Top Management Compensation and Shareholder Returns: Unravelling Different Models of the Relationship

In order to further examine the relationship between executive pay and company performance, this paper investigates the linkage between two separate components of executive compensation (i.e. cash compensation and stock options) and market return performance, among a selected sample of US pharmaceutical company CEOs and COOs. In the surveyed sample, changes in cash compensation were found to exhibit a between-firm relationship with lagged market returns, while Δ stock option grants displayed a within-firm relationship. The former result suggests a commonality in practices across all firms, while the latter denotes idiosyncratic firm-specific practices. These contrasts represent different degrees of the agency problem in the contracts for cash compensation as compared to the stock option components. Levels of cash compensation were affected primarily by firm size. Market returns were not instrumental influences on the levels of both compensation components     

Financial reporting fraud and CEO pay-performance incentives

Because prior studies find mixed results on the relation between CEOs’ pay performance incentives and a firm’s likelihood of financial reporting fraud, we restudy their relationship using innovative research methods. First, we concentrate on incentives from granting options rather than equity-based incentives. Second, we emphasize vested options, disregarding unvested option holdings, and take the logarithm transformation of option incentives. Third, we analyse the impact of option incentives on future financial reporting irregularities. Using this innovative approach as well as a full sample and a matched sample, we find that an increase in executives’ option incentives raises the likelihood of financial reporting violations. Moreover, the effect of option incentives on financial reporting fraud is moderated by auditor effort. In addition, we find that another proxy for the measurement of executives’ option incentives, namely, the number of vested options by executives, is highly correlated with the CEO’s vested stock option sensitivity.     

Determinants of monetary penalties for environmental violations

This research investigates the likely determinants of monetary penalties for poor environmental performance. We retrieve data from Bloomberg on the monetary penalties imposed on companies in the European Union (EU) found to have performed poorly in corporate social responsibility (CSR), and particularly in the environmental aspects of CSR. Our primary findings reveal that firms with high levels of greenhouse gas and hazardous waste emissions are more likely to receive monetary penalties. On the other hand, firms that invest in green supply chain practices and disclose environment‐related matters avoid monetary penalties more. We also find that firms having executive compensation linked with environmental compliance face more monetary penalties. This finding adds a new dimension to the voluminous research on executive compensation that has investigated primarily the effects of cash and stock option‐based compensation schemes on pay–performance sensitivities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Determinants and Valuation Implications of Compulsory Stock Option Disclosures in a Weak Regulatory Setting—The Case of France

Using a sample of listed French firms in 2005, the year of mandatory IFRS adoption in the European Union (EU), we investigate the determinants of disclosure compliance of stock option expenses under IFRS 2, Share‐based Payment. Stock options are a popular means of executive compensation in France relative to other EU countries. Prior to 2005, French accounting standards and corporate governance regulations did not require recognition of option expense amounts and required minimal supplementary disclosures. There was also a perception that enforcement was imperfect, in particular with respect to IFRS 2. Given this setting, we explore what factors influence the willingness of firms to follow compulsory IFRS requirements in a weak regulatory setting. We find that overall compliance with IFRS 2 disclosure requirements increases with U.S. and U.K. institutional ownership, U.S. cross‐listing, provision of English language statements, and decreases with CEO and family ownership of the firm. We also investigate how stock market prices are affected by the recognition and disclosure of stock option expenses according to IFRS 2 in this regulatory setting and find that investors value option expenses positively, particularly when accompanied by high‐disclosure compliance. Our findings have implications for other jurisdictions in the process of adopting or converging to IFRS.     

经理人股票期权会计问题研究

近年来,经理人股票期权激励机制在我国开始实施,如何在借鉴国外已有的先进经验的基础上,根据我国现有国情和“本土化”的股票期权计划的发展程度构建的我国股票期权会计制度就成为迫切需要解决的课题。本文认为我国经理人股票期权应当费用化确认,同时采用服务单位法在经理人提供服务期间进行摊销;选择公允价值为计量基础,行权日为计量日;采用公允价值法计算考虑经理人股票期权稀释效用后的每股收益并进行充分的信息披露。     

Does CEO compensation matter in boosting firm performance? Evidence from listed French firms

The paper investigates the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation on firm performance from a sample of 155 listed French companies on SBF 120, over 2009–2018. Findings suggest that an increase in CEO compensation seems to improve the accounting‐based firm performance, nevertheless it hurts the firm stock market value. More pronounced results are reported when we control for sector compensation interactions. We argue that attractive compensation may improve the executive services in achieving shareholders' objectives, but investors seem to not appreciate a CEO compensation increase. Based on the agency theory, it might be argued that investors fear possible executive opportunistic behavior encouraging them to enjoy overcompensation .     

Executive compensation and firm risk after successful mergers and acquisitions in Africa

This paper examines the impact of various executive compensation types on the postmerger risk taking by firm's executives. We find that executive pay influences firm risk differently depending on compensation type and risk measure. Specifically, we find that rewarding executives with cash compensation reduces the total postmerger risk of acquirers. However, managers are motivated to increase systematic risk when they are rewarded with stock‐based incentives. Besides, based on the argument that managerial compensation portfolio might impact systematic and unsystematic risks differently, our findings show no evidence of the impact of executive pay on unsystematic risk.     

Executive compensation and gender: S&;P 1500 listed firms

We examine if a gender gap persists in executive compensation and if the composition and the determinants of executive compensation for men versus women are the same for the S&P1500 listed firms during the period from 1992 to 2004. This analysis is also extended to high tech firms, where high scholarship is required both for male and female executives. The results reveal that the gender gap in executive compensation is reducing essentially after the year 2000. Also, the factors that explain the variation in executive compensation are not all the same for men and women. However, firms continue to pay women, who are considered more risk averse than men, a similar proportion of risky compensation components, such as stock options and restricted stocks, than they pay to men. In terms of technology firms, we find that the gender differences in total compensation are not statistically significant. Our study offers insight into recent data for executive compensation. The finding that the gender gap diminishes is a sign of a better functioning market for executives. Our findings could be potentially useful for compensation committees in order to develop compensation packages that take into consideration the degree of risk aversion in order to enhance performance. Compensation adjusted for risk aversion can produce a higher level of satisfaction for the employees and can lead to better performances. Future research should focus on international comparison of various dimensions of executive compensation.     

高管人员薪酬与上市公司经营绩效相关性分析——来自沪、深A股市场制造业上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国沪、深两市2004年A股制造业上市公司样本作为研究对象,从上市公司年度经营绩效以及管理人员报酬等相关信息着手,对上市公司经营绩效、公司规模、国有股比例、高管持股比例与高管人员的薪酬之间的相关性进行了实证分析,以探讨上市公司高层管理人员薪酬与公司绩效的内在关系。     

Backdating executive stock options—An ex ante valuation

When backdating executive stock options (ESOs), the exercise price is set in favor of the recipient executive. Relative to a non-backdated benchmark, we find an (ex ante) upper bound for the cost of backdating to shrink from 10% to about 3.7%, as a consequence of the regime change represented by the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX).We frame the backdating behavior as a (compound) exotic option, considering both simple and extended models of the underlying ESO—in the latter case we draw on the analytical ESO models of Sircar and Xiong (2007). Post-SOX, we use a Longstaff-Schwartz inspired least squares Monte Carlo approach.     

Compensation-based stock trading by corporate executive and aggregate management ownership of the firm: Some additional evidence

Managers place a low value on equity-based compensation because it exposes them to the risk of the firm. Such undervaluation and the need to achieve diversification may force a manager to sell his own stock of the firm in response to equity-based awards. In this paper we examine whether such stock selling by an executive depends on the aggregate level of management ownership of the firm. We argue that stock selling occurs at a high level of aggregate ownership where an executive has a low probability of being replaced. Our findings support this “management ownership” argument of compensation-based stock trading. One implication is that the board's effort to minimize agency conflicts becomes less effective once aggregate ownership increases to a certain threshold level. (JEL G30, G32) This research was carried out with the support of the Western New England College research fund.     

The Acquisition of Restructured Firms: An Illustration of Market Discipline?

We examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and acquisition activity subsequent to corporate restructurings in a sample of 152 firms created by a voluntary corporate spin-off. We also investigate the linkage between these relationships and the stock market reaction to the initial restructuring announcements. Surprisingly, CEO wealth in the form of stock and options is strongly related to friendly and hostile acquisition activity, respectively. Moreover, the stock market appears to anticipate this subsequent acquisition activity. These results ask us to rethink our understanding of the motivational properties of equity ownership and the stock market's reaction to voluntary corporate spin-off announcements.     

Market Reactions to the Regulation of Executive Compensation

Abstract

This paper investigates equity market reactions to the regulation of executive compensation. We exploit a natural experimental setting in Germany, where recent legislation introduces restrictions on the amount and on the components of board executive compensation packages, and invokes liability for the supervisory board in case of inappropriate remuneration arrangements. We use this exogenous shock to the contracting environment to infer market perceptions of the usefulness of the regulation. Using event study methodology, we investigate market reactions for the first-time announcement of regulatory intent and for a pooled sample of seven events leading to the adoption of the law act. We find weak evidence of an average negative market reaction to the proposed regulation. Multivariate analyses reveal that firms which were particularly affected by the regulation because board members received high abnormal remuneration experienced larger stock price discounts on average. Consistent with this, we find a positive relation between pay-performance sensitivity and the equity market reaction. Taken together, these findings indicate that the regulation was not considered beneficial from a shareholder perspective. This result is consistent with the market perceiving the regulation of executive compensation to impose potentially inefficient contractual arrangements for some firms.     

FAS 123R高管人员股票期权费用化的实施与影响——对我国的启示

美国财务会计准则FAS123R及中国新会计准则均要求股票期权费用化。股票期权费用化的会计处理一方面有助于减少过度的授予高管股票期权;但另一方面又会对公司业绩产生影响,在一定程度上弱化了股票期权的激励效果,留给管理层更多的操控盈余的空间。中国刚施行新准则不久,股票期权费用化的影响需要更多的实证研究,可能产生的问题需要准则制定机构及监管部门更多的关注。     

公司治理机制对物流企业成长性影响的实证研究——来自我国物流上市企业的经验证据

企业成长能力是物流企业转型升级的重要基石。依据委托代理理论,利用我国物流上市企业2008-2011年数据,实证检验了企业公司治理水平对物流企业成长性的影响。实证研究结果表明,股权集中度与企业成长性成倒"U"型关系;管理层薪酬水平对物流企业成长有显著的正向影响,无薪酬董事人数则对物流企业成长有显著的负面影响。     

The remuneration of CEOs and corporate financial performance in Norway

Economics and management literatures advocate that senior company executives should be remunerated on the basis of the financial performance of the firms they manage. This helps align the interests of management with those of stockholders. There are, however, problems in implementing pay for performance schemes and these, along with other factors, may lead to there being no empirical relationship between compensation and stockholder returns. This study set out to explore the determinants of chief executive compensation in Norwegian stock exchange listed firms. To date there have been very few studies on this topic using data from Norway; most previous research has employed American data. The results show a positive relationship between CEO pay and corporate size but there was no significant association between remuneration and corporate financial performance as measured by accounting profitability and as measured by stock returns. Estimates of the value added by companies were significantly related to chief executive pay. There was also a positive and significant relationship between a CEO's compensation and the average wage level of the company. This association may be due to the unique characteristics of Norway's social and economic structure.     

Geographical Proximity and Mutual Funds' Proxy Voting Behavior

This paper examines the influence of geographical proximity on mutual fund proxy voting decisions. Using mutual fund proxy voting data for the sample period July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, we find that fund managers vote more in favor of management of locally headquartered firms. The results are strong for proposals related to executive compensation, anti‐takeover provisions, social and political issues. We provide evidence to show that bias in proxy voting is not being driven by informational advantage; voting bias is prevalent in small as well as large size companies. Additionally, the voting pattern suggests that geographical proximity does not facilitate in better corporate monitoring as revealed in their voting decisions. We find that local fund managers vote more favorably in those proposals which do not increase shareholders' wealth and rights. Our results suggest that familiarity and social interaction between fund managers and firm executives located in the same geographic area might explain the local bias in mutual fund proxy voting behavior. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Family ownership,corporate governance,and top executive compensation

In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non‐executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Earnings fraud: board control vs CEO control and corporate performance – 1992–2004

The turn of the millennium is associated with increased corporate fraud, largely attributed to the failure of corporate governance. The compensation committee is expected to minimize fraud by rewarding only appropriate CEO behavior. A causal modeling approach, the Directed Acyclic Graph, was used to estimate the structure of corporate fraud. Corporate fraud was measured as illegal earnings statement(s), not all restatements but only those found illegal. A major finding is that the CEO's stock‐option compensation motivates the CEO to commit corporate earnings fraud, while cash salaries and bonuses are only indirectly related to earnings fraud through those stock options. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Scaling laws, talent amplification, and executive compensation in the commercial bank industry

This research takes an alternative approach in analyzing the distribution of executive compensation in the commercial banking industry. We make use of scaling laws—laws often applied in the physical sciences that relate the intensity of an event to its frequency—to quantify the distribution of compensation and to make inferences on the type of process that generates it. We find that the distribution of compensation for chief executive officers, chief financial officers and chief operating officers is consistent with the amplification of managerial talent. However, we find that senior lending officer compensation does not support such increasing returns to talent. (JEL G210, Y330)