Controlling Investment Decisions: Depreciation- and Capital Charges

This paper examines a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a divisional manager has superior information regarding the profitability of an investment project available to his division. The manager also contributes to the periodic operating cash flows of his division through personally costly effort. We demonstrate that it is optimal for the principal to delegate the investment decision and to base the manager's compensation on the residual income performance measure. Our analysis points to a class of depreciation rules and to a particular capital charge rate which together ensure that a profitable (unprofitable) project makes a positive (negative) contribution to residual income in every period. As a consequence, the compensation parameters for each period can be chosen freely so as to address the moral hazard problems without impacting the manager's investment incentives.     

How Fundamental are Fundamental Values? Valuation Methods and their Impact on the Performance of German Venture Capitalists

This paper studies how the use of alternative valuation methodologies affects investment performance for a sample of 53 German venture capitalists. We measure investment performance by the amount of investments they need to write off and by the number of companies they take public. We find that a significant number of investment managers use discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques, but only a minority appears to use a discount rate related to the cost of capital. The majority applies DCF using subjective discount rates. We present evidence that the use of DCF is correlated with superior investment performance only if applied in conjunction with an objectifiable discount rate. Also, funds that invest with a longer horizon perform better. The use of multiples is not significantly correlated with investment performance. We conclude that a focus on fundamental values confers an advantage.     

The irreversibility premium

When investment is irreversible, theory suggests that firms will be “reluctant to invest.” This reluctance creates a wedge between the discount rate guiding investment decisions and the standard Jorgensonian user cost (adjusted for risk). We use the intertemporal tradeoff between benefits and costs of changing the capital stock to estimate this wedge, which we label the irreversibility premium. Estimates are based on panel data for the period 1980-2001. The large dataset allows us to estimate the effects of limited resale markets, low depreciation rates, high uncertainty, and negative industry-wide shocks on the irreversibility premium. Our estimates provide a readily interpretable measure of the importance of irreversibility and document that the irreversibility premium is both economically and statistically significant.     

Is heterogeneous capital depreciation important for estimating firm-level productivity? Evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms

This paper contributes to the existing literature on estimating firm-level production functions. Using Chinese manufacturing survey data, we employ the firm-level heterogeneous capital depreciation rate to measure firms’ investment and assess its role using Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) production function estimation technique. Although there is some ongoing debate on the econometric soundness of the OP technique, we argue quantitatively that the heterogeneous depreciation rate muffles the measurement error associated with the key input demand investment. In our sample, it significantly narrows the gap of total factor productivity (TFP) estimates between the OP technique and a state-of-the-art estimation method that works without investment. We further reveal that the improved performance primarily originates from the dynamic evolution in the distribution of the capital depreciation rate.     

Renegotiation and the impossibility of optimal investment

In a model with asymmetric information and external equity financingit is impossible to achieve socially optimal investment becauseof renegotiation possibilities. The contractual solution suggestedby Dybvig and Zender (1991) is not dynamically consistent -the manager's contract would be renegotiated, resulting in inefficientinvestment. Moreover, no other compensation contract that wouldinduce the manager to invest efficiently survives renegotiation.Contracts that pay the manager based on the stock price, whileproducing suboptimal investment as in Myers and Majluf (1984),are robust to renegotiation.     

Accrual Accounting for Performance Evaluation

This paper examines alternative accrual accounting rules from an incentive and control perspective. For a range of common production, financing and investment decisions we consider alternative asset valuation rules. The criterion for distinguishing among these rules is that the corresponding performance measure should provide managers with robust incentives to make present value maximizing decisions. Such goal congruence is shown to require intertemporal matching of revenues and expenses, though the specific form of matching needed for control purposes generally differs from GAAP. The practitioner oriented literature on economic profit plans (EPP) has made various, and at times conflicting, recommendations regarding adjustments to the accounting rules used for external financial reporting. Our goal congruence approach provides a framework for comparing and evaluating these recommendations.     

Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?

This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls. Under the manager's optimal policy, the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money. As the asset value goes to zero, volatility goes to infinity. However, the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking. Sometimes, the manager's optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account. Furthermore, giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility.     

CVP under uncertainty and the manager's utility function

Cost-volume-profit analysis has focused on the firm's short-run output decision assuming that the manager maximizes the firm's objective function rather than his or her own. This study argues that the decision problem facing the manager is to determine not only the level of output, but also the level of investment in risky assets in such a way that the expected utility of the manager's own end-of-period wealth can be maximized when the manager's wealth function is dependent on vested interests both within and outside of the firm, possibly in competition with the firm. Through analytical work, it is demonstrated that a change in fixed costs of the firm affects not only the production decision of a manager, but also his orher decision to invest in risky assets. The direction of this fixed cost effect depends on the particular type of risk aversion displayed by the manager. From the analytical work, five propositions are developed for empirical investigation in the future.The most helpful comments of Professor Cheng-few Lee are greatly acknowledged. We wish to thank anonymous referees who's comments have improved the paper. Furthermore, participants at the seminar at the University of Massachusetts Lowell also provided helpful comments.     

基金业绩如何影响风格漂移和经理离职?——理论与经验分析

本文通过一个两期模型,刻画了基金业绩如何通过影响市场信念,进而影响基金风格漂移和基金公司的解雇行为。若上期基金业绩很好,基金经理就会在乐观的自我能力预期下,完全按照自己的判断选择基金投资风格;若上期业绩一般,基金经理会因为调整成本而不太愿意切换投资风格;而若上期业绩很差导致自我能力预期悲观,基金经理就宁愿模仿上期绩优基金的投资风格。综合起来,基金风格漂移将随上期基金业绩呈现出显著的U型关系。进一步,因为业绩很差的基金经理会采取模仿策略,因此在市场风格发生切换时更有可能发生基金经理解雇事件。此外,本文基于中国开放式基金的季度数据,检验了风格漂移与滞后一期基金业绩之间的关系,经验证据稳健地支持了理论分析的各种结论。     

Information systems, incentives and the timing of investments

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of introducing information systems into a model featuring managerial incentive problems and investment opportunities that are mutually exclusive over time. In a principal-agent model in which a manager (agent) has superior information about investment costs, we introduce information systems, the signals from which are available to both the manager and the owner of the investment opportunity, which allow the owner to decrease the manager's informational advantage.We examine (i) the characteristics of the optimal information systems; (ii) the effects of such information systems on the owner's investment and compensation choices and on the value of the investment opportunity to the owner; (iii) the effects of such information systems on the timing of investment; (iv) the effects of such information systems on the overall probability of investment; and (v) when the owner might want to improve the information system at a particular point in time.     

What's your real cost of capital?

In valuing any investment project or corporate acquisition, executives must decide what discount rate to use in their estimates of future cash flows. The traditional approach is to apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which has remained fundamentally unchanged for 40 years. But the formula--in particular, its beta element--has long been a source of frustration. In fact, corporate executives and investment bankers routinely fudge their CAPM estimates, say the authors, because experience and intuition tell them the model produces inappropriate discount rates. CAPM has three main problems: First, beta is a measure of both a stock's correlation and its volatility; second, beta is based on historical data; and third, CAPM rates don't take into account the term of the investment. These factors together result in discount rates that defy common sense. As an alternative to CAPM and its beta element, the authors developed a forward-looking approach to calculating a company's cost of capital, the market-derived capital pricing model (MCPM). It does not incorporate any measure of historical stock-to-market correlation, relying instead on estimates of future volatility derived from the options market. This is helpful since investor expectations from the options market are built into a company's current stock price. Using GE as an example, the authors give step-by-step instructions for how to calculate discount rates with MCPM. They also offer evidence from a range of industries to show that MCPM's discount rates are more realistic--especially from the corporate investor's perspective--than are CAPM's.     

基金业绩如何影响风格漂移和经理离职?——理论与经验分析

本文通过一个两期模型,刻画了基金业绩如何通过影响市场信念,进而影响基金风格漂移和基金公司的解雇行为。若上期基金业绩很好,基金经理就会在乐观的自我能力预期下,完全按照自己的判断选择基金投资风格;若上期业绩一般,基金经理会因为调整成本而不太愿意切换投资风格;而若上期业绩很差导致自我能力预期悲观,基金经理就宁愿模仿上期绩优基金的投资风格。综合起来,基金风格漂移将随上期基金业绩呈现出显著的U型关系。进一步,因为业绩很差的基金经理会采取模仿策略,因此在市场风格发生切换时更有可能发生基金经理解雇事件。此外,本文基于中国开放式基金的季度数据,检验了风格漂移与滞后一期基金业绩之间的关系,经验证据稳健地支持了理论分析的各种结论。     

Performance measurement for investment decisions under capital constraints

An owner delegates investment decisions to a better informed manager whose time preferences are unknown to the owner. Due to exogenous capital constraints, not all profitable projects can be undertaken, and therefore the owner wants the manager to select the NPV-maximizing set of projects. We show that the relative benefit cost allocation scheme proposed by prior literature does not solve this problem. Adopting the same information structure as in Rogerson (J Polit Econ 105, 770–795, 1997) and Reichelstein (Rev Account Stud 2, 157–180, 1997), we demonstrate how to obtain robust goal congruence using residual income. The resulting revenue recognition and cost allocation rules lead to a performance measure reflecting the expected NPV-ranking of projects in each and every period.

Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing

This paper examines how information becomes reflected in prices when investment decisions are delegated to fund managers whose tenure may be shorter than the time it takes for their private information to become public. We consider a sequence of managers, where each subsequent manager inherits the portfolio of their predecessor. We show that the inherited portfolio distorts the subsequent manager's incentive to trade on long-term information. This allows erroneous past information to persist, causing mispricing similar to a bubble. We investigate the magnitude of the mispricing. In addition, we examine endogenous information quality. In some cases, information quality increases when the manager's expected tenure decreases.     

Net Present Value-Consistent Investment Criteria Based on Accruals: A Generalisation of the Residual Income‐Identity

Abstract:   In recent years, many firms have favoured residual income for value based management. One main argument for this measure is its identity with the net present value rule and that this compatibility with the net present value rule holds true for all possible depreciation schedules selected. In this article, we analyse whether there are other, undiscussed, accrual accounting numbers that enable net present value‐consistent investment decisions for all possible depreciation schedules. Our analysis provides an if‐and‐only‐if characterisation of the entire class of net present value‐consistent investment criteria, based on accounting information. This provides new insights into the residual income concept, hurdle rates, opening and closing error conditions achieved by applying more common performance measure structures, and allocation rules. Moreover, our analysis shows the limits of constructing such investment criteria.     

How to motivate your problem people

Managers who motivate with incentives and the power of their vision and passion succeed only in energizing employees who want to be motivated. So how do you motivate intractable employees--the ones who never do what you want and also take up all your time? According to Nigel Nicholson, you can't: Individuals must motivated themselves. Nicholson advocates a method that turns conventional approaches to motivation upside down. Instead of pushing solutions on problem employees, the manager should pull solutions out of them by creating circumstances in which the employees can channel their motivation toward achievable goals. That means addressing any obstacles-possibly even the manager's own demotivating style--that might be hindering the employees. The author's method demands that a manager take charge of a difficult situation and resolve it. An investment of time is required, but it will bring the manager to a resolution sooner than other means would. Using detailed examples, Nicholson walks the reader through his method, pointing out potential pitfalls along the way. First, the manager creates a rich picture of the problem person. Second, the manager exercises flexibility and reframes goals so that the employee can meet them. Third, in a carefully staged, face-to-face conversation, the manager meets with the problem employee on neutral ground. Whether a problem is solved or simply resolved, the payoffs from using this method extend beyond the specific employees who have been difficult to motivate. Besides increasing a manager's chances of motivation problem people, the method can inspire an entire team by signaling that the organization deals with difficult people rather than discarding them.     

Adverse selection, contract design, and investment distortion

We examine the design of compensation contracts and determination of investment policies when a manager has private information regarding the effect of investment on both the firm's cash flows and the private benefits she is able to extract from employment. We show that, in general, the optimal mechanism is characterized by a menu of salary and option contracts. When the manager's private information relates only to the firm's cash flows, the firm overinvests relative to the Pareto optimal level. On the other hand, if the private information relates only to private benefits, the firm will underinvest.     

Performance Measures in Earnings‐Based Financial Covenants in Debt Contracts

This paper examines how performance measures are defined in major earnings‐based financial covenants in loan contracts to shed light on the economic rationales underlying the contractual use of performance measures. I find an earnings‐based covenant is typically based on a performance measure close to earnings before interest, tax, amortization, and depreciation expenses (EBITDA). However, my empirical analyses show that EBITDA is less useful in explaining credit risk than earnings before interest and tax expenses (EBIT) and even the bottom‐line net income. Thus, measuring credit risk cannot fully explain the choice of accounting performance measures in earnings‐based covenants. I conjecture that contracting parties choose an EBITDA‐related measure, instead of a measure calculated after depreciation and amortization expenses (e.g., EBIT), to make the performance measure less sensitive to investment activities, which can be controlled through other contractual terms, such as a restriction on capital expenditure, and provide empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture.     

Performance Evaluation and Corporate Income Taxes in a Sequential Delegation Setting

We consider a setting where a firm delegates an investment decision and, subsequently, a sales decision to a privately informed manager. For both decisions corporate income taxes have real effects. We show that compensating the manager based on pre-tax residual income can ensure after-tax NPV-maximization (goal congruence) for each decision problem in isolation. However, this metric fails if both decisions are nontrivial, since it requires asset-specific hurdle rates and hence precludes asset aggregation. After-tax residual income metrics (e.g., EVA) allow the firm to consistently apply its after-tax cost of capital as the hurdle rate to its aggregate asset base. We show that existing tax depreciation schedules may explain why firms in practice use more accelerated depreciation schedules than those suggested by previous studies. Our findings also rationalize the widespread use of dirty surplus accounting for windfall gains and losses for managerial retention purposes.     

Equivalent valuations in cash flow and accounting models

This paper investigates the equivalence of equity valuation between the free cash flow model and the residual income model. Two conditions are found to be jointly sufficient for Residual Income and Free Cash Flow models to produce the same equity valuation: (a) the models’ discount rates jointly satisfy the Modigliani and Miller (Am Econ Rev 48:261–297, 1958) condition which relates discount rates for levered equity, unlevered equity, tax savings and debt, and (b) forecasts of the two models’ variables jointly satisfy the income statement and balance sheet identities. Past discussions fail by ignoring or misusing (a).