财政透明的治理效应研究北大核心

本文在评估过度支出和收入不足两种地方财政表现的基础上,利用地级市面板数据,检验财政透明的治理效应。结果表明:提高财政透明度有助于降低地方财政过度支出的规模,从而改善地方财政状况;其内在的机制是,财政透明度的提升强化了社会对财政和预算信息的关注,促进地方政府提高公共服务供给效率,降低过度财政支出。强度DID模型的结果也证实,新《预算法》对预算信息公开的法定要求通过增强地方财政透明度,能够显著降低地方财政过度支出。本文的政策涵义是,应通过细化和完善年度及中长期预算信息的公开内容,构建兼具信息公开和预警监督的透明财政运行体系,推动地方财政持续健康发展。     

政府干预、政治关联与企业非效率投资——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究

以2004~2009年间701家上市公司为样本,研究政府干预、政治关联对企业非效率投资行为的影响。研究发现:政府干预一方面会加剧有自由现金流量公司的过度投资,对国有企业过度投资的影响更为严重;另一方面可以有效地缓解融资约束企业的投资不足,尤其是国有企业的投资不足。这说明,出于自身的政策性负担或政治晋升目标,政府会损害或支持所控制的企业,这为政府"掠夺之手理论"和"支持之手理论"提供了实证支持。研究还发现,政治关联与过度投资和投资不足均负相关,这表明,政治关联可以作为法律保护的替代机制来保护企业产权免受政府损害,并为企业谋取利益。     

不确定性与企业投资效率研究的文献综述

企业在不确定环境下的投资决策一直是经济学和金融学关注的焦点问题。本文从国内外研究现状着手,对不确定性与企业投资效率关系的文献进行了归纳分析,发现主流研究普遍认为不确定性对企业投资具有抑制作用。即不确定性越大,企业投资效率越低,具体表现为由不确定性引起的投资不足程度更高。通过对不确定性影响投资效率的相关文献进行系统梳理,为以后相关研究奠定了理论基础。     

媒体报道与投资效率

本文基于国内上市公司近六年主流媒体报道的经验数据,对媒体报道与企业投资之间的关系进行了探究,研究发现:媒体报道尤其是正面报道数量越多,投资行为越被关注,越会导致管理层过度自信,或由于投资者情绪高涨,会增强企业的投资程度,引发过度投资或者缓解投资不足;而负面报道对企业投资程度的影响并不显著。本研究可为投资者提供决策参考。     

财政分权、地方政府行为与公共教育支出

地方政府竞争、政府治理是分权后地方政府行为表现的两种形式。通过分析表明:前者对公共教育支出产生负向影响,后者对公共教育支出产生正向影响。在经济分权政治集权的体制下,中国地方政府更多的是对上级负责而不是对下级负责,更倾向于以GDP为主要目标进行竞争,而不是地方治理,这是地方政府投入教育的动机不足,导致公共教育支出偏低的重要原因。     

管理层持股、税收规避与企业非效率投资

论文在考察管理层持股与企业非效率投资关系的基础上,实证检验了税收规避对管理层持股与企业非效率投资关系的中介作用.在区分投资过度与投资不足后,发现在企业投资过度的情况下,管理层显著通过减少企业的税收规避活动提高企业的投资效率;然而在投资不足情况下,避税活动的中介效应并不明显.研究结论表明,授予管理层一定股权,可以显著降低税收规避活动中的代理问题,减少董事会对管理层的监督成本.     

Investment Decisions in Anticipation of Recessions and Outperformance of Pre-Acting Firms

We empirically examine whether firms make investment decisions in anticipation of recessions and subsequently perform better. Using a large quarterly dataset of fixed asset investments for U.S. firms during 1984–2012, we show that not all firms efficiently adjust their investment decisions in anticipation of a recession. However, we find that pre-acting firms that properly adjust their investment decisions (i.e., underinvest) before a recession outperform re-acting firms that fail to make proper investment decisions (i.e., overinvest) before a recession in subsequent returns on assets, returns on investments, and market-adjusted return measures.     

Fiscal Decentralization,Budgetary Transparency,and Local Government Size in China

This article makes use of panel data for 31 provinces between 1985 and 2010 and specifies a dynamic panel model to investigate the determinants of local government size in China and achieved several conclusions: (1) the fiscal decentralization since TSS reform in 1994 has increased the local government size; (2) budgetary transparency has a U-shape nonlinear effect on local government size; (3) fiscal revenue is the important factor to drive the overexpansion of local government size in China; and (4) local government size has a strong dependence of past path.     

The Relationship Among Managerial Sentiment,Corporate Investment,and Firm Value: Evidence from Taiwan

This study has two objectives: to examine the relationship between managerial sentiment and corporate investment and to examine the relationship between investment and firm value. We use a sample of Taiwanese firms and find that an optimal level of investment that maximizes a firm's value does exist and that it depends upon the quality of the investment opportunities. In addition, the empirical results show that when firms have valuable (nonvaluable) investment opportunities, managerial optimism (pessimism) makes overinvestment (underinvestment) more likely. Interestingly, the overinvestment (underinvestment) phenomenon for optimistic (pessimistic) managers differs significantly between valuable project and nonvaluable project firms.     

Fiscal Transparency,Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings

Fiscal transparency can provide policymakers with incentives to adopt better policies by enhancing the public debate on the design and sustainability of fiscal policy and establishing accountability for their implementation. Fiscal transparency can also reduce uncertainty about fiscal policy and fiscal outturns by providing more information on the underlying fiscal position and fiscal risks. Both effects suggest that countries should benefit from adopting transparency enhancing policies through better market assessments of their sovereign risk. In this paper, we investigate whether fiscal transparency has an effect on market perceptions of sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign credit ratings, and if so, through which channels. We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings – one standard deviation increase in fiscal transparency increases credit ratings by 0.7 and 1 notches (or steps in the credit rating scale) in advanced and developing economies, respectively – but its effect works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, fiscal transparency is associated with better fiscal outcomes, leading indirectly to higher credit ratings. In developing economies, the direct uncertainty‐reducing effect of fiscal transparency seems to be more important. Indeed, the effect of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance is found to increase with the level of institutional development.     

我国农村公共投资发展态势分析

农村公共投资主要由人力资本投资、生产和生活投资两大部分组成。改革开放以来,农村人力资本投资总量在逐年增长,但地区差异显著;伴随我国综合国力的不断增强,国家用于农村生产和农民生活方面投资的绝对额也在相应提高,但农业支出占财政总支出的比重却呈总体下降趋势。应全面提高财政保障农村公共事业水平,加快城乡统一的公共服务制度建设。     

The Underinvestment and Overinvestment Hypotheses: an Analysis Using Panel Data

We study the relationship between firm value and investment to test the underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses. The results obtained, using panel data methodology as the estimation method, indicate that the abovementioned relation is quadratic, which implies that there exists an optimal level of investment. As a consequence, firms that invest less than the optimal level suffer from an underinvestment problem, while those investing more than the optimum suffer from overinvestment. The quadratic relation is maintained when firms are classified depending on their investment opportunities, the optimum being in accordance with the quality of investment opportunities.     

政府治理、控制权结构与投资决策—基于家族上市公司的经验证据

本文基于双重代理视角分析了地方政府治理水平和控制权结构影响家族企业投资行为的机理。以2002～2008年间我国家族上市公司为研究样本,实证检验发现,超额控制程度较高的家族企业,其内部人有动机为实现其私人收益,忽略资本市场股票价格所提供的投资机会信号,偏离最优投资决策,降低公司投资股价之间敏感度。而较高的地方政府治理水平一方面通过约束内部人的机会主义行为,另一方面使企业拥有更多的外部融资便利,减少与政府的协调成本,提高市场配置资源的能力,从而提高投资股价敏感度。进一步研究发现,家族超额控制降低投资-股价敏感度的动机在地方政府治理水平较差的家族企业中更为显著,并且会降低投资对公司业绩的贡献程度。该研究发现不仅有助于我们从理论层面更好地理解镶嵌于政府层面代理问题的中国家族企业的投资行为,而且对于提高地方政府在维持证券市场的公共治理水平,进而推动我国家族企业健康发展有着重要的政策意义。     

Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing

We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.     

Corporate Governance,Companies’ Disclosure Practices and Market Transparency: A Cross Country Study

We examine the link between corporate governance, companies’ disclosure practices and their equity market transparency in a study of more than 5,000 listed companies in 23 countries covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008. Our results confirm the belief that better‐governed firms make more frequent disclosures to the market. We also find greater disclosure in common law relative to code law countries. However firms with better governance in both code and common law countries make more frequent disclosures. We measure market transparency by the timeliness of prices. In contrast to single country studies, results show, for the 23 countries collectively, better corporate governance is associated with less timely share prices. This would suggest that a firm substitutes better corporate governance for transparency. We are thus led to the conclusion that even if information is disclosed more frequently by better‐governed firms, it does not necessarily follow that information is reflected in share prices on a timelier basis.     

Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing

We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.