to estimate preferences for specific insurance policy attributes such as coverage period, method of loss assessment, timing of indemnity payments and the cost of insurance. Our results suggest that farmers do value crop insurance under certain conditions and some are willing to pay a premium for such coverage in excess of the subsidised rates they are currently required to pay under this programme. In particular, farmers value the assurances that they will receive timely payouts when they incur losses, and may not have a strong preference for the method with which losses are assessed. On the other hand, farmers are quite sensitive to coverage periods. Our baseline assessment shows that when optimised to farmer requirements, there can be a sizeable demand for crop insurance by developing country farmers.     

Actuarial Fairness of Crop Insurance Rates with Constant Rate Relativities

Increased availability and demand for low-deductible crop insurance policies have increased focus on crop insurance rating methods. Actuarial fairness cannot be achieved if constant multiplicative factors are used to determine how premiums change as coverage levels increase. A comparison of premium rates generated by the factors used by the two most popular crop insurance products with those generated by a standard yield distribution shows that the popular insurance products overcharge for low-deductible policies in most counties. This overpricing may explain why large premium subsidies were required to induce farmers to move from low-deductible to high-deductible policies beginning in 2001.     

Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective on Agricultural Policy

Lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress. This article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy, describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post "disaster relief" and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails. Absent ex ante government policy, ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance, which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under-production by operating farmers. Ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance, price supports, and a program participation fee.     

Share Tenancy, Ownership Structure, and Prevented Planting Claims in Crop Insurance

A conceptual model based on opportunity cost and expected utility principles establishes linkages between the likelihood of prevented planting claims in crop insurance and existing share leasing arrangements/internal farm business structures. Results of heteroskedastic probit estimation procedures indicate that simpler internal business structures and more dominant farmer–tenant leasing position can increase the probability of submitting a prevented planting claim.     

论地质灾害风险与保险

地质灾害风险特征和我国地质灾害救助体制决定了保险是地质灾害风险管理的有效手段。利用保险学理论对地质灾害风险进行分析可知地质灾害风险基本符合可保险条件,具有可保性。根据中国的具体国情、地质灾害保险需求还是较大的,因而地质灾害保险市场是有发展前景的,目前的问题主要是地质灾害保险供给不足,研究建立适合中国国情的地质灾害保险机制并将其纳入地质灾害补偿体系,意义重大。     

Estimating the Prevalence and Cost of Yield-Switching Fraud in the Federal Crop Insurance Program

Producers who manipulate and switch their reported crop-yields between separately insured units can increase their insurance indemnities substantially. A statistical model that identifies potential yield switching is developed. The unrestricted statistical model is singular and is identified by imposing a mixture of system-estimable and system-nonestimable restrictions. Lower bound estimates of yield-switching fraud incidence and costs are obtained by applying the model to 207,067 multiple unit producers who purchased crop insurance in 1998.     

Tests for the Role of Risk Aversion on Input Use

For risk-averting agents, risks alter production decisions while the existence of institutions to insure against adverse states of nature will likely restore decisions toward levels under risk neutrality. In this article, conditions are identified on a stochastic technology to test   H^rn _0,≤  : that risk averters choose smaller input levels than risk neutral agents, and   H^ra _0,≤  : that an increase in risk aversion reduces input use. A robust statistical method to test for dominance is adapted to stochastic production relations. It is found that   H^rn _0,≤  is likely true for nitrogen application on Iowa corn. Weaker evidence is found in favor of   H^ra _0,≤  .     

Crop Yield Skewness Under Law of the Minimum Technology

No satisfactory motivation has been forwarded in favor of any crop yield distribution, including the normal. This article explores the foundations of yield distributions for the Law of the Minimum resource constraint technology at the plot level of analysis. With independent, identical, uniform resource availability distributions the yield skew is positive, whereas it is negative whenever the distributions are normal. Simulations show how asymmetries in resource availabilities determine skewness. It is suggested that a negative yield skew occurs whenever production is tightly controlled so that the left tails of some resources availabilities distributions are thin. Irrigation may increase yield skewness.     

Evaluating the Potential of Index Insurance Schemes to Reduce Crop Yield Risk in an Arid Region

We evaluate yield risk reduction through weather index, area yield index and farm yield insurance contracts for wheat farms in Kazakhstan by employing data from 1980 to 2002. We use the usual mean variance (MV) approach and also a second‐degree stochastic dominance (SSD) criterion. While MV is not necessarily consistent with the expected utility (EU) theory, SSD results only in a minimum but EU‐consistent benefit from insuring. Differences in the estimation results for both approaches underline the advantage of applying both criteria to analyse the risk‐reducing potential of crop insurance. Bootstrapping results show that none of the analysed insurance schemes provides statistically significant risk reduction for every single farm. In addition, weather‐based index insurance is found to provide less risk reduction than area yield insurance based on the rayon (county) yield. Moreover, rayon yield index insurance can reduce yield risk more effectively for Kazakhstan's wheat producers than farm yield insurance with a low strike yield.     

Constrained Efficient Contracts for Area Yield Crop Insurance

With area yield crop insurance, indemnification occurs when area yield falls below a yield trigger that is chosen by the producer. The maximum value for this yield trigger is generally restricted (e.g., 80% of the long term area average yield). The impact of this trigger constraint on the optimal design of an area yield insurance contract is examined. Within the constrained efficient contract, indemnities consist of both a lump sum payment and a payment that is proportional to the yield shortfall. Because lump sum payments may not be feasible to implement, efficiency-enhancing modifications to standard contracts are also proposed.