An effective hybrid variance reduction method for pricing the Asian options and its variants

In this paper, we propose a variance reduction method that combines importance sampling and control variates to price European Arithmetic Asian options and its variants (i.e., Asian options plus knock-in or knock-out options) under the Black-Scholes model. The numerical results show that the proposed methods are especially efficient under the following scenarios: in the money, low volatility, more sampling dates, and higher barrier thresholds.     

财务契约、财务危机预警与公司财务治理

本文将财务预警系统纳入公司财务治理结构中，根据财务契约与财务预警的关系，采用制度形式对财务预警系统的信息传输渠道和反馈方法规范化，以提高有效性的发挥。文章从财务契约的股权契约，报酬契约，信贷契约和其他利益相关者契约与财务危机预警的关系入手，分别讨论在股东之间，股东与经营者之间，债权人与股东和经营者之间如何用契约的形式，保证财务预警系统在公司治理中有效运作。     

我国职业经理人薪酬战略选择——递延股票薪酬

职业经理人作为企业经营者中一个特殊的群体,企业应针对其特征,制定符合其价值的薪酬体系,才能具有激励职业经理人、提升企业竞争力的双重作用。本文从我国职业经理人的涵义着笔,分析了我国职业经理人的薪酬现状及其需求,在此基础上提出了我国职业经理人薪酬战略选择-递延股票薪酬。     

房地产开发企业如何创造股东价值

上市筹集资金是房地产企业发展的趋势,为了赢得更多的投资,房地产企业必须以股东价值最大化为管理目标。介绍了一种股东价值模型,从竞争优势缺口和竞争优势期间两方面,来说明专业化经营和品牌化战略是房地产企业增加股东价值的必要手段。     

How mass layoffs are related to lower job performance and OCB among surviving employees in Chile: an investigation of the essential role of psychological contract

This study aimed to investigate how mass layoffs impact surviving employees in organizations. More specifically, this study ascertained the relationships between mass layoffs and employee work behaviors. It was theorized that mass layoffs will be negatively related to employee performance and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB) through its relationships with job insecurity and psychological contract breach. Moreover, it was expected that perceived manager support would buffer against the negative relations of contract breach with employee performance and OCB. A study among 615 employees in multiple Chilean organizations showed support for the hypotheses: job insecurity and psychological contract breach mediated the relationships between mass layoffs and employee performance and OCB. We also found moderating relationships of manager support, but the relations of breach with performance and OCB were particularly negative when manager support was high, indicating feelings of betrayal among high-support employees in response to contract breach. Moreover, the relation of contract breach with performance was positive for low-support employees, and non-significant for high-support employees. Our study advances understanding of the processes underlying how mass layoffs influence employee behavior in the workplace, through introducing the psychological contract as a way of understanding the relationships.     

科技创业企业现金流量权相机性分配的经验分析

科技创业企业在进行外源融资时,投资者和创业者之间的现金流量权分配是这类企业产权结构的一项主要内容。这类企业现金流量很小,创业者的工资收入往往很低,他们的收入主要采用股份的形式。因此,现金流量权的相机分配是投资者激励作为经营管理者的创业者积极性的一个重要手段。     

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner–manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade‐off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity‐lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant‐strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low‐cost manager and output control for a high‐cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Employment and remuneration of Irish chartered accountants: evidence of

Literature on gender-based salary differentials has proliferated in recent years but there have been few studies on salary differentials in the accounting profession. This paper examines factors influencing remuneration of Irish chartered accountants. Responses to the Leinster Society of Chartered Accountants (LSCA) annual salary survey in 1995 and 1996 were analysed. Employee-related and employer-related factors influencing remuneration were examined including gender, work experience, level of responsibility, employment contract and size and industry. Gender was a significant explanatory variable in explaining differences in salaries paid to employees working in non-audit businesses. Gender, however, was not found to be significant in explaining differences in salaries paid in audit practices. As partners in auditing firms are not included in this research (because partners do not earn a salary) this finding must be interpreted cautiously.     

Common holdings and strategic manager compensation: The case of an asymmetric triopoly

We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a common holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This coordination leads to a reallocation of production and induces a redistribution of profits. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare.     

The Incentives for Innovative Activity in the Managerial Firm

This paper discusses the incentives for innovation by a manager‐led firm. In particular, it is investigated how remuneration practices influence the choice of a risky project. In the first place, a dynamic model with uncertainty is used to determine the optimal employment level with exogenous growth and risk. In the second part of the paper, growth and risk are explained by R&D expenditures. Optimal investment expenditures for R&D are derived for (i) the profit‐maximizing firm and (ii) the managerial firm, where the manager receives a fixed salary as well as a variable share of profits. If risk neutrality is assumed, then no difference exists. However, if risk aversion is considered, the managerial firm will invest more into R&D than the owner‐led company. Size‐related salaries are an additional reason for higher expenditures of R&D by managers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

股权激励经理人道德风险的化解——全面风险管理视角

股权激励依据激励相容原理,为降低公司管理层的代理成本,俘获优质人力资本,激励核心人才而设计,属于薪酬的长期激励部分,其成败关系到公司高管激励约束机制的建设、薪酬制度的完善、企业的长远发展。在我国上市公司股权激励实践中,出现了实施条件过宽、业绩考核不严、预期收益失控、侵蚀股东和公司权益、高管离职减持股份等偏差,是公司经理人产生道德风险的表现。公司治理中的道德风险问题,既要依靠有效的激励机制,又要依靠内部监督、制衡和外部约束来防范。道德风险具有内生性、潜在性、控制艰巨性,单点防范、应急管理不能有效地化解这些问题,只有用全面风险管理的理念进行系统治理,才能有效抑制经理人道德风险的发生和扩散,释放股权激励的正能量,实现股权激励的本来目的。     

经济增加值作为业绩考核指标的探讨

经济增加值作为企业业绩评价指标,越来越引人注目并被广泛使用,它是一种全面财务管理和薪金激励体制的柜架,把资本预算、业绩评价和激励报酬结合起来了,把管理者的利益和股东利益统一起来。将其恰当地融入一家公司的管理中会带来丰厚的回报。     

加强苏北农村基层党组织建设的思考——以徐州、连云港、淮安农村的基层党组织建设为例

农村基层政权是国家政权的基础,这个基础的动摇,势必影响到国家的稳定。随着国家新农村建设的推进,我国农村基层党组织和党员队伍的总体状况是好的,但是还存在着基层党组织能力弱化;领导核心地位受到挑战;致富能力较弱;先锋模范作用发挥不到位等问题,本文通过对徐州、连云港和淮安地区基层党组织的对比和分析,提出了加强思想建设、组织建设和作风建设来增强苏北农村基层党组织的作用。     

Principal–principal–agency relationships and the role of external governance

This paper explores agency problems associated with mutual and joint stock organizational forms. It examines whether the independent mode of distribution acts as a governance factor that reduces principal–agent and principal–principal costs. By analyzing a 1990–1997 panel of life insurance companies this paper provides evidence that mutuals have higher principal–agent costs, but lower principal–principal costs, compared with stocks. Independent distribution mitigates both agency problems by reducing managerial expenses while safeguarding interests of policyholders. These relationships are positively moderated by product complexity and free cash flow. This is consistent with the assumption that companies that use independent agents exhibit lower levels of manager and shareholder opportunism. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

实施年薪制的“八大困惑”

年薪制实施确实调动了经营者的积极性。但由于我国国有企业产权不明晰、经理市场发育滞后、业绩考核体系和配套法规不完备,在企业实施年薪制中,也带来了不少问题,造成了诸多困惑。     

Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Multilateral Contracting: When Nondiscrimination Implies Uniformity

DeGraba and Postlewaite (1992) show that the seller of a durable input can solve the time inconsistency problem by offering most-favored-customer (MFC) protection to buyers. McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that if a supplier sells inputs to competing firms using two-part tariffs, MFC protection that allows a firm to replace its contract with a contract executed by any other firm will not solve the commitment problem, and argue this implies managers cannot use MFCs as a strategic commitment device in complex contracting situations. This paper shows that if the profits of the seller and the buyers are monotonic in each term of the contract, then applying MFC protection to each term of a contract allows a manager to solve his commitment problem in complex contacting situations. We show that "standard" contract arrangements (two-part tariffs, declining block tariffs, and royalties as a percentage of sales) meet this condition.     

Optimal Loyalty‐Based Management

We study an agency model in which an entrepreneur selects a manager from a candidate set. The selected manager's effort improves the project's potential environment, and is a hidden action. The realized project environment is the entrepreneur's private information. A manager's utility has two components—(i) loyalty, with which the manager values the organization's profit, and (ii) selfishness, with which the manager values the monetary transfer he receives from the entrepreneur. We find that if the manager's task is easy enough, it is optimal to use a purely loyal manager. Otherwise, it can be optimal to use a manager with mixture of loyalty and selfishness—the manager's mixed motivation alleviates the entrepreneur's misrepresenting incentive, and as a result, the output distortion in the optimal contract can be reduced. In addition, when it is optimal to use a manager with mixed motivations, the entrepreneur selects someone who is more selfish than loyal.     

Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation

In settings where the revelation principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently inferior to centralized decision making, and at best achieve the same level of performance. This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a bound on the number of contingencies in any contract. For a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information, we compare centralized mechanisms where the principal retains sole responsibility for contracting and coordinating production, with delegation mechanisms where one agent (a manager) is delegated authority to contract with other agents and coordinate production. Relative to centralization, delegation entails a control loss, but allows decisions to be more sensitive to the manager's private information. We identify circumstances under which the flexibility gain outweighs the control loss, so that delegation emerges superior to centralized contracting.     

The impact of signal dependence and own ability awareness on herding behaviour: a tale of two managers

This model examines the case of managers whose signals, when informative, are perfectly correlated as in the Scharfstein and Stein model [1990. The American Economic Review 80(3): 465–479]. This has a herd increasing impact as it introduces a positive reputation externality. On the other hand, it is also assumed that managers have perfect knowledge of their own ability, an assumption with herd reducing implications. Combining these two offsetting, in terms of herding, assumptions, it is found that a smart manager who plays first will sometimes, but not always, truthfully announce his/her private information. On the other hand, a smart manager who plays second will always report his/her true signal, while a dumb manager who plays second may herd, either on the first manager's action and/or on the prior. It is also found that the more likely a dumb manager who plays second is to herd on the first manager's action, the less likely is a smart manager who plays first to herd on the prior. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

代理发放工资账户功能创新的探讨

文章借鉴了美国商业银行账户管理的创新方式,提出了国内商业银行将代理发放工资账户设计为“工资理财账户”的设想,并对其可行性进行了分析。