Bank failure,risk, and capital regulation

This paper examines the effect of capital regulation on bank risk. It is shown that an increase in the capital-to-asset ratio reduces the riskiness of a bank's equity capital. Nevertheless, the probability of bank failure increases. The reason for this result is that the probability of bank failure depends upon both the risk and return of the asset portfolio. An increase in the capital requirement results in an optimal portfolio with a risk-return combination that has a higher probability of bank failure.     

An empirical study of depositor sensitivity to bank risk

Using a cross-sectional data set on U.S. commercial banks, the argument that during the mid 1980s to early 1990s depositors were insensitive to bank risk is empirically examined. Bank risk is measured by the predicted probability of bank failure as a function of contributing factors. The natural log of bank deposits is then regressed on bank risk and other control variables. The coefficient on bank risk in this equation measures the sensitivity of deposits to bank risk. A close examination of the estimated coefficient on bank risk offers little support for the argument that depositors were insensitive to bank risk.     

Understanding the consequences of diversification on financial stability

In this paper, we study the consequences of diversification on financial stability and social welfare using an agent based model that couples the real economy and a financial system. We validate the model against its ability to reproduce several stylized facts reported in real economies. We find that the risk of an isolated bank failure (i.e. idiosyncratic risk) is decreasing with diversification. In contrast, the probability of joint failures (i.e. systemic risk) is increasing with diversification which results in more downturns in the real sector. Additionally, we find that the system displays a “robust yet fragile” behaviour particularly for low diversification. Moreover, we study the impact of introducing preferential attachment into the lending relationships between banks and firms. Finally, we show that a regulatory policy that promotes bank–firm credit transactions that reduce similarity between banks can improve financial stability whilst permitting diversification.

     

Financial stability indicators and public debt developments

This paper investigates the inter-linkages between financial stability and fiscal policy. It analyzes the effect of selected financial stability indicators on the probability of future debt deterioration, controlling for several macroeconomic variables. We find significant evidence that a fragile banking system can put at risk public finances. Weak bank profitability, low asset quality and a weak capital base increase the fragility of the banking system, thus, raising the probability of future fiscal troubles.     

内部控制质量、资本结构与银行风险承担——货币政策与股权集中度的调节作用

本文选取2009—2018年中国24家上市银行年度数据,采用面板模型对内部控制质量对银行风险承担的影响及其作用机制进行实证分析。研究结果表明：（1）内控质量对银行风险承担具有抑制作用。内控质量提高有助于提升银行部门间贷款信息传递及风险协同控制效率,由此降低银行风险承担。相对于非国有、低联结度与高权力度银行,内控质量对国有、高联结度与低权力度银行风险承担的影响力度更大。（2）资本结构在内控质量与银行风险承担的关系中承担着中介作用,内控质量通过影响资本结构来影响银行风险承担,“内控质量—资本结构—银行风险承担”的传导渠道有效。（3）货币政策对内控质量与银行风险承担关系具有非对称性调节作用。高利率货币政策会减弱内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用,宽松货币政策会加剧内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用。（4）股权集中度提高会减弱内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用,这归于控制权过度引发的关联贷款风险集聚效应对冲了内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制效应。本文研究结论可为防控中国银行部门单体风险及金融系统性风险提供重要的理论指导与决策参考。     

Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy

This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets–Wouters model as the central bank׳s approximating model, the paper׳s main findings are as follows. First, a central bank׳s credibility can have large consequences for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can benefit from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in policy performance. Fourth, the risk premium shock represents an important potential source of model misspecification. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policymaker that seeks robustness.     

Bank failures caused by Large withdrawals: An explanation based purely on liquidity

In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401–419.] model with aggregate uncertainty, we show that there exists an equilibrium with the following properties: all consumers deposit at the bank, all patient consumers wait for the last period to withdraw, and the bank fails with strictly positive probability. Furthermore, we show that the probability of a bank failure remains bounded away from zero as the number of consumers increases.This equilibrium explains bank failures driven by extreme withdrawals solely on liquidity since they happen because both banks and depositors are illiquid. Furthermore, it does not require much of the elements typically emphasized, including: consumers well informed about the true state of nature, a non-zero consumption after a crisis, consumers’ panic and sunspots. We therefore think that aggregate risk in Diamond-Dybvig-like environments can be an important element to explain bank crises.     

Monetary policy and bank performance: The role of business models

This paper examines the relationship between monetary policy and bank performance in a multiple-instrument environment, particularly highlighting the conditioning role of bank business models. Employing a unique dataset of Vietnamese commercial banks from 2007 to 2019, we display that banks react to monetary policy changes, either when the central bank increases policy rates or injects money into the economy through open market operations, by decreasing overall returns and increasing financial instability. Additionally, we document that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves benefits bank outcomes, contrasting to open market operations, albeit the central bank uses both of these policy instruments to alter money supply in the economy. Our key analysis of interest reveals that business models considerably matter in the effects of monetary policy on bank performance. Collectively, our findings demonstrate that banks’ business models that yield more non-interest income or diversify more into different income sources may mitigate the pass-through of monetary policy to bank performance. This finding holds across all interest- and quantitative-based monetary policy indicators and across all the functions of risk-taking behavior, earning-profit capacity, and financial stability. Furthermore, while plotting the marginal effects of monetary policy, we realize that they are insignificant for banks whose business models heavily rely on non-traditional segments.     

紧缩性政策下银行信贷资金期限配置行为分析

从我国银行贷款传导渠道的典型事实出发,通过建立SVAR模型对紧缩性政策影响下我国银行业信贷资金期限配置行为进行研究,结果表明,当人民银行上调政策利率之后,银行出于防范利率上升所引致的净利息收益下降目的而增加短期贷款并减少中长期贷款,这就意味着,利率风险管理已成为影响银行信贷资金期限配置行为的决定因素。在此情况下,人民银行应充分发挥利率工具在促进信贷结构调整中的作用。     

Do credit squeezes influence firm survival? An empirical investigation of China

This paper analyses the effect of a “credit squeeze” policy that was set by the Chinese government in 2007, increasing the strictness for firm-level bank loans. We adopt the difference-in-difference (DID) model to compare the survival rate change before and after the policy was implemented. We further explore the mechanism behind how the “credit squeeze” policy reduced the probability of firms surviving the market from perspectives such as financial constraints and ownership structures. The “credit squeeze” policy significantly increased firms’ operating costs and lowered firms’ productivity. In addition, we find that the zombie firm phenomenon existing in state-owned enterprises has a large impact on our estimation. Our results provide practical policy implications regarding the compromise between systematic debt risk and firm survival.     

The role of banks in the monetary policy transmission in the new EU member states

This paper aims to enrich the knowledge on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the new European Union member states with empirical evidence on the impact of monetary policy on bank lending. This work is based on individual bank balance sheet data and covers a sample of commercial banks from 10 Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1998–2006. We follow the approach suggested by Kashyap and Stein (1995) and control for cross-section heterogeneities among banks. The results indicate the existence of asymmetric adjustment of loan quantities with respect to specific bank characteristics. Our findings indicate the existence of a functioning bank-lending channel through small banks. This applies in the short-run to several, but not all, of the analysed banks.     

Cluster Analysis for mixed data: An application to credit risk evaluation

Credit risk is one of the main risks faced by a bank to provide financial products and services to clients. To evaluate the financial performance of clients, several scoring methodologies have been proposed, which are based mostly on quantitative indicators. This paper highlights the relevance of both quantitative and qualitative features of applicants and proposes a new methodology based on mixed data clustering techniques. Indeed, cluster analysis may prove particularly useful in the estimation of credit risk. Traditionally, clustering concentrates only on quantitative or qualitative data at a time; however, since credit applicants are characterized by mixed personal features, a cluster analysis specific for mixed data can lead to discover particularly informative patterns, estimating the risk associated with credit granting.     

Liquidity indicators,early warning signals in banks,and financial crises

This research compares the performance of three liquidity indicators, namely liquidity ratio (LiqR), liquidity creation (LiqC) and net stable funding difference (NSFD), for sending early warning signals for distressed banks. Recent evidence has shown that LiqR appears incapable of measuring the liquidity condition of banks. However, LiqC and NSFD have not yet been fully examined. Thus, which indicator is more useful in an early warning model becomes an interesting issue. We classify distressed banks as banks that have experienced a bank run, bailout, or failure. Sample data are collected from the United States and the European Union from before and after the financial crisis. We then estimate model predictive value using the sample before the crisis to predict liquidity shortages. Evidence shows that the academic (LiqC) and officially recommended indicators (NSFD) outperform LiqR as early warning signals. Furthermore, LiqC performs best when banks actively engage in income diversification but not fund diversification. Therefore, a well income-diversified bank with high LiqC tends to have high distress probability in the next period.     

Forecasting distress in cooperative banks: The role of asset quality

This paper analyzes the drivers of financial distress that were experienced by small Italian cooperative banks during the latest deep recession, focusing mainly on the importance of bank capital as a predictor of bankruptcy for Italian nonprofit banks. The analysis aims to build an early-warning model that is suitable for this type of bank.The results reveal non-monotonic effects of bank capital on the probability of failure. In contrast to distress models for for-profit banks, non-performing loans, profitability, liquidity, and management quality have a negligible predictive value. The findings also show that unreserved impaired loans have an important impact on the probability of bank distress. Moreover, the loan–loss ratio provision on substandard loans constitutes a suitable antibody against bank distress. Overall, the results are robust in terms of both the methodology (i.e., frequentist and Bayesian approaches) and the sample used (i.e., cooperative banks in Italy and euro-area countries).     

In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

The effects of international off-site surveillance on bank rating changes

This article explores the determinants for off-site surveillance of short and long-term bank rating changes for rated banks in Asia, and the differences between them. An ordered logit model reveals that the CAMEL criteria for asset quality and capital adequacy and other financial variables such as asset size and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) play an important role that influences both the short-term and long-term bank ratings. Notably, it is found that higher capital to loan ratio and greater liquid asset ratio are likely to improve the probability of long-term creditworthiness, while higher impaired loan ratios are less likely to improve the short-term bank ratings. Results of the marginal effect suggest that the dividable scale helps to improve long-term creditworthiness through cross-selling tactics, synergy gains, and a better capability for fund raising.     

商业银行信用风险控制在助学贷款中的运用

实行助学贷款是发展教育的一项重要政策,但在实施的过程中却出现了"银行有钱贷不出"和"学生没钱贷不到"的尴尬局面,这引起了人们对这项政策的再思考。通过对产生这种现象的内在原因的分析和对银行和学生二者之间预期效用的比较分析,以及对银行和学生行为选择的分析,认为缺乏有效的抵押担保机制和良好的社会信用体系是导致这种现象的重要原因,最后从制度约束和道德约束两方面思考,减少信息不对称现象,增加学生不还贷成本,降低银行风险,不断完善助学贷款制度。     

Measures to tame credit growth: Are they effective?

This paper focuses on policy measures taken to curb bank credit growth in the private sector in the pre-crisis period 2003–2007. Our analysis is based on an original survey conducted in 2010 on eleven central banks in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The findings reveal substantial policy intervention: a total of 82 measures were implemented in CEE during the period considered. The paper presents a panel data analysis of the effectiveness of the policy measures adopted in the region. The overall results indicate that certain measures – particularly asset classification and provisioning rules and loan eligibility criteria – might have been effective in taming bank credit growth, especially if applied in the context of more general policy measures featuring a combination of various instruments. However, in countries in which the authorities managed to somewhat decrease the flows of bank credit into the economy, the measures were often circumvented via direct, cross-border credit from foreign banks and credit provided by domestic, non-bank financial companies.     

The dynamics of the leverage cycle

We present a simple agent-based model of a financial system composed of leveraged investors such as banks that invest in stocks and manage their risk using a Value-at-Risk constraint, based on historical observations of asset prices. The Value-at-Risk constraint implies that when perceived risk is low, leverage is high and vice versa; a phenomenon that has been dubbed pro-cyclical leverage. We show that this leads to endogenous irregular oscillations, in which gradual increases in stock prices and leverage are followed by drastic market collapses, i.e. a leverage cycle. This phenomenon is studied using simplified models that give a deeper understanding of the dynamics and the nature of the feedback loops and instabilities underlying the leverage cycle. We introduce a flexible leverage regulation policy in which it is possible to continuously tune from pro-cyclical to countercyclical leverage. When the policy is sufficiently countercyclical and bank risk is sufficiently low the endogenous oscillation disappears and prices go to a fixed point. While there is always a leverage ceiling above which the dynamics are unstable, countercyclical leverage policies can be used to raise the ceiling. We also study the impact on leverage cycles of direct, temporal control of the bank׳s riskiness via the bank׳s required Value-at-Risk quantile. Under such a rule the regulator relaxes the Value-at-Risk quantile following a negative stock price shock and tightens it following a positive shock. While such a policy rule can reduce the amplitude of leverage cycles, its effectiveness is highly dependent on the choice of parameters. Finally, we investigate fixed limits on leverage and show how they can control the leverage cycle.     

What if they had not Gone Negative? A Counterfactual Assessment of the Impact from Negative Interest Rates

The counterfactual estimation technique of Pesaran and Smith ( 2016 ) is employed to provide an assessment of the impact stemming from the implementation of negative interest rates in three European economies (Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland). The analysis indicates that negative interest rates did not have a significant effect on bank lending growth or inflation in any country. This failure to reject the policy ineffectiveness hypothesis most likely lies in the fact that negative interest rates did not ease the situation for the factors restricting the supply of bank lending, namely bank funding costs and Return‐on‐Equity.