Size and relatedness of units sold: An agency theory and resource-based perspective

This study tests the effects of ownership concentration, outside director equity holdings, and corporate strategy on, and the Performance implications of, the size and relatedness of units sold by parent firms. The study is based on a model that integrates agency and resource-based theories, and a sample of sell-offs by 112 Fortune 500 firms. Ownership concentration is found to be associated positively with the sale of unrelated and small units. This relationship is strengthened when outside director equity is high. In addition, the effects of corporate strategy types on the characteristics of units sold depend on ownership concentration and outside director equity. Finally, post'sell-off performance of the parent firm is associated negatively with the relatedness of the unit sold. These results suggest that the type of unit sold depends on the type of economic benefit sought by the parent firm.     

Longevity and the life-cycle of management buy-outs

The longevity debate about buy-outs has hitherto been restricted. By focusing on large highly leveraged transactions, existing research has taken only a partial view of how long buy-outs last and the factors influencing longevity. This paper develops and tests hypotheses concerning the influences on buy-out longevity across the whole spectrum of management buy-out applications. Both quantitative and case study evidence from the U. K. is presented. A heterogeneity view of buy-outs is supported. Tests using quantitative data show that earlier exit is associated with larger buy-outs, and buy-outs arising on privatization from the public sector and from non-U. K. parents. Case study evidence principally supports hypotheses that earlier exit is associated with financing institutions being in a relatively stronger position than management and with more rapidly changing market conditions for the firm.     

The independent and joint effects of the skill and physical bases of relatedness in diversification

By examining the independent and joint effects of the skill and physical bases of relatedness, this study develops a multidimensional view of relatedness in diversification. The paper compares the ways the two bases identify relatedness, and examines empirically the relationship between relatedness and performance for a sample of 158 large diversified manufacturing firms. Each base of relatedness alone had no significant effect on financial performance. However, when the two approaches were combined, there was a strong positive effect on most indicators of performance. The findings demonstrate how different bases of relatedness complement and extend one another, and they clarify findings of previous studies that used a single base of relatedness. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Variations in ownership behavior and propensity to diversify: a study of the Indian corporate context

The relationship between ownership and diversification has been the focus of renewed debate between financial economists and strategic management scholars. While financial economists hold that manager‐controlled firms tend to reflect higher levels of diversification, strategy researchers argue that ownership and diversification are not systematically related. In throwing light on this debate, this study uses a fine‐grained definition of ownership groups to explore how the different objectives and monitoring predispositions of distinct ownership groups might influence diversification strategy. The empirical examination is set in India to offer a striking contrast from the predominantly U.S.‐based studies that have shaped the ongoing debate. Findings show that diverse ownership groups adopt different postures in monitoring and/or influencing organizational diversification. While some ownership groups are closely associated with focused strategies, and some encourage diversification, others are quite indifferent. These results suggest that the context‐specific variation among ownership groups is germane to our understanding of diversification strategy. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate governance,investment bandwagons and overcapacity: an analysis of the worldwide petrochemical industry, 1975–95

Previous research has provided conflicting arguments and evidence on which corporate governance system—bank based or market based—is better in preventing managers from investing in value‐destroying projects. This paper attempts to further the debate by comparing the effect of these different corporate governance systems on preventing capacity expansion bandwagon behavior in the worldwide petrochemical industry in the period 1975–95. Our study shows, first, that neither system is particularly effective in curbing overinvestment; however, the market‐based system seems to be less ineffective than the bank‐based system. Second, free cash flow appears to drive greater bandwagon behavior in the market‐based system than in the bank‐based system. Finally, within the bank‐based system, companies that rely on one bank–shareholder are more likely to join the bandwagon than those with more than one. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于持续发展的企业社会责任与企业战略目标管理融合研究

近年来,企业社会责任受到越来越多的关注。本文提出企业社会责任已成为一种独特投资工具的假设,并阐述了它的三个特性。在有利于人类社会和企业自身持续发展的理念基础上,从分析、设计、执行和控制等方面构建了企业社会责任和企业战略目标管理融合框架,提出企业社会责任管理实现从局部视角到系统视角的转变。为实现以上模式,企业要转变经营理念、经营者角色和经营方式,以促进企业社会责任成为推动可持续发展的重要力量。     

大股东控制、多元化经营与现金持有价值

已有多元化经营经济后果研究结论并不一致,本文认为其主要原因在于多元化经营的经济后果也是多元的,不同公司特征和不同影响链条下多元化经营对公司价值的影响也不同。本文以多元化经营对现金持有价值的影响为切入点,分别从市场价值和公司绩效视角分析多元化经营的经济后果。实证结果发现从整体上看,多元化经营对现金持有价值影响并不显著,但按大股东持股比例高低分组回归发现,当大股东持股比例高时,能够有效约束管理者的机会主义行为,提高内部资本市场效率,从而使得多元化经营能够显著提高现金持有价值;而当大股东持股比例低时,严重的代理冲突会导致多元化经营公司内部资本市场损失效率,从而导致现金持有价值的降低。     

生产性服务业集聚与经济增长的空间计量分析

本文选取2003～2012年我国31个省、自治区、直辖市数据,运用空间面板固定效应模型,实证检验了我国生产性服务业集聚与经济增长之间的关系。结果表明：我国地区经济增长呈现明显的空间集聚特征;生产性服务业专业化集聚和多样化集聚对经济增长均具有显著的正向影响,但多样化集聚对经济增长的作用更为突出。因此,各地区应注重加强与相邻地区间的交流与合作,形成经济互助,以促进经济协调发展。同时应该提高我国生产性服务业的集聚程度,尤其是提高生产性服务业的多个产业间的共同集聚,充分发挥其对地区经济增长的正向促进作用。     

Corporate Governance and Firm Capabilities: A Comparison of Managerial, Alliance, and Personal Capitalisms

Incentive structures embodied in different systems of corporate governance produce firms with inclinations towards the development of particular capabilities and strategic assets and disinclinations towards the development of others. To the extent that there is an excessive dependence upon any particular type of governance, an economy as a whole will be endowed with both its benefits and costs. As such, governance reform in East Asian economies may be better aimed at cultivating alternative governance institutions alongside existing relational institutions, rather than in converting these governance systems into facsimiles of the so-called Anglo-American model.