Politics,partisanship and the power to veto: does gubernatorial line-item veto power affect state budgets?

How does line-item veto (LIV) power affect a governor’s ability to structure the state budget? Is LIV power only relevant as a partisan tool? Is it still relevant when the state legislature can override the veto? We use a rich disaggregated data set to test the effect of the gubernatorial LIV on state budgets, controlling for political factors such as party affiliation of the governor and legislature, minority status of the governor, and the legislature’s ability to override a LIV. Our results suggest that LIV power has very weak influence, if any, on governors’ ability to influence state budgets.     

The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures

Although a great deal of research examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the state legislature, the consequences for the state executive branch have been largely ignored. The voter initiative process provides the governor with a method to circumvent the legislature, which may increase the power of the governor in theory. However, it also provides citizens with a means to bypass the traditional lawmaking process and avoid the governor’s veto. This may reduce the power of the governor and lead to policies farther from the preferences of the governor. This study examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the power of the state governor by estimating total election cycle spending. Campaign expenditures are expected to reflect any sustained gain or loss in power due to the availability of the voter initiative process. The results indicate that gubernatorial campaign expenditures are significantly lower in states in which the voter initiative process is available. This finding suggests that state governors sustain a loss in political power when the voter initiative is available. Additionally, the findings imply that individuals may employ the voter initiative process as a substitute for gubernatorial support.     

Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto

Forty-three of the fifty states of the United States have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions. In this paper, I test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power. Using data from 1865 to 1994, I show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future; in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority, they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future, liberal legislatures. The results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas. First, by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process, it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions. Second, it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily ‘insulate’ policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power (e.g. [Moe, 1989] and [de Figueiredo, 2002]).     

Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget

Empirical research on the geographic distribution of U.S. federal spending shows that small states receive disproportionately more dollars per capita. This evidence, often regarded as the consequence of Senate malapportionment, in reality conflates the effects of state population size with that of state population growth. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978–2002, this study shows that properly controlling for population dynamics provides more reasonable estimates of small‐state advantage and solves a number of puzzling peculiarities of previous research. We also show that states with fast‐growing population loose federal spending to the advantage of slow‐growing ones independently of whether they are large or small. The two population effects vary substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy some advantage in defense spending, whereas fast‐growing ones are penalized in the allocation of federal grants, particularly those administered by formulas limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia, which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.     

Presidential Reputation and the Veto

This paper develops a dynamic model of the bargaining between a legislature and an executive with veto power. The dynamic nature of the model provides the executive with incentives to use the veto as a reputation building device in order to gain more favorable legislative outcomes. The model illustrates that the implicit threat of building a reputation may cause the legislature will be more accommodating in its proposals to the executive. The model illustrates the possibility of a ``honeymoon period' of legislative accommodation followed by a decline in the president's influence. This paper also explores ways in which the legislature might mitigate the effects of presidential reputation building.     

国企高管政治晋升、研发投资与企业绩效

近年来,国企高管政治晋升激励效果逐渐受到学者们关注。为此,基于2009-2014年国有上市公司752个样本值,从研发投资视角考察高管政治晋升与企业绩效关系。研究结果表明：国企高管政治晋升与企业绩效显著正相关,说明与政治晋升机会较小的国企高管相比,政治晋升机会较大的国企高管更注重企业绩效;国企高管政治晋升与研发投资显著负相关,在晋升当年,高管出于自身利益考虑会减少研发投资;研发投资对企业绩效存在显著促进作用,并对国企高管政治晋升与企业绩效关系起调节作用。     

Tenure,promotion and executive remuneration

Commentators frequently remark on the need to pay high levels of chief executive officer remuneration to attract, motivate and retain the best executives for Britain's leading companies. This paper presents the results of an empirical investigation into tenure, promotion and executive remuneration. The remuneration of the chief executive officers at some of Britain's largest businesses is examined. In the majority of cases the CEO had not been lured away from rivals but had risen through the internal labour market, often after a long–term employment relationship. Moreover, long job tenure and internal promotion were associated with higher levels of pay. It is concluded that understanding of this controversial issue will be improved if it is recognized that a part of current executive pay may be a reward for previous successful performance.     

Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry

This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality.     

Democracies,Politics, and Arms Supply

Throughout the 20th century arms have not only been tradable goods, but also policy instruments. This paper focuses on countries supplying major conventional weapons (MCW), and investigates whether changes in political conditions impact the quantity of MCW supplied to third countries. In particular, it concentrates on democratic exporters and estimates a gravity‐type panel tobit for the years 1975–2004. Results suggest that the exporter's chief executive, being right‐wing, has a positive and significant impact on MCW exports. This may reflect a general right‐wing tendency to support national industry and deregulate heavy industry exports. It is also found that higher concentration of power is associated with lower MCW exports, and that executives which serve the last year of their term and can run for re‐election tend to decrease MCW exports.     

The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike?

According to an influential theoretical argument, presidential systems tend to present smaller governments relative to parliamentary countries because the separation between those who decide the size of the fiscal purse and those who allocate it creates incentives for lower public expenditures. In practice, however, presidential and parliamentary countries come in many forms. In particular, variation in procedural rules that assign budget prerogatives across the popular branches of government may affect the underlying incentives that differentiate these types of regimes in terms of fiscal outcomes. More specifically, we argue that more hierarchical rules that concentrate budgetary power in the executive relative to the legislature do not only reduce the extent of the common pool problem but also limit the degree of separation of powers, which may have a countervailing effect. Consequently, the effect of the form of government on public expenditures is conditional on specific procedural rules. We test this hypothesis on a broad cross-section of countries and find that presidentialism has a negative impact on government size only when executive discretion in the budget process is low (that is, in a context of separation of powers). However, the negative effect of presidentialism on expenditures vanishes when the executive’s discretion over the budget process is higher. This result, in addition to highlighting that not all budget institutions have the same effect on incentives and outcomes, points out how important it is to go beyond broad characterizations of political institutions for explaining policy outcomes, and more generally, for moving forward the research agenda in constitutional political economy.     

高管法律执业经历、内部控制与上市公司违法行为研究

许多上市公司拥有法律从业背景的董事、监事、高管，知法懂法的他们可能会更加依法办事，但也有可能因为对法律的了解以及应对法律问题的自信而进行更多操控，导致公司更易卷入诉讼案件中。本文使用Logit模型，将上市公司按照是否存在内控缺陷进行分组，检验具备法律执业背景的高管所在公司是否更容易被卷入诉讼纠纷。实证和稳健性检验的结果均显示，管理层拥有法律执业经历人员比例越高的上市公司反而越容易卷入被起诉纠纷，但是更好的内部控制会削弱这种情况的发生。本文丰富了高管特质与企业表现相关研究，也为上市公司审慎选择公司高管、加强内部控制、规范经营行为提供了有益启示。     

学者型CEO更加自律吗?——学术经历对高管在职消费的影响

本文选取2010—2016年中国沪深A股上市公司样本,实证检验CEO学术经历对高管在职消费行为的影响。研究发现,学术经历有助于CEO强化道德自觉、增强道德自律,形成内在的自我约束与监督机制,进而抑制了其所在企业的高管在职消费活动。当CEO拥有高层次学术经历或来自内部晋升时,CEO学术经历对高管在职消费的抑制效应更为显著。该结论在采用双重差分模型、Heckman两阶段模型控制潜在的内生性问题及其他稳健性检验之后仍然成立。进一步研究表明,在自由现金流较多、董事会规模较大或独立性较低、外部审计监督较弱以及产品市场竞争程度较低等公司内外部治理环境较差的情景下,学者型CEO的自律品质所能发挥的治理作用更大,对高管在职消费的抑制效应也更为明显。此外,在党的十八大之后,随着“八项规定”等多项高压反腐政策的出台,政策效应在国有企业高管在职消费的治理中发挥着主导性作用,CEO学术经历对国有企业高管在职消费的抑制效应有所下降。本文为高管学术经历的治理效应假说提供了证据支持,对于上市公司规范和治理高管在职消费行为、选聘合适的高管人才具有重要的借鉴意义。     

“债转股”与高管薪酬业绩敏感性研究

"债转股"对高管激励具有显著影响,基于A股上市公司样本研究发现,相对于非"债转股"公司来说,"债转股"公司的高管薪酬业绩敏感性较高,"债转股"能提高对公司高管的激励效应。提高高管薪酬业绩敏感性要结合公司治理结构的优化,当单一大股东持股比例过高时,可以引进新的股东改善公司治理的监督机制以更好地激励高管;企业所有权分配的支配权的让渡必须依靠各产权主体之间的资源谈判来完成,应使债权人在公司治理中更好地发挥相机治理及其对高管激励的替代效应。     

EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION PLANNING: BARRIERS AND SUBSTITUTES IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

Predicted shortages of chief executives combined with growing economic and social significance of the nonprofit sector in an increasingly complex operating environment highlight the need for executive succession planning. Accordingly, our research explores factors that may influence executive succession planning in nonprofit and cooperative forms of organizations. Survey data (N = 242) were analyzed using multiple regression analysis. Results suggest both barriers to and substitutes for executive succession planning that help explain the apparent dearth of succession planning efforts in these organizations. A penchant for continuity was found to be a barrier to such planning, while elements of governance quality and internal development were found to substitute for executive succession planning.     

Partisan influence on social spending under market integration,fiscal pressure and institutional change

In this paper we examine whether partisan influence on social expenditure in the OECD has decreased over the past three decades. We analyze whether a reduced partisan influence is due to more trade openness, larger budget deficits or the creation of new supranational institutions. Our empirical approach distinguishes between the effects on the long-run growth of social expenditures and its short-run adjustment to violations of the long-run equilibrium linking social spending with macroeconomic and demographic trends. We find that partisan motives, indeed, play an important role in the explanation of short-run dynamics in social spending. Left-wing parties are found to spend significantly more than their right-wing counterparts and parties spend more before elections. However, the partisan influence has changed over time. While ideology has lost some of its influence, the electoral cycle has become more important to explain changes in social expenditure. This result should be addressed to a general institutional change that took place in the early 1990s and continued over that decade. While changes in trade openness, indebtedness and budget deficits have not changed the partisan influence on social spending, they are particularly important to explain the short-run dynamics of social spending.     

Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states

Several theories suggest that states?? choices of constitutional rules are at least partially a function of neighboring constitutions. This paper provides the first analysis of spatial dependence of specific provisions within state constitutions in the United States. The analysis effectively makes constitutional rules endogenous, contributing to a relatively underdeveloped branch of constitutional economics. By employing a series of probit estimations of nineteen specific constitutional rules, I find evidence of spatial dependence in state constitutions. Specifically, the presence of specific constitutional constraints pertaining to term limits, supreme court justice selection, recall, home rule, direct democracy, constitutional amendment by convention, balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limits, line item veto, victims?? bill of rights, health and welfare, right to privacy, environmental protection, sex discrimination, abortion, and official language all exhibit some evidence spatial dependence.     

The Executive Veto: Purpose, Procedure, and Paradox

American governments, federal and state, leave a gap in legislative representation: global majorities are practically silent compared with local ones. An executive veto can right the balance. But prevailing procedural designs are fraught with paradox. I offer a simple new design that avoids paradox, can be instituted without constitutional amendment, and enhances both legislative and executive responsibility.     

Do Chinese executives reward for luck?

This paper examines the sensitivity of executive compensation to luck based on Chinese listed companies. To identify the causal effect, we rely on companies’ market performances driven by exogenous oil prices. We document a positive relationship between executive compensation and market performance driven by oil prices, which support the story of pay for luck. Moreover, by introducing a natural experiment China in 2015, i.e., the policy of “CEO compensation limit” in state-owned firms, we show that the shock of CEO compensation limit significantly weakens the effect of pay-for-luck. We further show that there is asymmetry in pay for luck. Specifically, when oil prices rise, executive compensation is more sensitive to good luck. In addition, the sensitivity of executives to pay-for-luck is more pronounced in firms with state-owned, higher equity concentration, and related party transaction.     

Credible communication in dynastic government

This paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government. When information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations, each administration has an incentive to choose its (suboptimal) one-shot expenditure policy, and then misrepresent its choice to its successor. Consequently, it has been suggested that “horizontal accountability,” i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of a government's activities. This paper suggests a cautious approach to that view.The baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period. Even with auditing, credible disclosure is shown to be problematic. Various extensions to this baseline model are examined. In one extension, “liberal” (i.e., those prefering larger government expenditures) and “conservative” (those prefering smaller expenditures) regimes and auditors evolve over time. It is shown that “conservative” (“liberal”) auditors are not credible when the current regime is also “conservative” (“liberal”). Moreover, because information transmission stops when the auditor's and the regime's biases coincide, effective deterrents even in the “good” periods (when the auditor's and the administration's biases differ) are difficult to construct. In all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices. These constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium. Various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed.     

高管人力资本、高管报酬和公司绩效关系的实证研究——以中部地区上市公司为例

高管人力资本、高管报酬和公司绩效三者之间体现何种关系特征,是企业配置高管人员有效实施高管报酬激励的重要依据,是提升公司绩效的有效保证。本文的研究结果表明,高管的任期与公司绩效存在正相关关系,与高管报酬存在负相关关系;高管年龄与公司绩效存在负相关关系,与高管报酬存在正相关关系;高管的教育背景与公司绩效存在负相关关系,与高管报酬存在正相关关系。公司治理因素尤其是股权因素对高管人力资本特征与公司绩效、高管报酬的相关性有很大的影响。