Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

Non‐Governmental Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies as a Two‐Stage Game of Voluntary Public Good Provision

In small groups, norm enforcement is achieved through mutual punishment and reward. In large societies, norms are enforced by specialists such as government officials. However, not every public cause is overseen by states, for instance those organized at the international level. This paper shows how nongovernmental norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. As a first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to a nongovernmental agency that produces an incentive system. The second stage is the provision of a public good on the basis of private contributions. The incentive system increases contributions by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. It is shown that, even in large populations, nongovernmental norm enforcement can be supported in a noncooperative equilibrium of utility‐maximizing individuals. This result is in sharp contrast to those obtained in the standard situation of voluntary provision of an intrinsic public good which—without altruism or related motives—is eroded by free‐riding. Reliance on altruistic behavior is not required in supplying the second‐order public good “norm enforcement” in large societies.     

Social network and private provision of public goods

Using a simple model with interdependent utilities, we study how social networks influence individual voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good. Departing from the standard model of public good provision, we assume that an agent’s utility has two terms: (a) ‘ego’-utility derived from the agent’s consumption of public and private goods, and (b) a social utility which is the sum of utility spillovers from other agents with whom the agent has social relationships. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium and describe the equilibrium in terms of network characteristics. We show that social network always has a positive effect on the provision of the public good. We also find that, in networks with “small world”-like modular structures, ‘bridging’ ties connecting distant parts of social network play an important role inducing an agent’s contribution to public good. Assumptions and results of the model are discussed in relation to the role of social capital in community-level development projects and to the effect of innovation networks on firms’ R&D investments.     

The scope of satisfactory mechanisms for the provision of public goods

This paper establishes the existence of satisfactory public-good provision mechanisms when utilities are nonseparable. The assumptions used to obtain this result are: (1) that the public good is continuously variable; (2) that utility functions are parametrically representable and twice continuously differentiable; and (3) that the provision rule is a strictly increasing function of the reported marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the private good. The satisfactory mechanisms derived are all augmented Groves mechanisms and are equivalent to Groves mechanisms if, and only if, each consumer's utility function is additive in income.     

Finitely Repeated Voluntary Provision of a Public Good

This paper theoretically explores the voluntary provision of a public good when either one of the following holds: (i) agents’ utility is the sum of their monetary earnings and a nonmaterial component, or (ii) agents’ exhibit satisficing behavior. We show that a small degree of either nonmaterial payoffs or satisficing behavior can generate large contributions in a finitely repeated game, even if the incentive to free‐ride on others’ contributions calls for negligible public good provision in the static game. The equilibrium is characterized by a sharp decline in contributions toward the end of the game. Several comparative results regarding group size and technology are consistent with laboratory data obtained in experimental studies. The model also predicts the restart effect observed in previous experiments.     

农村社区公共物品的农户自愿供给——基于声誉理论的分析

农户的声誉不仅能给农户带来直接效用,它还具备信息效应与资本效应,对农户参与农村社区公共物品供给博弈的均衡路径产生重要影响。在独立博弈下,声誉的直接效用能使农户采取合作行动;在关联博弈和重复博弈中,声誉的信息及资本效应对农户的偷懒行为有很强的约束,将导致博弈进入合作均衡。因此基于声誉损益的考虑,由农户自愿供给农村社区内的公共物品会是一个有效的结果。     

Contribution to a public good under subjective uncertainty

This paper examines how voluntary contributions to a public good are affected by the contributors' heterogeneity in beliefs about the uncertain impact of their contributions. It assumes that contributors have Savagian preferences that are represented by a two‐state‐dependent expected utility function and different beliefs about the benefit that will result from the sum of their contributions. We establish general comparative statics results regarding the effect of specific changes in the distribution of beliefs on the (unique) Nash equilibrium provision of the public good, under certain conditions imposed on the preferences. We specifically show that the equilibrium public good provision is increasing with respect to both first‐ and second‐order stochastic dominance changes in the distribution of beliefs. Hence, increasing the contributors' optimism about the uncertain benefit of their contributions increases aggregate public good provision, as does any homogenization of these beliefs around their mean.     

When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action

This paper studies collective-action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork. A leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team successfully provides, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterization of long-run play reveals the determinants of success; these include the correlation between players' costs of provision and their valuations for the good. The addition of an extra "bad apple" player can "spoil the barrel" by destabilizing successful teams and so offers a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors.     

COMMUNITY HOMOGENEITY AND REVEALED PREFERENCES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS

This paper examines the links between community homogeneity and the demand for environmental quality. Using data from California, this paper shows that communities that are more homogeneous in terms of race and educational attainment are more likely to support the public provision of environmental goods, after controlling for political ideology, voter turnout, and the distribution of benefits and costs across communities. The models also reveal nonmonotonic relationships between racial and social groups and support for the public provision of environmental amenities. Support for environmental initiatives in a community typically increases at an increasing rate the greater the concentration of Whites. On the other hand, support generally increases at a decreasing rate the greater the share of African Americans and Asians in the population. Results for a proposal that would have imposed a tax on oil extraction to fund alternative energy projects suggest a different pattern of nonlinear associations. (JEL D72, H42, Q51, Q58)     

Auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector

This paper investigates the impact of a ministry's budget size on the choice between auditing a (Niskanen)bureau and employing competitive bidding in the provision of a publicly funded good. The ministry's marginal expected payoff increases fastest with budget size for auctioning as opposed to auditing. However, the ministry is shown to switch from a purely public provision to a competitive provision as the budget size increases even if expected fixed costs favor the audit. The study contributes to the literature by extending the Niskanen framework and by endogenizing the institutional arrangements for the provision of public sector goods.     

Costly Tax Enforcement and Financial Repression

Using an overlapping generations production‐economy model characterized by financial repression, purposeful government expenditures and cost of tax collection, we analyse whether financial repression can be explained by the cost of raising taxes. We show that with public expenditures affecting utility of the agents, modest costs of tax collection tend to result in financial repression being pursued as an optimal policy by the consolidated government. However, when public expenditures are purposeless, the above result only holds for relatively higher costs of tax collection. But, more importantly, costs of tax collection cannot produce a monotonic increase in the reserve requirements. What are critical, in this regard, are the weights the consumer assigns to the public good in the utility function and the size of the government.     

Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences

Tax-favored contributions for financing some public goods may be a useful part of optimal nonlinear income tax and expenditure policy. There are two sides to the potential gain from subsidized donations. First, for a given level of public good provision, higher private donations from high earners than low earners eases the incentive compatibility constraint for donors and so can raise social welfare. This follows since considering a lower-paid job includes a perception of a drop in public good provision. Second, private donation reduces consumption, easing the resource constraint. This paper explores optimal policy, using first a model with standard preferences and then a model with a warm glow of giving. In addition to showing the conditions for the level of public goods, the paper considers the pattern of optimal subsidization across earnings levels. Analysis of optimal taxation with warm glow preferences is sensitive to the choice of preferences that are relevant for a social welfare evaluation. After considering optimal rules with formulations of social welfare which do and do not include warm glow utility, the paper considers the choice of normative criterion. Like the earlier literature, this paper assumes that organizing private donations is costless while tax collection has a deadweight burden. Since private charitable fundraising is very far from costless, the paper is an exploration of economic mechanisms, not a direct guide to policy.     

Religious identity and the provision of public goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States

This paper describes a simple model of how a ruler’s religious identity affects public goods provision. Our primary insight is that rulers reduce public goods expenditures to a greater degree when there are privately-provided substitutes excludable by religion.The basic idea is that if the good is provided privately to the ruler’s co-religionists, the ruler faces weaker incentives to provide this public good because his co-religionists receive lower marginal utility from its provision. Testing such a conjecture is an empirical challenge, however, since the religious identity of rulers rarely varies over time and place. We address this problem by exploiting variation in the religion of rulers in the Indian Princely States. Using data from the 1911 and 1931 Indian censuses, we find that Muslim-ruled states had lower Hindu literacy but had no significant impact on Muslim literacy. This result is consistent with our model, as Muslim religious schools provided a substitute for public schools that served both Hindus and Muslims. The model is further substantiated by the fact that the religion of the ruler had no statistically significant impact on railroad ownership or post office provision, neither of which had privately-provided substitutes.     

The tax implications of cost shifting in cost-benefit analysis in mental health

This paper examines the tax implications of systems of care for psychiatric patients that rely more on the provision of services in the community rather than in state hospitals. State governments pay the costs of patient care in state hospitals, but share costs with the federal government (via Medicaid) for community based care. Taxes create distortions as gauged by the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). Since state and federal governments use different tax mixes, one needs a MCF for each form of government to evaluate system changes. Separate estimates of the MCF for each state in the USA are derived. Only for Alaska is cost shifting welfare improving.     

Observable preferences for public goods

This paper discusses the circumstances under which it is possible to use the market or aggregate demand functions generated from individual utility maximization to obtain consumers' preferences for certain classes of public goods, and thus obtain the information needed to satisfy the Samuelsonian efficiency conditions for these public goods. The restrictions on the preferences of all consumers which are sufficient to use the aggregate demand function are: (i) there exists a price vector such that the level of public good provisiion is valueless, and (ii) the marginal rate of substitution of the private good price for the level of public good provision is independent of income.     

Private Information in the BBV Model of Public Goods

To analyze the private provision of a public good in the presence of private information, we explore the connections between two frameworks: the binary public good model with threshold uncertainty and the standard continuous model à la Bergstrom et al. Linearity of best responses in others' contributions is key to matching the two frameworks. We identify all utility functions that display this linearity, and we provide conditions ensuring that the minimal properties that Bergstrom et al. require for utilities are satisfied. Using techniques developed in the threshold uncertainty framework, we show existence and uniqueness of the Bayes‐Nash equilibrium—thus generalizing existing results—and we analyze its comparative statics properties. In particular, under the reasonable assumption that agents' income is stochastic and private information, we complement the full‐information crowding‐out and redistribution results of Bergstrom et al. If the government taxes agents' income proportionally and redistributes (expected) revenues lump sum, equilibrium public good provision can increase or decrease, even if the set of contributors is unchanged. Similarly, we show that crowding‐out can be one‐for‐one, less than one‐for‐one, or more than one‐for‐one. Finally, we extend our results to a multidimensional framework in which agents' unit costs of contributions are also private information.     

Heterogeneous Preferences for Community Recycling Programs

This paper examines household preferences for community recycling programs, which have both public and private good dimensions. The data come from a survey conducted in Seattle (WA) which elicited stated preference-contingent ratings for different recycling programs relative to status quo, with experimental variation in the overall community recycling rate achieved and expected household cost. The recycling rate is interpreted as capturing the public benefits of recycling programs and constitutes the most common measure used by policy agencies for setting waste management objectives and evaluating policy initiatives. The analysis begins with fixed parameter models that explore different ways of handling rating data and mixed logit estimations that capture household preference heterogeneity both within and across different recycling programs. This analysis yields unique estimates of willingness to pay for an increase in the community recycling rate. Predicted individual-specific utility parameters are then regressed on household background information to explicitly examine the nature of preference heterogeneity. Overall, this paper generates interpretable policy-relevant insights into the public and private good dimensions of community recycling programs.     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

The Reform of Local Public Utilities in Italy

The Italian system of local public utilities has recently undergone an important reform process. The first round of reforms, introduced in the 1990s, represented a remarkable change in the social welfare function with regard to the management of local public utilities. The legislation was specifically designed to cut costs and reduce deficits. A second round of reforms, required by European directives, started around the mid-1990s. Several laws were passed introducing important innovations and regulating specific sectors: public transport; electricity; and gas. Article 35 of the 2002 Financial Law was the final step in a comprehensive reform of the whole local public utility sector. The main innovations of the Financial Law concerns liberalization. Article 35 states that the general rule for awarding service provision contracts is competitive tendering; the rationale is obviously that of competition for the market. The general rule as expressed by Article 35 is nevertheless limited during the transition period. In the long run, competitive tendering will become the normal way of awarding contracts for local public utility provision. Even if there are doubts that full competition will be introduced into the sector, liberalization does appear to be having an effect, forcing many local public utilities to become more efficient. The changes introduced have brought about a better and a more efficient system with a greater number of large size enterprises and on the average a more active management.
In the future, the liberalization process may come to a standstill due to an insufficient number of competitors. Strong public administrations are therefore needed to prevent opportunistic behaviour by private firms.