浅谈相对绩效评估的负面激励问题

本文对相对绩效评估这一激励机制,从激励理论的角度出发,分析了其代理人异质性、多任务下激励扭曲等容易产生的负面激励问题。本文的主要结论是代理人的异质性容易造成激励程度的下降,而当代理人面对多任务时,倾向于完成较易测度的指标,从而造成激励扭曲。     

销售人员线性激励合同的信息经济学分析

销售经理往往很难监督销售人员是否努力工作,使得销售人员的激励合同很难基于销售人员的努力程度,而是基于销售人员的销售业绩.运用委托代理理论构建的销售人员基于销售业绩的线性契约,探讨销售提成系数以及基本工资的影响,有利于销售人员激励合同的确定.     

企业股权激励实践探讨

随着社会的不断发展,我国企业面临的竞争越发激烈,内部核心人员流失与代理问题成为各企业发展过程中面临的重要问题。为确保企业实现长足发展,必须采取有效措施解决核心人员流失及代理问题,因此股权激励机制成为企业发展过程中的重要薪酬机制。其作为一种长期激励机制,能帮助企业留住更多的人才,提升企业发展效益。为此,文章首先阐述了股权激励的概念,通过探讨企业股权激励中的管理层薪酬改革内容,分析企业股权激励存在的问题,并提出有针对性的措施与实践方法,希望能提高企业股权激励的实践效果,促进企业正常运行。     

CEO激励提高了内部控制有效性吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据

本文以国有上市公司为样本,全面讨论了CEO激励对内部控制有效性的作用机制。研究发现,(1)给予CEO适度的超额薪酬激励和股权激励有助于内部控制有效性的提高;(2)与一般CEO相比,具有行政经历的CEO会削弱激励机制在内部控制有效性中的提升作用。本文的经验证据表明,CEO激励是现阶段提升内部控制有效性的关键,但国有上市公司尚存在的行政任命制度扭曲了市场化激励机制,削弱了内部控制有效性。     

对上市公司管理层激励特征的探讨

管理层薪酬制度,对于企业的公司治理来说非常重要,激励报酬会影响管理层决策的动机,经理人的行为会受到企业薪酬结构影响.建立科学的薪酬机制激励企业的经营管理者,以有效地解决委托代理问题,已经成为我国上市公司治理的一个重要问题.本文阐述了上市公司管理层激励机制存在的问题,提出上市公司管理层激励机制创新的方式方法     

上市公司股权激励与绩效实证研究

管理层股权激励机制自上世纪后半叶起在西方发达市场经济国家得到了广泛的认同和推广.近十年来我国上市公司一直探索实施股权激励机制,股权激励机制作为一项有效的长期激励机制,对我国企业的发展和内部治理方面都起到了积极的作用.本文对股权激励机制实证研究文献进行了综述,并运用SPSS.13统计分析软件对我国实施股权激励的上市公司进行了实证研究.     

论商业银行人力资本激励风险管理

金融危机后，我国商业银行如何建立科学合理的薪酬激励及配套人力资本激励机制，防范人力资本激励风险，本文拟从人力资本激励机制、激励风险及类型、激励风险管理途径等方面进行探究。     

我国上市公司高管股权激励回顾与启示

随着我国从计划经济向市场经济的转轨,从上世纪九十年代开始,我国就已逐渐引进了股权激励,而始于2005年的股权分量改革,为我国上市公司高管股权激励提供了必要的条件,并于近几年来在上市公司中掀起了股权激励热潮。本文旨在通过对上市公司高管人员股权激励主要形式介绍和我国股权激励实践的回顾,总结出建立适合我国上市公司的有效的高管人员股权激励机制的若干启示,以期能够为上市公司制定高管人员股权激励方案提供有益的借鉴。     

激励制度对企业绩效的影响

伴随着现代经济的发展,中国的企业在关注如何实现企业价值最大化的同时,渐渐把目光转向对企业绩效的关注.如何调动员工和经理人的积极性,使企业达到最令人满意的绩效水平,是越来越多的股东所考虑的问题.本文通过对现行的激励制度——薪酬激励机制和股权激励机制的研究,分析了企业绩效的影响因素,探讨激励制度与企业绩效之间的关系,以及如何提高我国企业的企业绩效.     

快消品行业不同企业销售人员薪酬激励方案研究

快消品行业作为实体经济的重要经济分支,对于促进实体经济发展和产业结构调整优化方面起着至关重要的作用.快消品行业与人们的生活戚戚相关,它在一定程度上决定了人们的生活水准,为提升了人们生活的舒适度和满意度发挥了重要作用.本文采用理论联系实际,从快消品的销售人员的薪酬激励作为切入点,选择了快消品行业中比较具有代表性的口腔清洁品(A公司)、化妆品(B公司)和食品饮料(C公司)三个不同的企业作为案例的研究实例,从公司概况、销售人员薪酬激励政策和措施,薪资的结构和构成标准角度出发,通过比较研究,分析提炼,从而得出目前快消品行业销售人员薪酬激励方案中可能存在的普遍问题,对其产生原因进行分析,且并针对其问题提出建议和对策,以期改变目前快消品公司中因薪酬激励不足带来的人员流失,绩效降低等问题.本文研究成果希望为薪酬激励理论在企业的实际运用起到一定借鉴和参考作用,尤其是同类型的快消品企业或者快消企业中新的分支类型起到借鉴和帮助作用,为快消企业中降低销售人员离职率、改善其绩效及提高其对企业的忠诚度提供一定帮助.     

上市公司管理层股权激励的决定因素研究

管理层股权激励决定因素的研究是我国上市公司股权激励研究的一个热点.本文以管理层股权激励水平为被解释变量,成长能力、公司规模、企业风险、自由现金流、股权制衡度、股权集中度及管理层任期为解释变量来研究上市公司管理层股权激励的决定因素.通过本文的研究发现企业风险和管理层股权激励正相关且显著,公司规模、自由现金流及股权制衡度对...     

West meets east: Understanding managerial incentives in Chinese SOEs

State-owned enterprises (SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promotion within the bureaucratic system. Political promotion is key to understanding the incentives of SOE managers. In the reform and opening up era, SOEs have been reformed and exposed to political and market forces. The design of incentive systems for SOE managers has thus become complicated and challenging. Our study provides important implications for this key issue of SOE reform.     

Managerial incentives, derivatives and stability

In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm.     

企业集团现金分布、管理层激励与资本配置效率

本文以母公司为视角,基于科层代理理论和信息不对称理论,研究不同生命周期阶段母子公司现金分布变化对资本配置效率的影响及母公司管理层激励的治理效应。研究发现:在成长期,母公司 “自主型”财控模式下子公司高持现比率导致了过度投资,对母公司管理层薪酬激励和股权激励能够抑制过度投资,此时对母公司管理层激励表现为抑制子公司经理人圈地的监督机制;在成熟期,母公司 “平衡型”财控模式适度降低子公司持现比率,缓解了过度投资,对母公司管理层股权激励能够进一步抑制过度投资,但薪酬激励无效;在衰退期,母公司“家长型”财控模式下过度回笼资金带来投资不足,股权激励能够抑制投资不足,此时对母公司管理层股权激励表现为驱动子公司经理人投资的勉励机制。     

管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据

本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。     

Net neutrality and investment incentives

This article analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. Concerning the ISPs' investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion decreases the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Thus, contrary to ISPs' claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. A discriminatory regime can also weaken CPs' investment incentives because of CPs' concern that the ISP would expropriate some of the investment benefits.     

CEO incentive plans and corporate liquidation policy

To investigate CEOs' incentives to liquidate their firms, we examine the effects of insider ownership and compensation in stock options on 30 voluntary liquidation decisions by industrial firms in the period 1975–1986. We find that liquidation decisions are influenced by CEO incentive plans and increase shareholder value. Firms with more outside board members, smaller market-to-book ratios, and attempts by outsiders to gain control are more likely to be liquidated. Although few top executives of liquidating firms subsequently take comparable jobs, at least 41% of CEOs who downsize are made better off by liquidation.     

Ex ante loss control by insurers: Public interest for higher profit

This article examines the incentives of an insurer to modify loss distributions prior to the sale of insurance. While actions such as lobbying Congress for mandatory airbags in automobiles are undertaken by insurers for the stated purpose of reducing the aggregate loss in society, they also change the nature of the risk being insured and, hence, affect the profitability of insurance sales. For the case of loss prevention (reducing the probabilty of a loss), insurers do not always have an incentive to invest in loss control. For loss reduction (reducing the severity of any loss that does occur), the incentive is to reduce the size of small losses while simultaneously increasing the size of large losses. Venezian Associates     

CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies

We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies and show that the risk-taking incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) significantly influence their firms’ financial policies. In particular, we find that CEOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with lower (higher) leverage and higher (lower) cash balances. CFOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with safer (riskier) debt-maturity choices and higher (lower) earnings-smoothing through accounting accruals. We exploit the stock option expensing regulation of 2004 to establish a causal link between managerial incentives and corporate policies. Our findings have important implications for optimal corporate compensation design.