Fee competition among Big 4 auditors and audit quality

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Both the GAO (Public accounting firms: mandated study on consolidation and competition. GAO, Washington, 2003; Audits of public companies: continued...     

The dark side of audit market competition

This paper examines the relation between audit market competition and audit quality. We use the staggered introduction of bullet trains in different Chinese cities as shocks to travel time between audit clients and prospective audit firms, which increases the threat of competition for incumbent audit firms. The inception of bullet train connectivity leads to a 4.5 percentage point (pp) increase in the probability of GAAP violations and a 1.7 pp decrease in the probability of modified audit opinions for clients headquartered in connected cities. Bullet train connectivity is also followed by a 1.6 pp decrease in income-decreasing audit adjustments but no change in income-increasing audit adjustments. The negative relation between bullet train connectivity and audit quality is 1) stronger when bullet trains put greater competitive pressure on incumbent auditors and 2) weaker when clients demand high audit quality. Our paper provides plausibly causal evidence that competition lowers audit quality.     

The impact of product market competition on earnings quality

The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of product market competition on earnings quality. Based on a sample from the US manufacturing sector for the period 1996–2005, we find consistent evidence showing a positive relation between product market competition and earnings quality. Additional tests also confirm a positive relation between product market competition and the precision of public and private information held by investors and analysts. We also provide evidence that firms competing in concentrated and heterogeneous industries are associated with a number of earnings attributes and information quality not shared by those competing in concentrated but homogeneous industries. These findings are consistent with the intuition that firms enjoying a monopolistic advantage tend to avoid the attention of their competitors and politicians by creating a more opaque information environment.     

An empirical test of spatial competition in the audit market

This study empirically examines the effects of competition through differentiation on audit pricing. Based on prior economic theory on differentiated-product markets (e.g., Hotelling, 1929, Tirole, 1988), we hypothesize that audit fees are affected by an auditor's relative location in a market segment. We define audit markets per industry segment and U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Area and specify an auditor's industry location relative to the client (auditor–client industry alignment) and relative to the closest competitor (industry market share distance to closest competitor). We find that audit fees increase in both auditor–client industry alignment and industry market share distance to the closest competitor.     

The effect of accounting firm mergers on the market for audit services: New Zealand evidence

This article examines the outcomes of accounting firm mergers using data about the frequency of audit switches, the numbers of partners in the respective firms, and perceptions revealed in interviews with partners. Evidence from client switches does not show any evidence that the mergers were followed by cost reductions, or of collusion to force prices up. The effects of the mergers appear to have been elsewhere—the merging firms reduced partner numbers substantially, increasing partner leverage so that individual remaining partners were better off. Data from interviews confirm these findings, and show that the culture of individual firms had a significant effect on determining which group of partners controlled the merged firm.     

The effect of audit market structure on audit quality and audit pricing in the private-client market

This study examines whether audit market structure affects audit quality and audit pricing. We analyze two conceptually distinct dimensions of market structure: audit market concentration and client mobility. Focusing on the private-client segment of the Belgian audit market, we compare the pricing and quality effects of market structure between the segment of small and medium-sized (SME) clients and the segment of large clients to test how audit complexity moderates such effects. We find that market concentration impairs price and quality competition in the SME-client segment. Market concentration is unrelated to audit quality in the large-client segment, where we argue that concentration is endogenous to audit complexity. Furthermore, we find that client mobility stimulates price competition in both segments but improves audit quality only in the large-client segment. We interpret our findings as evidence that (a) audit market concentration impairs competition especially when audits have low complexity and that (b) the large-client market segment, characterized by higher audit complexity and higher market concentration, can also be price and quality competitive if clients are sufficiently mobile, and change auditors relatively frequently.     

The pricing of initial audit engagements by big 4 and leading mid-tier auditors

The recent investigation of the UK audit market by the Competition Commission testifies to perennial regulatory concerns regarding increasing supplier concentration, big 4 dominance of large company audits and the capacity of mid-tier auditors to compete. Against this backdrop, this paper presents new evidence on whether there is competitive pricing for initial audit engagements by big 4 auditors relative to their next four largest mid-tier (mid 4) counterparts for the UK quoted and private corporate sectors. Based on data from FAME for 2007 and 2010, the evidence indicates that larger quoted companies switching between the big 4 benefit from substantial discounts, with smaller discounts attracted by clients switching to the mid 4. Coupled with evidence that fees for both audit and non-audit services recover in subsequent periods, and consistent with the theoretical framework, the paper concludes that big 4 discounting is a competitive outcome aimed at securing future economic rents. New evidence demonstrates that smaller clients switching to big 4 or mid 4 auditors do not benefit from low-balling.     

How does auditors’ work stress affect audit quality?Empirical evidence from the Chinese stock market

With reference to the Job Demands-Control Model,we empirically examine the effect of auditors’ work stress on audit quality using a sample of Chinese A-share li...     

Big Six auditors and audit quality: The Korean evidence

This study investigates the association between discretionary accruals and Big Six and non-Big Six auditors, and the direction of auditor change. We hypothesize that there is no significant difference in discretionary accruals between Big Six and non-Big Six clients when there is low incentive for auditors to provide high-quality audits, as in Korea.Upon examination of the discretionary accruals of firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 1994 to 1998, we find there is no significant difference between the discretionary accruals of firms with Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. This holds true for firms that switch from non-Big Six to Big Six auditors and vice versa. These resources imply that there may be no difference in audit quality between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors in Korea. This is consistent with other studies in Korea, while inconsistent with the findings of previous studies on audit quality in other countries.     

Agency costs and product market competition: The case of audit pricing in Greece

Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs are not dependent on product market competition. However, elsewhere in the economics literature, theoretical analysis and empirical research have indicated that product market competition reduces agency costs by reducing the marginal cost of eliciting effort from agents. We investigate the relationship between product market competition and audit fee, as an example of agency cost. Taking advantage of a proprietary data set for Greek audit firms, we find that the audit fee and audit hours are inversely associated with client firm product market competition. We conclude that audit effort, as an agency cost, is reduced where competitive forces reduce the need for shareholders to bear the costs of monitoring agents.     

Is the audit services market competitive following Arthur Andersen's collapse?

This study investigates whether audit markets remain competitive in the wake of Arthur Andersen's demise and merger with Ernst & Young to create the Big Four. We conduct the study estimating audit fee models using Australian audit market data from both 2000 and 2003 to determine whether there is any evidence of cartel pricing either before, or subsequent to, the merger. In both years, we find evidence of a Big N price premium when estimating an audit fee model across all clients, and when we estimate the model separately across large and small client market segments. This evidence is consistent with product differentiation by Big N auditors and competitive markets.     

The impact of capital market competition on relationship banking: Evidence from the Japanese experience

Disagreement exists about the potential effects of changes in competition on relationship lending. Boot and Thakor (2000) predict that an increase in capital market competition should lead to a reduction in relationship lending; however, Dinç (2000) predicts that greater capital market competition should increase relationship lending. Thus far, data limitations have precluded empirical tests of these competing hypotheses. In this study, we use a unique data set drawn from the deregulation of the Japanese financial system. Our findings show that increased capital market competition is associated with reduced relationship lending. However, the effect differs according to the maturity of the loans; increased capital market competition is associated with reduced long-term, but greater short-term, relationship lending.     

The impact of aggressive orders in an order-driven market: a simulation approach

This article investigates resiliency in an order-driven market. On basis of a vector autoregressive model capturing various dimensions of liquidity and their interactions, I simulate the effect of a large liquidity shock, measured by a very aggressive market order. I show that, despite the absence of market makers, the market is resilient. All dimensions of liquidity (spread, depth at the best prices and order book imbalances) revert to their steady-state values within 15 orders after the shock. For prices, a long run effect is found. Furthermore, different dimensions of liquidity interact. Immediately after a liquidity shock, the spread becomes wider than in the steady state, implying that one dimension of liquidity deteriorates, while at the same time, depth at the best prices increases, meaning an improvement of another liquidity dimension. In subsequent periods, the spread reverts back to the steady-state level but also depth decreases. Also, I find evidence for asymmetries in the impact of shocks on the ask and bid side. Shocks on the ask side have a stronger impact than shocks on the bid side. Finally, resiliency is higher for less-frequently traded stocks and stocks with a larger relative tick size.     

An examination of the Vietnamese emerging market economy: understanding how and why auditors have responded to the audit law reforms

Using New Institutional Sociology (NIS), we seek to explain the variation between what was intended with the Vietnamese reforms to audit in 2011 and the actual practice, and why there is variation. This paper reports findings from interviews with 70 individuals representing identified groups of stakeholders in the market for audit and assurance services in Vietnam. Overall, the findings indicate that there still exist business risks for foreign companies that pursue trade and commerce in communist Vietnam, particularly where non‐Big 4 audit firms are involved in the external audit function, as in some cases auditor independence is most likely compromised.     

The (mis)fit between the profile of internal auditors and internal audit activities

This study investigates whether there is a fit between the profile of internal auditors and the activities of the internal audit department (IAD). It also seeks to discover which type of internal auditors fit which type of internal audit (IA) activities. This is commonly referred to as the person-job (P-J) fit. Furthermore, this study investigates whether this (mis)fit is associated with the outsourcing/co-sourcing of IA activities and turnover within the IAD. Bringing strategic human resource management (SHRM) into IA can be considered as the key contribution of this paper. The results of this study are based on a questionnaire completed by 280 members of the Institute of Internal Auditors in Belgium. The results show that there is a fit between some characteristics of internal auditors working in an IAD and the activities of the IAD. The results also show that certain internal auditor characteristics fit with certain types of IA activities. However, the degree of fit varies. Furthermore, it was found that IADs that co-source/outsource were significantly more associated with a misfit between the profile of the internal auditors and the activities of the IAD, whereas a misfit was not significantly associated with a high turnover of internal auditors.     

Audit report lag: the role of auditor type and increased competition in the audit market

This study investigates the effect of auditor type (private vs. state) and increased competition in an audit market on audit report lag (ARL). This is the first study to provide evidence regarding the effect of audit market competition on ARL. Utilising structure–conduct–performance theory, we predict that competition pressures private auditors to be more efficient and to have less reporting lag than state auditors. We also predict that competition among auditors after a liberalisation period forces auditors to be more efficient and to record less ARL than before. We use a unique data set in Iran, whereby the audit market liberalisation (an audit market where services were previously provided primarily by a state entity) has resulted in both state and private auditors simultaneously providing audit services. The findings are consistent with the following hypothesis, that is ARL is shorter for private auditors than it is for state auditors, and ARL decreases as competition increases in the Iranian audit market. Consistent with the structure–conduct–performance theory, the findings suggest that increased competition in the audit market results in higher efficiency, as reflected by a shorter ARL.     

Diversification by the audit offices in the US and its impact on audit quality

Audit offices in the US exhibit a wide variation in the number of industries they service. Strategic management theory suggests that diversification can affect the quality of output, depending on the nature and circumstances of diversification. This paper examines the effect of diversification at the audit office level on audit quality. Five proxies of audit quality are examined, mainly, absolute discretionary accruals, propensity to meet-or-beat earnings expectations by a cent, propensity to restate financial statements, propensity to receive a comment letter after an SEC review and propensity to issue a going concern opinion. Results suggest that diversification has detrimental effects on audit quality. On the other hand, when the diversification is part of the audit firm level strategy, the detrimental effects on audit quality are dampened. Moreover, when the diversification at the office level is part of a revenue expansion strategy, the audit quality is adversely affected. However, there is no detrimental effect on the audit quality when revenue expansion is not the objective. Also, diversification across dissimilar industries leads to more adverse effect on audit quality than diversification to similar industries. Results also suggest that when the audit office is located in a market with more (less) diversified client base, the adverse effects of diversification on audit quality are weaker (stronger). Finally, the offices of big-4 audit firms handle diversification better with less adverse effect on audit quality. The findings are important since they identify additional factors that explain audit quality at the audit office level.     

Former auditors on the audit committee and earnings management: Evidence from African banks

This paper investigates whether former auditors on the audit committee constrain earnings management through loan loss provisions. Based on an analysis of the annual reports of 82 African listed banks over the period 2011–2016, findings show that the presence of former auditors on an audit committee is associated with lower earnings management. This result suggests that audit committee members with auditing expertise and background contribute to effective monitoring of management’s accounting practices. Furthermore, results reveal that the reducing effect on earnings management of former auditors is strongest for directors who are unaffiliated with the bank’s current external auditor.     

The impact of audit committee expertise on audit quality: Evidence from UK audit fees

Governance regulators currently place great emphasis on ensuring the presence of financial expertise on audit committees (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; UK Corporate Governance Code 2010–2016). Underlying this is a belief that greater expertise enhances the effectiveness of audit committees and, by extension, the quality of the external audit. This study investigates the impact of audit committee expertise on one measure of audit quality - audit fees paid by FTSE350 companies. Our analysis finds that audit committees possessing greater levels of financial expertise are associated with higher audit fees. When we segregate financial expertise between accounting and non-accounting, we find that the positive impact identified is driven by non-accounting expertise. Furthermore, when we separate FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms we find the impact of financial expertise is confined to FTSE250 firms. Our findings are important as they highlight the usefulness of segregating financial expertise between specialists and non-specialists, something which regulators in the UK and in the USA currently do not do. Our findings also highlight the potential value of audit committee expertise in smaller as opposed to larger listed firms, suggesting that the value of expertise to audit quality depends on the specific financial reporting challenges firms face.     

The distraction effect of non-audit services on audit quality

Regulators have expressed concerns that an emphasis on non-audit services (NAS) could distract from the audit function, even for clients with minimal NAS purchases. Motivated by this concern, we examine whether a greater emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients generally (i.e., not to a specific client) can distract from the audit function, thus reducing audit quality. We find evidence of an NAS distraction effect, where a greater emphasis on NAS at the audit office-level results in more client financial statement restatements, even after controlling for client-specific NAS. Further, the association exists among clients that purchase minimal NAS, suggesting that this association relates to distraction effects in addition to independence issues examined in prior research. This study should be of interest to audit firms, audit committees, and regulators because it provides new evidence regarding issues related to a business model that includes both audit and non-audit services.