On the design of an optimal non-linear tax/pension system with habit formation

We study the optimal tax/pension design in a two-period model where individuals differ in both productivity and discount rates or projection bias and where their utility of the retirement period consumption is not independent of the earlier standard of living. We consider both welfarist and paternalistic social objectives. The paternalistic government attempts to correct the projection bias by using a higher discount factor. We derive general mathematical expressions that characterize optimal tax/pension design (marginal tax/subsidy rates). They suggest that the pattern of marginal labor income taxes depends on habit formation. Negative marginal labor income tax rates are possible. To gain a better understanding, we examine numerically the properties of an optimal lifetime redistribution policy with habit formation. We find support for non-linear tax/pension program in which some types of individuals are taxed while some are subsidized. The effect of changes in the degree of habit formation is explored in the numerical simulations as well as the implications of different degrees of correlation between skill and projection bias.     

National income taxation and the geographic distribution of population

We study how different national taxation schemes interact with geographic variation in productivity and consumption amenities in determining regional populations. A neoclassical migration equilibrium model is used to analyze the current nominal income tax system in Norway. The analysis is based on estimated regional income differences accounting for both observable and unobservable individual characteristics and the value of experience. Given regional differences in incomes and housing prices, quality of life and productivity are calibrated to model equilibrium. Compared to an undistorted equilibrium with lump-sum taxation, nominal income taxation creates a disincentive to locate in productive high-income regions. The deadweight loss due to locational inefficiencies is 0.18% of gross domestic product (GDP). We study real income taxation and equal real taxes as alternative tax systems. Both alternatives generate a geographic distribution of the population closer to the undistorted equilibrium, and hence with lower deadweight loss. In an extension of the analysis, we take into account payroll taxes. The existing regionally differentiated payroll taxes to the disadvantage of cities generate a deadweight loss of 0.22% of GDP in an economy with lump-sum income taxation. The two distortionary taxes interact and strengthen each other and the combined distortionary effect of income and payroll taxation in the Norwegian system is 0.46% of GDP.     

Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model

Why are social security transfers associated with retirement rules? This paper focuses on the political interactions between retirement and social security. Using a probabilistic voting approach, it analyzes why old people are induced to retire in order to receive pension transfers from the young. A crucial hypothesis is that leisure in old age represents a “merit good,” which is positively valued by all agents in the society, young and old. Thus, the politicians choose to tax the labor income of the old, to induce them to retire. Retirement increases the level of ideological homogeneity of the old. In fact, once retired, the elderly are more “single-minded,” since they only care about redistributive issues, such as pensions. This increase in their political power allows them to win the political game and to receive a positive transfer from the young (social security).     

Public Pension Reform in the United Kingdom: What Effect on the Financial Well‐Being of Current and Future Pensioners?*

Unlike many tax and benefit changes, reforms to public pension programmes take many years to have their full effect. This paper examines the effect of reforms to the public pension programme in the United Kingdom on the state retirement incomes of current generations of pensioners and on the prospective state incomes of future generations of pensioners. We show that, for an individual with lifetime earnings close to male average earnings, the UK pension system is at its most generous to those reaching the state pension age around the year 2000, but that the introduction of the state second pension and the pension credit postpones this peak for individuals on lower incomes and for those with substantial periods out of paid employment spent with caring responsibilities. We also consider how the ‘mix’ of benefits, particularly between the contributory and income‐tested sectors, could change over time, and the impact that this would have on incentives to save for retirement.     

Taxes and stabilization in contemporary macroeconomic models

The role of proportional and procyclic labor income taxes for automatic stabilization with stochastic productivity is analyzed in a contemporary macroeconomic model based on imperfect competition. The importance of short-run nominal wage rigidity for the effectiveness of progressive taxes on labor income for stabilizing output and raising household welfare is examined in a model that yields complete analytical solutions with stochastic output shocks. Increasing the procyclicity of labor income tax rates raises welfare with and without rigid nominal wages in the model economy. With fully flexible prices and wages, a positive covariance between the distortionary tax rate and productivity reduces the volatility of production and employment. This effect disappears under nominal wage rigidity, although progressive taxation can still raise welfare by reducing the distortion caused by a proportional labor tax. With rigid nominal wages and flexible consumer goods prices, payroll taxes levied at rates that rise with output can serve as automatic stabilizers. JEL Code E62 · H20     

The tax benefit of income smoothing

A worker can reduce tax liability by contributing to a private pension plan when marginal tax rates are high and withdraw pension benefits when marginal tax rates are low. We quantify the tax benefit of income smoothing through the private retirement system and find that it is negligible. This conclusion is important to households, investment advisers, tax policymakers, and scholars engaged in financial retirement planning.     

企业年金税收优惠政策的成本:一个文献综述

企业年金规模和税收优惠政策的关系很复杂,若无相应约束机制,提高优惠力度只会增加成本,企业年金得不到良性发展,税收优惠政策只能低效率运行,并产生相应成本。限制高收入职工的避税行为、明确参保职工的税收优惠政策以及加强职工退休年龄的监管,有利于降低税收优惠政策的成本,进而提高目前我国企业年金税收优惠政策的效率。     

Retirement Behaviour in Austria: Effects of Incentives on Old‐Age Labour Supply

We provide an extensive analysis of retirement behaviour in Austria with a special focus on the role of incentives delivered by the tax and benefit system in determining individual retirement decisions. A comprehensive microsimulation model of the Austrian pension system is applied to calculate retirement benefit entitlements and forward‐looking incentive measures (social security wealth, accrual rate, peak and option values) on an individual basis. We use the calculated incentive measures as the main explanatory variables in probit models to explain retirement decisions. We base our microsimulation and estimations on an extensive administrative Austrian data set. These data contain information on more than 300,000 new retirees from the period 2001–11. We provide robust evidence that incentive measures are well suited to explaining individual retirement decisions.     

Pension reform,retirement, and life-cycle unemployment

This paper investigates the labor market impact of four often proposed policy measures for sustainable pensions: strengthening the tax benefit link, moving from wage to price indexation of benefits, lengthening calculation periods, and introducing more actuarial fairness in pension assessment. We consider the impact on three margins of aggregate labor supply, retirement behavior, job search, and hours worked. We provide some analytical results and use a computational model to demonstrate the economic impact of recent pension reform in Austria. Reducing the distortion in the retirement decision by introducing pension supplements and discounts conditional on the chosen retirement date promises the largest gains. We also find that the pension reform is far from sufficient to offset the fiscal implications of projected demographic change in Austria.     

Wages,productivity, and retirement

Pensions, both state provided and privately provided, affect incentives to retire. But private pensions are part of the long term compensation package, and altering pensions not only affects retirement incentives, but also wages. A key factor in determining whether retirement occurs at the appropriate age is the relation of productivity to alternatives. When wages, coupled with public and private pension accrual, deviate from worker productivity, private retirement incentives are distorted. Sometimes this results in too much early retirement, creating fiscal difficulties. Sometimes, it results in a desire for delayed retirement, which argues for mandatory retirement rules. Pay compression, where wages do not vary across individuals as much as productivity, exacerbate distortions. Defined benefit pension plans tend to create incentives to retire after a certain number of years of work. Defined contribution plans do not have this feature. Public plans should be designed noting their interaction with incentives that are already inherent in the private wage and pension schemes.     

Political Sustainability and the Design of Environmental Taxes

This paper studies the issue of political support for environmental taxes. The environmental tax is determined by majority voting, given a refund rule that specifies the allocation of tax proceeds. The refund rule is chosen by a welfare-maximizing constitutional planner. We show that: (i) The equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the proportion of tax reductions based on wage incomes. (ii) If labor and capital income taxes are reduced in the same proportion, to keep the government's budget balanced, majority voting yields a rate of environmental taxation that is lower than the optimal (Pigouvian) level. (iii) To mitigate this negative bias, the government reduces wage taxes by a higher proportion than capital income taxes. (iv) The final outcome will either be the Pigouvian tax or else all reductions will be given in wage taxes. This depends on individuals' preferences for the polluting good as well as wage and capital income distributions.     

Die Riester-geförderte Altersvorsorge – steuerliche Vorteile durch atypische Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten in der Rentenphase

The paper focusses on the repayment of the generated capital of the so called “Riester-Rente” from an individual investor’s point of view. Beginning with the contract formation tax and biometrical induced effects are influencing the advantageousness of the government-funded “Riester-Rente”. This paper shows that under certain circumstances an atypical capitalization of the personal pension plan at beginning of the retirement period is preferable to the “normal” refunding using annual pension payments.     

The political origin of pension funding

The paper seeks to explain the huge cross country variation in private pension funding, shaped by historical choice made when universal pension systems were created after the Great Depression. According to Perotti and von Thadden [Perotti, E., von Thadden, E.-L., 2006. The political economy of corporate control and labor rents. J. Polit. Econ., 145–175], large inflationary shocks due to war damage devastated middle class savings in some countries in the first half of the XX century. This shaped political preferences over the role of capital markets and social insurance, and contributed to the Great Reversals documented by Rajan and Zingales [Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., 2003. The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the 20th century. J. Finan. Econ. 69 (1), 5–50]. Wealth distribution shocks are indeed strongly related to private pension funding, as a large shock reduces the stock of private retirement assets by 58% of GDP. While the sample size is limited, the results are robust to other explanations, such as legal origin, original financial development, past and current demographics, religion, electoral voting rules, redistributive politics, national experiences with financial market performance, or other major financial shocks that were not specifically redistributive. Corroborating evidence indicates that such redistributive shocks help explain the cross country variation in social expenditures, state ownership of industry, financial development and employment protection measures as predicted by the political shift hypothesis.     

论社会保障

在对美国社会保障制度改革的政策建议中,彼得·戴蒙德教授主张通过养老金相关参数的调整来适应未来养老基金支出增长的压力,方式是改善养老金待遇标准和税收规则以确保养老基金的精算平衡。其基本观点是:第一,社会保障是退休后收入的基础,是防止贫困和失去保险机会的保障,所以社会保障制度应该建立;第二,因为人们很少自愿进行养老金积累,年金化的强制性公共养老金就非常重要,一是能平衡终生收入,二是能够提供就业激励;第三,公共养老金计划对工人及其家庭,特别是儿童、配偶和遗属有重要保障作用;第四,延迟退休能提高未来的消费,设计合理的待遇累进原则和退休审查制度会有助于增加劳动激励;第五,养老金的代际转移是一种再分配,较多的再分配会对工作生涯形成激励;第六,为实现精算平衡,应引入自动平衡机制来自动调整税率和待遇水平,以减少立法的压力。     

On taxing capital income with income shifting

We examine a linear capital income tax and a nonlinear labor income tax in a two-type model where individuals live for two periods. We assume that taxes are paid only in the second period in which the agents receive both labor and capital income and may shift income from labor to capital. The two types of individuals may differ with respect to wage rate and initial resource endowments. In the absence of income shifting, endowment variation motivates a capital income tax which would not exist where there is pure wage rate variation. In the latter circumstance, income shifting would indeed establish a case for a capital income tax while adding variation in resource endowments would ambiguously affect the case. The asymmetric information case for a capital income tax must be traded off against distortionary effects not only on savings, but also on labor as an agent may earn labor income which is reported and taxed as capital income.      

Conflict of interest and proxy voting by institutional investors

Political pressures can bias public pension funds (PPFs) toward activist shareholders. The pension business ties mutual fund families (MFFs) have with portfolio firms can bias them toward firm management. We examine how these contrasting conflicts of interest affect institutional investors' proxy voting behavior and show PPFs (MFFs) are considerably more supportive of activist shareholders (firm management) in voting, even if doing so may harm investment value. The biases are more pronounced when incentive conflicts are stronger. PPFs support shareholder (management) proposals more (less) when Democrats gain more power in the fund's home state. Conflicted PPFs are particularly active in supporting value reducing shareholder proposals.     

The downside of formula apportionment: evidence on factor demand distortions

This paper investigates the impact of corporate taxes on the input factor choice of multi-jurisdictional entities (MJEs) under a formula apportionment (FA) regime. Our testing ground is the German local business tax that applies FA regulations with income apportionment according to the relative payroll share. Using unique data on the population of German firms, we find that MJEs distort their employment and payroll costs in favor of low-tax locations. On average, a 1-percentage-point-increase in the tax rate differential between an affiliate and foreign group members is found to lower the affiliate’s payroll to capital ratio by 1.9%.     

Public pensions and labor supply over the life cycle

In order to remain fiscally solvent, governments of many countries have reformed their public pension schemes to encourage labor supply at older ages. These reforms include reductions in the generosity of public pensions and reduced penalties for working past the normal retirement age. In this paper, we consider how reforms to public pension systems affect labor supply over the life cycle. We put the recent empirical evidence on the effect of government pensions on labor supply in a life cycle context, and we present evidence on the effectiveness of tax reforms for stimulating labor supply over the life cycle. Our main conclusion is that the labor supply of older workers is responsive to changes in retirement incentives. The labor supply of younger workers is less responsive. Thus the trend towards lower taxes on older workers in many developed countries should continue to fuel their trend towards later retirement.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.