Price Regulation and Public Service Obligations under International Arbitrage

National regulation generates price differentials between countries stimulating arbitrage by international distributors. Harmed manufacturers counteract using vertical price-squeeze or non-price discrimination. We show that: (i) either under regulatory commitment or discretion, there are non-linear relationships between technology/market conditions and the first-movers pricing strategy; (ii) public service obligations on distributors allow regulators to manipulate parallel exports so as to improve national welfare; (iii) to prevent sabotage, regulation should provide manufacturers with adequate countervailing incentives; (iv) coordinating national agencies alleviates negative regulatory and market externalities. Therefore, static and dynamic efficiency concerns may arise within a regional exhaustion regime of intellectual property rights.We are grateful to the Editor Michael A. Crew, an anonymous referee, and Luigi Buzzacchi for valuable comments and suggestions. We have benefited from financial support granted by MIUR-FIRB Project MAIS.     

Trade policy in the face of price and non-price strategies

When selling their products domestically or internationally, firms rely on more than just price as a strategic variable. They also rely on non-price instruments such as advertising and/or R&D investments. Any trade policy that affects or limits the use of one variable will likely have strategic consequences for the use of all the others. Using a Hotelling model with vertical differentiation we focus on how trade policy barriers alter price and non-price competition on the goods market. The main results are as follows: first, no matter whether the trade restriction (tariff) is placed on the non-price instrument or on the good itself, the foreign (domestic) firm prefers to increase (decrease) its use of its pricing tool and give up some of (increase) its use of the non-price instrument. Second, in the presence of a non-price instrument, tariffs do not always lead both firms to increase their price: it can lead the foreign firm to decrease its (final) price.     

Safe harbor input prices and market exclusion

An essential input price that is “too high” relative to the downstream price leads to inefficient foreclosure and one that is “too low” induces the vertically-integrated firm to engage in non-price discrimination. Displacement ratios are used to derive the range of safe harbor (downstream/upstream) margin ratios within which no market exclusion arises in equilibrium. The range of admissible margin ratios is increasing in the degree of product differentiation and reduces to a single ratio in the limit as the products become homogeneous. A key policy finding is that complementary price-ceiling and price-floor constraints can prevent both forms of market exclusion.     

Demand-Side Technology Standards Under Inefficient Pricing Regimes

When price-setting regulators haveobjectives other than maximizing socialsurplus, the conservation potential ofdemand-side technology standards can besignificantly diminished. This paperdemonstrates this by empirically recovering thesocially sub-optimal preferences of a group ofwater managers in a groundwater-dependentregion of California and simulating theirinefficient price response to the mandatedadoption of low-flow appliances by homeowners. The resulting reduction in the conservationpotential of these appliances is quantified,and a modest tax is shown to be a relativelycost-effective policy tool for conservation. If non-price conservation policies arepreferred according to equity criteria, thepaper suggests that, in order to preserve theirconservation potential, policy-makers should berequired to continue to set prices as if notechnology standards had been introduced.     

JAPANESE ANTITRUST: RECONCILING THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Japanese antitrust law exempts a variety of vertical and horizontal restraints that remain closely regulated in the United States. Despite these dissimilar antitrust environments, however, market concentration, firms' exercise of market power, and deadweight loss from monopoly are highly similar in the two countries. The hypothesis that antitrust alters the relative mix of price to non-price competition rather than the absolute level that competition assumes might explain this empirical puzzle. Thus, this paper studies Japanese antitrust exemptions for resale price maintenance and export cartel associations to illustrate how adopting vertical and horizontal restraints has allowed Japanese firms to substitute towards forms of non-price competition better tailored to industry characteristics.     

UNIVERSAL ACCESS,PARALLEL TRADE AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE

Governments often subsidize poorer groups in society to ensure their access to new drugs. We analyse the optimal income‐based price subsidies in a strategic environment. We show that universal access is less likely to arise when price arbitrage prevents international price discrimination. When this is not the case, under some income ranges, bilateral universal coverage can be supported by equilibrium subsidies together with bilateral partial provision. In such a case, international health policy coordination becomes relevant. We also show that asymmetric universal access to medicines across countries can arise, even when countries are ex ante symmetric, when international price discrimination is possible and governments cannot design subsidies proportional to either income or quality.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

PRICE DISCRIMINATION AT THE LINKS

This paper reports on an econometric analysis of the pricing structures at 46 public access golf courses in the San Francisco area. Comparisons among several attempts to get a generic measure of price discrimination suggest that the standard deviation of the prices charged is the best measure. Using narrowly cast measures of price discrimination, the paper successfully distinguishes among several different types. Measures of price discrimination can be significant regressors, yet the overwhelming majority of existing work excludes such a variable, leading to biased estimates of the other parameters.     

Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays

A lively debate has developed concerning the incentive for a price-regulated input monopolist to engage in non-price discrimination if it vertically integrates into downstream markets. This paper identifies the key industry characteristics that determine whether such discrimination is likely, and studies both theoretically and numerically the tradeoffs among three important characteristics in the simplest extant model. The incentive to discriminate is theoretically ambiguous, but data for the US telecommunications industry indicate that discrimination is likely in the absence of policy-induced countervailing incentives. Countervailing policies include direct penalties for discriminatory behavior, forcing vertical autonomy, and fostering upstream competition.     

Is all domestic water consumption sensitive to price control?

This paper presents a model of residential water demand based on the Stone–Geary utility function, which explicitly considers a threshold of water that is insensitive to price and a quantity that can adapt instantaneously to price changes. First, the threshold is assumed constant, being then allowed to vary according to past levels of consumption, a proxy for households' water-using equipment and habits. A measure of the depreciation rate of habits is derived and the effectiveness of price and non-price conservation measures are compared. The results provide useful policy recommendations for the studied case of Seville (Spain).     

Price discrimination with partial information: Does it pay off?

This paper investigates the profit effects of price discrimination when firms have partial information about consumer preferences. It shows that price discrimination can boost industry profit if firms have access to the right kind of information about consumer preferences while remaining ignorant of other relevant information.     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

Russian Railways Reform and the Problem of Non‐discriminatory Access to Infrastructure

Abstract Restructuring of the Russian railways system is well under way. Among the policies just now coming into practice are two that are standard in railways restructuring in other countries: the provision of access to the infrastructure by independent train operating companies, and assurances of non‐discriminatory access terms for such companies. However, 'discrimination'– in the traditional economic sense – is a standard and often welfare‐enhancing pricing strategy for the recovery of fixed costs in a sector, like railways, with declining average costs. If competition regulators are unable to distinguish between discrimination that harms competition and discrimination designed only to recover fixed costs, policy makers in Russia and elsewhere will face a choice between large government subsidies and large welfare losses. In these circumstances, other restructuring models should be considered.     

Payments or Persuasion: Common Pool Resource Management with Price and Non-price Measures

We use lab experiments to study policies that address common pool resource overuse. We look at a price mechanism, specifically a Pigouvian subsidy, and four non-price interventions. The non-price policies are information alone, information with a normative message, communication alone, and normative messages with communication allowed. In all experiment sessions, no intervention occurs in the first seven and last seven rounds, allowing us to examine the effects of introducing and taking away a policy. The subsidy leads to near-efficient extraction, but surprisingly leads groups that were not over-extracting to also reduce extraction. This over-compliance decreases efficiency, although on net the subsidy is the most efficiency-enhancing intervention. Information provision, communication, normative appeals, and normative appeals combined with communication all reduce over-extraction (though by less than the subsidy) without exacerbating over-compliance; however, the effects of information alone and communication alone are small and not robust. The non-price policies cause a decline in over-extraction of from 0.549 (information) to 11.441 % (normative appeals with communication). These effects are of the same order of magnitude as the effects seen in major field studies of conservation messaging. The subsidy has the worst persistence properties (after the intervention ceases), while normative messages with communication have the best.     

Advertising and pricing policies in the equine breeding industry or sex and the single stallion

A unique aspect of the equine breeding industry is the way in which the current year's demand for stud services depends on the previous year's production levels. In a monopolistically competitive market, product differentiation and product promotion and advertisement are important aspects of industry conduct. A stallion's reputation and therefore demand for his services depend on the stallion owner's ability to differentiate the product.

The price a stallion owner charges depends on the quality of the stud himself, and also on the quality of his offspring. The producer's output (foals) become advertisements for the stallion when they are raced, shown, etc. They also can become substitutes for the stallion, since they are an alternative source of the stallion's genes. Stallion owners are in the special position that they need to prove their stallion's ability to sire quality offspring, while bearing in mind they are producing possible substitutes. Outstanding offspring will generate demand for the parent's services if they are successfully shown, raced, etc. Conversely, progeny who compete unsuccessfully will decrease demand by contributing to a poor reputation for themselves, their breeder and their sire. But, outstanding individuals eventually become breeding stock and therefore offer an alternative source for the ‘winning genes’.

This intergenerational dependence has led to pricing policies and practices in the equine breeding industry which have important implications. Common practices include: incentives to compete, rebates for gelding male offspring, price discrimination in favour or quality mares and limited bookings. These policies illustrate aspects of industry conduct commonly discussed in industrial organization literature such as first-degree price discrimination, non-linear pricing and non-price competition. The use of artificial insemination and other new breeding technologies and thus the potential for a stallion to breed larger numbers of mares, further compounds the extent and results of such practices.

This paper investigates pricing policies in the equine breeding industry, using a case study approach. A model of indsutry pricing policies is developed and tested using data for American Quarter Horses.     

规制权力配置、下游垄断与中国电力产业的接入歧视-理论分析与初步的实证检验

本文构建了一个"上游竞争、下游垄断"结构下接入歧视的简化模型,分析了部分纵向一体化的买方垄断者对独立发电企业实施接入价格和数量歧视的动机和条件。在揭示歧视行为与规制重建滞后之间的特征性事实的基础上,我们利用500多家发电企业和区域电网的相关数据,从统计描述和回归分析两个方面对理论假设进行了初步的检验,结果证明了两类接入歧视,特别是价格歧视的存在。     

Price behaviour in European countries: testing the law of one price in the short– and long–run at various levels of aggregation

The objectives of this paper are to test the relaltive version of the law of one price in the short and the long run at various levels of aggregation for traded goods. The use of an error-correction model is made to test the validity of the hypothesis in the short run with a built-in tendency to one price in the long run. Using unit value trade data at the aggregate, 2-digit and 3-digit levels of the Standard International Trade Classification, the law of one price is generally rejected in the short run, although a long-run proportional relatlionship between prices of fairy homogeneous products are used the hypothesis is rejected both in the short and long run. This suggests that non-price changes which are likely to be incorporated in unit values are probably gradual and affect EEC countries in a similar manner. Price changes, however, are somewhat erratic and hence with unitvalue data, the law of one price in the long run is not contradicted, while it is refuted at the disaggregate level when price data are used.     

The true story of wine and cloth, or: building blocks of an evolutionary political economy of international trade

Standard trade theory is a theory about the structure of international production which emerges from an international arbitrage equilibrium. It is not a theory about the activity of trading which is simply taken for granted or which is treated implicitly in the concept of exogenous trade costs. This paper proposes an alternative evolutionary framework based on networks as structures of non-price interactions into which price/quantity-interactions are embedded. These networks manifest different levels with specific problems of coordination and communication, i.e. levels of market transactions, of transaction-enabling transactions, of markets for market access rights, and of the respective transaction-enabling transactions. Furthermore, the theory is based on the analysis of capabilities to trade, resting upon competitive advantage, which cannot be imitated. The exploitation of competitive advantage presupposes the capability to control network interactions, identified as social capital. Finally, the security of market access reflects power balances among countries.

Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions

Constrained efficient provision of an excludable public good is studied in a model where preferences are private information. The provision level is asymptotically deterministic, making it possible to approximate the optimal mechanism with a mechanism that provides a fixed quantity of the good and charges fixed user fees for access. In general, the fixed fees involve third degree price discrimination, but, if names are uninformative about preferences, the analysis provides a justification for average cost pricing.     

寡占市场下的广告成因探究

依照微观经济学和产业组织理论,高度集中产业市场中的寡头厂商往往会在价格变量上形成暗中或默契的价格串谋,使产业市场处在一种“准完全垄断”的状态。广告是企业主要的非价格竞争变量之一,重复博弈的结果使得寡头厂商能够走出囚徒困境(放弃产品的广告宣传),而垄断利润的存在导致第三方潜在进入的威胁,在位寡头厂商必然会联合起来进行抵制,通过广告串谋提高市场进入壁垒。