Accounting and Competitive Tendering in UK Local Government: An Institutionalist Interpretation of the New Public Management

The paper applies institutional theory to analyse the changing role of accounting and contracting in UK local government as the compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) regime was extended to white-collar activities such as housing management, finance, legal services and information technology. Employing an organizational fields model, accounting changes were seen to be influenced by a combination of legal coercion, normative and competitive forces, the resistance and manipulation of the large local authorities together with the facticity of the new accounting and contracting regimes. The theoretical framework is applied to field-work carried out in a large metropolitan authority in the north of England where CCT methodologies directly affected housing management but not other services such as finance. Although resisting CCT for finance, the authority subsequently introduced a radical scheme of voluntary competitive tendering for selected finance processes. The paper examines how accounting and contracting may be adapted to emerging trends in the New Public Management associated with Best Value policies.     

Bureaucratic Limits to Markets: The Case of Local Government in Victoria, Australia

Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) was introduced into local government in the state of Victoria (Australia) as the centrepiece of a reform package to make local government more 'business-like' and market-oriented. This article evaluates the extent of changes introduced by the reforms. To some extent, post-bureaucratic organizational characteristics have been adopted, although the degree of change has been limited by several factors, including: the bureau-shaping behaviour of senior managers, the failure of competition to generate contestable environments for all services, and the increased level of formalization which has accompanied the introduction of CCT in local authorities.     

Best Value: Is It Delivering?

The enhancement of public service performance has been a central concern of successive Labour governments since 1997. Best Value is intended to address this by replacing the former policy of compulsory competitive tendering with a policy that has been likened to a local government version of total quality management. In this article the authors draw on a survey of local government officers to explore the extent to which BV is providing the basis for improvements in the quality of local services and finds mixed results.     

An Assessment of Competitive Tendering using Transaction Cost Analysis

Competitive tendering is the means by which most goods and services are produced by public bodies: therefore it is important to try to improve it. Transaction cost analysis, in particular the concepts of bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism, provided the framework for examining two competitively tendered contracts let by the Government Purchasing Agency (in Northern Ireland). The firms tendering for the contracts were surveyed and interviews were carried out with purchasing staff managing the tendering process. The authors found that the main areas for further improvement in competitive tendering are the availability of information on previous contracts and debriefing, providing a clearer specification of user needs and of quantities.     

Minding the Quality in Local Authority Finance Departments

The quality of financial services in local authorities cannot be taken for granted. It requires active management to counteract the unrelenting pressures of increasing workloads and reducing resources. Warwickshire County Council has developed and implemented a distinctive approach to quality management for financial services which is gaining a great deal of attention. It provides a framework for continuous improvement and a way forward for quality evaluation in tendering exercises.     

Trust-Based Relationships in Local Government Contracting

This article examines issues of trust and competition as they relate to a number of services provided by British local government. The first section outlines the changing policy context of competition for local authority services and is followed by a discussion of the nature of trust under contracting, drawing on elements of (primarily) economic theory to identify the features of contracting which we would expect to find in a 'low trust world'. The authors ask whether these features appear to be present in contracting and point to some features of the CCT legislative framework which may help to explain this. After reviewing private sector practice, the extent to which it could be replicated under CCT is examined.     

Accrual Accounting and the Efficiency of the Core Public Sector

This paper evaluates the 'microeconomic' case for the extension of accrual accounting to the core government for the purposes of performance measurement, competitive tendering and asset management. Having found the microeconomic case to be weak, it suggests that it is the potential role of accrual accounting as an indicator of the fiscal stance of the public sector (particularly in respect to intergenerational equity) which provides a convincing rationale for its introduction in core government, and that this has significant methodological implications.     

The relationship between supplier control and competition in public sector outsourcing

The aim of this article is to develop theory and contribute to empirical studies about how the effectiveness of bureaucratic controls in public sector outsourcing is contingent upon supplier competition, and why and how this interaction plays out differently for hard and soft types of outsourced services. In previous inter‐organizational management control (IOMC) research there is a contradiction between theory and empirical results concerning how bureaucratic control and supplier competition interacts in aligning suppliers. While IOMC theory suggests competition reduces the need for bureaucratic control, empirical studies clearly indicate the opposite. We extend previous research and theorizing by differing between the outsourcing of hard and soft types of services and by testing the joint effect of bureaucratic control and competition on supplier alignment. The empirical case for testing theory is outsourcing by competitive tendering in the public sector. We use transaction level data from 166 local government suppliers in Sweden. In accordance with our prediction, the effect of bureaucratic control in aligning suppliers decreases with supplier competition when hard types of services are outsourced. For soft types of services, our results indicate that bureaucratic control is not contingent upon supplier competition. Furthermore, we show that when supplier competition is low the effect of bureaucratic control on supplier alignment is stronger for hard than for soft types of services. These results constitute an important contribution to the central notion of the interplay between bureaucratic control and competition in the IOMC literature.     

Smart work and hard work: explicating a learning orientation in strategic management accounting

This paper examines the skills and aptitudes necessary to undertake a strategic management accounting project. It argues that individuals involved in such projects are required to work both smart and hard. This argument is developed theoretically by reference to the work of educational psychologists who have identified two different types of goal orientation which people pursue in achievement situations: the learning orientation and the performance orientation. Evidence that strategic management accounting requires a learning orientation is provided by means of a case study which describes its use in a competitive tendering situation. This is followed by a discussion of the potentially symbiotic relationship of strategic management accounting and organizational learning. The discussion leads to the specification of a research agenda that may have significant implications for the practice and learning of management accounting.     

Determinants of bond tender premiums and the percentage tendered

We analyze a large sample of US corporate bond tender offers to understand what affects tender premiums as well as the percentage of bonds tendered. For the average (median) tender offer, the tender price is 5.55% (3.24%) greater than the pre-tender market price while the percentage of bonds tendered is 82.3% (94.6%). Premiums offered by firms are greater when the firm is simultaneously soliciting consents to amend restrictive covenants and when the bond has a greater number of restrictive covenants. Premiums are also greater when long-term risk-free yields are low and the yield curve is flatter – conditions where a firm might want to lock in favorable long-term rates by issuing new debt and retiring old debt. Bondholders respond to higher tender premiums by tendering a greater percentage of their bonds – a 1% increase in tender premium increases the tendering rate by approximately 9%. Bondholders also tender a greater percentage of bonds possessing less desirable characteristics such as a short remaining maturity or bonds that are simultaneously undergoing consent solicitations. Finally, we find that tender offers are easier to complete when bond ownership concentration is greater.     

The ins and outs of outsourcing and insourcing: what have we learnt from the past 30 years?

This paper explores recent experience with outsourcing of public services. It highlights how approaches to outsourcing have evolved during the past 30 years, moving through phases of competitive tendering, partnership working, strategic commissioning, prime contracting and, more recently, insourcing. The paper finishes with 10 lessons for commissioners and service providers which can be drawn from these experiences.     

Trading Profits in Dutch Auction Self-Tender Offers

We document abnormal trading profits in Dutch auction self-tenders. Tender period profits—buying after announcement and selling just before expiration—are 1.74 percent ( Bhagat, Brickley, and Lowenstein (1987) report similar profits for interfirm tenders). Buying just before expiration and tendering yields abnormal profits of 1.36 percent ( Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) report 9 percent for fixed-price self-tenders using a filter rule). Total profits from buying just after announcement and tendering remain positive after adjusting for bid-ask spreads. Trading profits are higher for smaller firms, and positively correlated with tender period unsystematic risk, suggesting that they arise due to the pricing of event risk.     

WHO WINS IN LARGE STOCK BUYBACKS – THOSE WHO SELL OR THOSE WHO HOLD?

Both fixed-price and dutch auction repurchases offer large premiums over current values to tendering shareholders. And, because announcements of such offers are generally accompanied by significant increases in stock prices, economists view selftender offers as mechanisms for signaling undervaluation. Using samples of fixed-price and dutch auction self-tender offers from the 1980s, this study attempts to answer the following questions: Are non-tendering shareholders fully compensated for the premium wealth transfer by the increase in the intrinsic value of their shares? Since fixed-price offers feature larger premiums, are they accompanied by larger increases in intrinsic value (or do insiders have a tendency to “overpay” in fixed-price offers)? Is the premium wealth transfer a big component of the returns to the two shareholder groups—and what percentage of firm value does the transfer represent? The findings of this study, unlike those reported by earlier research, suggest that the two types of offers generate roughly the same total returns (about 10–11%, on average, during the offering period) to shareholders who do not tender. Fixed-price offers involve considerably larger premiums (over the new, “full-information” price) and wealth transfers than dutch auctions. Reflecting the higher premiums, shareholders tendering into fixed-price offers receive higher returns than those tendering into dutch auctions (13.8% vs. 11.3% during the announcement period). But while fixed-price offers involve a considerably larger wealth transfer from non-tendering to tendering shareholders, fixed-price repurchases compensate the non-tendering shareholders for the larger wealth transfer with larger increases in “intrinsic value,” thus generating the same total return as dutch auctions. Moreover, despite the large premiums offered in both types of offers, the wealth transfer implicit in the premium represents a small cost (less than 1% in fixed-price offers, and less than 0.1% in dutch auctions) to non-tendering shareholders.     

Foreign participation and banking competition: Evidence from the Indonesian banking industry

Foreign participation in Indonesian banking has expanded from the establishment of foreign de novo banks into the acquisition of existing local banks. The increase in foreign participation has therefore not been associated with a growing number of banks. This study aims to examine the competitive behavior of foreign and local banks as a competitive banking industry is important in boosting economic efficiency and economic growth. This study also examines the role of modes of entry of foreign banks on competition, either through the establishment of foreign de novo banks or the acquisition of local banks. The recent methodological refinements of the Panzar–Rosse method developed by Bikker et al. (2011) are employed to estimate the level of competition among local and foreign banks. Generally, the foreign banks, particularly foreign de novo banks behaved more competitively than local banks, and their penetration is therefore important in creating a contestable market. This study found that in terms of assets, on average foreign de novo banks were smaller, more efficient, and had lower overhead costs, so they could offer lower loan rates and disburse more loans. The recent consolidation in the Indonesian banking industry may have an adverse impact on competition as it restricts the establishment of foreign de novo banks.     

Fiscal federalism and local public finance: A computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework

This paper attempts to make an argument for the feasibility and usefulness of a computable general equilibrium approach to studying fiscal federalism and local public finance. It begins by presenting a general model of fiscal federalism that has at its base a local public goods model with (1) multiple types of mobile agents who are endowed with preferences, private good endowments, and land endowments, (2) local governments that produce local public goods funded by a property tax, and (3) a land market that capitalizes local policies to equilibrate supply and demand. To this, a state (or national) government producing a state public good is added, and all levels of government abide by majority rule voting. A computable general equilibrium framework is derived from this theoretical model and calibrated to New Jersey micro tax data. It has been applied elsewhere to study the dominance of property in local tax bases as well as the general equilibrium effects of state or national intergovernmental programs such as redistributive grants in aid, district power equalization, and the deductibility of local taxes. Results in these areas are summarized and potential future applications discussed.     

Concepts and Indicators of Local Authority Performance: An Evaluation of the Statutory Frameworks in England and Wales

A conceptual framework for evaluating statutory performance indicators for local authorities is developed. The framework, which contains 14 dimensions of organizational performance, is then applied to the indicators set for local government from 1993/94 to 2001/02. The results show that the validity and comparability of the indicators has improved substantially over time. However, a critical weakness that remains is the absence of indicators that link spending with service outcomes. Such indicators are essential if judgements about value for money and Best Value are to be made.     

Political Interference and Stock Price Consequences of Local Bias

Politics can interfere with capital markets. We show that political interference is a necessary condition for local bias in the stock market. We extend the framework of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) and find that the inverse relation between market‐to‐book ratios and the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in a state (RATIO) is only prevalent among firms located in areas where politics has substantial influence on local markets. Our results indicate that the impact of politically induced local bias is primarily demand driven and stronger among firms that are less visible.     

商业银行竞争力及其评价研究

本文从企业竞争力出发,结合商业银行的特性,对商业银行竞争力进行了理论探讨,给出了商业银行竞争力的定义;引入迈克尔·波特的竞争优势理论,对商业银行竞争过程和竞争力形成过程进行了创新性的研究,提出了商业银行竞争力要素构成的一般理论分析框架,揭示了商业银行竞争力的要素构成;据此设计了新的商业银行竞争力评价指标体系和操作方法,创设了既可以用于银行间竞争力横向比较,又可以反映银行间竞争力动态纵向变化的竞争力指数编制方法。     

Quote-based competition and trade execution costs in NYSE-listed stocks

This study examines quotations, order routing, and trade execution costs for seven markets that compete for orders in large-capitalization NYSE-listed stocks. The competitiveness of quote updates from each market varies with measures of the profitability of attracting additional order and with volatility and inventory measures. The probability of a trade executing on each market increases when the market posts competitive quotes. Execution costs for non-NYSE trades when the local market posts competitive (non-competitive) quotes are virtually the same (substantially exceed) costs for matched NYSE trades. Collectively, these results imply a significant degree of quote-based competition for order flow and are consistent with off-NYSE liquidity providers using competitive quotations to signal when they are prepared to give better-than-normal trade executions.     

The joint estimation of bank-level market power and efficiency

The aim of this study is to provide a methodology for the joint estimation of efficiency and market power of individual banks. The proposed method utilizes the separate implications of the new empirical industrial organization and the stochastic frontier literatures and suggests identification using the local maximum likelihood (LML) technique. Through LML, estimation of market power of individual banks becomes feasible, while a number of restrictive theoretical and empirical assumptions are relaxed. The empirical analysis is carried out on the basis of EMU bank data. Market power estimates indicate fairly competitive conduct in general; however, heterogeneity in market power estimates is substantial across banks. The latter result suggests that the practice of some banks deviates from the average fairly competitive behavior, a finding that has important policy implications. Finally, efficiency and market power present a negative relationship, which is in line with the so-called “quiet life hypothesis”.