RENOVATIO MONETAE: WHEN GESELL TAXES WORKED

Gesell taxes on money have recently received attention as a way of alleviating the zero lower bound on interest rates. Less known is that such taxes generated seigniorage in medieval Europe for around two centuries. When a Gesell tax was levied, current coins ceased to be legal and had to be exchanged into new coins for a fee. Using a cash-in-advance model, we analyze under what conditions agents exchange coins and the tax generates revenues. A low exchange fee, high punishments for using old coins, and a long time period between re-mintings induce people to use new coins.     

Fiscal devaluation and real exchange rates in the Euro area: Some econometric insights

We explore whether a fiscal devaluation, that is, a reduction in employers’ social security contributions and an increase in value added tax, affects two indicators of bilateral real exchange rates in the euro area: one based on unit labor costs, and another based on consumer prices. We find that, in the short term, cuts in employers’ contributions depreciate real exchange rates based on unit labor costs, while value added tax hikes appreciate real exchange rates based on consumer prices. In the long run, a value added tax increase also appreciates the real exchange rates based on unit labor costs.     

Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation*

The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two‐country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non‐residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non‐residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.     

出口退税、贸易盈余和外汇储备的一般均衡分析与中国的实证

本文构建了一个简单的大国开放经济一般均衡模型,从理论上探讨了外汇储备从贸易盈余时的短期均衡到贸易平衡时的长期均衡的动态变化过程,并在此基础上量化分析了降低出口退税率对长期均衡时的外汇储备的影响。研究表明,降低出口退税率在短期内对减少贸易盈余和控制外汇储备增量有一定的帮助,但长期来看则与出口产品的价格弹性密切相关,只有降低那些价格弹性较大的产品的出口退税率,才能够有效地减少长期均衡时的外汇储备,否则可能产生适得其反的效果。中国数据的实证研究支持了理论模型的结论。由于中国的出口产品总体缺乏价格弹性,因此,近年来实行的一系列出口退税政策改革在长期内使国家外汇储备出现了一定程度的增加。本文最后提出了相关的政策建议。     

Income tax policy and lifetime labor supply

A progressive income tax structure provides incentives for individuals to alter their rate of work and their age of retirement. Compared to a zero tax or proportional tax equilibrium, progressive taxation induces individuals to take less leisure in the form of retirement in exchange for more leisure during the worklife, especially at high wage levels. The imposition of a special pension tax provision on top of a progressive tax structure offsets the distortion on leisure alternatives imposed by progressivity. Indeed, the pension tax deferral provision can neutralize the impact of tax progressivity on the work profile over life. The magnitude of these tax inducements in the U.S. tax structure are non-trivial and therefore are expected to alter labor supply decisions over the lifetime. The model finds empirical support using data from the Social Security Newly Entitled Beneficiaries Survey.     

Trade policy reform and international trade tax revenue in Uganda

This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between tariff reform and customs tax revenue by explicitly capturing the institutional features of decision making in the econometric modeling. The results show that exchange rate depreciation has had pass through effects to the domestic market price of imports which reduces trade tax revenue to GDP ratio in the long run, though it increases trade tax revenue in the short term. There are also seasonal patterns in the short term trade tax payment. The results point to some scope to harness the benefits associated with trade policy reform without having to worry a lot about its effects on trade (and overall) tax revenue. In fact, it would be possible to realise modest increases in trade tax revenue if the exemption regime were to be reviewed and if there was capacity to contain the disruptive impact of sharp exchange rate depreciations.     

Reserve Requirements and Real Exchange Rate Misalignments in Emerging Market Economies

A popular policy target in emerging markets is the real exchange rate as an undervalued real exchange rate is seen to enhance international competitiveness. Within an augmented Dornbusch model it is shown that the implicit tax of low remunerated reserve requirements represents an efficient tool to depreciate the real exchange rate. The model is empirically tested for a panel of Latin American, East Asian and Eastern European countries. Controlling for the impact of fiscal policies and direct capital controls, the reserve requirement tax significantly explains real exchange rate misalignments.     

电子商务税收问题及其相关对策

电子商务是知识经济时代未来贸易的发展方向,它在改变传统贸易方式,给企业提供更多商机的同时,也因其本身具有的交易虚拟化、跨时空、高流动性的特点对地方税制及税收征管等造成了很大的冲击,产生了许多新的问题。因此,应在电子商务税收政策方面及税收征管方面采取相关措施,使其进一步完善。     

A TALE OF TAX POLICIES IN OPEN ECONOMIES

To evaluate fiscal policy reforms for Euro‐area countries, this article develops and calibrates a small open economy model. Debt reduction reforms require higher tax rates in the short term in exchange for lower rates in the long term as the debt‐servicing burden falls. Using the capital income tax to implement such a policy leads to welfare gains; the consumption tax, a very small welfare gain; and the labor income tax, a welfare loss. Holding fixed the long‐run debt–output ratio, offsetting a lower capital income tax with either a higher labor income or consumption tax generally yields welfare gains.     

The Big Bang: Tax Evasion After Automatic Exchange of Information Under FATCA and CRS

ABSTRACT

After decades of ineffective attempts to fight tax evasion, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) recently implemented the first encompassing international exchange of tax-related information on an automatic basis. This is an important development because tax evasion contributes to rising socio-political inequality and political sovereignty losses. This article assesses the treaties’ impact on tax evasion by conducting a difference-in-difference analysis of cross-border asset data. The results show that the treaties are successful. Household assets in tax havens that are not hidden behind corporate identities are estimated to be 67 per cent lower than they would have been without automatic exchange of information. Furthermore, this reduction is not offset by an increase in treaty circumvention using identity concealment or asset shifting to non-compliant jurisdictions. FATCA and CRS thus implement the first effective international cooperation against tax evasion. The results imply that political globalisation is capable to mitigate the political sovereignty losses and rise of inequality caused by economic globalisation.     

Does the quality of political institutions affect intra-industry trade within trade blocs? The ASEAN perspective

There has been a renewed resolve for deeper integration and cooperation within ASEAN. Intra-industry trade (IIT) is often viewed as a way of achieving economic as well as political integration. This article tests for the effect that political regime and governance may have on the intensity of IIT. We particularly examine if quality of political institutions which includes corruption and democracy indices as well as economic factors comprising corporate tax rate, regional FDI flow, flexibility of exchange rate regime, size of the market, economic distance affect the intensity of horizontal and vertical IIT. The study finds that control of corruption and good governance both increase the vertical IIT but not the horizontal IIT. The study further finds that intra-economy FDI flow, stable exchange rate regime, market size and proximity positively affect IIT within the trade bloc. However the negative effect of corporate tax rate suggests that if countries were to coordinate their tax policies, they could avoid harmful tax competition and promote IIT across their borders. The findings regarding the effect those economic and political factors have on the intensity of IIT certainly warrants the attention of policy makers and researchers alike.     

Impact of electoral competition,swing voters and interest groups on equilibrium policy platforms: Exploring the strategic forces at work

This paper constructs a stylized model of election between two opportunistic candidates who can influence equilibrium policy platforms in exchange for monetary contributions provided by two distinct lobby groups. Two key features are embedded which give rise to a dual uncertainty in the model: the existence of partisan spread across voter groups as well as the embezzlement of campaign funds received by the electoral candidates from the interest groups. We derive and compare the equilibrium platforms of the two office-seeking candidates in three scenarios: none of the above uncertainties exist (benchmark case), only uncertainty about voters’ preferences exist (swing-voter case), and both the uncertainties exist (swing voters and lobby groups case). We find that an opportunistic candidate’s swing-voter tax platform is always lower than the benchmark tax platform. Additionally, the equilibrium tax choice of electoral contenders in the swing voters and opposing lobby groups case is found to be greater than the tax level chosen under the swing-voter case if the lobby group advocating a greater level of tax is sufficiently well-organized such that it outweighs the relative swing-voter effect in that group. Furthermore, we find that when an electoral candidate transitions from being highly corrupt to becoming relatively more honest, the equilibrium level of public good provision adjusts in conformity with the well-organized group’s economic preferences. Finally, if the strength of relative lobbying effect is weaker, a lower partisan bias within that group induces an electoral candidate to choose a tax platform closer to that group’s policy bliss point.     

Tax efficiency in selected Indian states

This paper attempts to measure pure tax efficiency of fifteen major Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) for the period 1980–81 to 1992–93 in a manner that allows this efficiency to vary both across time as well as across states. It is discovered that there is a moral hazard problem in the design of central grants in that higher grants by the central government to the state governments reduce efficiency of tax collection by these states. The less poor states are more efficient in tax collection. The rankings of states by tax efficiency for the various years do not converge. An index of aggregate tax efficiency is calculated and it appears that this index has been stagnating. It is argued that the weight placed on tax effort in the formula determining central grants to state governments should be increased to improve tax efficiency of state governments. First version received: November 1997/final version received: November 1998     

Taxing Nothing – Tax Arbitrage and the Vanishing Revenue from Capital Income Taxation

In a one-period model the implications of the German tax code, concerning capital taxation, onto the capital market equilibrium are examined. Therefore, we model a corporation sector subject to the corporation tax and private investors liable to private income taxation. We show that there neither exist any possibilities for local tax arbitrage nor tax clienteles. Extending the model for stocks and derivative financial instruments, the tax base for private capital income taxation vanishes and the tax revenue drops to zero.revised version received September 3, 2003     

Monetary effects of a consumption tax

Abstract. This paper analyzes the short-run effects of a consumption tax increase (VAT or national sale tax) on aggregate demand. Because it increases the prices paid by consumers relative to the prices received by suppliers, a consumption tax affects the supply of real money balances, in addition to reducing expenditures. Hence, when a consumption tax replaces an income tax so as to maintain a balanced government budget, the net effect can plausibly be contractionary.     

税收流失的博弈分析

从财政交易制度框架内看,税收流失其实是一种交易成本。纳税人与税务当局的非合作博弈,不存在纯战略纳什均衡,但存在混合战略纳什均衡,即税务机关和纳税人分别以一定的概率随机选择稽查和逃税,同时,税收流失也表现为征税中存在的纳税与人政府、政府与纳税人以及政府、税务机关与税务人员三种委托代理问题。因此,依法治税的激励结构设计至少应包括四个方面：保证财政交易制度中的支出面与税收收入基本对称：优化税制;税务机关激励纳税人讲实话的制度安排,对税务人员的激励。     

中国皇权专制社会赋税制度变迁的特点

中国皇权专制社会赋税制度变迁的特点，即在“重农抑商”思想下，统治阶级必然对工商税实行重税政策；而田赋和徭役制度变迁的特点是沿着减少交易费用的方向变迁。用新制度经济学的方法对上述问题进行论证，能够为中国皇权社会赋税制度变迁的特点和规律性研究提供新的理论视角。     

Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows

This paper considers withholding taxes and information exchange as alternative means to tax international interest income. For each regime, we consider the maximum level of taxation of foreign-source income that can be sustained as the equilibrium of a repeated game. The best regime is the one that brings the level of taxation in the repeated game closest to the cooperative level of interest taxation. Sustainable levels of taxation in either regime depend on the importance of bank profits and on the marginal cost of public funds, among other things. Simulations with the model illustrate the choice between withholding taxes and information exchange. An explicit possibility is the emergence of a mixed regime, with one country imposing a withholding tax and the other country providing information. The basic model is extended to allow for size differences between the two countries and to incorporate a third, outside country.