超级零售商渠道权利的外部性研究

目前,国内营销类文献对零售商主导市场问题的讨论主要集中在零售商和供应商的渠道冲突上.本文旨在透过零售商渠道权力增强的现象,全面分析零售商渠道权力的运用对整个市场及生产商、其他分销商和消费者产生的积极和消极影响,提出如何规制零售商渠道行为从而减少其渠道权力的负外部性、促进正外部性的相关对策和建议,以期为提高营销渠道效率和渠道整体利益、规范市场交易秩序提供理论指导.     

零售商议价势力及其福利效应——兼论通道费的起因

零售商与生产商在分销渠道内不同的权力分配将导致不同的结果。根据显示偏好原理界定零售商议价势力及其代理指标,并将其引入经典的报童模型,计算出进一步分析和比较的参考基准。然后逐一分析零售商议价势力对最优采购量、零售商利润、生产商利润和总渠道利润的影响,结果表明,零售商议价势力对最优采购量和零售商利润具有正面效应,对生产商利润和总渠道利润的效应不确定,可能一直为负,也可能先正后负。模型的扩展分析表明,通道费作为一种补偿机制,与较高的批发价格相结合,将同时增加零售商利润、生产商利润和渠道总利润,但由于降低了最优采购量而对消费者福利产生负面效应。     

零售商主导型供应链的订货模型构建

大型零售商在供应链中的地位越来越重要,垄断零售商控制了主要销售渠道.目前对于主导型供应链的研究大多集中在以制造商为主导的供应链,极少有针对零售商处于核心地位的供应链进行研究.在一个由制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链中,零售商处于主导地位,其所选择的订货策略使自身利润最大.本文通过建立相关模型,分析零售商最优订货参数,并同制造商主导供应链和纵向一体化的情况进行了对比.     

分销渠道权力与价格机制

本文通过分析分销渠道的定义以及目前分销渠道中越是接近顾客的渠道成员的权力越来越大的情况下,正确认识到目前渠道资源竞争的激烈性,为了在竞争中取胜必须充分运用和最大化渠道资源。由此必然会涉及渠道权力以及其分配的问题,分析和总结了西方一些学者对渠道权力的看法。渠道以及渠道权力的分析,为其价格机制的分析奠定了一些理论基础,分析了三种情况下的价格机制：生产商的权力大于零售商;生产商的权力小于零售商;生产商的权力与零售商相当。     

分销渠道权力与价格机制

本文通过分析分销渠道的定义以及目前分销渠道中越是接近顾客的渠道成员的权力越来越大的情况下，正确认识到目前渠道资源竞争的激烈性，为了在竞争中取胜必须充分运用和最大化渠道资源。由此必然会涉及渠道权力以及其分配的问题，分析和总结了西方一些学者对渠道权力的看法。渠道以及渠道权力的分析，为其价格机制的分析奠定了一些理论基础，分析了三种情况下的价格机制：生产商的权力大于零售商；生产商的权力小于零售商；生产商的权力与零售商相当。     

风险喜好型零售商主导的双渠道定价策略研究

一个由生产商和零售商组成的供应链中决策的顺序为:零售商率先根据自己掌握的市场信息公布最大潜在订单数量,生产商根据最大订单数量来调整其批发价格和直销渠道价格,最后零售商才确定其最优订货数量。研究表明,在一个由风险喜好型的零售商和一个风险规避型的供应商组成的供应链中,零售商风险偏好系数超过某一特定值时,随着需求方差的增加,零售渠道最优定价会越来越高;而对于风险规避型供应商,则是随着需求方差和(或)供应商风险规避程度的增加,会选择较低的产品售价以期获得稳定的收入。     

零售商垄断势力、通道费与经济规制

拥有买方垄断势力的零售商对生产商的纵向约束是近年来西方国家反垄断司法实践所关注的焦点之一,然而现有的文献对于零售商拥有买方垄断势力的情形很少涉及.现实中,随着零售业的变革,下游零售商很可能在产业链中成为主导企业,从而导致零售商要求生产商交纳"通道费"的现象十分普遍.本文基于SCP分析框架,对零售商垄断势力下的通道费及其福利效应进行分析,并对相应的政府规制提出建议.     

非对称信息下双渠道供应链的定价决策分析

以制造商为主导方,研究了非对称信息条件下双渠道供应链的定价决策问题。从制造商和零售商信息不共享和信息共享两个视角进行定量分析。研究发现,双渠道供应链中,制造商和零售商存在信息共享的定价决策结果和收益水平均高于信息不共享时的结果。     

基于渠道权力的自有品牌产品定价方式选择

本文重点分析在不同的渠道权力结构下自有品牌产品的定价方式的选择.研究表明:零售商只有在高度权力均衡和零售商主导的渠道权力结构下才会开发自有品牌;在高度权力均衡时,零售商对自有品牌实施跟随定价方式;在零售商主导时,零售商对自有品牌实施高端定价方式;且在不同的权力结构下,二者对制造商产品的定价方式也有所不同.     

零售商引入自有品牌动机的博弈分析

近年来,关于自有品牌的理论研究成为学术界的一个热点。本文将零售商自有品牌的质量水平设为一个变量,在上游一家主导生产商和下游一家零售商的分析框架下,运用博弈论分析方法,讨论了零售商引入自有品牌的动机及其社会福利影响。     

Efficient replenishment in the distribution channel

Efficient replenishment (ER), a business process that involves the reduction of order cost to facilitate deliveries of goods from the manufacturer to the retailer, is becoming increasingly important in distribution channel management. While a well-executed ER program is expected to lower total channel costs and increase channel profit, very little is known about how this incremental channel profit is distributed between the manufacturer and the retailer and how it varies across the two common channel relationship structures, retailer price leadership and manufacturer price leadership.In this paper, we develop the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer gain more or less from the adoption of ER based on a game theoretic channel model of bilateral monopoly under the two channel relationship structures. We develop analytic results on the impact of ER on purchase quantity, price and the distribution of profits in three cases, namely, (1) when only the retailer adopts ER, (2) when both the manufacturer and the retailer adopt ER, and (3) when the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically integrated in the distribution channel, which adopts ER.The results, which can be generalized for all demand functions, show that the manufacturer benefits from the retailer's adoption of ER only when the manufacturer's holding cost relative to the retailer's is sufficiently large, relative to its order cost relative to the retailer's. By adopting ER, the retailer gains more than what the manufacturer gains even if the manufacturer is the price leader. Both the parties are likely to gain more if they both adopt ER than if only the retailer adopts ER. The incremental channel profit due to the retailer's ER adoption is highest in a vertically integrated distribution channel and is greater in a retailer-led channel relationship than in a manufacturer-led relationship.     

How does the added new online channel impact the supporting advertising expenditure?

This research addresses the strategic effect of a newly added online channel on a manufacturer’s supportive advertising expenditure once a manufacturer opts to open an online channel to compete with its retailer. We first study the manufacturer–traditional retailer supply chain and consider three different scenarios: (1) product is less compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (2) product is more compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (3) product has the same compatibility with the online channel as with the traditional channel. Our results show that the added online channel significantly impacts the manufacturer’s investment in supportive advertising. Depending on the different product categories, the impact of the newly added online channel on the supportive advertising expenditure also will be different. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the manufacturer–online retailer supply chain and investigate the effect of that added online channel on the manufacturer’s supportive advertising to the online retailer. Based on our results, the manufacturer can utilize our findings to improve its decision-making when it plans to open an online channel to improve its product distribution.     

Attack and defend: the role of targeting in a distribution channel

This paper studies the role of targeting in a distribution channel composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. In channel interactions, the manufacturer can deploy targeted advertising while the retailer can initiate targeted pricing. Using a game-theoretic framework, we find the following results: (1) Targeted advertising increases the manufacturers profit at the expense of the retailer; (2) The retailer may be worse off using targeted pricing; (3) Targeted pricing discourages the manufacturer from launching targeted advertising which is a more severe threat to the retailer. Therefore, the retailer may optimally use targeted pricing, even when it hurts profit, to defend against the attack of targeted advertising by the manufacturer.     

Ownership coordination in a channel: Incentives,returns, and negotiations

In many industries firms have to make quantity decisions before knowing the exact state of demand. In such cases, channel members have to decide which firm will own the units until demand uncertainty is resolved. The decision about who should retain ownership depends on the balance of benefit and risk to each member. Ownership, after all, is costly. Whichever member owns the units accepts the risk of loss if more units are produced than can be sold. But ownership also grants firms the flexibility to respond to demand once it becomes known by adjusting price. In this study, we analyze ownership decisions in distribution channels and how those decisions are affected by demand uncertainty. We model demand based on micro-modeling of consumer utility functions and capture demand uncertainty related to market size and price sensitivity. This study shows that as long as the degree of uncertainty about market size is intermediate, the retailer and the manufacturer both benefit when the manufacturer maintains ownership of the units. But when there is substantial uncertainty about market size, the retailer and the channel are better off if the retailer takes ownership but the manufacturer still prefers to maintain ownership. Thus, there is potential for channel conflict regarding ownership under high levels of uncertainty. We show that, using product returns, the manufacturer can achieve the same outcome under retailer ownership as under manufacturer ownership. This provides an additional new rationale for the prevalence of product returns. The first-best outcome (from the perspective of total channel profit), however, is under retailer ownership without product returns when uncertainty is high (i.e., product returns reduce the total channel profit). Negotiations between the manufacturer and the retailer can lead to the first-best outcome but only under quite restrictive constraints that include direct side payments by the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer being pessimistic about its outside option (when an agreement cannot be reached) during the negotiation.     

Retailer voluntary investment against a threat of manufacturer encroachment

To elucidate supply chain cooperation between a manufacturer and a retailer, this study examines a model in which the retailer makes voluntary investments to reduce the marginal production cost of the manufacturer. The manufacturer is allowed to introduce a direct selling channel in addition to the indirect channel through the retailer (i.e., manufacturer encroachment), which however dampens the retailers’ investment incentives. The retailer can leverage its voluntary investments as a means of deterring manufacturer encroachment. We demonstrate that manufacturer encroachment is strategically deterred when the retailer’s cost-reduction technology is sufficiently effective. This strategic encroachment deterrence encourages the retailer to invest more, but it narrows the variety of channels from which consumers can select. When the latter effect dominates the former effect, consumer surplus declines with strategic encroachment deterrence.

     

Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel

Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.     

Why would a big retailer refuse to collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs?

Big retailers that carry a large assortment of products rely on knowledgeable salespeople to provide purchase advice to customers and match customers with suitable products. Interestingly, big retailers vary in their policies regarding whether to allow their salespeople to receive manufacturer SPIFF (Sales Person Incentive Funding Formula) payments, which motivate salespeople advising at no cost of the retailer. In this study, we investigate a big retailer’s incentive to block manufacturer SPIFF programs, which has the consequence of demotivating salespeople from advising customers, from the perspective of vertical channel interactions. We scrutinize a big retailer’s decision to maximize its profit through managing its channel interactions with upstream manufacturers offering horizontally differentiated products, customers uncertain about true fits with competing products, and its salesperson who can match customers with suitable products through offering purchase advice. Our analysis shows that motivating the salesperson to advise customers is profitable for the retailer only if the such advising has moderate effectiveness in matching consumers and suitable products, and only in this case would the retailer collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs. Otherwise, salesperson advising hurts retailer profit and the big retailer benefits from blocking manufacturer SPIFF programs. Our study reveals the interesting theoretical insight that the incentives of a big retailer and upstream manufacturers to motivate sales advising reside in their incentives to battle for a more favorable channel status.     

Retailer and manufacturer advertising scheduling in a marketing channel

This paper investigates, in a bilateral monopoly, the optimal scheduling of retailer and manufacturer advertising in a three-period planning horizon. Consistent with previous literature, the integrated channel adopts continuous advertising schedules when advertising effects are not very large and decay exponentially over time. Conversely, when pricing and advertising decisions are uncoordinated, vertical externalities also influence advertising scheduling. Consequently, channel members can optimally implement each of the following three advertising schedules depending on the effects of retailer and manufacturer advertising: The full continuous schedule, in which channel members advertise in the three periods; the full pulsing schedule, in which the two channel members advertise only in the first and third periods, and the mixed schedule where the retailer continuously advertises and the manufacturer advertises exclusively in the first and third periods. Surprisingly, the uncoordinated channel adopts lower retail prices than the integrated channel when the mixed schedule is adopted.     

Pure Components versus Pure Bundling in a Marketing Channel

This paper examines how channel interactions influence product bundling decisions by channel members. Specifically, what products or bundles should be offered, at what prices, and by which channel members, in equilibrium. To answer this, we analyze Stackelberg games between a manufacturer and retailer, with pricing and bundling as decision variables, under discrete and uniform continuous distributions of reservation prices. We find that selling pure components by both manufacturer and retailer is the equilibrium except in a narrow region of the parameter space. However, if the manufacturer can sell bundles and prevent unbundling, then such a bundling strategy is optimal in many cases. Interestingly, the channel and retailer also benefit from this strategy.     

Perceptions of price (un)fairness in a channel context

This article extends prior research on perceptions of price (un)fairness by attempting to disentangle where in the marketing channel (un)fairness inferences lie. Extant research in this area overwhelmingly considers (un)fairness perceptions with respect to the pricing action only, ignoring attributions aimed at specific channel actors. This article illustrates differences in (un)fairness inferences with respect to retailers and manufacturers given price increases accompanied by decreased product supply, increased demand, or increased variable costs. We show that a retailer is considered relatively more unfair than a manufacturer given a price increase accompanied by a demand increase, as well as when no explicit reason is given for the price increase. Conversely, a manufacturer is considered relatively more unfair given a price increase accompanied by a supply decrease. Both channel entities are considered equally fair given a price increase accompanied by a channel (both retailer and manufacturer) or manufacturer cost increase, while a retailer is deemed relatively more unfair given a price increase accompanied by a retailer cost increase. This research generally suggests that inferences of causality for specific pricing actions may differentially skew toward upstream or downstream channel entities depending on the particular economic circumstances of the price change.